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[GE Morton]

But this is a definition of the word 'fact', not the word 'proposition'.

Er, no. It was a definition of the word "objective."

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/objective

So you are stubbornly insisting that 'of' or 'relating to' an object...refers to a proposition, when that is not mentioned at all in this definition. You're making an unjustified but telling assumption.

Yes. A proposition is something that is "of, relates to," an "object of phenomenon (etc.) . . ."

No this very much on topic. Like all so-called abstract things, propositions are misleading metaphysical fictions.

Egads. That term is no more misleading or "metaphysical" than the word "sentence," or "statement." It is simply (as I said) a verbal construct which asserts a state of affairs. Where did you come up with this mystical interpretation?

And the JTB truth-condition is a clear example of what I'm saying about their mystical nature: S knows that p iff p is true. (It's not, as you said some time ago, S knows that p is true iff p is true.)

I've never said that. What I said was, "The proposition 'P' is true IFF P." E.g., the proposition "Snow is white" is true IFF snow is white. That is the "semantic theory of truth." It is not a theory of knowledge.

The JTB (justified true belief) theory of knowledge, BTW, requires more than that P be true. It also requires that the knower believes that P is true, and that his belief is justified. There are, however, problems with that theory, as pointed out by Gettier several decades ago.

https://fitelson.org/proseminar/gettier.pdf

(Others, of course, have argued that Gettier's analysis is flawed).

What S can know is that a feature of reality (a state-of-affairs) is the case, and that is not 'knowing that p'.

That is true. There is "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description" (Russell). I can know that it is now snowing outside by looking out the window; no propositions are involved. That is "knowledge by acquaintance." But I can also know that Paris is the capital of France, though I've never been to France. That is "knowledge by description," and does involve propositions. The overwhelming portion of everyone's knowledge is knowledge by description.

Neither a feature of reality, nor our knowing that it's the case, has anything to do with the truth of an assertion that it indeed is the case.

Oh, quite wrong. While features of "reality" don't depend upon propositions, our knowledge of them usually does --- it depends upon our having reason to believe the propositions asserting them are true (because most of our knowledge is knowledge by description).

'In linguistics and philosophy, a proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence, where "meaning" is understood to be a non-linguistic entity which is shared by all sentences with the same meaning.[1] Equivalently, a proposition is the non-linguistic bearer of truth or falsity which makes any sentence that expresses it either true or false.'

That a fiction - the non-linguistic entity that is the meaning of a sentence - has been around for a long time - like Platonic forms - is no reason to treat it with any respect. To the bonfire with it,

Heh. Yes, I've heard that analysis, or similar ones. I agree they are contrived, even "metaphysical," and superfluous. They aim to explain in what sense "Snow is white" and "Der schnee ist weiss" express the same proposition. But we can say they do if they both assert the same state of affairs. No "non-linguistic entities" are required. Those two propositions, while not identical, are equivalent.

That you thoughtlessly assume Webster's definition of 'fact' is talking about propositions is startling evidence of this delusion . . .

Again, the definition was of "objective."

Good. I think we may be near the end. So, to summarise, I think we agree on the following.

1 A fact is, primarily, a state-fo-affairs that is or was the case. And what we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts. And here I want to point out that none of this, so far, is about propositions - more accurately, factual assertions.

2 A fact is a state-of-affairs that can be asserted by a factual assertion - a linguistic expression - which is true if the state-of-affairs is the case. And as a matter of usage, we can call such a true factual assertion a fact. But here I want to point out the potential confusion in this completely different use of the word 'fact'. It's critical that we clarify which way we're using the word 'fact': a state-of-affairs or a description of a state-of-affairs.

Not "completely different." There is obviously a relationship between them. But so far, so good.

3 To apply the adjectives 'objective' and subjective' to facts-as-states-of-affairs is incoherent.

Not incoherent, just . . . infelicitous. Because "fact" can refer either to a state of affairs or to a proposition asserting it, the objective/subjective distinction can carry over (in common usage) from the latter to the former. That is usually harmless.

4 We disagree as to whether the adjectives 'objective' and 'subjective' can be applied to propositions. But, anyway, you maintain that the distinction refers to the public confirmability of a state-of-affairs.

