Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Sy Borg]

It could be made objective if we discovered what the meaning of life was. Since there is no such meaning, the former can never be made objective.

Somewhat circular but meaningful nevertheless. :mrgreen:

Ha! I think that the great aim of pretty well all living things is to avoid suffering. Maybe in the far future, some life will transcend its biological roots and, perhaps, even suffering per se?

As for meaning in the meantime, we'd be links in a chain towards a more peaceful future (seemingly after we have wiped out most biology, including most humans).

[Tegularius]

Maybe in the far future, some life will transcend its biological roots and, perhaps, even suffering per se?

As long as there's risk in the world and the subterfuge of unfavorable events which often happen randomly, suffering, or some form of it, is unavoidable, which no morality can neutralize, make objective or acceptable.

As for meaning in the meantime, we'd be links in a chain towards a more peaceful future (seemingly after we have wiped out most biology, including most humans).

Sounds like a Lex Luthor solution to me!

[GE Morton]

The point that I intended to make was that it may will be impossible to commit to (i.e., to consider yourself irrevocably bound by) objectively prescribed rules of morality.

That may well be true for some people. The task for philosophers, however, is develop a moral theory, moral principles and rules, that are rationally defensible, which requires that they can be objectively validated. That some people might be emotionally unable to comply with them is a problem for psychologists.

I draw a analogy (admittedly imperfect) to the sense of beauty in music. If I consider certain music beautiful or ugly, it's extremely unlikely that anyone is going to be able to give me objective criteria that will make me think otherwise.

Nor would you have any reason to do so. There is a crucial difference, however, between aesthetics and ethics --- the former is entirely self-regarding, while the latter is other-regarding. No one else has any legitimate interest in what sorts of music or art give you pleasure; they do have an interest in how you behave. Moralities, as I defined them earlier, are sets of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting. Those rules must override any personal tastes, interests, or preferences one might have. Indeed, that is the very purpose of moral rules --- to constrain acts one might be inclined to take to advance some personal interest when they would adversely effect other moral agents.

But in any such case, I do not doubt that my ultimate decision would depend on (what for want of a better phrase at the moment, I would call) my moral sense of the matter, and not on a chain of reasoning applying various, binding "objective" moral rules. The latter strikes me as little different than Leibniz's "let us calculate!"

Well, that is effectively an abandonment of morality. A society in which everyone follows only his own rules is a society without rules. Question: is that approach universalizable? I.e., are you prepared to accept the results of everyone else's personal "moral sense"? Osama bin Laden's? Donald Trump's?

By couching the example in terms of Highway 61, I was alluding to Dylan's "Highway 61 Revisited" . . .

Heh. Missed the reference.

In that case the "objective" standard is God's will.

"God's will" is not an objective standard. A moral rule is objective if whether or not it furthers the goals of a moral theory is publicly verifiable.

Let's change the approach, and move on to the Gallup poll theory of morality, the idea that the "community consensus" is the objective standard for morals. Jim Crow anyone?

The consensus criterion is simply the ad populum argument, and thus is fallacious.

It just that I'm inclined to think that, in the end, my moral decisions are a matter of attitude. And I also think that that's the way it is for most people.

I agree. Vernacular moralities are mostly emotionally-based. And hence are non-rational and non-viable.

[BobS]

The task for philosophers, however, is develop a moral theory, moral principles and rules, that are rationally defensible, which requires that they can be objectively validated. That some people might be emotionally unable to comply with them is a problem for psychologists.

"Emotionally unable" is a loaded way phrase it. (What's your emotional ability to accept my approach that morality is a matter of attitude?) Another way to put it is that some people might find such an approach “morally unacceptable.” With that as a starting part, we may envision a group of people who consider morality a matter of attitude squaring off against those who believe in Objective Theory A, those who believe in Objective Theory B and those who believe in Objective Theory C. OK, who's "right"? How do we decide? Is there a binding meta-theory out there, Objective Theory D, which decides the issue? Those who are so emotionally stunted that they can’t buy an objective approach in the first place will reject that solution.

I draw a analogy (admittedly imperfect) to the sense of beauty in music. If I consider certain music beautiful or ugly, it's extremely unlikely that anyone is going to be able to give me objective criteria that will make me think otherwise.

Nor would you have any reason to do so. There is a crucial difference, however, between aesthetics and ethics --- the former is entirely self-regarding, while the latter is other-regarding.

No one else has any legitimate interest in what sorts of music or art give you pleasure; they do have an interest in how you behave. Moralities, as I defined them earlier, are sets of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting. Those rules must override any personal tastes, interests, or preferences one might have. Indeed, that is the very purpose of moral rules --- to constrain acts one might be inclined to take to advance some personal interest when they would adversely effect other moral agents.

