Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Belindi]

Greta wrote:

On the other hand, being visually-oriented animals, humans tend to stare, and this is considered to be an act of aggression by many species. The faux pas can go either way.

I hear autistic people do less eye contact. That must mean autistic people all else being equal readily make friends with animals.

[Peter Holmes]

Fair point. No - my objection is to the argument that morality is objective - that there are moral facts - simply because an action can be consistent with a goal.

It depends upon how you understand the term "morality." If you take it, as I stated above, to refer to the a set of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, the aim of which rules is enabling all agents in that setting to maximize their well-being, then whether a proffered rule advances that goal is an empirical matter, and thus objective.

But of course, if you construe "morality" to refer to something esoteric, mystical, or a product of emotions and psychological idiosyncrasies --- i.e., as having some non-rational origin or basis --- then it will not be objective.

A morality must be rational to be philosophically respectable. Constructing a rational morality is a pragmatic endeavor, just as is (as I mentioned) constructing a workable set of traffic rules. The vernacular moralities that many people follow and espouse do not have a rational basis and hence will not be objective.

I think we've done this to death already. I'd just point out that your account involves value-judgements - and therefore subjectivity - at every stage. And this is a fine example: 'A morality must be rational to be philosophically respectable.' Is that a fact or a matter of opinion?

The fact that an action can be consistent with a goal, which itself makes no moral claim about rightness and wrongness, and so can't be a moral fact, does nothing to establish moral objectivity. Truth is, there are no moral facts, so morality can't be objective.

[Terrapin Station]

Whether anything amounts to well-being is just the same though. You can't publicly see anyone's feeling of well-being. You can publicly see them state that something creates a feeling of well-being in them, and you can observe states that _you_ count as well-being, but that's just the same for my feeling of unease. You can observe me make statements about it, and you can take observable states to count as it, but you can't actually observe my feeling.

I don't have to observe your feelings. I only have to observe your behavior to learn what is in your interests and thus what contributes to your welfare. What I count as well-being has nothing to do with it.

lol -- how would it be up to you rather than me what's in my interests and what contributes to my welfare?

[GE Morton]

I think we've done this to death already. I'd just point out that your account involves value-judgements - and therefore subjectivity - at every stage.

Of course, though not at every stage. Every philosophical question and issue --- not to mention all questions and issues in science, economics, etc., involves some value judgment, namely, that the question or issue is worthy of attention, investigation, discussion. E.g., seeking an effective vaccine for COVID proceeds from the value judgment that preventing that disease is a goal worth pursuing. All human activities, or at least those deliberate and intentional, presuppose some goal, which entails assigning some value to that goal.

And this is a fine example: 'A morality must be rational to be philosophically respectable.' Is that a fact or a matter of opinion?

It is actually a tautology --- philosophy (as that term is understood in Western academia) being the rational analysis of problematic issues and concepts.

1. The study of the nature, causes, or principles of reality, knowledge, or values, based on logical reasoning.
2. A system of thought based on or involving such study: the philosophy of Hume.

https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/searc ... philosophy

The fact that an action can be consistent with a goal, which itself makes no moral claim about rightness and wrongness, and so can't be a moral fact, does nothing to establish moral objectivity. Truth is, there are no moral facts, so morality can't be objective.

There is no special, "moral" sense of "rightness" and "wrongness." An act is right or wrong depending only upon whether, and the extent, to which it advances some given goal. E.g., selecting a screwdriver to drive a nail is a wrong choice of tool; selecting a hammer is the right tool. The only thing that qualifies an act or decision as a "moral" one is the fact that it involves a rule governing interactions between agents in a social setting. "Moral" decisions are simply pragmatic decisions in that context. That a given rule does or does not advance the stated goal is a "moral fact," just as that hammers are best for driving nails is a "carpentry fact."

[GE Morton]

I don't have to observe your feelings. I only have to observe your behavior to learn what is in your interests and thus what contributes to your welfare. What I count as well-being has nothing to do with it.

lol -- how would it be up to you rather than me what's in my interests and what contributes to my welfare?

It is not "up to me" to select your interests. It is only "up to me" to learn what are your interests, by observing your behavior.

[Terrapin Station]

I don't have to observe your feelings. I only have to observe your behavior to learn what is in your interests and thus what contributes to your welfare. What I count as well-being has nothing to do with it.

lol -- how would it be up to you rather than me what's in my interests and what contributes to my welfare?

It is not "up to me" to select your interests. It is only "up to me" to learn what are your interests, by observing your behavior.

Which wouldn't include me telling you what my interests are?

[Sy Borg]

Greta wrote:

On the other hand, being visually-oriented animals, humans tend to stare, and this is considered to be an act of aggression by many species. The faux pas can go either way.

I hear autistic people do less eye contact. That must mean autistic people all else being equal readily make friends with animals.

I do seem to empathise with animals more than average, but it would seem less so than most vegans, vegetarians, people who work in animal shelters etc. I do think that the strong priority humans have for other humans over other species is tribal rather than objective, ie. because we are "superior organisms". More complex, of course, does not mean "better" if the more complex entities are more destructive, eg. Stalin vs a pet dog,

[GE Morton]

Which wouldn't include me telling you what my interests are?