Do you in fact agree with these assertions? If not, please amend them where necessary.

Yes. But I'm surprised you disagree that "objective" and "subjective" can be applied to propositions, given that is precisely to what they are most often applied.

Alfie: "Mozart was a better composer than Beethoven."

Bruno: "That is a subjective statement."

Alfie: "Quitting smoking reduces the risk of lung cancer."

Bruno: "That is objectively true."

[Sculptor1]

Alfie: "Mozart was a better composer than Beethoven."

Bruno: "That is a subjective statement."

Alfie: "Quitting smoking reduces the risk of lung cancer."

Bruno: "That is objectively true."

So far so good.
You would think that the above is true, and yet I take issue with the second statment, which is not always true.
If you are terminal with cancer, or actually going to die for ANY reason, they quitting will not change anything.
The statement does not specify what is meant by "smoking". Depending on what you are "smoking" changes the meaning of the statement. Smoking a kipper, smoking herbal?
Now one would have thought, as you did that calling this objective would put you on safe ground; it does not.
Now ask yourself how much more difficult would it be to make a moral statement without ambiguity which was also accurate and objective in all instances.

[Peter Holmes]

But this is a definition of the word 'fact', not the word 'proposition'.

Er, no. It was a definition of the word "objective."

Sorry, my mistake.

Like all so-called abstract things, propositions are misleading metaphysical fictions.

Egads. That term is no more misleading or "metaphysical" than the word "sentence," or "statement." It is simply (as I said) a verbal construct which asserts a state of affairs. Where did you come up with this mystical interpretation?

See below. A proposition is supposed to be what is expressed by a verbal construct (a 'token sentence') - but is not the sentence itself. Your description, with which I agree, is non-standard.

And the JTB truth-condition is a clear example of what I'm saying about their mystical nature: S knows that p iff p is true. (It's not, as you said some time ago, S knows that p is true iff p is true.)

I've never said that. What I said was, "The proposition 'P' is true IFF P." E.g., the proposition "Snow is white" is true IFF snow is white. That is the "semantic theory of truth." It is not a theory of knowledge.

Sorry if I misremember what you wrote. If I have the time, I'll check. But here you're stating the correspondence theory of truth, which is obviously tautological. And I'm talking about the JTB theory of knowledge, which relies on the correspondence theory.

The JTB (justified true belief) theory of knowledge, BTW, requires more than that P be true. It also requires that the knower believes that P is true, and that his belief is justified. There are, however, problems with that theory, as pointed out by Gettier several decades ago.

Yes. And the main problem is the assumed necessity of the truth-condition, which Gettier recycled, and which gets things back to front.

https://fitelson.org/proseminar/gettier.pdf

(Others, of course, have argued that Gettier's analysis is flawed).

What S can know is that a feature of reality (a state-of-affairs) is the case, and that is not 'knowing that p'.

That is true. There is "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description" (Russell). I can know that it is now snowing outside by looking out the window; no propositions are involved. That is "knowledge by acquaintance." But I can also know that Paris is the capital of France, though I've never been to France. That is "knowledge by description," and does involve propositions. The overwhelming portion of everyone's knowledge is knowledge by description.

Neither a feature of reality, nor our knowing that it's the case, has anything to do with the truth of an assertion that it indeed is the case.

Oh, quite wrong. While features of "reality" don't depend upon propositions, our knowledge of them usually does --- it depends upon our having reason to believe the propositions asserting them are true (because most of our knowledge is knowledge by description).

I'd like to pursue this another time - and I need to explain what I mean, which, I agree, I haven't done here.

'In linguistics and philosophy, a proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence, where "meaning" is understood to be a non-linguistic entity which is shared by all sentences with the same meaning.[1] Equivalently, a proposition is the non-linguistic bearer of truth or falsity which makes any sentence that expresses it either true or false.'

That a fiction - the non-linguistic entity that is the meaning of a sentence - has been around for a long time - like Platonic forms - is no reason to treat it with any respect. To the bonfire with it,

Heh. Yes, I've heard that analysis, or similar ones. I agree they are contrived, even "metaphysical," and superfluous. They aim to explain in what sense "Snow is white" and "Der schnee ist weiss" express the same proposition. But we can say they do if they both assert the same state of affairs. No "non-linguistic entities" are required. Those two propositions, while not identical, are equivalent.

