Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[popeye1945]

1 The moral realists and objectivists I've come across agree that 'morality is not a physical object'. And, by implication, they also agree that moral rightness and wrongness are not physical properties.quote

1-We all agree then.

2 The strange metaphysical question as to the existence of non-physical objects and properties (and relations) remains a defeater - in my opinion - to moral realism and objectivism.

2-I simply state that thoughts are not physical, meaning is not physical but that thoughts and meanings made manifest in the physical world are physical.

3 To me, the expression 'morality is meaning' is mystical. In other words, it isn't trying to say anything open to rational explanation or criticism. It's a bit like 'God is love'.

3-I don't believe there is anything mystical about it. If you feel a rock compare it to other like things and find it hard, you conclude rocks are, and rocks are hard, you've given the thing/object its meaning, the meaning is relative to your bodily experience.

4 And the expression 'meaning is the property of conscious subjects' is similarly metaphysically sonorous and empty. But ... I'm impatient.
[/quote]

4-Well, when you look about, at objects, where do you suspect they gain there meaning, even the bible has Adam naming things. In the absence of consciousness, there is no object, in the absence of object, there is no consciousness. Subject and object stand or fall together.

[Peter Holmes]

1 The moral realists and objectivists I've come across agree that 'morality is not a physical object'. And, by implication, they also agree that moral rightness and wrongness are not physical properties.quote

1-We all agree then.

2 The strange metaphysical question as to the existence of non-physical objects and properties (and relations) remains a defeater - in my opinion - to moral realism and objectivism.

2-I simply state that thoughts are not physical, meaning is not physical but that thoughts and meanings made manifest in the physical world are physical.

And I simply state that, pending evidence for their existence, so-called non-physical things are misleading fictions - derived from the metaphysical, nomenclaturist delusion that abstract nouns are the names of things of some kind, which must, therefore, exist somewhere, somehow.

My standing question is: what and where are so-called abstract things, and in what way do they exist? Answer comes there none. We've just assumed they exist for at least two and a half millennia. Time to wake up.

3 To me, the expression 'morality is meaning' is mystical. In other words, it isn't trying to say anything open to rational explanation or criticism. It's a bit like 'God is love'.

3-I don't believe there is anything mystical about it. If you feel a rock compare it to other like things and find it hard, you conclude rocks are, and rocks are hard, you've given the thing/object its meaning, the meaning is relative to your bodily experience.

Nope. To say a rock is hard is not to 'give it a meaning'. Outside language, reality has no meaning. Features of reality just do or don't exist. Would saying 'this rock exists' give the rock a meaning?

I guess we're agreeing - only I think your understanding of 'meaning' is metaphysical, which is therefore delusional.

4 And the expression 'meaning is the property of conscious subjects' is similarly metaphysically sonorous and empty. But ... I'm impatient.

4-Well, when you look about, at objects, where do you suspect they gain there meaning, even the bible has Adam naming things. In the absence of consciousness, there is no object, in the absence of object, there is no consciousness. Subject and object stand or fall together.

Objects don't 'gain their meaning'. That claim is incoherent.

[GE Morton]

That is all quite correct. Those latter, however, have not been the goals of moralities historically, either vernacular or formal moralities. A "morality" is a set of principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, the underlying aim of virtually all of them being to enable agents to interact peacefully and productively, which constrain them from inflicting harms or losses on other agents. A set of rules having any aim other than this would not be a "morality."

Even if this description of what has historically counted as a 'morality' were correct - which it isn't - patriarchy and white supremacy are both compatible with the 'underlying aim' you claim a rational morality must have.

No, those are not compatible with the "underlying aim." But perhaps that is my fault; I should have said "enable ALL agents . . ."

And the definition of a 'moral agent' has always been and remains a matter of opinion.

Definitions are not "matters of opinion." The definition of "moral agent" is standard in the literature and not controversial.

Your distinction between vernacular and formal moralities is tendentious, in my opinion, because you are merely promoting your moral views as 'formal' and rational, and all other views as 'vernacular' and less than rational.

Maybe I should clarify that distinction. A "vernacular morality" is a morality actually espoused and perhaps followed by "ordinary people." A formal morality is one systematically constructed via logical argument, such as Aristotle's, Spinoza's, Kant's, Mills', etc.