All of this begs the question, by restating what it is about which we disagree. You see morals as having a “purpose”, and (I infer this from what you say; please correct me if I’m wrong) as an appropriate basis for controlling the behavior of other people as well as yourself. But my viewpoint is different.

I see morality as being an attitude; one that can be informed by objective criteria, but an attitude in the end (making my analogy to the sense of beauty in music, although “admittedly imperfect,” entirely appropriate). Controlling other people is another matter. I reserve that for the law, which can be developed along objective lines, although different interest groups, as is their wont, will strive to have their particular moral positions adopted -- with the result being due to the gave and take of politics, and not due to a calculation governed by a supposedly universal objective moral theory.

To this day, in these here United States, “other-regarding” moralists think that it’s entirely appropriate, a wonderful thing in fact, to impose religion on other people, and to throw the latter into prison for engaging in the “wrong” kind of sexual behavior. Until 1961 laws which barred atheists from public employment were deemed perfectly fine (in that year the Supreme Court struck down a Maryland law that barred atheists from serving even as notaries public, a result no doubt still remembered with great bitterness by extremely moral people). Until 2003 people could be imprisoned for engaging in oral sex; it took a 6-3 Supreme Court decision to do away with that one (yeah, three supremes thought that statutes enforcing that sort of “moral condemnation” were just dandy). We are still in the Dark Ages. Here we are, with people at the top of the legal food chain (as well as born-agains, who support Trump especially for this reason) thinking that people should be punished for their terrible morals.

But in any such case, I do not doubt that my ultimate decision would depend on (what for want of a better phrase at the moment, I would call) my moral sense of the matter, and not on a chain of reasoning applying various, binding "objective" moral rules. The latter strikes me as little different than Leibniz's "let us calculate!"

Well, that is effectively an abandonment of morality.

I like the loaded way you express this one. To my mind, you and I obviously have different views of what morality is. To your mind, I don’t have a view of morality; instead, I’ve simply abandoned morality. Good one!

Do you really believe that arriving at the correct moral decision is a matter of "calculation," as Leibniz would have it?

A society in which everyone follows only his own rules is a society without rules.

Even if society has laws? How are laws not rules?

Question: is that approach universalizable? I.e., are you prepared to accept the results of everyone else's personal "moral sense"? Osama bin Laden's? Donald Trump's?

The answer to the first question is “yes”; everyone's morality ultimately is a matter of attitude. That some people's attitudes would lead them to bind themselves to a particular result solely because of objective considerations is another matter entirely. The answer to the remaining questions is that it’s not a matter of “acceptance.” As far as morality is concerned, my approval or disapproval is (IMHO!) a matter of attitude.

Trump is a moral cipher; he doesn’t think about morality. Many born-agains, with medieval moral views, support him. Osama bin Laden had his own moral viewpoint. I “accept” that such is the world. Now, whether Trump should be sent to Mars ASAP: that’s a matter of what the law provides or doesn't provide. That it would be nice for his supporters to be sucked up into the Rapture, never to bother us again, and that it was a happy thing that Osama was taken out, are attitudes that some have.

"God's will" is not an objective standard. A moral rule is objective if whether or not it furthers the goals of a moral theory is publicly verifiable.

"God's will" is not an objective standard in the formal sense (i.e., the way that philosophers like to categorize things), but it is for the purpose of the distinction that I’ve been drawing all along: morality as a matter of attitude versus morality as something that comes from the outside.

The consensus criterion is simply the ad populum argument, and thus is fallacious.

Correct me if I’m wrong: the ad populum argument is that a proposition must be true if most people believe it. I don’t know why it’s not obvious that that’s not how I was using the consensus criterion.

Imagine people who, for some strange reason, can’t agree on the “correct” objective theory of morality. (A real head-scratcher that they can't agree, huh? What could possibly be holding them up?) Suppose someone proposes: “Well, we need an objective theory here. How about we all agree to abide by the consensus in the community?” And the others cry in unison: “Sure, why not?” That would constitute the adoption of an "objective" standard.

Unless you can propose a meta-objective theory of morals (“Objective Theory D”, waaaay back at the beginning of this post) that will compel us to recognize the bestest, perfectest objective moral approach of all, the consensus approach might be considered by some to be as good as any.

It’s just that I'm inclined to think that, in the end, my moral decisions are a matter of attitude, informed as they may be by objective consideration. And I also think that that's the way it is for most people.

I agree. Vernacular moralities are mostly emotionally-based. And hence are non-rational and non-viable.

If you wish to consider the idea of morality as a matter of attitude to be “emotionally-based”, and thus be contented that you are condemning it, be my guest.