Actually, it's the two sentences that have the same function. And that's the problem with talk of propositions - the venerable delusion that they exist.

That you thoughtlessly assume Webster's definition of 'fact' is talking about propositions is startling evidence of this delusion . . .

Again, the definition was of "objective."

Again, sorry. Obviously, to define (describe the use of)) the words 'objective' and 'subjective' is to say nothing about propositions. And the applicability of those adjectives is a separate matter. I think it clearer to describe assertions (linguistic expressions) as factual and non-factual, rather than objectivie and subjective. But that goes to the heart of the claim that moral assertions can be factual - so that there can be moral facts.

Good. I think we may be near the end. So, to summarise, I think we agree on the following.

1 A fact is, primarily, a state-fo-affairs that is or was the case. And what we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts. And here I want to point out that none of this, so far, is about propositions - more accurately, factual assertions.

2 A fact is a state-of-affairs that can be asserted by a factual assertion - a linguistic expression - which is true if the state-of-affairs is the case. And as a matter of usage, we can call such a true factual assertion a fact. But here I want to point out the potential confusion in this completely different use of the word 'fact'. It's critical that we clarify which way we're using the word 'fact': a state-of-affairs or a description of a state-of-affairs.

Not "completely different." There is obviously a relationship between them. But so far, so good.

I have to insist on 'completely different'. The nature of the relationship between completely different things can, of course, be debated.

3 To apply the adjectives 'objective' and subjective' to facts-as-states-of-affairs is incoherent.

Not incoherent, just . . . infelicitous. Because "fact" can refer either to a state of affairs or to a proposition asserting it, the objective/subjective distinction can carry over (in common usage) from the latter to the former. That is usually harmless.

Again, I have to insist on 'incoherent'. A feature of reality, such as a dog, cannot coherently be decribed as objective or subjective.

4 We disagree as to whether the adjectives 'objective' and 'subjective' can be applied to propositions. But, anyway, you maintain that the distinction refers to the public confirmability of a state-of-affairs.

Do you in fact agree with these assertions? If not, please amend them where necessary.

Yes. But I'm surprised you disagree that "objective" and "subjective" can be applied to propositions, given that is precisely to what they are most often applied.

Alfie: "Mozart was a better composer than Beethoven."

Bruno: "That is a subjective statement."

Alfie: "Quitting smoking reduces the risk of lung cancer."

Bruno: "That is objectively true."

Claim: 'water is a compound of hydrogen and oxygen'. Would it make sense to call that a subjective assertion? If not, why does it make sense to call it an objective assertion? More simply, it's a factual assertion with, therefore, a truth-value which is independent from opinion. By contrast, a non-factual assertion, such as 'Mozart was a better composer than Beethoven', has no truth-value at all. It merely expresses an (aesthetic) opinion.

All for now. More to come - when I hope to show why there can be no moral facts, so that morality can't be objective - based on what we've done so far.

[BobS]

It seems to me that the concept of objective morality is bound to fail as a practical matter, even assuming it were theoretically possible to establish appropriate, objective criteria for making moral decisions.

Assume that we think we've finally figured out all of the appropriate objective criteria for making moral decisions. Applying those criteria to a particular moral question, you discover that it leads to a result that you find repugnant. What do you decide; do you accept or reject the objective result?

For example, to your shocked eyes and ears, the objective criteria dictate that you go out on Highway 61. And kill your son. And if you don't do that, you're an immoral schmuck. Kill him or not?

I suppose an answer might be that this particular example is unfair, since anyone who's moral enough to worry about whether there's an objective standard for morality is always going to have intuitions that are reasonably consistent with the objective results. Consequently, there's no chance that such a blaring conflict will ever arise. As under the analogous divine command theory, where it's simply inconceivable that God would ever command anyone to kill his own son.

Well, if that's the case, why spend your life trying to determine what those elusive, not-having-come-close-be-being-established-in-a-thousand-years, likely-to-be-debated-forever, objective criteria are? Why waste all that time, when you think that those criteria have to line up with what you already believe?