And, yes, vernacular moralities tend to be non-rational.

You claim that what you call a public morality must have the aim you describe . . .

If it doesn't have that aim then it is not a public morality (as that term has been understood historically).

But there's subjectivity - there are choices and decisions - at every stage in this model. There are no moral facts at all, so moralty can't be objective.

I think we've covered this. Yes, the aim --- to enable all agents in a social setting to maximize their welfare --- is subjective. Someone who does not share that aim would likely propose a very different set of "moral" rules and principles.

And of course there are moral facts. E.g., "If you accept the above aim, then you should not murder" is a moral fact.

[GE Morton]

And I simply state that, pending evidence for their existence, so-called non-physical things are misleading fictions - derived from the metaphysical, nomenclaturist delusion that abstract nouns are the names of things of some kind, which must, therefore, exist somewhere, somehow.

You have a very narrow understanding of what counts as an "existent" or a "thing." There are endless classes of non-physical existents. To quote Quine, "To be is to be the value of a bound variable."

[Peter Holmes]

That is all quite correct. Those latter, however, have not been the goals of moralities historically, either vernacular or formal moralities. A "morality" is a set of principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, the underlying aim of virtually all of them being to enable agents to interact peacefully and productively, which constrain them from inflicting harms or losses on other agents. A set of rules having any aim other than this would not be a "morality."

Even if this description of what has historically counted as a 'morality' were correct - which it isn't - patriarchy and white supremacy are both compatible with the 'underlying aim' you claim a rational morality must have.

No, those are not compatible with the "underlying aim." But perhaps that is my fault; I should have said "enable ALL agents . . ."

And the definition of a 'moral agent' has always been and remains a matter of opinion.

Definitions are not "matters of opinion." The definition of "moral agent" is standard in the literature and not controversial.

Sorry, but definitions - as either explanations of the uses of words, or description of things - are, uncontroversially, matters of opinion - even if the opinions is wide or universal.

Your distinction between vernacular and formal moralities is tendentious, in my opinion, because you are merely promoting your moral views as 'formal' and rational, and all other views as 'vernacular' and less than rational.

Maybe I should clarify that distinction. A "vernacular morality" is a morality actually espoused and perhaps followed by "ordinary people." A formal morality is one systematically constructed via logical argument, such as Aristotle's, Spinoza's, Kant's, Mills', etc.

And, yes, vernacular moralities tend to be non-rational.

Why? Your faith in a morality that is 'formal' and 'constructed via logical argument' is quaint. Perhaps Aristotle's contempt for women and slaves demonstrates the objectivity of such moral systems. After all, rationality is the aim.

You claim that what you call a public morality must have the aim you describe . . .

If it doesn't have that aim then it is not a public morality (as that term has been understood historically).

This is just false. Every single so-called 'public morality' has contained judgements about what should be considered acceptable and unacceptable - and those are matters of opinion. There's nothing factual about them.

But there's subjectivity - there are choices and decisions - at every stage in this model. There are no moral facts at all, so moralty can't be objective.

I think we've covered this. Yes, the aim --- to enable all agents in a social setting to maximize their welfare --- is subjective. Someone who does not share that aim would likely propose a very different set of "moral" rules and principles.

And of course there are moral facts. E.g., "If you accept the above aim, then you should not murder" is a moral fact.

Nope. What we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case, or a description of such a feature of reality. And neither of those is 'moral' in the sense of 'morally right or wrong'. The expression 'moral fact' is incoherent. There are only facts about which there can be moral opinions, which are necessarily subjective.

[popeye1945]

And I simply state that, pending evidence for their existence, so-called non-physical things are misleading fictions - derived from the metaphysical, nomenclaturist delusion that abstract nouns are the names of things of some kind, which must, therefore, exist somewhere, somehow.

You must then think that your own thoughts are non-existent----yes?

My standing question is: what and where are so-called abstract things, and in what way do they exist? Answer comes there none. We've just assumed they exist for at least two and a half millennia. Time to wake up.

