Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Sy Borg]

[then mistakenly lists more ideas informally known as "theories"]

Just because people call something a "theory" informally does not make it a theory.

Well, yes, it does. The meanings of words are ascertained by observing how they are actually used.

The debate was about the formal meaning of theory. You know this so stop playing games. It would be bizarre for me, or anyone, to claim that people are incapable of referring to their random ideas as "theories".

Stop trying to shift the goal posts. It's an obvious flim flam and adds nothing useful to the forum. In order for a theory to be formulated, consensus is needed amongst experts, not unanimity, but a consensus. Obviously.

As for the informal use of "theory", there are obviously no limits. People can, and do, say as they will.

[GE Morton]

(I think I've already explained what I think morality is and what counts as a moral assertion. But I'm happy to come back to that later. For now, we're discussing the nature and function of moral assertions such as 'slavery is wrong'.)

I may have missed that, with respect to what morality is. Please reprise it. As for what counts as a moral assertion, as far as I can recall, the definition you offered was circular --- i.e., something like, "A moral assertion is any assertion that asserts that something is morally right or wrong." Which is, of course, circular and thus uninformative.

Perhaps you didn't notice that the Merriam-Webster definition of 'objective' makes no mention of propositions or their public verifiability. So your definition of the word 'objectivity' - 'public verifiability of a proposition' - is your choice.

Methinks you need to read that more carefully: "2 a: of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind."

What relates to, or are "of" objects, phenomenon, or conditions are propositions.

'A "fact" is a proposition which asserts some state of affairs which is publicly confirmable. If a moral proposition asserts some state of affairs which is publicly confirmable, then it, too, is a "fact," just as any other proposition which asserts a confirmable state of affairs.'

And this is obviously incorrect. The predicate should be 'is publicly confirmed', not 'is publicly confirmable'. So your conditional should be as follows:

If a moral proposition asserts some state of affairs which is publicly confirmed, then it, too, is a "fact," just as any other proposition which asserts a [publicly] confirmed state of affairs.

And I think your definition of a fact is this: A fact is a proposition which asserts a publicly confirmed state-of-affairs.

No, it is not. First, my own statement ("A 'fact' is a proposition which asserts some state of affairs which is publicly confirmable") was a gloss, and not strictly accurate. Subjective propositions can also be facts, e..g, "I have a headache" is not publicly confirmable, yet it can be a fact. Only objective facts must be publicly confirmable.

And, no, not "confirmed." If there is life on Mars that will be a fact right now, even though the proposition asserting it is not confirmed at the present. If life on Mars is discovered by astronauts in 2040, it will be understood to have been a fact in 2021 as well. There are infinitely many facts about the universe not yet discovered, and propositions asserting them would be true, even though not known to be true.

A factual proposition is one which asserts a state of affairs that is publicly confirmable, whether or not it has been confirmed. Sometimes we mark the distinction between propositions which are (in principle) confirmable from those that have been actually confirmed with the qualifier "established" --- "It is an established fact that smoking increases the risk of lung cancer."

In sum, a fact need not be known in order to exist.

[GE Morton]

The subject of morality is human feelings and desires.

If that is what you understand by "morality," then I certainly agree it is not, and can never be, objective. Nor worth discussing, either.

[GE Morton]

The debate was about the formal meaning of theory.

Yes, and that is what I and TS gave you above. It makes no reference to consensuses.

[Sy Borg]

The debate was about the formal meaning of theory.

Yes, and that is what I and TS gave you above. It makes no reference to consensuses.

It does not need to because it's so obvious. But you already know that ...

[Peter Holmes]

(I think I've already explained what I think morality is and what counts as a moral assertion. But I'm happy to come back to that later. For now, we're discussing the nature and function of moral assertions such as 'slavery is wrong'.)

I may have missed that, with respect to what morality is. Please reprise it. As for what counts as a moral assertion, as far as I can recall, the definition you offered was circular --- i.e., something like, "A moral assertion is any assertion that asserts that something is morally right or wrong." Which is, of course, circular and thus uninformative.