And aside from that, it remains the case that objective criteria don't have to line up with your personal views. The entire reason for seeking such criteria is so you can look to them in deciding how to behave. Maybe have them dictate how you behave. Therefore, if you're going to accept the idea that morality is objective, you have to accept that at times you will be required, as a moral person, to act in ways contrary to what you personally consider moral. Outside of those True Believers who opt for the divine command theory, is anyone really going to buy that?

[Peter Holmes]

It seems to me that the concept of objective morality is bound to fail as a practical matter, even assuming it were theoretically possible to establish appropriate, objective criteria for making moral decisions.

Assume that we think we've finally figured out all of the appropriate objective criteria for making moral decisions. Applying those criteria to a particular moral question, you discover that it leads to a result that you find repugnant. What do you decide; do you accept or reject the objective result?

For example, to your shocked eyes and ears, the objective criteria dictate that you go out on Highway 61. And kill your son. And if you don't do that, you're an immoral schmuck. Kill him or not?

I suppose an answer might be that this particular example is unfair, since anyone who's moral enough to worry about whether there's an objective standard for morality is always going to have intuitions that are reasonably consistent with the objective results. Consequently, there's no chance that such a blaring conflict will ever arise. As under the analogous divine command theory, where it's simply inconceivable that God would ever command anyone to kill his own son.

Well, if that's the case, why spend your life trying to determine what those elusive, not-having-come-close-be-being-established-in-a-thousand-years, likely-to-be-debated-forever, objective criteria are? Why waste all that time, when you think that those criteria have to line up with what you already believe?

And aside from that, it remains the case that objective criteria don't have to line up with your personal views. The entire reason for seeking such criteria is so you can look to them in deciding how to behave. Maybe have them dictate how you behave. Therefore, if you're going to accept the idea that morality is objective, you have to accept that at times you will be required, as a moral person, to act in ways contrary to what you personally consider moral. Outside of those True Believers who opt for the divine command theory, is anyone really going to buy that?

Thanks, BobS. That's interesting. I'm wondering if, by 'objective moral criteria' you mean 'moral facts' of the form: this is morally right/wrong. (Contributor VA offers 'humans ought not to kill humans' or 'it's wrong for humans to kill humans' as an example of a moral fact.)

I agree with your argument about the necessarily subjective nature of our reaction to any moral claim. But I've been arguing that that very subjectivity must apply to any moral claim in the first place. In other words, the idea of 'objective moral criteria' or 'moral facts' is incoherent. There can be no such things. A moral assertion can only ever express an opinion - even if everyone holds that opinion - and can never make a falsifiable factual claim.

[Peter Holmes]

Apologies. I mixed up sites. VA is not a contributor here.

[BobS]

I'm wondering if, by 'objective moral criteria' you mean 'moral facts' of the form: this is morally right/wrong. (Contributor VA offers 'humans ought not to kill humans' or 'it's wrong for humans to kill humans' as an example of a moral fact.)

I agree with your argument about the necessarily subjective nature of our reaction to any moral claim. But I've been arguing that that very subjectivity must apply to any moral claim in the first place. In other words, the idea of 'objective moral criteria' or 'moral facts' is incoherent. There can be no such things. A moral assertion can only ever express an opinion - even if everyone holds that opinion - and can never make a falsifiable factual claim.

I don't know if I'm misusing a terms that have common meanings in philosophy. But the way that I look at the idea of objective morality is that it presumes that in any situation (especially any difficult situation) where a moral decision is to be made, one considers various objectively prescribed factors, and then reasons, evaluates and applies those factors in some sort of objectively prescribed manner, and then reaches the objectively "correct" conclusion. That conclusion certainly would be a "fact" if you considered morality to be objective, but in difficult cases it would be a fact to be learned or discovered after considering other, more preliminary facts.

I thus consider "this is morally right/wrong" a moral conclusion that one would draw after considering various objective criteria, i.e., criteria prescribed by whatever objective theory is in play.

I agree that morality has to be subjective. I have trouble making any sense of how any external moral code, objective or otherwise, can possibly trump my own views, provided, of course, that I'm open to other views and reasons, and approach the issue with appropriate seriousness. How can abiding by (presumed) objectively prescribed moral principles that I find repugnant be considered a moral way to conduct myself? How is that any different than acting a particular way simply because I was ordered to do so? Like Abe heading out on Highway 61.

