Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

1 The distinction between axiology and moral theory isn't clear cut.

It has not always been kept clear in the history of philosophy. But the concepts involved are easily distinguishable.

A moral assertion expresses a moral value-judgement - which is an evaluation.

"Moral value judgment" embodies a confusion of concepts, as does the ubiquitous phrase, "moral values." A rational moral judgment (that an act is right or wrong) is not a value assessment of that act.

Value assignments are intrinsically subjective. Propositions asserting/assigning values are only cognitive if a valuer is specified. I.e., "X has value V" is non-cognitive (it has no determinable truth conditions). "X has value V to P" can be cognitive (we can observe P to see if he will give up V to secure X). Thus values are necessarily relative to valuers, and hence subjective.

Someone who pronounces an act right or wrong because he finds it unpleasant, distasteful, offensive, or inimical to some desire or preference he has is not doing ethics; he is merely expressing some values he holds --- all of which are subjective.

And anyway, arguments for the objectivity of assertions of non-moral value are as unsound as those for the assertion of moral rightness or wrongness. There's no objectivity here.

All value assertions are indeed subjective, but not "unsound." Soundness applies to arguments, not propositions, which are either true or false. Value assertions may even be true, as long as a valuer is specified or implied.

That the goal of morality is to enable all agents to maximise their welfare is an opinion - not a fact.

I acknowledged earlier that some philosophers have held that moral rules have a different goal, such as "living the good life," or conforming to "God's Will." But the central concern, the predominant thrust, of nearly all moral codes throughout history has been condemning acts which inflict loss or injury on other moral agents --- "Don't kill or maim," don't steal," "don't cheat," don't rape," etc., and encouraging acts which aid others "be kind," be generous," "keep your promises," etc. --- all rules necessary to make social life rewarding, and even possible.

That is, of course, a subjective goal --- all actions aim at some goal, and all goals are subjective. Someone who does not share that goal will have no use for these moral rules, just as a person not concerned with safe and efficient travel on highways will have no use for traffic rules. Those rules remain objective, however --- they either do or do not further that goal.

Your analysis of the function of a moral assertion, such as 'slavery is morally wrong' is incorrect. That assertion doesn't mean 'X is inconsistent with goal Y'. It means 'X is morally wrong, whatever the goal'. That we apply our moral assertions universally is one reason why we can mistakenly think of them as objective.

Unless "Slavery is morally wrong" means inconsistent with some moral principle, and that principle embodies some goal, then the proposition is non-cognitive. It merely expresses a personal preference or value.

[popeye1945]

Morality is subjectively implicit until it is made explicit in the physical world, like any human creation it is a biological extension. It is an expression of the nature of humanity, at which time it is subjectively owned, and objectively real in the form of a system in the world. So it is made objectively real by the humanity that created it.

[Peter Holmes]

Morality is subjectively implicit until it is made explicit in the physical world, like any human creation it is a biological extension. It is an expression of the nature of humanity, at which time it is subjectively owned, and objectively real in the form of a system in the world. So it is made objectively real by the humanity that created it.

Thanks, but I think you're missing the point.

A fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case, or a description of such feature of reality - typically a linguistic expression - whose truth-value (true) is independent from opinion. And since what we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts, moral objectivism is the claim that there are moral facts. In retrospect, I should have called my OP 'Are there moral facts?'

Now, that we have and are still developing moral values and rules - that we make judgements about moral rightness and wrongness - these are the relevant facts, which means that those factual assertions are true. But they aren't moral assertions, and these aren't moral facts. The fact that morality is 'real in the form of a system' doesn't means that moral assertions describe facts - because they don't. Moral rightness and wrongness are not features of reality that are or were the case - so there are no moral facts.

So morality - in the sense moral philosophers talk about moral objectivity - isn't and can't be objective. Moral realists and objectivists are mistaken.

[popeye1945]

Thanks, but I think you're missing the point.

A fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case, or a description of such feature of reality - typically a linguistic expression - whose truth-value (true) is independent from opinion. And since what we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts, moral objectivism is the claim that there are moral facts. In retrospect, I should have called my OP 'Are there moral facts?'