Perhaps you didn't notice that the Merriam-Webster definition of 'objective' makes no mention of propositions or their public verifiability. So your definition of the word 'objectivity' - 'public verifiability of a proposition' - is your choice.

Methinks you need to read that more carefully: "2 a: of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind."

What relates to, or are "of" objects, phenomenon, or conditions are propositions.

No, you read it again more carefully. There's no mention of either propositions or their confirmability. Do you think a proposition is 'independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers'? When we observe a thing 'in the realm of sensible experience', such as a dog or a tree, are we observing a proposition? Is ours a universe of (largely unknown) propositions? Absurd!

The conceptual mess you're in is a result of befuddlement by the myth of propositions - the myth that linguistic expressions 'embody' or 'manifest' abstract things (so-called propositions) which, in some magical way, actually are the states-of-affairs that they assert. The JTB account of knowledge casually restates the myth, as does the ridicuous idea of propositional knowledge. (Would the expression 'sentence knowledge' be coherent?)

That you thoughtlessly assume Webster's definition of 'fact' is talking about propositions is startling evidence of this delusion - mistaking what we say about things for the way things are. But here's a simpler definition from the Concise Oxford. 'fact: a thing that is known to exist, to have occurred, or to be true.' The two completely different meanings of 'fact' are evident here. A thing that is known to exist or to have occurred is obviously not a proposition.

'A "fact" is a proposition which asserts some state of affairs which is publicly confirmable. If a moral proposition asserts some state of affairs which is publicly confirmable, then it, too, is a "fact," just as any other proposition which asserts a confirmable state of affairs.'

And this is obviously incorrect. The predicate should be 'is publicly confirmed', not 'is publicly confirmable'. So your conditional should be as follows:

If a moral proposition asserts some state of affairs which is publicly confirmed, then it, too, is a "fact," just as any other proposition which asserts a [publicly] confirmed state of affairs.

And I think your definition of a fact is this: A fact is a proposition which asserts a publicly confirmed state-of-affairs.

No, it is not. First, my own statement ("A 'fact' is a proposition which asserts some state of affairs which is publicly confirmable") was a gloss, and not strictly accurate. Subjective propositions can also be facts, e..g, "I have a headache" is not publicly confirmable, yet it can be a fact. Only objective facts must be publicly confirmable.

Nope. A fact is, primarily, a state-of-affairs that is or was the case. And what we call 'objectvity' is independence from opinion when considering the facts. So to call facts (states-of-affairs) objective or subjective is a category error - a grammatical misattribution. The expression 'objective fact' is a redundancy or tautology; and the expression 'subjective fact' is plain incoherent.

And, no, not "confirmed." If there is life on Mars that will be a fact right now, even though the proposition asserting it is not confirmed at the present. If life on Mars is discovered by astronauts in 2040, it will be understood to have been a fact in 2021 as well. There are infinitely many facts about the universe not yet discovered, and propositions asserting them would be true, even though not known to be true.

Notice your recognition here that a fact is a state-of-affairs that can be asserted by a proposition - or, more accurately, a factual assertion. So you've casually abandoned your definition of a fact as a proposition.

A factual proposition is one which asserts a state of affairs that is publicly confirmable, whether or not it has been confirmed. Sometimes we mark the distinction between propositions which are (in principle) confirmable from those that have been actually confirmed with the qualifier "established" --- "It is an established fact that smoking increases the risk of lung cancer."

In sum, a fact need not be known in order to exist.

Okay, thanks. It's obvious that a fact that 'need not be known in order to exist' is not a proposition. So now we can move on to address the nature and function of a 'moral proposition' - more accurately, a moral assertion - such as 'slavery is wrong'. I have to stop now, however.

[Sculptor1]

The subject of morality is human feelings and desires.

If that is what you understand by "morality," then I certainly agree it is not, and can never be, objective. Nor worth discussing, either.

