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[Terrapin Station]

Science, can, by the way, what winds up being the case, or what is likely to be the case, given certain moral stances being culturally followed. But science's job isn't to say what should be the case. It's up to people to decide what they want to be the case. Science can just give them knowledge of what's likely to happen should people behave in certain ways.

[Terrapin Station]

Oops--screwed up the beginning of that last post. I left out a words: "Science, can, by the way, address what winds up being the case . . ."

[Terrapin Station]

Oy vey. Word, not words.

I wish they'd set this board so that we can edit posts. I'm a typo king.

[psyreporter]

[*]Can empirical science be a guiding principle for life (human progress), i.e. would it be valid to blindly follow the scientific method?
[/list]

The only science there can be of normatives or values is a descriptive science of those things. In other words, a study of what people happen to value, why they value it, etc. Science can't tell us what to value, what to do. There are no objective facts about such things. There are simply dispositions that individuals have when it comes to normatives and values.

How can there be a place for morality when one considers that facts obtain outside the scope of a perspective? Demanding attention for morality, despite the strong natural inclination for moral consideration embedded in human culture and perhaps even within the human body, in theory it would be similar to demanding a belief in God.

What theoretical basis can be available by which morality obtains a due place in science? As mentioned in the OP, philosophy cannot be the answer because it is increasingly treated as if it is something similar to religions that should be abolished.

When morality is reduced to an empirical property of social science, what theory could potentially prevent the idea that morality is an illusion?

Why would one be able to argue that the states of affairs i.e. "reality" is real or definitive? One could only use empirical evidence for such a claim and that implies that it is not known what causes reality to exist, by which it is to be implied that one cannot know if reality is real or definitive and thus it is not possible to claim that facts obtain when people (as an observer) exist or not.

There are a number of curious things here.

First, why would "what causes reality to exist" be necessary for knowing whether there is reality? (Keeping in mind that by "reality" here we're referring to the objective world.)

Because without such knowledge, one can pose anything, from 'random chance' to 'illusion' to 'magic' to a simulation by aliens. Such a situation does not allow one to make a claim that poses that reality is 'real' outside the scope of a perspective.

Second, I'm not sure how you're using "know." Some people seem to use "know" so that knowledge only obtains when there is certainty, and that seems to maybe be the case here because of the word "definitive." I don't agree with using "know/knowledge" that way, though. On my view, we have different options for belief in a case like this--ontological realism vs ontological idealism, for example, and the issue is simply the reasons that we consider good enough reasons to believe one option versus another.

When science is practiced autonomously and intends to rid itself of any influence of philosophy, 'knowing' a fact nessesarily entails certainty. Without certainty, philosophy would be essential and that would be evident for any scientist, which it apparently isn't.

FInally, even if we were using "know/knowledge" with a certainty connotation, it would certainly be possible to claim things in lieu of certainty, otherwise we'd be able to make claims about almost nothing.

One can argue on behalf of utilitarian value from a human perspective but at question is whether the consideration is valid on a fundamental level.

[psyreporter]

The following transcript of a talk by philosophy professor Daniel Dennett at Oxford University provides an examination of the problem discussed in this topic from the perspective of the claim that facts indeed obtain outside the scope of a perspective.

(2021) Competence Without Comprehension
Introductory quote of philosopher Robert Beverly Mackenzie:

"In the theory with which we have to deal, Absolute Ignorance is the artificer so that we may enunciate as the fundamental principle of the whole system that in order to make a perfect and beautiful machine, it is not requisite to know how to make it. ( thinking isn't needed) This proposition will be found on careful examination to express in condensed form this central purport of the theory and to express in a few words all Mr. Darwin's meaning, who by a strange inversion of reasoning seems to think absolute ignorance fully qualified to take the place of absolute wisdom in all of the achievements of creative skill."

Dennet: Bingo. He's got it. That's right. That is what Darwin is saying and it is a strange inversion of reasoning.

...

In the case of evolution, the process of natural selection itself is competent, has no comprehension, doesn't need comprehension. It brilliantly produces all sorts of marbles of design, competence without any comprehension. No mind at all.