[Terrapin Station]

I'm wondering if, by 'objective moral criteria' you mean 'moral facts' of the form: this is morally right/wrong. (Contributor VA offers 'humans ought not to kill humans' or 'it's wrong for humans to kill humans' as an example of a moral fact.)

I agree with your argument about the necessarily subjective nature of our reaction to any moral claim. But I've been arguing that that very subjectivity must apply to any moral claim in the first place. In other words, the idea of 'objective moral criteria' or 'moral facts' is incoherent. There can be no such things. A moral assertion can only ever express an opinion - even if everyone holds that opinion - and can never make a falsifiable factual claim.

I don't know if I'm misusing a terms that have common meanings in philosophy. But the way that I look at the idea of objective morality is that it presumes that in any situation (especially any difficult situation) where a moral decision is to be made, one considers various objectively prescribed factors, and then reasons, evaluates and applies those factors in some sort of objectively prescribed manner, and then reaches the objectively "correct" conclusion. That conclusion certainly would be a "fact" if you considered morality to be objective, but in difficult cases it would be a fact to be learned or discovered after considering other, more preliminary facts.

I thus consider "this is morally right/wrong" a moral conclusion that one would draw after considering various objective criteria, i.e., criteria prescribed by whatever objective theory is in play.

I agree that morality has to be subjective. I have trouble making any sense of how any external moral code, objective or otherwise, can possibly trump my own views, provided, of course, that I'm open to other views and reasons, and approach the issue with appropriate seriousness. How can abiding by (presumed) objectively prescribed moral principles that I find repugnant be considered a moral way to conduct myself? How is that any different than acting a particular way simply because I was ordered to do so? Like Abe heading out on Highway 61.

Another thing to keep in mind is that while principles (or edicts or whatever) can be objective in the sense of utterances or texts being objective (even though people usually act like there's far more unity in this than there actually is), the prescriptions, the moral assessments "behind" those utterances can't be objective. Those have to come from individuals having mental dispositions that they then express.

Or in other words, things we say or write aren't identical to the mental content that prompted them.

[Sculptor1]

Objectivity can only be achieved when arbitrary criteria are concocted to delete personal view points.
Any morality with deleted view points is not morality, but something else

[popeye1945]

What could make morality objective, or what could make any idea objective? The answer, you create something out of it in the physical world. You created a structures, systems that build and maintain said structures. How does a spider create a complex web in the objective world, the answer, out of its very nature, the web, an extension of its being. Morality, an extension of the beings that would create it, out of the nature of their own being. Why would we build these objective structures? We build them for the same reason you build a fire when it is cold, to keep you well and safe in the physical world. Morality is about the life and well being of humanity, each creature, each specices creates something for its mutual benefit accordding to its own complexity. If not expressed as an object, it is built into the social behaviour of its species, ever re-learned, ever re-established. All meaning belongs to a conscious subject, which enables the subjects to build outwards into the physical/objective world, enhancing its own well being, it's own safety.

[GE Morton]

See below. A proposition is supposed to be what is expressed by a verbal construct (a 'token sentence') - but is not the sentence itself. Your description, with which I agree, is non-standard.

What is expressed by a (certain kind of) sentence is a claim that a certain state of affairs exists. Propositions are what we call sentences having that purpose. Those who find it necessary to postulate the existence of an abstract entity to account for the equivalence of "Snow is white" and, "Der schnee ist weiss" suffer from latent Platonism.

But here you're stating the correspondence theory of truth, which is obviously tautological. And I'm talking about the JTB theory of knowledge, which relies on the correspondence theory.

One thing can correspond with another in many ways, i.e., the term can denote many types of relationships between the two things. The semantic theory of truth (per Tarski, et al) is indeed s type of "correspondence theory," since there is obviously some correspondence between a proposition and the state of affairs it asserts. But it is not the "classical" correspondence theory of the Russell et al, which imagined some sort of structural correspondence between a proposition and the state of affairs asserted by it.