For years you have been banging on about this, but have consistently FAILED to over a single example of an objective moral truth.
And by you own definition(is objective if its truth conditions are publicly confirmable) have no morality which is sully agreeable to the public.

[GE Morton]

Methinks you need to read that more carefully: "2 a: of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind."

What relates to, or are "of" objects, phenomenon, or conditions are propositions.

No, you read it again more carefully. There's no mention of either propositions or their confirmability. Do you think a proposition is 'independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers'? When we observe a thing 'in the realm of sensible experience', such as a dog or a tree, are we observing a proposition? Is ours a universe of (largely unknown) propositions? Absurd!

Egads. You stubbornly ignore ignore the words "of, relating to" in that definition, and pretend that it only mentions being "an object, phenomenon . . ." etc. No, a proposition is not independent of thought and perceptible by all observers. But it certainly is of, and relates to, some such object or phenomenon.

The conceptual mess you're in is a result of befuddlement by the myth of propositions - the myth that linguistic expressions 'embody' or 'manifest' abstract things (so-called propositions) which, in some magical way, actually are the states-of-affairs that they assert.

Well, that is wandering pretty far from the topic, and is gratuitous. There is nothing mythical or magical about propositions, and no one I know of claims they "are" the states of affairs they assert. A proposition is merely a verbal construction that asserts a state of affairs. They are true if the state of affairs they assert exists, false if it does not. They are objective if the state of affairs they assert is publicly confirmable, subjective if it is only privately confirmable.

"So-called" propositions? You're challenging a term that is ubiquitous in the philosophical literature and whose meaning is perfectly clear and universally understood? Do you really want to tilt at that windmill?

That you thoughtlessly assume Webster's definition of 'fact' is talking about propositions is startling evidence of this delusion - mistaking what we say about things for the way things are. But here's a simpler definition from the Concise Oxford. 'fact: a thing that is known to exist, to have occurred, or to be true.' The two completely different meanings of 'fact' are evident here. A thing that is known to exist or to have occurred is obviously not a proposition.

We've covered this. I agree that "fact" can refer to either a confirmed state of affairs, or to a proposition asserting such a state of affairs. E.g.,

Alfie: "Paris is the capital of France."

Bruno: "Yes, that is a fact."

A fact is, primarily, a state-of-affairs that is or was the case. And what we call 'objectvity' is independence from opinion when considering the facts.

Agree.

So to call facts (states-of-affairs) objective or subjective is a category error - a grammatical misattribution. The expression 'objective fact' is a redundancy or tautology; and the expression 'subjective fact' is plain incoherent.

Also agree, unless understood colloquially. Strictly speaking, facts are neither objective nor subjective; only the propositions asserting them are.

Notice your recognition here that a fact is a state-of-affairs that can be asserted by a proposition - or, more accurately, a factual assertion. So you've casually abandoned your definition of a fact as a proposition.

As said above, the term "fact" can apply either to a confirmed state of affairs, OR to a proposition asserting such a state of affairs. The term is regularly used for both purposes.

[GE Morton]

For years you have been banging on about this, but have consistently FAILED to over a single example of an objective moral truth.

But I have. Several times.

And by you own definition(is objective if its truth conditions are publicly confirmable) have no morality which is sully agreeable to the public.

"Publicly confirmable" doesn't mean, or imply, "agreeable to the public."

[Terrapin Station]

[then mistakenly lists more ideas informally known as "theories"]

Just because people call something a "theory" informally does not make it a theory.

Well, yes, it does. The meanings of words are ascertained by observing how they are actually used.

The debate was about the formal meaning of theory. You know this so stop playing games. It would be bizarre for me, or anyone, to claim that people are incapable of referring to their random ideas as "theories".

Stop trying to shift the goal posts. It's an obvious flim flam and adds nothing useful to the forum. In order for a theory to be formulated, consensus is needed amongst experts, not unanimity, but a consensus. Obviously.

As for the informal use of "theory", there are obviously no limits. People can, and do, say as they will.

No one was introducing colloquial senses of "theory," by the way.