Turing launders all the comprehension out of the process of arithmetic makes an automatic clueless arithmetic do-er, and then shows how you can build up and build up and build up from there.

In other words, in both cases, mind, consciousness and understanding is an effect not a cause. It's not the beginning cause, it's in fact a rather recent effect. So if Darwin explains the intelligent creator - or explains away the intelligent creator - Turing explains the God-like mind. Or explains away the God-like mind.

I think right there is the main source of the antipathy. People want God-like minds. They want their minds to be flipping mysterious. They want them to be a little miracle between the ears. Any engineering type theory of what the mind is is offensive to them.
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fuGNHdg ... s-are-they

Philosophers appear to refer to the implications as "Absolute Ignorance" which would include a complete abolishing of morality.

At question in this topic is the origin of the idea that competence can exist without comprehension (i.e. mind), which appears to be the belief that facts obtain outside the scope of a perspective.

[Terrapin Station]

How can there be a place for morality when one considers that facts obtain outside the scope of a perspective?

So, again, science doesn't at all say that all facts are "outside the scope of a perspective." Psychology and Sociology are sciences. Cognitive science, including neuroscience, is obviously a science. Psychiatry is a science as well.

Morality is a psychological and social phenomenon. There are psychological and sociological facts.

It's just that some facts are objective (on a realist view, which most scientists have), and we often stress that facts, including many psychological facts, even, don't hinge on persons' beliefs about them--in other words, beliefs about them can be wrong.

When morality is reduced to an empirical property of social science, what theory could potentially prevent the idea that morality is an illusion?

No one is claiming that morality is an illusion. It's just that it's a psychological phenomenon. It's just like no one is saying that, say, having desires or food preferences is an illusion. They're psychological phenomena.

Because without such knowledge, one can pose anything, from 'random chance' to 'illusion' to 'magic' to a simulation by aliens.

And indeed people can and do posit all sorts of things. What it comes down to is the reasons we have, the reasons that we consider good reasons, for believing one possibility over another. That doesn't tell anyone what's the case with 100% certainty. That's not possible to have. You have to weight the reasons to believe one possibility over another and make what seems to be the best choice based on that.

When science is practiced autonomously and intends to rid itself of any influence of philosophy, 'knowing' a fact nessesarily entails certainty.

The end part of that is actually anathema to science. The whole gist of science is that it has to be open to revision. That was one of the primary features that distinguished it from what came before. It was the whole revolution. Something that's known with certainty isn't open to revision.

Science can't rid itself of philosophy. It has to make philosophical assumptions such as uniformity, which allows replicability for experiments, etc. Those are philosophical conclusions and can't be otherwise.

[Terrapin Station]

Philosophers appear to refer to the implications as "Absolute Ignorance" which would include a complete abolishing of morality.

That whole passage is about getting past the belief that intelligence is required for evolution, for producing creatures with minds, with intelligence. In other words, "God" need not apply.

The passage is nothing about morality; certainly it's nothing about abolishing morality.

[Gertie]

Arjand

I'd put it that this is a directly known fact which I can't be mistaken about, because the nature of experience is itself to be directly known. It's just the way it is, if you have conscious (as Nagel puts it ''what it is like'') experience, you can't help but know it while it's happening.

How would that be different from 'knowing' that an apple falls to the ground when you release an apple in front of your eyes? The mentioned experience is a manifestation of something that is not yet known today (the origin of consciousness) by which it cannot be said that it is a 'fact'. The experience derives significance by means of memory (a retro-perspective) which is empirical.

The significance and meaning of what we experience accrues over time as we create a model of the world and how it works, including ourselves. But the directly known building blocks of the model are our directly known experiential states. I can infer a real apple is falling in front of my eyes based on having that directly known conscious experience. But I might be hypnotised, dreaming, it's a visual illusion, a brain in a vat, Last Thursdayism might be true, Descartes' Demon might be messing with me - or only the experience itself might actually exist. But in the moment, the experience of seeing the apple fall is certainly real.


Relating this to your definition -

At question in this topic is whether the idea that facts obtain outside the scope of a perspective is valid and the potential implications when the idea is not valid.