Now, that we have and are still developing moral values and rules - that we make judgements about moral rightness and wrongness - these are the relevant facts, which means that those factual assertions are true. But they aren't moral assertions, and these aren't moral facts. The fact that morality is 'real in the form of a system' doesn't means that moral assertions describe facts - because they don't. Moral rightness and wrongness are not features of reality that are or were the case - so there are no moral facts.

So morality - in the sense moral philosophers talk about moral objectivity - isn't and can't be objective. Moral realists and objectivists are mistaken.
[/quote]

Peter, You wish to make it more complicated than it needs to be. You are forgetting that the physical world in and of itself is meaningless, it just is, does it continue to exist in the absence of a conscious being, no, at least not cognitively. Cognitive knowing is the only form of knowing available to us. The objective world as object is the fuel of the mind, without it there cannot be said to be a mind. Yes, the objective world is independent, that is a meaning also, and belongs soully to a conscious subject. Apparent reality is a biological readout, biological interpretation of the physical world relative, always relative to biological consciousness. Morality based upon our common biology deem facts to be those meanings that relate to the welfare and maintenance of the body, or how the biological world is effected by that physical world. All human constructs, read systems and structures are bestow upon the world by consciousness and they are as real as the building your living in. They are made manifest by human biological extension. Morality rightly is a schemata of what in the physical world is good or bad relative to a concerned biological consciousness.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter, You wish to make it more complicated than it needs to be. You are forgetting that the physical world in and of itself is meaningless, it just is, does it continue to exist in the absence of a conscious being, no, at least not cognitively. Cognitive knowing is the only form of knowing available to us. The objective world as object is the fuel of the mind, without it there cannot be said to be a mind. Yes, the objective world is independent, that is a meaning also, and belongs soully to a conscious subject. Apparent reality is a biological readout, biological interpretation of the physical world relative, always relative to biological consciousness. Morality based upon our common biology deem facts to be those meanings that relate to the welfare and maintenance of the body, or how the biological world is effected by that physical world. All human constructs, read systems and structures are bestow upon the world by consciousness and they are as real as the building your living in. They are made manifest by human biological extension. Morality rightly is a schemata of what in the physical world is good or bad relative to a concerned biological consciousness.

I'm afraid I find your way of putting it incomprehensible, mystical nonsense. But thanks for trying. I've set out my explanation as clearly as I can - at least, for now. So I'm leaving it for the moment. Thanks for the conversation.

[Terrapin Station]

Peter, You wish to make it more complicated than it needs to be. You are forgetting that the physical world in and of itself is meaningless, it just is, does it continue to exist in the absence of a conscious being, no, at least not cognitively. Cognitive knowing is the only form of knowing available to us. The objective world as object is the fuel of the mind, without it there cannot be said to be a mind. Yes, the objective world is independent, that is a meaning also, and belongs soully to a conscious subject. Apparent reality is a biological readout, biological interpretation of the physical world relative, always relative to biological consciousness. Morality based upon our common biology deem facts to be those meanings that relate to the welfare and maintenance of the body, or how the biological world is effected by that physical world. All human constructs, read systems and structures are bestow upon the world by consciousness and they are as real as the building your living in. They are made manifest by human biological extension. Morality rightly is a schemata of what in the physical world is good or bad relative to a concerned biological consciousness.

Yeah, a lot of this is murky to me, too.

The physical world is meaningless EXCEPT insofar as we're talking about brains (at least, barring other things being able to function as minds) engaging in the associative thinking that is meaning.

Does the world continue to exist in the absence of a conscious being? Of course. We'd need pretty robust reasons to believe something so absurd as that it doesn't.

Re "at least not cognitively"--well, yeah, duh re that no one is going to know about the world if there isn't anyone around to know anything. But that's simply like saying "Does the world continue to exist in the absence of cameras? No, at least not photographically." LOL--which just amounts to saying, "Hey, if there are no camera then there are no cameras" (or "If there are no cameras then there is nothing that can take photographs."--well, duh, of course not. But that's not telling us anything aside from indicating that we are familiar with what the term "camera" refers to, which shouldn't be something we have to announce in a philosophy forum.)