As for “non-viable”? Meaning what, that it’s not objective? Well, isn’t that what we’ve been talking about?

[Peter Holmes]

Definitions. What we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts. What we call a fact is a (publicly confirmable) feature of reality that is or was the case. So moral objectivism is the claim that there are moral facts. And so my OP is really asking: Are there moral facts?

Here's why I think there are no moral facts, so that morality can't be objective.

The choice of a moral goal, and the claim that only one moral goal is rational, are obviously subjective. They are matters of opinion. The only publicly confirmable (objective) thing about them is that people can and may choose the goal, and perhaps make the claim.

If moral objectivity amounts to nothing more than publicly confirmable consistency with a goal, then, in moral assertions, the words should, ought to, right and wrong are instrumental, and have no special moral meaning. So if an action is morally wrong, then it's wrong in the same way that, if we want to drive safely, it's wrong to jump the lights.

But given this, if our goal is patriarchy, then we should subjugate women. And if our goal is white supremacy, then it's right to oppress non-white people. If that's all that moral objectivity means, then these are publicly confirmable moral facts.

Objectivists who reject these grotesque conclusions have to explain with which goal the claim 'we ought/ought not to have this goal' is consistent. And similarly, with which goal is the claim 'our actions should be consistent with our goals' consistent?

My argument is that the very expression moral fact is incoherent; that there are no moral facts, but only facts about which there can be moral opinions, which are by definition subjective, how ever many people may share them.

(Note. I'm also adding this to my other OP: 'Is morality objective or subjective?', for anyone following only one of the discussions.)

[popeye1945]

The physical world is in and of itself utterly meaningless, utterly devoid of morality in the absence of a conscious subject. All meanings, all values and judgements are the property of conscious subjects. Objective morality is first a meaning, which is subjective, with the creative process/s it is made concrete in the outer physical world as constructs, systems and codes of behaviour. Remember that the physcial world is utterly meaningless thus subjectiveness is the creator of the objective creations of humanity. Subjective meaning made manifest in the outside world, are biological extensions of humanity.

[Peter Holmes]

The physical world is in and of itself utterly meaningless, utterly devoid of morality in the absence of a conscious subject. All meanings, all values and judgements are the property of conscious subjects. Objective morality is first a meaning, which is subjective, with the creative process/s it is made concrete in the outer physical world as constructs, systems and codes of behaviour. Remember that the physcial world is utterly meaningless thus subjectiveness is the creator of the objective creations of humanity. Subjective meaning made manifest in the outside world, are biological extensions of humanity.

Saying that what we call reality is meaningless makes sense only if it would make sense to say that what we call reality is meaningful - that what we call meaning is a property that reality could have but happens not to. And that's non-sense.

The idea that an abstract noun, such as meaning, is the name of a thing or property of some kind is an ancient metaphysical delusion. So the claim that meaning is a property of subjects is simply incoherent. It's nothing but mysticism, off with the fairies down the rabbit hole.

[popeye1945]

You need to think about what you read, and not be so invested in rashly disagreeing.

[Peter Holmes]

You need to think about what you read, and not be so invested in rashly disagreeing.

Just pointing out claims that are false ornot shown to be true, or arguments that are unsound or not shown to be sound.

You need to disinvest in your obviously cherished metaphysical blather.

[popeye1945]

Good night Stanlley!

[GE Morton]

The task for philosophers, however, is develop a moral theory, moral principles and rules, that are rationally defensible, which requires that they can be objectively validated. That some people might be emotionally unable to comply with them is a problem for psychologists.

"Emotionally unable" is a loaded way phrase it. (What's your emotional ability to accept my approach that morality is a matter of attitude?) Another way to put it is that some people might find such an approach “morally unacceptable.” With that as a starting part, we may envision a group of people who consider morality a matter of attitude squaring off against those who believe in Objective Theory A, those who believe in Objective Theory B and those who believe in Objective Theory C. OK, who's "right"? How do we decide? Is there a binding meta-theory out there, Objective Theory D, which decides the issue? Those who are so emotionally stunted that they can’t buy an objective approach in the first place will reject that solution.

Sorry for the long delay.

You seem to have missed the point. I agree that "vernacular moralities" --- moralities professed and inconsistently observed by most people --- are culturally conditioned and emotionally based. But, as I said above, the task for philosophers is to develop a moral theory that is rationally defensible --- philosophy being " . . . the rational, abstract, and methodical consideration of reality as a whole or of fundamental dimensions of human existence and experience."

https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy

A philosophically respectable moral theory, like any other philosophical theory, is one constructed of cognitive propositions (propositions having determinable truth values) and whose postulates are either self-evident or logically or empirically verifiable and whose theorems follow logically from them.

