Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Belindi]

Ninety-nine pages will do for this one.

But Einstein explained the difference between absolute and relative. Even theologians now know the difference.

[psyreporter]

A dogmatic statement is one unsupported by evidence or argument, such as your "As all such claims must be." My claim that morality can be objective, on the other hand, has been supported by extensive argument. You might wish to read the back thread and rebut those arguments.

Can you provide a simplified argument that would lock any opposing view into an automated exploration of those applicable arguments, so that by the strength of those arguments, objective morality can be made evident?

[Peter Holmes]

A dogmatic statement is one unsupported by evidence or argument, such as your "As all such claims must be." My claim that morality can be objective, on the other hand, has been supported by extensive argument. You might wish to read the back thread and rebut those arguments.

Can you provide a simplified argument that would lock any opposing view into an automated exploration of those applicable arguments, so that by the strength of those arguments, objective morality can be made evident?

Pending GEM's response, here's my take on the issue.

What we call objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts. So moral objectivism is the claim that there are moral facts - and that's what the claim that morality can be objective amounts to.

But what we call a fact is either a feature of reality that is or was the case, or a description of such a feature of reality. So a supposed moral fact must be one of those: a moral feature of reality that is or was the case, or a description of such a moral feature of reality.

But the claim that there are moral features of reality is obviously incoherent. There are only features of reality about which there can be moral opinions. For example, abortion and capital punishment are just features of reality (facts) about which people can have different moral opinions.

As I understand it, GEM's argument is that morality can be objective in the sense that the consistency of an action with a goal is a factual matter, so that an assertion of consistency - action X is consistent with goal Y - is factual and so has a truth-value independent from opinion. (I've suggested this echoes Sam Harris and Matt Dillahunty's 'subjective goal / objective means' argument, which I think is unsound.)

[GE Morton]

Can you provide a simplified argument that would lock any opposing view into an automated exploration of those applicable arguments, so that by the strength of those arguments, objective morality can be made evident?

I have no idea what might "lock any opposing view into an automated exploration" of those arguments. The best I can do is reprise them.

First, by "morality," I refer to a set of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting. I further take the aim of those rules to be enabling all agents in that setting (the "moral field") to maximize their welfare, insofar as the well-being of any given agent can be affected by the actions of other agents. In other words, the rules aim to restrain actions of agents which reduce the welfare of other agents, or prevent them from improving it, and encourage actions which improve others' welfare, to the extent that can be accomplished without reducing anyone else's.

To be sure, the term has been understood with a broader meaning by many moral philosophers, as embracing all kinds of conduct whether or not it affects other agents or occurs in a social setting. For many, "morality" refers to rules for "living the good life," or for complying with the Will of God. If one takes "morality" in one of those senses, then there can be no objective morality: what counts as as "good life" is intrinsically subjective, as is what is God's Will (the latter, BTW, raises a moral question in itself, i.e., the question of why one should endeavor to obey God's will, even if it could be known).

I distinguish morality as defined above from these other conceptions with the term "public morality." Agents constrained by the rules of the public morality remain free to further bind themselves with a private morality, such as a religious morality or by rules they believe assure living "the good life," as long as the latter rules don't conflict with the rules of the public morality.

Since the aim of a public morality is bringing about an empirical state of affairs, its rules will be objective. It is empirically determinable whether or not an act by an agent reduces or increases the well-being of another agent, or does neither. Thus it's "oughts" are instrumental "oughts" --- one "ought" to do X because doing X will improve someone's welfare; one ought not do Y because doing Y will reduce someone's welfare. Both of which outcomes are, in most cases, empirically determinable (in the instrumental sense "you ought to do X" simply means that doing X will further a given goal, e.g, "If one wishes to drive a nail one ought to get a hammer").

Some have argued that because what should count as well-being or welfare, like what counts as a "good life," is inherently subjective, so will be any rules proffered for achieving it. But while welfare or well-being is indeed idiosyncratic and subjective, what any agent counts as contributing to or detracting from his well-being is quite objective --- we can determine that by observing his behavior. We can see how he invests his time, efforts, money; what goods he seeks to acquire, what goals he pursues, and what evils he seeks to avoid. So we take Alfie's welfare to consist in satisfying whatever interests he has, as revealed by his actions.

I've elsewhere analogized the rules of a public morality to a set of traffic rules. The aim of the latter is to enable all users of the highway system to get where they wish to go, as quickly and safely as possible. They don't presume to set anyone's destinations, itineraries, or routes; they are indifferent to the purposes of the travel. They only constrain actions by drivers which interfere with others' travel or increase their risks.

So that's the gist of it.

[Steve3007]

...we can determine that by observing his behavior. We can see how he invests his time, efforts, money; what goods he seeks to acquire, what goals he pursues, and what evils he seeks to avoid. So we take Alfie's welfare to consist in satisfying whatever interests he has, as revealed by his actions.

Yes, and we can also simply ask him what he wants.

Since the aim of a public morality is bringing about an empirical state of affairs, its rules will be objective. It is empirically determinable whether or not an act by an agent reduces or increases the well-being of another agent, or does neither.

In principle this is true. So, in principle, for people who have equal knowledge of the empirical evidence as to which prior events cause which later events, there should be no debate as to what is the optimal set of laws for a society. i.e. there should be none of the classic (for example) left versus right debates between those people, so long as they all agree that the ultimate aim is to maximize the welfare of the citizens in the way you've described. i.e. according to their own definitions as to what their goals are.