It might, but since people regularly deny interests they have and profess those they don't (gamblers, politicians, salesmen, etc.) , that evidence is not terribly reliable. What someone does is more revealing than what they say.

[GE Morton]

But, if the control is great enough, there could be strong consensus of the "objectivity" of morality amongst both generally and amongst "captive experts" (for want of a better term).

A consensus, no matter how strong, that a proposition is objective doesn't make it objective. It is objective IFF its truth conditions are publicly verifiable.

Other species are moral agents within their own groupings. There are certain rules amongst wolf packs, lion prides, herds of cattle and so forth. This is not something that most humans appreciate, and one of the reasons why other species are so often mistreated by people.

Well, that would be an eclectic meaning for "moral agent." That social animals appear to follow some rules doesn't qualify them as moral agents. Several definitions of that term can be found in the literature; my own, which is generally consistent with most others, is,

A Moral Agent is a sentient creature who
a) has interests and some capacity for pursuing them, and
b) is capable of recognizing other qualifying creatures as moral agents who likewise have interests, which may differ from his own, and
c) is capable of understanding and formulating moral principles and rules and acknowledges the need for them in a moral field.

A Moral Subject is a sentient creature for whom a), but not b) nor c) is true.
A Moral Imbecile is a sentient creature for whom a) and b), but not c), are true.

Many animals satisfy a), several also satisfy b). None (except humans, and perhaps some other primates) satisfy c).

Many social animals follow rules that are genetically programmed or derive from familial/tribal bonds among members of a group, i.e., they are emotionally driven. One may be tempted to call those "moral" rules, but they are not moral in the philosophical sense, i.e., rationally devised.

Empathetic feelings humans may have for animals (and I certainly have them) don't count as moral rules either.

[Peter Holmes]

I think we've done this to death already. I'd just point out that your account involves value-judgements - and therefore subjectivity - at every stage.

Of course, though not at every stage. Every philosophical question and issue --- not to mention all questions and issues in science, economics, etc., involves some value judgment, namely, that the question or issue is worthy of attention, investigation, discussion. E.g., seeking an effective vaccine for COVID proceeds from the value judgment that preventing that disease is a goal worth pursuing. All human activities, or at least those deliberate and intentional, presuppose some goal, which entails assigning some value to that goal.

And this is a fine example: 'A morality must be rational to be philosophically respectable.' Is that a fact or a matter of opinion?

It is actually a tautology --- philosophy (as that term is understood in Western academia) being the rational analysis of problematic issues and concepts.

1. The study of the nature, causes, or principles of reality, knowledge, or values, based on logical reasoning.
2. A system of thought based on or involving such study: the philosophy of Hume.

https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/searc ... philosophy

The fact that an action can be consistent with a goal, which itself makes no moral claim about rightness and wrongness, and so can't be a moral fact, does nothing to establish moral objectivity. Truth is, there are no moral facts, so morality can't be objective.

There is no special, "moral" sense of "rightness" and "wrongness." An act is right or wrong depending only upon whether, and the extent, to which it advances some given goal. E.g., selecting a screwdriver to drive a nail is a wrong choice of tool; selecting a hammer is the right tool. The only thing that qualifies an act or decision as a "moral" one is the fact that it involves a rule governing interactions between agents in a social setting. "Moral" decisions are simply pragmatic decisions in that context. That a given rule does or does not advance the stated goal is a "moral fact," just as that hammers are best for driving nails is a "carpentry fact."

You say moral assertions are factual, because they merely assert goal-consistency, which is publicly verifiable - so that in this way morality is factual and so objective.

But the claim 'we ought to have this moral goal' is not a factual assertion with a publicly-verifiable truth value. It expresses an opinion, with which there can be rational disagreement that doesn't involve factual contradiction.

So the moral use of 'ought', 'should', 'right' and 'wrong' is not always (merely) instrumental and so publicly-verifiable. The words can have a 'special "moral" sense'.

I suggest your argument involves special pleading.

[Sy Borg]

But, if the control is great enough, there could be strong consensus of the "objectivity" of morality amongst both generally and amongst "captive experts" (for want of a better term).

A consensus, no matter how strong, that a proposition is objective doesn't make it objective. It is objective IFF its truth conditions are publicly verifiable.

Only if a person who knows what objective morals happens to be there. However, no such person exists; each treats their own morality as correct.

How does objective reality differ from the morality that you endorse?

Other species are moral agents within their own groupings. There are certain rules amongst wolf packs, lion prides, herds of cattle and so forth. This is not something that most humans appreciate, and one of the reasons why other species are so often mistreated by people.

Well, that would be an eclectic meaning for "moral agent." That social animals appear to follow some rules doesn't qualify them as moral agents. Several definitions of that term can be found in the literature; my own, which is generally consistent with most others, is,

A Moral Agent is a sentient creature who
a) has interests and some capacity for pursuing them, and
b) is capable of recognizing other qualifying creatures as moral agents who likewise have interests, which may differ from his own, and
c) is capable of understanding and formulating moral principles and rules and acknowledges the need for them in a moral field.

