Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

Not only is that not at all the case--there's simply a necessity to understand the different ways that people are using terms, but terminological stubbornness will only get in one's way re understanding what the world is really like. You'll be focused on squeezing things into the uncompromising way you use terms rather than focused on making accurate observations and adjusting your concepts and terms accordingly.

If you have puzzle out what eclectic meanings someone is attaching to common terms no substantive communication can occur; that conversation would be tedious and vacuous. Surreptitiously re-defining common terms is a tactic of sophists.

Nor does understanding what "the world is really like" require translating some idiosyncratic word usages. It only requires observing it.

[Terrapin Station]

If you have puzzle out what eclectic meanings someone is attaching to common terms no substantive communication can occur

If it's that difficult for you to learn, remember and apply different definitions that someone else is using, so that you can have "substantive" communication with them, you must have a learning disability. It shouldn't be difficult for you.

[Terrapin Station]

You're right, but you're repeating the same confusion I clarified earlier. Of course a rock, being a physical object composed of certain elements and having a certain complex geometric shape, has little, if anything, in common with an utterance, which is a sequence of sounds. But what that utterance asserts can be identical with some feature of the rock.

No, it can't. Either you're talking about the assertion as an utterance or you're talking about the meaning someone applies to it. Neither is anything like the rock.

Propositions assert that some external state of affairs exists. If they did not they would not communicate information.

I'm sure I've explained to you what communication is before. In short, communication occurs when two or more people apply meanings to utterances that are coherent, at least reasonably consistent, etc. to the parties involved.

That is false prima facie. "Identity" is a concept.

Oy vey, still with the moronic conflation of concepts with what concepts are about.

You're incapable of learning.

[GE Morton]

You're right, but you're repeating the same confusion I clarified earlier. Of course a rock, being a physical object composed of certain elements and having a certain complex geometric shape, has little, if anything, in common with an utterance, which is a sequence of sounds. But what that utterance asserts can be identical with some feature of the rock.

No, it can't. Either you're talking about the assertion as an utterance or you're talking about the meaning someone applies to it. Neither is anything like the rock.

We've had this conversation before. The meaning of a word is what it denotes, per common usages. Whatever may be in someone's head is irrelevant. We learn meanings of words by observing how people behave when they hear it, e.g., when someone says, "I'll have a small Coke, please," and the server hands him a small Coke, not a hamburger or a chocolate shake. We have no access to anything in anyone's head.

I'm sure I've explained to you what communication is before. In short, communication occurs when two or more people apply meanings to utterances that are coherent, at least reasonably consistent, etc. to the parties involved.

Unless you know the meanings of the words used you have no means of deciding whether the utterance is coherent. You learn the meanings of words by observing how they are used, not by mind-reading.

Oy vey, still with the moronic conflation of concepts with what concepts are about.

Concepts define what they are about. They are about whatever they say they are about.

[Terrapin Station]

We've had this conversation before. The meaning of a word is what it denotes, per common usages. Whatever may be in someone's head is irrelevant.

Right. We've had the conversation before. So you should know you're completely wrong. We can go step by step why again, but I doubt it will stick for reasons I already specified.

[Belindi]

We've had this conversation before. The meaning of a word is what it denotes, per common usages. Whatever may be in someone's head is irrelevant.

Right. We've had the conversation before. So you should know you're completely wrong. We can go step by step why again, but I doubt it will stick for reasons I already specified.

The socialmeaning of a word is what it denotes. Connotations may be either idiosyncratic and eccentric, or they may be part of social reality.

[Terrapin Station]

Right. We've had the conversation before. So you should know you're completely wrong. We can go step by step why again, but I doubt it will stick for reasons I already specified.

The socialmeaning of a word is what it denotes. Connotations may be either idiosyncratic and eccentric, or they may be part of social reality.

