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[GE Morton]

There is a correlation between the "outside world" --- the one we conceive and talk about --- and mental content, but it is far from perfect. The mental content is directly experienced; that "outside world" is a theoretical construct built upon that mental content --- a dynamic construct that evolves and mutates over time.

There is, to be sure, another sense of "outside world" --- an hypothesized world completely independent of us which is the cause of our mental content. That outside world is unknowable by us, and hence about which we can say nothing.

I find it difficult to address your comment. Not only does it seem to have nothing to do with the kind of perfect correlation/connection/whatever we want to call it, that's inherent to the measurement problem. But even other than, it still seems to makes no sense.

You're right; it has nothing to do with the measurement problem. The statement of yours to which the comment was directed was broader than that: "This perfect correlation or connection or whatever we want to call it, between mental content and the outside physical world."

That correlation is far from perfect.

For example, if you really can't tell anything about the noumenon, then how can you tell that the noumenon is independent of us, and is the cause of our mental contect? Especially that these are unnecessary assumptions.

It is postulated to be independent of us and the cause of mental phenomena. And, yes, it is necessary, if we wish to explain those phenomena (which consists in find their cause), given that no cause is evident within those phenomena.

And even though we technically can never say anything about the noumenon, does that mean that we shouldn't? So that's it, forget science, forget philosophy, I'm stuck with my own mind, and let's end any inquiry there?

Any proposition we might utter concerning the noumenon, other than those included in the hypothesis itself, would be non-cognitive. That hypothesis allows us to escape solipsism.

[GE Morton]

Kant doesn't seem to have realized that the dichotomy of noumena and phenomena is probably just a pragmatic one, not an ontological one. And most philosophers after him seem to have adopted this subtle dualistic mistake.

No, it is not "pragmatic." Since no cause of mental phenomena is apparent within that phenomena --- it doesn't explain itself --- an external cause must be postulated. There is no mistake.

[GE Morton]

The "real world" of science and common understanding is a model. The noumenon is what that model strives to be a model of. But we can never know how accurate that model is, because to compare two things you have to be able to observe both.

But one thing we tend to do, in order to assess whether the model is an accurate model of this noumenon, is decide that there are certain characteristics that the noumenon must have in order to "make sense" - to be coherent. We then look at the model to see if it has those characteristics. If it doesn't have characteristics which we deem it to need in order to be coherent, some of us then say "OK, forget the noumenon. Just use the model to make predictions of future observations, and don't worry about what it's a model of".

Hmmm. Not sure to what the first "it" in the 2nd to last sentence refers --- the noumenon, or the model? Nor am I sure the term "coherent" can be applied to the noumenon, or the universe. That is a demand we make of descriptions and theories (verbal constructs). We do assume that the noumenon (and the universe) are law-governed, since the alternative is randomness. And since random behaviors are inexplicable we rule that out (even though there may well be some randomness in the universe).

And I agree, essentially, with " . . . forget the noumenon. Just use the model to make predictions of future observations, and don't worry about what it's a model of". We need to posit its existence, but there is no need to say anything more about it.

[Atla]

You're right; it has nothing to do with the measurement problem. The statement of yours to which the comment was directed was broader than that: "This perfect correlation or connection or whatever we want to call it, between mental content and the outside physical world."

That correlation is far from perfect.

Wrong, it was a statement about the measurement problem.

It is postulated to be independent of us and the cause of mental phenomena. And, yes, it is necessary, if we wish to explain those phenomena (which consists in find their cause), given that no cause is evident within those phenomena.

No, it is not "pragmatic." Since no cause of mental phenomena is apparent within that phenomena --- it doesn't explain itself --- an external cause must be postulated. There is no mistake.

That's mistaking the phenomena with what the phenomena are 'showing'. The phenomena themselves need no cause, and postulating their independence or fundamental difference from the noumena is also a mistake.

Any proposition we might utter concerning the noumenon, other than those included in the hypothesis itself, would be non-cognitive. That hypothesis allows us to escape solipsism.

What's a non-cognitive proposition?

[GE Morton]

The point I'm making is, if we assume that hypothetical world is real, then that's what is being modelled.

Yes.

And as soon as you talk about 'we' or 'our experience' you have assumed that hypothetical world exists, is real, and you know something about it (that other people exist and have experience). By comparing notes about the contents of our experience with other people we just add detail to the model of an 'outside world' we share and can inter-subjectively agree on some things we experience in relationship to it.

Yes, we assume the model accurately represents that outside world, the noumenon. But we have no means of testing that assumption. Nonetheless, we rely on the model until it fails to correctly predict some phenomenon. In some cases we can tweak the model to remove that failure; in other cases we're forced to revise it substantially or rebuild it from scratch. But there are, in principle, many ways --- perhaps infinitely many ---to describe, or model, any given phenomena, all with equal explanatory power.