Yet those debates still occur between people who agree about that ultimate aim, and not just between people who disagree about it. I think the main underlying reason for this is that the principle I mentioned above can never be unambiguously converted into practice. There is always debate about whether a given set of rules will in fact cause the desired end result and how long and/or indirect a chain of events should be considered. The latter is, I think, a particularly common underlying reason for disagreement.

For example, some people who might be classed as "socially conservative" and who argue for various restrictions on things like personal sexual behaviour will often clash with people who might be classed as "socially libertarian". But if the social conservatives aren't invoking some kind of moral authority like a God, then the two groups are disagreeing as to the extent to which wide, long term consequences of various behaviours should be taken into account. I've had these debates with non-God-invoking social conservatives myself. They generally base their arguments on what they propose to be the empirical consequences of various behaviours related to sex. The argument then can't continue unless it starts deviating from philosophy and plunges into statistics.

[Terrapin Station]

Since the aim of a public morality is bringing about an empirical state of affairs, its rules will be objective. It is empirically determinable whether or not an act by an agent reduces or increases the well-being of another agent,

It's empirically determinable whether I have a feeling of unease, but my feeling of unease isn't objective.

[GE Morton]

Since the aim of a public morality is bringing about an empirical state of affairs, its rules will be objective. It is empirically determinable whether or not an act by an agent reduces or increases the well-being of another agent,

It's empirically determinable whether I have a feeling of unease, but my feeling of unease isn't objective.

It is empirically determinable by you, but not publicly determinable. It must be publicly determinable to be objective.

[Terrapin Station]

Since the aim of a public morality is bringing about an empirical state of affairs, its rules will be objective. It is empirically determinable whether or not an act by an agent reduces or increases the well-being of another agent,

It's empirically determinable whether I have a feeling of unease, but my feeling of unease isn't objective.

It is empirically determinable by you, but not publicly determinable. It must be publicly determinable to be objective.

Whether anything amounts to well-being is just the same though. You can't publicly see anyone's feeling of well-being. You can publicly see them state that something creates a feeling of well-being in them, and you can observe states that _you_ count as well-being, but that's just the same for my feeling of unease. You can observe me make statements about it, and you can take observable states to count as it, but you can't actually observe my feeling.

[Sy Borg]

A strong enough totalitarian dictator could make any morality he, she or it wanted to be "objective". The public will all enthusiastically agree because anyone with a variant opinion will "disappear".

Otherwise, morality is simply an aspect of the argy-bargy of social animals. Might most often is accepted as right. Take, for instance, human attitudes towards animals. It's considered right in many circles that non-human animals be objectified, treated as though they had no sensibilities. Our laws regarding animal treatment and control reflects inherently speciesist attitudes. There will come a time when humans realise that their treatment of animals was morally wrong and needlessly cruel, just as European descendants gradually came to the realisation that their treatment of indigenous people was morally wrong and needlessly cruel.

But, for now, objectification and harsh treatment of other species is well accepted in all societies, and seems likely will continue until so many animals have been wiped out that that scarcity will render living specimens more valuable than dead ones.

[Peter Holmes]

A strong enough totalitarian dictator could make any morality he, she or it wanted to be "objective". The public will all enthusiastically agree because anyone with a variant opinion will "disappear".

Otherwise, morality is simply an aspect of the argy-bargy of social animals. Might most often is accepted as right. Take, for instance, human attitudes towards animals. It's considered right in many circles that non-human animals be objectified, treated as though they had no sensibilities. Our laws regarding animal treatment and control reflects inherently speciesist attitudes. There will come a time when humans realise that their treatment of animals was morally wrong and needlessly cruel, just as European descendants gradually came to the realisation that their treatment of indigenous people was morally wrong and needlessly cruel.

But, for now, objectification and harsh treatment of other species is well accepted in all societies, and seems likely will continue until so many animals have been wiped out that that scarcity will render living specimens more valuable than dead ones.

I couldn't agree more. In discussions will moral objectivists, I've often been informed that moral concerns apply only to humans - as a matter of fact.

And agreed - I think our descendants will look back on us with a moral disgust identical to the disgust we feel for our slave-owning ancestors.

[Peter Holmes]

with moral objectivists

[Sculptor1]

Can you provide a simplified argument that would lock any opposing view into an automated exploration of those applicable arguments, so that by the strength of those arguments, objective morality can be made evident?

I have no idea what might "lock any opposing view into an automated exploration" of those arguments. The best I can do is reprise them.

First, by "morality," I refer to a set of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting. I further take the aim of those rules to be enabling all agents in that setting (the "moral field") to maximize their welfare, insofar as the well-being of any given agent can be affected by the actions of other agents.
So that's the gist of it.

That it totalitarianism, not morality.

[Sculptor1]

No moral question can ever be answered with the objective method.

[Peter Holmes]

No moral question can ever be answered with the objective method.

Agreed. And yet the delusion of moral objectivism persists. The more I witness the spectacle of intellectual contortion required to keep believing there are moral facts, the more I'm convinced that we're dealing with a quasi-religious belief - as hard to shake off as any other.

[Steve3007]

As I understand it, GEM's argument is that morality can be objective in the sense that the consistency of an action with a goal is a factual matter, so that an assertion of consistency - action X is consistent with goal Y - is factual and so has a truth-value independent from opinion. (I've suggested this echoes Sam Harris and Matt Dillahunty's 'subjective goal / objective means' argument, which I think is unsound.)

When you say "which I think is unsound" does that imply that you think GEM's argument that "morality can be objective in the sense that the consistency of an action with a goal is a factual matter" is unsound?

If so, I disagree. Whether it constitutes "morality being objective" or not, it seems obvious to me that the consistency of an action with a goal is indeed a factual matter.