I am not dealing with abstracts, but objects/as facts, and what is their meaning, how does the object come to have a meaning, and to what, to who does it have meaning?

3 To me, the expression 'morality is meaning' is mystical. In other words, it isn't trying to say anything open to rational explanation or criticism. It's a bit like 'God is love'. quote

Morality has meaning because its part of all meanings, and as such belongs to a conscious subject, meaning is subjective and is applied to the outside physcial world, biology defines.

I guess we're agreeing - only I think your understanding of 'meaning' is metaphysical, which is therefore delusional.

Well as I've said I do not know where the problem is, but its anything but delusional. I might help if you tell me, how do things acquire their meanings?

4 And the expression 'meaning is the property of conscious subjects' is similarly metaphysically sonorous and empty. But ... I'm impatient.

LOL!! Well thank you for your impatient--lol!!

Objects don't 'gain their meaning'. That claim is incoherent.

I give up!!

[Peter Holmes]

And I simply state that, pending evidence for their existence, so-called non-physical things are misleading fictions - derived from the metaphysical, nomenclaturist delusion that abstract nouns are the names of things of some kind, which must, therefore, exist somewhere, somehow.

You have a very narrow understanding of what counts as an "existent" or a "thing." There are endless classes of non-physical existents. To quote Quine, "To be is to be the value of a bound variable."

'...in a quantification'.

And precisely there is the metaphysical delusion I'm talking about. What have bound variables in quantifications to do with the existence and nature of things? Quine never grasped the profundity of what the later Wittgenstein was doing.

[Terrapin Station]

Morality is not a physical object. It is meaning, thus the property of conscious subjects, and only conscious subjects can manifest it into the world.

Morality is a physical phenomenon. Just like every other phenomenon. Whether it's an "object" would depend on how we're defining that term exactly. However we wind up defining it, it's important to remember that all objects, at least aside from single elementary particles, involve dynamic relations of matter.

[popeye1945]

Morality is a physical phenomenon. Just like every other phenomenon. Whether it's an "object" would depend on how we're defining that term exactly. However we wind up defining it, it's important to remember that all objects, at least aside from single elementary particles, involve dynamic relations of matter.
[/quote]

This insight was available to our ancestors, there are many truths in addition to it, particularly in the case of science. It is however fundamental to be aware that it is biological consciousness thatk creates meaning from sensations and cognitions to bestow meaning upon the physical world which is utterly meaningless in the absence of consciousness. When morality/meaning is made concrete, read made objective in the outside world, it is the meaning bestowed and/or given form.

[Peter Holmes]

You must then think that your own thoughts are non-existent----yes?

Spot the problem with this argument: So-called abstract things don't exist; therefore what we call thoughts don't exist.

I am not dealing with abstracts, but objects/as facts, and what is their meaning, how does the object come to have a meaning, and to what, to who does it have meaning?

Can what we call a dog (an object) 'have a meaning'? I'm pointing out the incoherence in your question.

Morality has meaning because its part of all meanings, and as such belongs to a conscious subject, meaning is subjective and is applied to the outside physcial world, biology defines.

As I've said, I think your use of the word meaning is metaphysical, and therefore confused. In what way do meanings 'belong to a conscious subject'? If this simply means that people use linguistic expressions that have meanings - then of course they do.

Well as I've said I do not know where the problem is, but its anything but delusional. I might help if you tell me, how do things acquire their meanings?

As above: what does it mean to say a thing can 'acquire a meaning'? Can you give an example of a thing acquiring a meaning? Then perhaps I'll understand what you mean.

[GE Morton]

Sorry, but definitions - as either explanations of the uses of words, or description of things - are, uncontroversially, matters of opinion - even if the opinions is wide or universal.

A definition states the accepted, understood meaning of a word in a given speech community, how it is commonly used. It either does or does not correctly state that use. When it does, it is a fact. I.e., "Word X means Y among speakers of L" is either true or false, which can be determined empirically.

Why? Your faith in a morality that is 'formal' and 'constructed via logical argument' is quaint. Perhaps Aristotle's contempt for women and slaves demonstrates the objectivity of such moral systems. After all, rationality is the aim.