And, no, it is not tautological. That is because the proposition P is expressed in an object language, and the proposition, "P is true," is expressed in a metalanguage. A theory of truth for a given language cannot be expressed in the language itself, without circularity.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_theory_of_truth

https://iep.utm.edu/s-truth/

Yes. And the main problem is the assumed necessity of the truth-condition, which Gettier recycled, and which gets things back to front.

Not sure what you're saying there.

Obviously, to define (describe the use of)) the words 'objective' and 'subjective' is to say nothing about propositions. And the applicability of those adjectives is a separate matter. I think it clearer to describe assertions (linguistic expressions) as factual and non-factual, rather than objective and subjective. But that goes to the heart of the claim that moral assertions can be factual - so that there can be moral facts.

"Factual" and "non-factual" don't make the same distinction as "objective" and "subjective," e.g., the distinction between "I have a headache" and "I have two arms." Both can be factual. "Factual" and "non-factual" are equivalent to "true" and "false," not "objective" and "subjective." And the definition given does say something about propositions, via the "of, or related to" preface.

I have to insist on 'completely different'. The nature of the relationship between completely different things can, of course, be debated.

Well, we may have (completely?) different understandings of "completely different."

A feature of reality, such as a dog, cannot coherently be decribed as objective or subjective.

Of course it can. Applying that adjective to a single object, such as a dog, would sound odd, but not applying it to many other states of affairs ("features of reality"), which are often called "objective facts." Most of the states of affairs asserted by propositions --- most "facts" --- are complexes, where some property is predicated to some subject.

Claim: 'water is a compound of hydrogen and oxygen'. Would it make sense to call that a subjective assertion? If not, why does it make sense to call it an objective assertion?

Because the state of affairs it asserts is publicly verifiable.

By contrast, a non-factual assertion, such as 'Mozart was a better composer than Beethoven', has no truth-value at all. It merely expresses an (aesthetic) opinion.

Oh, but it can have a truth value. The speaker will have some private criteria for excellence in music composition, and with that statement, "Mozart was a better composer than Beethoven," he is asserting Mozart's work better satisfies those criteria than Beethoven's. That may well be true. But since no one else no one else knows what are those criteria and hence cannot confirm the proposition, it is subjective.

More to come - when I hope to show why there can be no moral facts, so that morality can't be objective - based on what we've done so far.

Ok.

[GE Morton]

It seems to me that the concept of objective morality is bound to fail as a practical matter, even assuming it were theoretically possible to establish appropriate, objective criteria for making moral decisions.

Assume that we think we've finally figured out all of the appropriate objective criteria for making moral decisions. Applying those criteria to a particular moral question, you discover that it leads to a result that you find repugnant. What do you decide; do you accept or reject the objective result?

I certainly agree that as a practical matter securing compliance with any objective moral principles or rules would be challenging. But if you're committed to a rational morality then you comply with those rules, no matter how you feel. That you find a course of action commanded by those rules repugnant does not dissuade you from "doing the right thing."

Calling one's intuitions "moral" is presumptuous. The actions they urge will only be moral if they are consistent with the objective rules. People can be intuitively disposed to many actions which are profoundly immoral. Intuitions are non-rational, volatile, idiosyncratic, usually self-serving, and hence (in general) unreliable guides to moral behavior.

For example, to your shocked eyes and ears, the objective criteria dictate that you go out on Highway 61. And kill your son. And if you don't do that, you're an immoral schmuck. Kill him or not?

Is your son at a roadhouse on Highway 61, armed with an automatic rifle and threatening to kill everyone in the place? Are you the cop sent to the scene? When ordered to drop his weapon, does he instead take aim at one the patrons?

If so, then yes, if you don't shoot him you're an "immoral schmuck."

Therefore, if you're going to accept the idea that morality is objective, you have to accept that at times you will be required, as a moral person, to act in ways contrary to what you personally consider moral.

You will sometimes be required to act in ways that are contrary to your preferences or desires. But, again, it is presumptuous to call those desires "moral," or to endow them with moral significance.

[BobS]

I certainly agree that as a practical matter securing compliance with any objective moral principles or rules would be challenging. But if you're committed to a rational morality then you comply with those rules, no matter how you feel. That you find a course of action commanded by those rules repugnant does not dissuade you from "doing the right thing."