[Sculptor1]

For years you have been banging on about this, but have consistently FAILED to over a single example of an objective moral truth.

But I have. Several times.

Orwellian double talk

And by you own definition(is objective if its truth conditions are publicly confirmable) have no morality which is sully agreeable to the public.

"Publicly confirmable" doesn't mean, or imply, "agreeable to the public."

So you are implying that moral systems are generally disagreeable to the public or should be generally disagreeable; are like to be, are better if they are - what?. If that is the case then who the hell are moral laws supposed to serve?
Is it the case that you and a few friends get to decide what are the best moral laws and just impose them (objectively) upon everyone else?
Quit the double talk and...
Give an example.

[Sy Borg]

[then mistakenly lists more ideas informally known as "theories"]

Just because people call something a "theory" informally does not make it a theory.

Well, yes, it does. The meanings of words are ascertained by observing how they are actually used.

The debate was about the formal meaning of theory. You know this so stop playing games. It would be bizarre for me, or anyone, to claim that people are incapable of referring to their random ideas as "theories".

Stop trying to shift the goal posts. It's an obvious flim flam and adds nothing useful to the forum. In order for a theory to be formulated, consensus is needed amongst experts, not unanimity, but a consensus. Obviously.

As for the informal use of "theory", there are obviously no limits. People can, and do, say as they will.

No one was introducing colloquial senses of "theory," by the way.

Anyone masochistic enough can check to see the goalposts move around.

[GE Morton]

So you are implying that moral systems are generally disagreeable to the public or should be generally disagreeable; are like to be, are better if they are - what?

"Better"? "Better," how? Per what standard or criteria are you measuring them?

A set of moral rules X is "better" than set Y if X better serves the purpose for which those rules were created. Whether it does or not is an empirical matter, and thus objective. Whether or not anyone agrees with it is irrelevant. The ad populum argument is as fallacious when used in a moral argument as it is in any other context.

[Peter Holmes]

Methinks you need to read that more carefully: "2 a: of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind."

What relates to, or are "of" objects, phenomenon, or conditions are propositions.

No, you read it again more carefully. There's no mention of either propositions or their confirmability. Do you think a proposition is 'independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers'? When we observe a thing 'in the realm of sensible experience', such as a dog or a tree, are we observing a proposition? Is ours a universe of (largely unknown) propositions? Absurd!

Egads. You stubbornly ignore ignore the words "of, relating to" in that definition, and pretend that it only mentions being "an object, phenomenon . . ." etc. No, a proposition is not independent of thought and perceptible by all observers. But it certainly is of, and relates to, some such object or phenomenon.

But this is a definition of the word 'fact', not the word 'proposition'. So you are stubbornly insisting that 'of' or 'relating to' an object...refers to a proposition, when that is not mentioned at all in this definition. You're making an unjustified but telling assumption.

The conceptual mess you're in is a result of befuddlement by the myth of propositions - the myth that linguistic expressions 'embody' or 'manifest' abstract things (so-called propositions) which, in some magical way, actually are the states-of-affairs that they assert.

Well, that is wandering pretty far from the topic, and is gratuitous. There is nothing mythical or magical about propositions, and no one I know of claims they "are" the states of affairs they assert. A proposition is merely a verbal construction that asserts a state of affairs. They are true if the state of affairs they assert exists, false if it does not. They are objective if the state of affairs they assert is publicly confirmable, subjective if it is only privately confirmable.

No this very much on topic. Like all so-called abstract things, propositions are misleading metaphysical fictions. And the JTB truth-condition is a clear example of what I'm saying about their mystical nature: S knows that p iff p is true. (It's not, as you said some time ago, S knows that p is true iff p is true.) What S can know is that a feature of reality (a state-of-affairs) is the case, and that is not 'knowing that p'. Neither a feature of reality, nor our knowing that it's the case, has anything to do with the truth of an assertion that it indeed is the case.