Oh, my. My "faith" in logical argument? Doesn't everyone who purports to be a philosopher have "faith" in logical argument? Are you suggesting that because some logical arguments are invalid, reliance on logic and rationality is "quaint" and may be set aside as passe?

This is just false. Every single so-called 'public morality' has contained judgements about what should be considered acceptable and unacceptable - and those are matters of opinion. There's nothing factual about them.

You're no doubt speaking of vernacular moralities. I agree.

What we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case, or a description of such a feature of reality. And neither of those is 'moral' in the sense of 'morally right or wrong'. The expression 'moral fact' is incoherent. There are only facts about which there can be moral opinions, which are necessarily subjective.

Part of the problem here is your narrow conception of what the term "reality" (like "existent" and "thing") denotes.

A "moral" proposition is one which asserts a principle or rule governing interactions between agents in a social setting, the aim of which is preserving and improving the welfare of the agents in that setting, or one which declares a given act to be either commanded by, or consistent or inconsistent with, such a rule or principle. Whether a rule or act is or is not consistent with that aim is empirically determinable. It is a fact, and an aspect of "reality."

[popeye1945]

There are times when old antiques to today's generation have no meaning, it's an object sure enough, and often an object's function for people gives it its meaning for them. Not knowing the function of said antique the younger generation is stumped. When they know what the object was to an older generation they have no problem accepting its given meaning. There is another story that might help and I am rather fond of telling it. An old Buddhist monk is standing in front of a class of his students, he holds up a flower, then remaining silent for some time. After a time a student at the back of the room indicates he knows the teacher's intent. So, what was his intent, it was for them to realize that the said flower has no meaning in and of itself, it just is. To the rest of the class, it is a flower, and a rose at that. Before meaning is bestowed upon any object, it just is, cognitively in the total absence of biological consciousness it doesn't even exist--cognitively, but cognitively is the only way that we can know anything.

You mentioned a dog, well when one gets a dog, it's a dog sure enough, but you want to be able to call your dog, he's your dog, not just any dog. You need to be able to call him, so you give him a name to indicate a particular. Your name allows people to locate you, there are a lot of Peters, so in addition, you have a second name, the name doesn't really tell much about you and there are probably even a lot of Peter Homles, so even at that it is somewhat inadequate for identifying the particular you.

There is a difference between mind and brain, the brain is a physical object, its function is what we call the mind, our thoughts and emotional life occure here. It cannot be said that thoughts do not exist, for we can manifest the thought out into the physical world. The physical world is totally dependent upon biological consciousness, to be known at all. We have only one way of knowing, that is with the mind, with cognition. It's a lot to digest I know it might take a while to get your head around it. Surprisingly enough, it baffles quite a few people, and yet it is, the way it is.

[GE Morton]

And precisely there is the metaphysical delusion I'm talking about. What have bound variables in quantifications to do with the existence and nature of things? Quine never grasped the profundity of what the later Wittgenstein was doing.

Nothing. However, it has everything to do with what can and do say about them. "Thing" is the universal noun. Everything is a thing (which is a tautology). The term embraces many more categories of existents than physical objects (objects having mass and extended in time and space).

[Terrapin Station]

Morality is a physical phenomenon. Just like every other phenomenon. Whether it's an "object" would depend on how we're defining that term exactly. However we wind up defining it, it's important to remember that all objects, at least aside from single elementary particles, involve dynamic relations of matter.

This insight was available to our ancestors, there are many truths in addition to it, particularly in the case of science. It is however fundamental to be aware that it is biological consciousness thatk creates meaning from sensations and cognitions to bestow meaning upon the physical world which is utterly meaningless in the absence of consciousness. When morality/meaning is made concrete, read made objective in the outside world, it is the meaning bestowed and/or given form.
[/quote]
I'm not of the view that meaning can be made objective--that is, I'm not of the view that meaning can occur anywhere aside from individual minds (individual's brains functioning in mental ways).

[popeye1945]

Terrapin,
Yes, I fully agree, but, what you have quoted as what I have said, does not belong to me. All meaning is subjective, it is subjectively applied to the objects of the physical world. Meaning is never the actual property of the object, but always the subject. Meaning is the effect of stimulus and cognitive judgement of biological consciousness identified as the object.