I'd frame this as referring to the relationship between the ontological state of affairs and our epistemological knowledge of that state of affairs. It's about what is Real, and what we can Know, right? Knowing obviously requires an experiencing Subject with a perspective, but existing might not.

Once we accept that there is a real world which you and I inhabit and can share notes about, then we can inter-subjectively agree that there is a green apple we are both having the experience of seeing. We can agree to call that an ''objective ontological fact''. The distinction then would be whether apples can exist regardless of us observing them. And a further question would be whether apples always fall downwards regardless of someone seeing it happen - whether the pattern holds based on our explanatory Theory - gravity, cause and effect, physics or somesuch.


If science is a library of inter-subjectively compared notes about what exists and how the world works, it tells us Yes. Until someone observes or demonstrates otherwise - eg QM says once every gazillion years an apple falls upward, or more fundamentally it turns out stuff can only exist in certain ways in relation to other stuff, or whatever

And your claim is then what precisely, in an ontological v epistemological framing ...?


To address your question - if you believe that an Experiential State (eg the 'what it is like ' conscious experience of seeing an apple fall) requires the existence of a Subject Experiencer - then the idea that facts exist outside the perspective of an experiencer is an inference.


If you believe the experience of seeing an apple fall doesn't require the existence of an experiencer, then the notion of a 'perspective' isn't relevant. Only the experiences themselves exist.


If we already accept that there is a real world which we share with other people we can compare notes with about its nature, then we are already talking about a model. And what's more, a model which tells us we are flawed and limited observers and thinkers about the true nature of what we're modelling.


Personally I think this is the appropriate way to think about concepts like truth and facts.

January 24th, 2021, 2:20 pm
I don't know what you mean by ''facts having a ''qualiative nature''. The utilitarian value of having a shared model of the world we share is obvious. The scientific method builds on that by incorporating tests of peer review and repeatability in order to progress methodically by consensus. The utility proof is in the pudding. But all that our observations and theories can build is a model, because evolution tells us we are limited and flawed observers and thinkers, adapted for utility. So as regards truths and facts, science can only say This Model or Theory Holds... Until It Doesn't.

A Guiding Principle in life or progress is about more than facts and truths of course. Because conscious critters have a quality of life. We can't be fully described in 'objective' physicalist and measurable terms, the toolkit of science. We also have feelings, desires, goals, frustrations, etc. Life is meaningful, matters and has value to conscious critters. This is where Morality comes in, because it's our ability to experience a quality of life which makes it matter how we treat each other. That is the appropriate foundation for Oughts imo - the wellbeing of conscious creatures, as Harris pithily puts it.

While repeatability provides one with what can be considered certainty within the scope of a human perspective which value can be made evident by the success of science, at question would be if the idea that facts obtain outside the scope of a perspective is accurate on a fundamental level. If the idea is not valid, then that could have profound implications.

An example is the belief that natural selection is driven by random chance. Without the idea that facts obtain outside the scope of a perspective, such a belief would not be possible.

Agreed. The scientific account of how the world works is based on subjects' observations and drawing inferences from patterns and coming up with scientific theories. These theories are only considered sound if they are predictive. As soon as the prediction fails, the theory has to be dropped or adapted. It is acknowledged that this is a working model, open to change.


Within that model we can make assumptions about ontological states of affairs (facts) obtaining outside of observation if the patterns we have observed hold, and for the reasons we assume. Even when we can't verify the truth of that. I can assume that every time I drop an apple it will fall toward the ground. And if an apple falls from a tree no-one has ever seen or knows the existence of, that apple will also fall towards the ground. (Tho QM might say something different, I'm not sure, in which case new theories will supercede the old ones)

I'd say that once we accept that plants and animals exist in our shared world, how we treat them is then an issue of morality. If plants have no quality of life (can't experience 'what it is like' to be a tree or daffodil) they have no interests in the state of affairs - what happens to them is meaningless to them. Same with rocks and toasters. However conscious animal species do have a quality of life, and thus a stake in what happens to them, and so Ought to be treated with Moral consideration.

So I don't see this as an issue of Facts v Truth, rather of acknowledging the special qualitative (''what it is like'') nature of consciousness, which give conscious Subjects an interest in the state of affairs (ie why it matters what happens to us and how we treat other experiencing Subjects)

Would moral consideration only be applicable when the concept is plausible within the scope of a human perspective? If so, why?