Re "The objective world is the fuel of the mind . . ." that's where things start getting particularly murky, in a poetic way, perhaps, in your post.

[popeye1945]

Tarrapin, How about this, subject and object stand or fall together, they are mutually dependent and all meaning is the property of the conscious subject??

[Terrapin Station]

Tarrapin, How about this, subject and object stand or fall together, they are mutually dependent and all meaning is the property of the conscious subject??

I agree that meanings are properties of conscious subjects, but it's like saying that pains or feelings of deja vu are properties of conscious subjects. It's something that's the case, but it implies nothing about other stuff. It's not like the world consists of pains or feelings of deja vu and that's it.

[Belindi]

Tarrapin, How about this, subject and object stand or fall together, they are mutually dependent and all meaning is the property of the conscious subject??

I agree that meanings are properties of conscious subjects, but it's like saying that pains or feelings of deja vu are properties of conscious subjects. It's something that's the case, but it implies nothing about other stuff. It's not like the world consists of pains or feelings of deja vu and that's it.

I guess Popeye might agree that there is something 'out there' which is forever concealed by consciousness. NB I am not advocating mystical approaches to what may be 'out there'.

[Terrapin Station]

Tarrapin, How about this, subject and object stand or fall together, they are mutually dependent and all meaning is the property of the conscious subject??

I agree that meanings are properties of conscious subjects, but it's like saying that pains or feelings of deja vu are properties of conscious subjects. It's something that's the case, but it implies nothing about other stuff. It's not like the world consists of pains or feelings of deja vu and that's it.

I guess Popeye might agree that there is something 'out there' which is forever concealed by consciousness. NB I am not advocating mystical approaches to what may be 'out there'.

What could be good grounds for thinking that it's concealed by consciousness, though?

[Belindi]

Tarrapin, How about this, subject and object stand or fall together, they are mutually dependent and all meaning is the property of the conscious subject??

I agree that meanings are properties of conscious subjects, but it's like saying that pains or feelings of deja vu are properties of conscious subjects. It's something that's the case, but it implies nothing about other stuff. It's not like the world consists of pains or feelings of deja vu and that's it.

I guess Popeye might agree that there is something 'out there' which is forever concealed by consciousness. NB I am not advocating mystical approaches to what may be 'out there'.

What could be good grounds for thinking that it's concealed by consciousness, though?

Because all meanings are properties of conscious subjects therefore no meanings pertain to subjects that are not conscious.

All A is B

C is not-B

C is not A

I presume that "meanings are properties of conscious subjects," implies " also "and only conscious subjects".

[Terrapin Station]

I agree that meanings are properties of conscious subjects, but it's like saying that pains or feelings of deja vu are properties of conscious subjects. It's something that's the case, but it implies nothing about other stuff. It's not like the world consists of pains or feelings of deja vu and that's it.

I guess Popeye might agree that there is something 'out there' which is forever concealed by consciousness. NB I am not advocating mystical approaches to what may be 'out there'.

What could be good grounds for thinking that it's concealed by consciousness, though?

Because all meanings are properties of conscious subjects therefore no meanings pertain to subjects that are not conscious.

All A is B

C is not-B

C is not A

I presume that "meanings are properties of conscious subjects," implies " also "and only conscious subjects".

Weird that recently a bunch of posts from different people seem to be suggesting that the world is comprised solely of meaning(s). Meanings are properties of conscious subjects, sure. But the vast, vast majority of stuff in the world is not meaning(s).

It's like saying "A good reason for thinking that the world is concealed by consciousness is that ice cream flavor preference is a property of a conscious subject." That makes no sense, right? Unless someone is thinking that the world is solely comprised of preferences for ice cream flavors.

[popeye1945]

Ok you'all, you find my reasoning nonsense, so, tell me how morality is made objective?

[GE Morton]

Ok you'all, you find my reasoning nonsense, so, tell me how morality is made objective?

Have you read the backthread? That has been covered pretty thoroughly.

[popeye1945]

GE, Then why is the thread still running?