[GE Morton]

Definitions. What we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts. What we call a fact is a (publicly confirmable) feature of reality that is or was the case. So moral objectivism is the claim that there are moral facts. And so my OP is really asking: Are there moral facts?

Here's why I think there are no moral facts, so that morality can't be objective.

The choice of a moral goal, and the claim that only one moral goal is rational, are obviously subjective. They are matters of opinion. The only publicly confirmable (objective) thing about them is that people can and may choose the goal, and perhaps make the claim.

If moral objectivity amounts to nothing more than publicly confirmable consistency with a goal, then, in moral assertions, the words should, ought to, right and wrong are instrumental, and have no special moral meaning. So if an action is morally wrong, then it's wrong in the same way that, if we want to drive safely, it's wrong to jump the lights.

But given this, if our goal is patriarchy, then we should subjugate women. And if our goal is white supremacy, then it's right to oppress non-white people. If that's all that moral objectivity means, then these are publicly confirmable moral facts.

That is all quite correct. Those latter, however, have not been the goals of moralities historically, either vernacular or formal moralities. A "morality" is a set of principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, the underlying aim of virtually all of them being to enable agents to interact peacefully and productively, which constrain them from inflicting harms or losses on other agents. A set of rules having any aim other than this would not be a "morality."

At least, not a "public morality." There are also "private moralities" --- sets of rules governing personal behavior which can have other aims, such as "pleasing God," honoring one's ancestors, pursuing some personal ideals, or having some other idiosyncratic goal. I have no interest in these private moralities, as long as they do not conflict with the rules of a rational public morality.

[Peter Holmes]

Definitions. What we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts. What we call a fact is a (publicly confirmable) feature of reality that is or was the case. So moral objectivism is the claim that there are moral facts. And so my OP is really asking: Are there moral facts?

Here's why I think there are no moral facts, so that morality can't be objective.

The choice of a moral goal, and the claim that only one moral goal is rational, are obviously subjective. They are matters of opinion. The only publicly confirmable (objective) thing about them is that people can and may choose the goal, and perhaps make the claim.

If moral objectivity amounts to nothing more than publicly confirmable consistency with a goal, then, in moral assertions, the words should, ought to, right and wrong are instrumental, and have no special moral meaning. So if an action is morally wrong, then it's wrong in the same way that, if we want to drive safely, it's wrong to jump the lights.

But given this, if our goal is patriarchy, then we should subjugate women. And if our goal is white supremacy, then it's right to oppress non-white people. If that's all that moral objectivity means, then these are publicly confirmable moral facts.

That is all quite correct. Those latter, however, have not been the goals of moralities historically, either vernacular or formal moralities. A "morality" is a set of principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, the underlying aim of virtually all of them being to enable agents to interact peacefully and productively, which constrain them from inflicting harms or losses on other agents. A set of rules having any aim other than this would not be a "morality."

Even if this description of what has historically counted as a 'morality' were correct - which it isn't - patriarchy and white supremacy are both compatible with the 'underlying aim' you claim a rational morality must have. And the definition of a 'moral agent' has always been and remains a matter of opinion.

Your distinction between vernacular and formal moralities is tendentious, in my opinion, because you are merely promoting your moral views as 'formal' and rational, and all other views as 'vernacular' and less than rational.

At least, not a "public morality." There are also "private moralities" --- sets of rules governing personal behavior which can have other aims, such as "pleasing God," honoring one's ancestors, pursuing some personal ideals, or having some other idiosyncratic goal. I have no interest in these private moralities, as long as they do not conflict with the rules of a rational public morality.

You claim that what you call a public morality must have the aim you describe, and that publicly confirmable consistency of actions with those aims can constitute what can be called moral objectivity. But there's subjectivity - there are choices and decisions - at every stage in this model. There are no moral facts at all, so moralty can't be objective.

[popeye1945]

Morality is not a physical object. It is meaning, thus the property of conscious subjects, and only conscious subjects can manifest it into the world.

[Peter Holmes]

Morality is not a physical object. It is meaning, thus the property of conscious subjects, and only conscious subjects can manifest it into the world.

Just some thoughts on your way of putting this.

1 The moral realists and objectivists I've come across agree that 'morality is not a physical object'. And, by implication, they also agree that moral rightness and wrongness are not physical properties.

2 The strange metaphysical question as to the existence of non-physical objects and properties (and relations) remains a defeater - in my opinion - to moral realism and objectivism.

3 To me, the expression 'morality is meaning' is mystical. In other words, it isn't trying to say anything open to rational explanation or criticism. It's a bit like 'God is love'.

4 And the expression 'meaning is the property of conscious subjects' is similarly metaphysically sonorous and empty. But ... I'm impatient.