The view is "eclectic" in that it is not anthropocentric. Anthropocentrism is routinely assumed to be "correct", with zero consideration made for other species. Even today, millions or maybe even billions believe that other animals such as dogs, elephants and dolphins have no mind whatsoever - that, like Descartes, they see animals as incapable of experiencing happiness and pain, that it's all just reflex actions that simulate emotions.

To that end:

a) Social animals certainly have interests and the ability to pursue them.
b) Social animals certainly recognise other members of the group as moral agents.
c) Most people would have no clue how to devise coherent moralities, hence rampant inconsistencies and hypocrisies. You have set the bar far too high with this one. I would agree that a proportion of human leaders and academics would have an understanding of morality beyond that of other species and they dictate the morality adopted by the masses, who largely follow those leaders as reflexively as a wolf will follow its pack's alphas.

Social rules in all intelligent social species tend to be set by the culture of the particular group, which is driven by the environment and the leadership group. Differences can certainly be seen in the cultures of different social animal groups, most famously in chimps.

[GE Morton]

You say moral assertions are factual, because they merely assert goal-consistency, which is publicly verifiable - so that in this way morality is factual and so objective.

I say moral assertions MAY be factual. Obviously not all are. A "moral assertion," BTW, is a proposition which asserts that some act is consistent or inconsistent with the goal of enabling all agents to maximize their welfare. It is not just any proposition which asserts someone's approval or disapproval of something.

But the claim 'we ought to have this moral goal' is not a factual assertion with a publicly-verifiable truth value. It expresses an opinion, with which there can be rational disagreement that doesn't involve factual contradiction.

Quite right; it is not a factual assertion. Neither is it a moral assertion. It is, as you say, merely an opinion expressing a value judgment. Propositions declaring values are not moral propositions. As I've mentioned before, we have to respect the distinction between axiology and deontology.

So the moral use of 'ought', 'should', 'right' and 'wrong' is not always (merely) instrumental and so publicly-verifiable. The words can have a 'special "moral" sense'.

Propositions declaring values are not "moral uses" of those terms. That a certain goal is worthy of pursuit is an axiological proposition, not a moral one.

[Terrapin Station]

Which wouldn't include me telling you what my interests are?

It might, but since people regularly deny interests they have and profess those they don't (gamblers, politicians, salesmen, etc.) , that evidence is not terribly reliable. What someone does is more revealing than what they say.

If they say that your interpretation is off the mark, however, how would you support that you're correct and they've got it wrong (or they're being dishonest)?

[Peter Holmes]

You say moral assertions are factual, because they merely assert goal-consistency, which is publicly verifiable - so that in this way morality is factual and so objective.

I say moral assertions MAY be factual. Obviously not all are. A "moral assertion," BTW, is a proposition which asserts that some act is consistent or inconsistent with the goal of enabling all agents to maximize their welfare. It is not just any proposition which asserts someone's approval or disapproval of something.

But the claim 'we ought to have this moral goal' is not a factual assertion with a publicly-verifiable truth value. It expresses an opinion, with which there can be rational disagreement that doesn't involve factual contradiction.

Quite right; it is not a factual assertion. Neither is it a moral assertion. It is, as you say, merely an opinion expressing a value judgment. Propositions declaring values are not moral propositions. As I've mentioned before, we have to respect the distinction between axiology and deontology.

So the moral use of 'ought', 'should', 'right' and 'wrong' is not always (merely) instrumental and so publicly-verifiable. The words can have a 'special "moral" sense'.

Propositions declaring values are not "moral uses" of those terms. That a certain goal is worthy of pursuit is an axiological proposition, not a moral one.

1 The distinction between axiology and moral theory isn't clear cut. A moral assertion expresses a moral value-judgement - which is an evaluation. And anyway, arguments for the objectivity of assertions of non-moral value are as unsound as those for the assertion of moral rightness or wrongness. There's no objectivity here.

2 That the goal of morality is to enable all agents to maximise their welfare is an opinion - not a fact. There are and have been other, rationally defended goals. That you think them irrational or less rational is your opinion. There's no objectivity here.

3 Consistency with a goal is not a sufficient condition for the objectivity of a moral assertion of the form 'X is morally right/wrong'. And the claim that such supposed objectivity applies only to consistency with a specific goal is special pleading.

4 Your analysis of the function of a moral assertion, such as 'slavery is morally wrong' is incorrect. That assertion doesn't mean 'X is inconsistent with goal Y'. It means 'X is morally wrong, whatever the goal'. That we apply our moral assertions universally is one reason why we can mistakenly think of them as objective.

[GE Morton]

If they say that your interpretation is off the mark, however, how would you support that you're correct and they've got it wrong (or they're being dishonest)?

By pointing to the actions in question, and the relation between actions of that sort and their typical results. E.g., if a person orders a hamburger at MacDonalds, then eats it, that is pretty conclusive evidence that he likes hamburgers --- even if he should say "I don't like hamburgers." Now, of course, in some cases an action may be taken for some atypical reason, or to bring about some atypical result. We verify that by observing his further actions.