Well humans can think this through, and so have the ability to consciously act as moral agents, make moral choices.

But my position is as I said. that if a being has interests in the state of affairs (which requires conscious experience) then that being is deserving of moral consideration. Whether or not it has the cognitive toolkit to be a moral agent. So I'd include all sentient animals, but not plants or rocks or toasters, because as far as we can tell they can't experience a quality of life. Some living things can, some can't. If a carrot can't experience being alive, it has no stake in staying alive. So it's not life per se which deems a being worthy of moral consideration, it's the ability to experience that life (consciousness).

For example, recent evidence shows that rocks on earth developed the first photosynthesis by which the earth obtained oxygen that enabled life to arise. It started hundreds of millions of years before the first life forms existed.

For me, the only moral significance this has, lies in its potential for sentient life. The potential for sentient life muddies my waters, but regarding where we're at now, I think the welfare of conscious creatures is the appropriate foundation for morality. If we could just create consensus around that, I think the world would be a better place.

As the future brings different types of moral choices, I think the wellbeing of conscious creatures is the right foundation to work from. It's a consequentialist approach, with all the complexities and uncertainties that involves. When it comes to something like genetic engineering, the consequences can be very unpredictable, and I'd want stringent safeguards in place. But we live in a world ruled more by markets than morals...

[psyreporter]

My apologies for the late reply. This topic was started on the day that the forum went down. I didn't have much time when the forum was restored.

Our tendency to 'chunk' or parcel off what we can understand in relationship, the peak of this is the isolation of variables in experiments, seems like it works great on lower levels but tends to cause more 'hidden' artifacts in our assumptions which are less of a problem at lower levels where things aren't abstract but it wreaks havoc on things like the social sciences and gets even worse with open-ended philosophy. It doesn't help either that as biological agents, on a fitness landscape, we really aren't built well for completely impartial/neutral judgment of a landscape for attempts at absolute ordering of salience and it's part of why it's an incredibly rare (even when cultivated) gift that some can approximate that well enough to get useful results.

Perhaps the concept judgement itself is the origin of the problem. It is a retro-perspective at most, therefor potentially a hindrance for what matters on a fundamental level.

At question in this topic is: can a fact - as a retro-perspective - be considered of a nature that legitimizes the conviction that it is something that is 'objectively real' (outside the scope of a perspective) on a fundamental level?

The idea that facts obtain outside the scope of a perspective has profound implications, the natural tendency to abolish morality completely being one of them.

It appears to be an ideal of science to abolish morality completely.

Immoral advances: Is science out of control?
To many scientists, moral objections to their work are not valid: science, by definition, is morally neutral, so any moral judgement on it simply reflects scientific illiteracy.
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg ... f-control/

(2019) Science and Morals: Can morality be deduced from the facts of science?
The issue should have been settled by David Hume in 1740: the facts of science provide no basis for values. Yet, like some kind of recurrent meme, the idea that science is omnipotent and will sooner or later solve the problem of values seems to resurrect with every generation.
https://sites.duke.edu/behavior/2019/04 ... f-science/

I'm going to say a couple things on this:
1) Taking seriously the notion that facts exist as autonomous verifiable things is critical and it's something that we should take as boiler-plate, even if they themselves often mutate over time.
2) Unfortunately the facts on their own will not do the thinking for us. They might help set up boundary conditions, such as what constitutes harms, public ills, or what adds to suffering without an equal or opposite good.

One can argue on behalf of utilitarian value from a human perspective but at question is whether the consideration is valid on a fundamental level.

As I mentioned in my reply to TP: When science is practiced autonomously and intends to rid itself of any influence of philosophy, 'knowing' a fact necessarily entails certainty. Without certainty, philosophy would be essential and that would be evident for any scientist, which it apparently isn't.

Not sure I followed that fully - did you mean the frailty of economic and social systems to economic disaster vs. redundancy of personal capacity for obtaining food? Clearly we're seeing a bit of that with Covid and what it's been doing to the infrastructures of globalism.