There are conventional (or we could say "social") definitions of terms, where definitions are different than meanings (definitions being text, sound, etc. strings associated with a term). But re meaning, including denotation, that only works via an individual thinking about the definition in an associative, intentional (in the "aboutness" sense) manner. And as thinking, it cannot be literally shared (in the show and tell sense). It also can't be socially engineered, other than in a very indirect manner. Individuals may have very different denotations in mind where there is no way to easily discern this (because they're correlating different denotations with the same definitions, pointings, etc.) aside from the fact that long-term communication with them about the term in question may seem to be quirky or at least slightly off-kilter the longer the interaction goes on, but where it's very difficult if not impossible to pinpoint exactly where divergences are occurring, because the divergences are occurring in the stuff that's not shareable (again in the show and tell sense), not in the stuff that is shareable.

So in other words, people can both say, "x is y" (where x is the same definiendum (word to be defined) for both, and y the same definiens (definition) for both, in terms of observable text or sound strings), and they can both point at something where they verbally agree, "Yeah, that thing!" and so on, but the pointing, whether textual, aural or gestural, only works as pointing because each of them are thinking about it in an associative, intentional way. The textual, aural and gestural stuff can't refer on its own. It requires someone to think about it in an associative, intentional way. Textual, aural and gestural denotation is intentional--it has an "aboutness" property, and intentionality is the mark of the mental. That thinking can't be literally shared (it can only be correlated by the thinker with more textual, aural, gestural, etc. observables, where only the thinker knows the correlation between the observables and his/her thinking). And that thinking can be very different for each despite correlating it with the same observables. (A classic example is Quine's "gavagai," but where on my view, this can just as easily happen with people speaking the same language (or perhaps we should call that "the same language."))

So there are social definitions, but there is no social meaning, and meaning, both denotative and connotative, can vary wildly from individual to individual. We merely assume, for practical reasons, that it isn't varying too much until something starts to seem off-kilter in continued communicative interaction with someone, where we might not be able to peg quite where things are going askew.

Of course, sometimes people rather quickly are led to different observables (text, sounds, gestures) when we try to figure out what's going askew, but they won't always be--some cases simply remain uncrackable, and since we're always talking about correlations that are unobservable, the different observables (terms, definitions, pointings, etc.) can actually be correlated to the same (ignoring nominalist objections for a moment) mental content, making things more complicated.

[GE Morton]

The socialmeaning of a word is what it denotes. Connotations may be either idiosyncratic and eccentric, or they may be part of social reality.

All meanings are social. Language is a social activity, and presumes a social context. As I said, "The meaning of a word is what it denotes, per common usages."

It is true that words have connotative as well as denotative meanings. The former are idiosyncratic, and depend upon each person's personal experiences with the things a word denotes. As a timely example (in the US), the connotations of "cop" will be different for (some) blacks than for most whites. But the truth value of propositions depends only on the denotative meanings of the words used, not on those subjective connotations.

[Terrapin Station]

All meanings are social. Language is a social activity, and presumes a social context. As I said, "The meaning of a word is what it denotes, per common usages."

It is true that words have connotative as well as denotative meanings. The former are idiosyncratic, and depend upon each person's personal experiences with the things a word denotes. As a timely example (in the US), the connotations of "cop" will be different for (some) blacks than for most whites. But the truth value of propositions depends only on the denotative meanings of the words used, not on those subjective connotations.

I don't know if you're even capable of understanding what I wrote above that explains why this view is wrong.

[Sculptor1]

The socialmeaning of a word is what it denotes. Connotations may be either idiosyncratic and eccentric, or they may be part of social reality.

All meanings are social. Language is a social activity, and presumes a social context. As I said, "The meaning of a word is what it denotes, per common usages."

It is true that words have connotative as well as denotative meanings. The former are idiosyncratic, and depend upon each person's personal experiences with the things a word denotes. As a timely example (in the US), the connotations of "cop" will be different for (some) blacks than for most whites. But the truth value of propositions depends only on the denotative meanings of the words used, not on those subjective connotations.