So the model isn't a different world, it's how we experience the real world.

The model is the "real world" as we currently conceive it. It is not what we directly experience, however.

And as soon as you make 'we' claims, including claims about 'our experience', you have assumed a real 'outside-my-experience' world exists.

Actually, we make that assumption even before we make claims about our experience. The question of the cause of his existence and perceptions would arise even for a creature alone in the universe, if he/she/it were sentient.

Our inter-subjective shared model has its own methods of establishing 'objective' facts, the empirical/scientific method. It is here, within the current model, that the Hard Problem arises, and suggests our model of the real world as we experience it needs re-thinking.

Yes, it does. But the revision necessary is fairly minor.

[GE Morton]

You're right; it has nothing to do with the measurement problem. The statement of yours to which the comment was directed was broader than that: "This perfect correlation or connection or whatever we want to call it, between mental content and the outside physical world."

That correlation is far from perfect.

Wrong, it was a statement about the measurement problem.

Your statement quoted above says nothing about the measurement problem, which, BTW, is not a problem involving the correlation between mental content and the outside world.

It is postulated to be independent of us and the cause of mental phenomena. And, yes, it is necessary, if we wish to explain those phenomena (which consists in find their cause), given that no cause is evident within those phenomena.

No, it is not "pragmatic." Since no cause of mental phenomena is apparent within that phenomena --- it doesn't explain itself --- an external cause must be postulated. There is no mistake.

That's mistaking the phenomena with what the phenomena are 'showing'. The phenomena themselves need no cause, and postulating their independence or fundamental difference from the noumena is also a mistake.

That the phenomena are "showing" something is an hypothesis. The noumenon is postulated as the cause of those phenomena. And, yes, causes are necessarily different from and independent of their effects. A casual relationship is not an identity relationship.

Any proposition we might utter concerning the noumenon, other than those included in the hypothesis itself, would be non-cognitive. That hypothesis allows us to escape solipsism.

What's a non-cognitive proposition?

A proposition is non-cognitive if it has no articulable and actionable truth conditions, no determinable truth value. I.e., when we don't know what observations to make or procedures to follow to determine whether it is true or false.

[Atla]

Your statement quoted above says nothing about the measurement problem,

When I write "measurement problem", I'm talking about the "measurement problem".

which, BTW, is not a problem involving the correlation between mental content and the outside world.

Wrong, of course it involves that too. Unless you can show that for some reason it doesn't.
But you probably don't know what kind of perfect correlation/connection/whatever we want to call it, is in question here. Which was my point, ~90% people on philosophy forums aren't up-to-date with metaphysics.

That the phenomena are "showing" something is an hypothesis. The noumenon is postulated as the cause of those phenomena. And, yes, causes are necessarily different from and independent of their effects. A casual relationship is not an identity relationship.

You are still confusing the (nature of the) phenomena themselves with what the phenomena are showing. Yes, what the phenomena are showing (how the phenomena are shaped / what they present), may be an end result of a 'causal chain', if we want to force a one-directional causality on the world.

But that in no way means that the phenomena themselves are "caused" by noumena, and that there is a fundamental one-directional causality between them, or that they are independent. Postulating such things is nonsense.

[Steve3007]

Hmmm. Not sure to what the first "it" in the 2nd to last sentence refers --- the noumenon, or the model?

That's the sentence: "We then look at the model to see if it has those characteristics."

In that sentence the "it" refers to the model.

Nor am I sure the term "coherent" can be applied to the noumenon, or the universe.

Nor am I. But I note that some people do apply what they seem to see as a test of coherence or "making sense" to the thing which we call reality and which we think of our models as attempting to describe. That appears to be one reason for some people's philosophical issues with some of the findings of quantum mechanics, if we think of those findings as being attempts to describe a thing we call reality and not just attempts to describe the regularities we notice in our sensations.

That is a demand we make of descriptions and theories (verbal constructs).

Yes. We ask that verbal and mathematical constructs that are used to describe things are internally logically consistent. But, as I said, I note that a lot of people, often in vaguely defined ways, extend concepts like consistency and coherence to the things being described as well as to the descriptions. I think it often stems from a confusion between that which is logically inconsistent and that which is empirically not observed to be the case. For example, it is empirically observed that objects don't spontaneously appear/disappear. (That might sometime superficially be observed to happen, but it always turns out that the object in question has gone behind something, or been transformed into another type of object, or whatever.) Some people seem to take this empirically verified rule as a logically necessary rule and conflate those two completely different types of rule or principle.

[Atla]

Nor am I sure the term "coherent" can be applied to the noumenon, or the universe.