I intended to indicate that "not thinking" (carelessness) and making progress by any means was essential to lift humanity to a higher level. Today it can potentially be said that humans should evolve further and re-introduce the human wisdom think before you act to allow it to evolve into a 'moral being' that is able to prosper for the next thousand years.

[psyreporter]

Morality is a psychological and social phenomenon. There are psychological and sociological facts.

It's just that some facts are objective (on a realist view, which most scientists have), and we often stress that facts, including many psychological facts, even, don't hinge on persons' beliefs about them--in other words, beliefs about them can be wrong.

...

No one is claiming that morality is an illusion. It's just that it's a psychological phenomenon. It's just like no one is saying that, say, having desires or food preferences is an illusion. They're psychological phenomena.

The 'no belief' fact is at question. A perspective necessarily implies a sort of belief because it reaches into the unknown.

It appears that your argument is a physicalist perspective by which morality ultimately originates in the human brain, which means that morality ultimately should be considered an illusion.

A fact relative to psychological and social phenomenons would amount to 'events in time', which is also evident by your defense of the Kalam cosmological argument (the idea that time must have a beginning because an 'infinite amount' of time-states is impossible), in topic Endless and infinite.

Now, if there's an infinite amount of time prior to the creation of the Earth, how does the time of the creation of the Earth arrive. For it to arrive time has to pass through an infinity of durations, right? (Again, this is going by you saying that time is duration and that time as duration occurs independently of us.) Can time pass through an infinity of durations to get to a particular later time? How?

You don't seem to understand my comments to creation. The whole point is that if there's an infinite amount of time prior to Tn then we can't get to Tn because you can't complete an infinity of time prior to Tn. Why not? Because infinity isn't a quantity or amount we can ever reach or complete.

It is clear that you consider an infinite amount relative to Tn (i.e. 6:38 p.m.) by which you imply that time must have had a beginning.

A discussion in a different topic:

So I'm a physicalist. I'm convinced that the mind is simply brain processes.

I don't at all buy determinism.

The two are not necessarily connected.

If the mind originates from brain processes, that implies that something that is physical determines who someone is (i.e. his/her thoughts and behaviour). From such a perspective it does not appear logical to maintain a belief in free will.

Why should one hold a belief in anything if one argues that the physical, something that can be defined, is the origin of the believing itself? It appears that such a conviction should naturally result in the abolishing of any form of believing, which includes the belief in free will.

Because without such knowledge, one can pose anything, from 'random chance' to 'illusion' to 'magic' to a simulation by aliens.

And indeed people can and do posit all sorts of things. What it comes down to is the reasons we have, the reasons that we consider good reasons, for believing one possibility over another. That doesn't tell anyone what's the case with 100% certainty. That's not possible to have. You have to weight the reasons to believe one possibility over another and make what seems to be the best choice based on that.

Yes, 'believing' that facts are outside the scope of a perspective. At question is whether that is valid if it can be made evident that one cannot know.

Science can't rid itself of philosophy. It has to make philosophical assumptions such as uniformity, which allows replicability for experiments, etc. Those are philosophical conclusions and can't be otherwise.

What if the assumption turns into a dogma and the idea is wrong?

[psyreporter]

The significance and meaning of what we experience accrues over time as we create a model of the world and how it works, including ourselves. But the directly known building blocks of the model are our directly known experiential states. I can infer a real apple is falling in front of my eyes based on having that directly known conscious experience. But I might be hypnotised, dreaming, it's a visual illusion, a brain in a vat, Last Thursdayism might be true, Descartes' Demon might be messing with me - or only the experience itself might actually exist. But in the moment, the experience of seeing the apple fall is certainly real.

My argument is that memory is a retro-perspective and cannot provide evidence that reality is real. In a sense, earth or a galaxy as a whole could be seen as a memory and thus a retro-perspective.

A memory can change in time.

Relating this to your definition -

At question in this topic is whether the idea that facts obtain outside the scope of a perspective is valid and the potential implications when the idea is not valid.

I'd frame this as referring to the relationship between the ontological state of affairs and our epistemological knowledge of that state of affairs. It's about what is Real, and what we can Know, right? Knowing obviously requires an experiencing Subject with a perspective, but existing might not.