However, at least here you clarify the difference and separation between a feature of reality and a linguistic expression that describes it. And that difference and separation is critical in this debate about what constitutes a fact, and therefore whether there can be so-called moral facts.

"So-called" propositions? You're challenging a term that is ubiquitous in the philosophical literature and whose meaning is perfectly clear and universally understood? Do you really want to tilt at that windmill?

Yes. A proposition is not, as you say, 'merely a verbal construction that asserts a state of affairs'. Here's one representative definition:

'In linguistics and philosophy, a proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence, where "meaning" is understood to be a non-linguistic entity which is shared by all sentences with the same meaning.[1] Equivalently, a proposition is the non-linguistic bearer of truth or falsity which makes any sentence that expresses it either true or false.'

That a fiction - the non-linguistic entity that is the meaning of a sentence - has been around for a long time - like Platonic forms - is no reason to treat it with any respect. To the bonfire with it,

That you thoughtlessly assume Webster's definition of 'fact' is talking about propositions is startling evidence of this delusion - mistaking what we say about things for the way things are. But here's a simpler definition from the Concise Oxford. 'fact: a thing that is known to exist, to have occurred, or to be true.' The two completely different meanings of 'fact' are evident here. A thing that is known to exist or to have occurred is obviously not a proposition.

We've covered this. I agree that "fact" can refer to either a confirmed state of affairs, or to a proposition asserting such a state of affairs.{/quote]
So it's 'confirmed', not 'confirmable' now?

E.g.,

Alfie: "Paris is the capital of France."

Bruno: "Yes, that is a fact."

A fact is, primarily, a state-of-affairs that is or was the case. And what we call 'objectvity' is independence from opinion when considering the facts.

Agree.

So to call facts (states-of-affairs) objective or subjective is a category error - a grammatical misattribution. The expression 'objective fact' is a redundancy or tautology; and the expression 'subjective fact' is plain incoherent.

Also agree, unless understood colloquially. Strictly speaking, facts are neither objective nor subjective; only the propositions asserting them are.

Notice your recognition here that a fact is a state-of-affairs that can be asserted by a proposition - or, more accurately, a factual assertion. So you've casually abandoned your definition of a fact as a proposition.

As said above, the term "fact" can apply either to a confirmed state of affairs, OR to a proposition asserting such a state of affairs. The term is regularly used for both purposes.

Good. I think we may be near the end. So, to summarise, I think we agree on the following.

1 A fact is, primarily, a state-fo-affairs that is or was the case. And what we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts. And here I want to point out that none of this, so far, is about propositions - more accurately, factual assertions.

2 A fact is a state-of-affairs that can be asserted by a factual assertion - a linguistic expression - which is true if the state-of-affairs is the case. And as a matter of usage, we can call such a true factual assertion a fact. But here I want to point out the potential confusion in this completely different use of the word 'fact'. It's critical that we clarify which way we're using the word 'fact': a state-of-affairs or a description of a state-of-affairs.

3 To apply the adjectives 'objective' and subjective' to facts-as-states-of-affairs is incoherent.

4 We disagree as to whether the adjectives 'objective' and 'subjective' can be applied to propositions. But, anyway, you maintain that the distinction refers to the public confirmability of a state-of-affairs.

Do you in fact agree with these assertions? If not, please amend them where necessary.

[Sculptor1]

So you are implying that moral systems are generally disagreeable to the public or should be generally disagreeable; are like to be, are better if they are - what?

"Better"? "Better," how? Per what standard or criteria are you measuring them?

LOL
Surely that is your **** problem.
I'm not the one trying to impose his morality on everyone and claiming he is objective.

A set of moral rules X is "better" than set Y if X better serves the purpose for which those rules were created.

WHICH IT WHAT FFS???

Whether it does or not is an empirical matter, and thus objective. Whether or not anyone agrees with it is irrelevant. The ad populum argument is as fallacious when used in a moral argument as it is in any other context.

Morals are not nad never been how you describe them.
Morals are always imposed by the powerful on those iver whom they have power.

You would clearl this all up with one good example.