Nor am I. But I note that some people do apply what they seem to see as a test of coherence or "making sense" to the thing which we call reality and which we think of our models as attempting to describe. That appears to be one reason for some people's philosophical issues with some of the findings of quantum mechanics, if we think of those findings as being attempts to describe a thing we call reality and not just attempts to describe the regularities we notice in our sensations.

It's entirely possible that the world is random and makes no sense at all. That the big questions have no answers.

So either we don't even try to deal with big questions. Or we do try, and assume that there is some consistency, logic to the world, because otherwise it's not possible to get anywhere. Personally I don't understand the 'let's not try' attitude at all, at least not in a philosophical setting.

Besides quantum mechanics is a bad example. It is mind-bendingly strange, but it is mind-bendingly strange in a perfectly consistent manner. It's cliché, but no prediction of QM was ever wrong. What would it describe if not a behaviour of reality?

[Steve3007]

It's entirely possible that the world is random and makes no sense at all.

Would you regard "being random" and "making no sense" as the same?

[Steve3007]

What would it describe if not a behaviour of reality?

One of the standard answers, as we know, is that it describes and predicts the results of experiments - observations. The question of whether those results tell us something about the "behaviour of reality" is the question that some people prefer to leave open, or prefer to regard as entirely metaphysical (those being the kinds of people who regard something that is "entirely metaphysical" as angels on the head of a pin meaningless.)

[Atla]

Would you regard "being random" and "making no sense" as the same?

I guess I don't, not necessarily. But I'm not sure, after all it makes no sense anymore.

One of the standard answers, as we know, is that it describes and predicts the results of experiments - observations. The question of whether those results tell us something about the "behaviour of reality" is the question that some people prefer to leave open, or prefer to regard as entirely metaphysical (those being the kinds of people who regard something that is "entirely metaphysical" as angels on the head of a pin meaningless.)

I don't understand this attitude at all, in a philosophical setting. Instrumentalism is not a philosophy, it's the lack of philosophy.

[GE Morton]

. . . which, BTW, is not a problem involving the correlation between mental content and the outside world.

Wrong, of course it involves that too. Unless you can show that for some reason it doesn't.

Er, no. The burden of proof rests with he who holds the affirmative.

But you probably don't know what kind of perfect correlation/connection/whatever we want to call it, is in question here. Which was my point, ~90% people on philosophy forums aren't up-to-date with metaphysics.

"Up to date with metaphysics"? Which/whose metaphysics do you deem "up to date"?

That the phenomena are "showing" something is an hypothesis. The noumenon is postulated as the cause of those phenomena. And, yes, causes are necessarily different from and independent of their effects. A casual relationship is not an identity relationship.

You are still confusing the (nature of the) phenomena themselves with what the phenomena are showing.

You seem not have grasped the point you just quoted. So let me repeat it: that the phenomena are "showing" something (something beyond themselves) is an hypothesis, a theory of the phenomena. Which theory is another mental artifact.

Yes, what the phenomena are showing (how the phenomena are shaped / what they present), may be an end result of a 'causal chain', if we want to force a one-directional causality on the world.

But that in no way means that the phenomena themselves are "caused" by noumena, and that there is a fundamental one-directional causality between them, or that they are independent. Postulating such things is nonsense.

You just contradicted yourself. If mental phenomena are effects of a causal chain, then then some cause(s) is necessary. The noumenon is postulated to be that cause. If it is "nonsense," then so is is the causal chain. And if that is also nonsense, then phenomena are inexplicable.

[GE Morton]

Besides quantum mechanics is a bad example. It is mind-bendingly strange, but it is mind-bendingly strange in a perfectly consistent manner. It's cliché, but no prediction of QM was ever wrong. What would it describe if not a behaviour of reality?

It describes the observations --- the phenomena we experience.

[Atla]

Er, no. The burden of proof rests with he who holds the affirmative.

"Up to date with metaphysics"? Which/whose metaphysics do you deem "up to date"?

If you were more up-to-date, you would know that you are asking for proof for something that was observed to be the case for every experiment ever carried out. Hence the measurement problem.

You seem not have grasped the point you just quoted. So let me repeat it: that the phenomena are "showing" something (something beyond themselves) is an hypothesis, a theory of the phenomena. Which theory is another mental artifact.

Obviously, and? That wasn't the issue.

You just contradicted yourself. If mental phenomena are effects of a causal chain, then then some cause(s) is necessary. The noumenon is postulated to be that cause. If it is "nonsense," then so is is the causal chain. And if that is also nonsense, then phenomena are inexplicable.

You still don't seem to understand the difference between the mental phenomena and what the mental phenomena are showing. I addressed this above. I don't know what else to tell you if you fail to make this simple distinction.

It describes the observations --- the phenomena we experience.

Which is also true for everything else ever in science, was that supposed to be an argument for something?