There can be no strict line between connotation and denotation, since the descriptive power of words are at all times limited by a network of interconnected metaphors.
Even the most careful and meticulous dictionaries can offer ambiguous and unclear definitions. And rarely does a word have a single unimpeachable denoted meaning, and no word can be without connotation.

[GE Morton]

All meanings are social. Language is a social activity, and presumes a social context. As I said, "The meaning of a word is what it denotes, per common usages."

It is true that words have connotative as well as denotative meanings. The former are idiosyncratic, and depend upon each person's personal experiences with the things a word denotes. As a timely example (in the US), the connotations of "cop" will be different for (some) blacks than for most whites. But the truth value of propositions depends only on the denotative meanings of the words used, not on those subjective connotations.

I don't know if you're even capable of understanding what I wrote above that explains why this view is wrong.

You wrote above, "But re meaning, including denotation, that only works via an individual thinking about the definition in an associative, intentional (in the "aboutness" sense) manner."

You seem to be stating the trivial truth that meanings presuppose some sentient --- thinking --- creature, and that it "works" by such a creature forming an association between some vocal sound and some set of perceptible things.

Well, of course. But an explanation of how meanings come to be is not an explanation of what meanings are. And it certainly isn't an explanation of how meanings are learned or how they manage to become widely understood within a speech community, allowing members of that community to convey information to one another.

Yes, various mental processes are required to produce, learn, and interpret meanings. But we need know nothing about those to learn and use a language. Indeed, we can assume all of the other members of our speech community are zombies, or automatons with no minds at all, and still learn their language and communicate with them. We need only observe their behavior.

[GE Morton]

There can be no strict line between connotation and denotation . . .

That is true of some words, e.g., words that serve to express or arouse emotions. But it is not true of concrete nouns, verbs, or adjectives and adverbs denoting empirical properties. Per my example above, while "cop" may arouse different connotations in different people, it's denotative meaning is understood by all (a government employee empowered to enforce laws and make arrests).

Even the most careful and meticulous dictionaries can offer ambiguous and unclear definitions. And rarely does a word have a single unimpeachable denoted meaning, and no word can be without connotation.

Many words have multiple meanings, each one denoting a different set of objects. Normally the context makes clear which meaning is intended. You're also right that dictionary definitions are sometimes ambiguous or unclear. They're written by humans, after all.

[Sculptor1]

There can be no strict line between connotation and denotation . . .

That is true of some words, e.g., words that serve to express or arouse emotions. But it is not true of concrete nouns, verbs, or adjectives and adverbs denoting empirical properties. Per my example above, while "cop" may arouse different connotations in different people, it's denotative meaning is understood by all (a government employee empowered to enforce laws and make arrests).

Please show me any single word that can denote without connoting. ANY one.

Even the most careful and meticulous dictionaries can offer ambiguous and unclear definitions. And rarely does a word have a single unimpeachable denoted meaning, and no word can be without connotation.

Many words have multiple meanings, each one denoting a different set of objects. Normally the context makes clear which meaning is intended. You're also right that dictionary definitions are sometimes ambiguous or unclear. They're written by humans, after all.

All words and their meanings are artefactual. I fail to see why your last sentence has any force or meaning.
Many make the mistake of thinking words are the true representative of Platonic forms.

[Terrapin Station]

You wrote above, "But re meaning, including denotation, that only works via an individual thinking about the definition in an associative, intentional (in the "aboutness" sense) manner."

You seem to be stating the trivial truth that meanings presuppose some sentient --- thinking --- creature, and that it "works" by such a creature forming an association between some vocal sound and some set of perceptible things.

Well, of course. But an explanation of how meanings come to be is not an explanation of what meanings are.

How it works it now it comes to be. Weird that you don't understand the word "works," which is why you put it in quotation marks. So if turns out that I was right. You're not capable of understanding what I wrote.

[Terrapin Station]

Oops, autocorrect typo: the first sentence was supposed to be "How it works is how it comes to be."