Yes, that is correct. My argument is that an empiricial perspective cannot provide evidence for the reality of existence. This may seem negligble in light of the certainty that may appear evident in the facts of science, however, when considering to use facts as 'guiding principle', it would be important.

If science is a library of inter-subjectively compared notes about what exists and how the world works, it tells us Yes. Until someone observes or demonstrates otherwise - eg QM says once every gazillion years an apple falls upward, or more fundamentally it turns out stuff can only exist in certain ways in relation to other stuff, or whatever

And your claim is then what precisely, in an ontological v epistemological framing ...?

The notion 'until someone observes otherwise' is not a sound foundation for a guiding principle for life/Nature. To be wise is to make the right choice beforehand, not after learning from error. (wise is to prevent errors). To achieve wise progress would require the right fundamental guiding principle.

My argument is that (the result of) science is 'history' and cannot be a guiding principle.

The issue that this topic intends to address is that the belief that facts remain the same in time is used as foundation to use science as a guiding principle.

To address your question - if you believe that an Experiential State (eg the 'what it is like ' conscious experience of seeing an apple fall) requires the existence of a Subject Experiencer - then the idea that facts exist outside the perspective of an experiencer is an inference.

If you believe the experience of seeing an apple fall doesn't require the existence of an experiencer, then the notion of a 'perspective' isn't relevant. Only the experiences themselves exist.

If we already accept that there is a real world which we share with other people we can compare notes with about its nature, then we are already talking about a model. And what's more, a model which tells us we are flawed and limited observers and thinkers about the true nature of what we're modelling.

You clearly denote that an aspect of 'believing' is involved. That belief is turned into an 'assumption' when used practically.

What if the assumption turns into a dogma and the idea is wrong?

Agreed. The scientific account of how the world works is based on subjects' observations and drawing inferences from patterns and coming up with scientific theories. These theories are only considered sound if they are predictive. As soon as the prediction fails, the theory has to be dropped or adapted. It is acknowledged that this is a working model, open to change.

Within that model we can make assumptions about ontological states of affairs (facts) obtaining outside of observation if the patterns we have observed hold, and for the reasons we assume. Even when we can't verify the truth of that. I can assume that every time I drop an apple it will fall toward the ground. And if an apple falls from a tree no-one has ever seen or knows the existence of, that apple will also fall towards the ground. (Tho QM might say something different, I'm not sure, in which case new theories will supercede the old ones)

My argument is that the certainty that facts may appear to provide is a retro-perspective and cannot be a guiding principle.

Would moral consideration only be applicable when the concept is plausible within the scope of a human perspective? If so, why?

Well humans can think this through, and so have the ability to consciously act as moral agents, make moral choices.

That would assume that morality is an 'effect'. How would that be possible when there is no empirical evidence that morality exists? Human thoughts can also imagine a pink elephant standing on top of the mount Everest, for example. How would that be different from a thought that is labeled 'moral consideration'?

But my position is as I said. that if a being has interests in the state of affairs (which requires conscious experience) then that being is deserving of moral consideration. Whether or not it has the cognitive toolkit to be a moral agent. So I'd include all sentient animals, but not plants or rocks or toasters, because as far as we can tell they can't experience a quality of life. Some living things can, some can't. If a carrot can't experience being alive, it has no stake in staying alive. So it's not life per se which deems a being worthy of moral consideration, it's the ability to experience that life (consciousness).

The idea that rocks are meaningless may not be valid. When there is meaning, there is applicability of moral consideration.

For example, recent evidence shows that rocks on earth developed the first photosynthesis by which the earth obtained oxygen that enabled life to arise. It started hundreds of millions of years before the first organic life forms existed.

(2021) Non-classical photosynthesis by earth's inorganic semiconducting minerals
Our work in this new research field on the mechanisms of interaction between light, minerals, and life reveals that minerals and organisms are actually inseparable.
https://phys.org/news/2021-01-non-class ... cting.html

For me, the only moral significance this has, lies in its potential for sentient life. The potential for sentient life muddies my waters, but regarding where we're at now, I think the welfare of conscious creatures is the appropriate foundation for morality. If we could just create consensus around that, I think the world would be a better place.