The point that I intended to make was that it may will be impossible to commit to (i.e., to consider yourself irrevocably bound by) objectively prescribed rules of morality.

Calling one's intuitions "moral" is presumptuous.

We may or may not have the same idea of what "intuitions" means. I'm inclined to take an attitudinal approach to morals. If that's what you consider presumptuous, then we are indeed on different pages.

I draw a analogy (admittedly imperfect) to the sense of beauty in music. If I consider certain music beautiful or ugly, it's extremely unlikely that anyone is going to be able to give me objective criteria that will make me think otherwise.

For example, I've preferred classical music (among other genres) all my life, and played classical piano for years. Admittedly, I was little better than a good typist. But while I'm hardly a musical giant, I do know a bit about classical music and am comfortable judging what's beautiful and what's not. And I seriously dislike listening to J.S. Bach's music. Acquaintances with far greater musical ability than mine have said that I should give it more of a try, and I will eventually see how great and attractive it is. Well, I don't claim that it's not great music or a work of genius. I just don't like it and don't consider any of it beautiful. My loss.

Likewise, I've informally studied music that I do love. For example, Beethoven's piano sonatas. There are many objective things that can be and have been said about the sonatas, but I have to say that after acquainting myself with some such things, I don't love the sonatas one bit more. Maybe I have a somewhat greater "understanding" or "appreciation" of the sonatas than I did before, but that has never made that music any more beautiful or moving to my ears. I don't rule out the possibility of such a thing happening; I just don't consider it fundamental.

Leaving that imperfect analogy behind, and coming back to morality, I certainly concede that with regard to any moral issue, my understanding or appreciation of it could change with further thought, study, argument, whatever. In fact, as a general principle, I imagine that the possibility of my changing my opinion as to certain moral issues is greater than the chance that I could go from seriously disliking Bach's music to finding it beautiful. But in any such case, I do not doubt that my ultimate decision would depend on (what for want of a better phrase at the moment, I would call) my moral sense of the matter, and not on a chain of reasoning applying various, binding "objective" moral rules. The latter strikes me as little different than Leibniz's "let us calculate!"

Is your son at a roadhouse on Highway 61, armed with an automatic rifle and threatening to kill everyone in the place? Are you the cop sent to the scene? When ordered to drop his weapon, does he instead take aim at one the patrons?

By couching the example in terms of Highway 61, I was alluding to Dylan's "Highway 61 Revisited" (hey, the voice is goofy -- there I go making aesthetic judgments again -- but the words amused me when I first heard them). The following is taken from memory, so I blame old age for any inaccuracies:

"God said to Abraham, 'Kill me a son'
Abe said, 'You must be puttin' me on'
God said, 'No', Abe said, 'What?'
God said, 'You can do what you want Abe but...
next time you see me you better run'
Abe said, 'Where you want this killin' done?'
God said, 'Out on Highway 61'"

In that case the "objective" standard is God's will. No roadhouse, automatic rifles or cops involved. Throwing them into the mix rather dramatically changes the point I was making.

Let's change the approach, and move on to the Gallup poll theory of morality, the idea that the "community consensus" is the objective standard for morals. Jim Crow anyone?

You will sometimes be required to act in ways that are contrary to your preferences or desires. But, again, it is presumptuous to call those desires "moral," or to endow them with moral significance.

I understand your point, but we'll have to agree to disagree. In morality, as in music, my preferences or desires ultimately are all I have. That is not to say that serious consideration of the opinions of others doesn't enter into it. It just that I'm inclined to think that, in the end, my moral decisions are a matter of attitude. And I also think that that's the way it is for most people. If it's not, then if the objective moral principles say "kill us a son, because that's what we say; nothing else matters," you "should" go ahead a kill him.

[Sy Borg]

What makes anything objective? Observation and evidence.

Are there observations and evidence that prove that any morals are objective rather than subjective? Are there examples of rigorous testing for this?

BTW, GE, which political party comes closest to embracing what you see as objective morality?

[Tegularius]

It could be made objective if we discovered what the meaning of life was. Since there is no such meaning, the former can never be made objective.

Somewhat circular but meaningful nevertheless.