As the future brings different types of moral choices, I think the wellbeing of conscious creatures is the right foundation to work from. It's a consequentialist approach, with all the complexities and uncertainties that involves. When it comes to something like genetic engineering, the consequences can be very unpredictable, and I'd want stringent safeguards in place. But we live in a world ruled more by markets than morals...

In my opinion, such a limited scope cannot be correct when it concerns morality. The simple notion that there is no empirical evidence that morality exists, is evidence that a limited scope cannot be applicable. A human thought cannot be a ground for considering moral consideration of a quality that is otherwise than an illusion.

[Gertie]

Arjand

At question in this topic is whether the idea that facts obtain outside the scope of a perspective is valid and the potential implications when the idea is not valid.

I'd frame this as referring to the relationship between the ontological state of affairs and our epistemological knowledge of that state of affairs. It's about what is Real, and what we can Know, right? Knowing obviously requires an experiencing Subject with a perspective, but existing might not.

Yes, that is correct. My argument is that an empiricial perspective cannot provide evidence for the reality of existence. This may seem negligble in light of the certainty that may appear evident in the facts of science, however, when considering to use facts as 'guiding principle', it would be important.

We mostly agree here. I'd put it a little differently -

A perspective, aka a conscious experience, only provides certainty of its own existence.

The contents of conscious experience (a world containing me, trees, other people like me, memories of past evidents, patterns/laws the world seems to work by, etc) imply the ontological existence of those things, are evidence they exist, but it's inferred knowledge, untestable and could be wrong.

But we can usefully create a model of the world based on our perceptions which is internally coherent and consistent. (It's a model, because we can only have immediate first person knowledge of our own conscious experience/perspective). Adjusting the model as we go. And science plays a major role in that ability to create a coherent shared model of the world. Not perfect, but incredibly useful.

The question is then - what does this model fail to answer, and what concerns does it fail to address. And I think the obvious area is consciousness. Not just the factual how/why it exists, but the fact that conscious experience brings meaning, value, purpose and consequently moral issues into the world. Those require a different type of guiding principle than physical laws.

[psyreporter]

Arjand

I'd frame this as referring to the relationship between the ontological state of affairs and our epistemological knowledge of that state of affairs. It's about what is Real, and what we can Know, right? Knowing obviously requires an experiencing Subject with a perspective, but existing might not.

Yes, that is correct. My argument is that an empiricial perspective cannot provide evidence for the reality of existence. This may seem negligble in light of the certainty that may appear evident in the facts of science, however, when considering to use facts as 'guiding principle', it would be important.

We mostly agree here. I'd put it a little differently -

A perspective, aka a conscious experience, only provides certainty of its own existence.

The contents of conscious experience (a world containing me, trees, other people like me, memories of past evidents, patterns/laws the world seems to work by, etc) imply the ontological existence of those things, are evidence they exist, but it's inferred knowledge, untestable and could be wrong.

But we can usefully create a model of the world based on our perceptions which is internally coherent and consistent. (It's a model, because we can only have immediate first person knowledge of our own conscious experience/perspective). Adjusting the model as we go. And science plays a major role in that ability to create a coherent shared model of the world. Not perfect, but incredibly useful.

The question is then - what does this model fail to answer, and what concerns does it fail to address. And I think the obvious area is consciousness. Not just the factual how/why it exists, but the fact that conscious experience brings meaning, value, purpose and consequently moral issues into the world. Those require a different type of guiding principle than physical laws.

One has merely the begin of a pattern to ground the assumption that existence is a certainty, which is empirical (a retro-perspective) and not evidence of anything 'real'. In essence, consciousness expresses itself by means of 'pattern recognition' which is a retro-perspective.

A pattern (value) cannot be the origin of itself. The begin that is introduced by pattern recognition (the observing mind) is necessarily the begin of the world itself. Any inference within the scope of a pattern cannot be evidence of anything 'real'.

Even in the case of the physical world, it may be wrong to assume the presence of a certainty factor. While as seen from the utilitarian value perspective one could argue that a 'certainty factor' isn't at question, when it concerns the potential usage of the idea as a guiding principle (e.g. for eugenics) it could become important.

Essentially, humans are emerged in 'value' (e.g. the solar system, the galaxy, the Universe). The scope of potential actions almost automatically fall within the scope of what value entails. When it concerns the 'origin' of value however, i.e. to achieve a state of 'wise progress' for longer term prosperity of humans, then it may become important to master the fundamentals of what it takes for value to arise/be possible (morality).

A dumb 'surfing' on the value of the Universe (morality embedded in the human nature) may not be the best option when considering modern day risks such as exponential growth.

[Gertie]

Arjand

I'd frame this as referring to the relationship between the ontological state of affairs and our epistemological knowledge of that state of affairs. It's about what is Real, and what we can Know, right? Knowing obviously requires an experiencing Subject with a perspective, but existing might not.

Yes, that is correct. My argument is that an empiricial perspective cannot provide evidence for the reality of existence. This may seem negligble in light of the certainty that may appear evident in the facts of science, however, when considering to use facts as 'guiding principle', it would be important.

We mostly agree here. I'd put it a little differently -

A perspective, aka a conscious experience, only provides certainty of its own existence.

The contents of conscious experience (a world containing me, trees, other people like me, memories of past evidents, patterns/laws the world seems to work by, etc) imply the ontological existence of those things, are evidence they exist, but it's inferred knowledge, untestable and could be wrong.

But we can usefully create a model of the world based on our perceptions which is internally coherent and consistent. (It's a model, because we can only have immediate first person knowledge of our own conscious experience/perspective). Adjusting the model as we go. And science plays a major role in that ability to create a coherent shared model of the world. Not perfect, but incredibly useful.

The question is then - what does this model fail to answer, and what concerns does it fail to address. And I think the obvious area is consciousness. Not just the factual how/why it exists, but the fact that conscious experience brings meaning, value, purpose and consequently moral issues into the world. Those require a different type of guiding principle than physical laws.

One has merely the begin of a pattern to ground the assumption that existence is a certainty, which is empirical (a retro-perspective) and not evidence of anything 'real'. In essence, consciousness expresses itself by means of 'pattern recognition' which is a retro-perspective.

A pattern (value) cannot be the origin of itself. The begin that is introduced by pattern recognition (the observing mind) is necessarily the begin of the world itself. Any inference within the scope of a pattern cannot be evidence of anything 'real'.

Even in the case of the physical world, it may be wrong to assume the presence of a certainty factor. While as seen from the utilitarian value perspective one could argue that a 'certainty factor' isn't at question, when it concerns the potential usage of the idea as a guiding principle (e.g. for eugenics) it could become important.

Essentially, humans are emerged in 'value' (e.g. the solar system, the galaxy, the Universe). The scope of potential actions almost automatically fall within the scope of what value entails. When it concerns the 'origin' of value however, i.e. to achieve a state of 'wise progress' for longer term prosperity of humans, then it may become important to master the fundamentals of what it takes for value to arise/be possible (morality).

A dumb 'surfing' on the value of the Universe (morality embedded in the human nature) may not be the best option when considering modern day risks such as exponential growth.

Sorry but I can't parse what you're saying here. It looks like it would need a lot of time to agree definitions and a mutually understandable framework to get any further, so I'll leave it there.

[psyreporter]

A perspective, aka a conscious experience, only provides certainty of its own existence.

Sorry but I can't parse what you're saying here. It looks like it would need a lot of time to agree definitions and a mutually understandable framework to get any further, so I'll leave it there.

My argument is simply that the certainty that you denote to be provided by conscious experience originates from perceived value (a pattern), which is a retro-perspective and cannot provide evidence of existence.

Usefulness of a model of the world is merely utilitarian value and cannot be a basis for a guiding principle since a guiding principle would concern what is essential for value to be possible (a priori or "before value").

The simplest departure from pure randomness implies value. This is evidence that all that can be seen in the world - from the simplest pattern onward - is value.

The origin of value is necessarily meaningful but cannot be value by the simple logical truth that something cannot originate from itself. This implies that a meaning of life is applicable on a fundamental level and that morality is vital for guiding progress.