Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

All we can know of "how it is" is what we can perceive. Are you claiming we cannot accurately describe what we perceive?

Whether that's all we can know or not, us something something about it IS NOT THE SAME as it.

[Terrapin Station]

Oops:

"Whether that's all we can know or not, us saying something about it IS NOT THE SAME as it."

[GE Morton]

PS: You're not merely claiming the trivial truth that a proposition about X is not identical with X, are you?

But here's what you said earlier.

Terrapin Station wrote: Surely he was using "fact" as a "state of affairs" and NOT as "what is asserted by a true proposition."

GEM repied: Those are identical. States of affairs are precisely what is asserted by true propositions, nothing more or less.

So to clarify, do you think a state-of-affairs is identical to what is asserted by a true proposition - or not?

Do you conflate what we say about things with the way things are? If so, that's an obvious mistake.

Yes, a state of affairs is identical what is asserted by a true proposition. E.g., "Paris is the capital of France" asserts that Paris is the capital of France. That Paris is the capital of France is a state of affairs. That state of affairs is what "Paris is the capital of France" asserts.

A state of affairs is not identical with the proposition asserting it, of course. A proposition is a certain form of words. But it is identical with what that proposition asserts.

Do you conflate what we say about things with the way things are? If so, that's an obvious mistake.

Well, that depends on what we say. If I say, "Marseilles is the capital of France," that would not be identical with "the way things are." But if I say, "Paris is the capital of France," that would be identical with the way things are.

And, of course, all we can know about "the way things are" is what we can perceive and deduce from what we perceive.

[Terrapin Station]

Yes, a state of affairs is identical what is asserted by a true proposition. E.g., "Paris is the capital of France" asserts that Paris is the capital of France. That Paris is the capital of France is a state of affairs. That state of affairs is what "Paris is the capital of France" asserts.

A state of affairs is not identical with the proposition asserting it, of course. A proposition is a certain form of words. But it is identical with what that proposition asserts.

Except, again, that the above is wrong. There were states of affairs 4 billion years ago. There were no assertions 4 billion years ago. So the relationship isn't one of identity.

[GE Morton]

We seem to be bogged down in epistemology and ontology again. So I feel the need to rewind and try to clarify the lines of our disagreement. My argument is this.

A moral assertion, such as 'slavery is wrong', expresses a value-judgement about slavery. It doesn't make a factual claim with a truth-value, which is why it isn't false to say 'slavery is not morally wrong' - as did most of our ancestors until very recently.

"Slavery is wrong" may very well, and indeed often does, express nothing more than a value judgment. It may merely mean, "I disapprove of slavery," Which falls in the same category as, "I don't like onions."

But if we modify that assertion slightly, to, "Slavery is morally wrong," then the speaker is not saying merely that he dislikes slavery; he is claiming that slavery is inconsistent with some moral principle. It is no longer a value judgment; it is logical conclusion, or purports to be. It may or may not be valid (there may be some non-sequitur involved), or it may not be sound (the principle which serves as the premise may be false, or dubious). The speaker would have the burden of defending that principle. A person may argue, sincerely, that slavery is morally wrong while personally accepting it (think of Thomas Jefferson).

Nothing in reality can verify or falsify either of those moral assertions, precisely because they don't have truth-value.

Even if "Slavery is wrong" is indeed merely a value judgment, equivalent to, "I dislike slavery," it still has a truth value. The speaker either does or does not like slavery. It is subjective, of course, but even subjective statements have truth values. And, yes, that the speaker dislikes slavery is a "fact," a feature of "reality," just as would be the fact that he dislikes onions.

A moral assertion, such as 'slavery is wrong', can be true if it is consistent with an axiom, postulate or goal, such as 'promote the well-being of everyone equally' - and that in this way morality is or can be objective. He says the moral 'ought' is merely instrumental: if we want to promote the well-being of everyone equally, then we ought not to enslave anyone. And since consistency with an axiom is verifiable, factual assertions about consistency have truth-value and can be facts - true factual assertions. So again, since objectivity is independence from opinion when considering the facts, in this way morality is or can objective. The choice of axiom is subjective, but what follows can be objective.

You do fine until the last sentence. A choice of an axiom --- or indeed any choice --- is not "subjective." "Subjective" and "objective" are properties of propositions, and choices are not propositions. In this case the axiom reflects and codifies a certain goal, one which expresses a widely shared conception of the aim, the purpose, indeed the meaning, of "morality." Choices of goals are not "objective" or "subjective" either. They do, of course, reflect some desire on the part of the agent who adopts it, which can be idiosyncratic, but so do all human actions. In setting out to develop a moral theory we take the goal as a given --- or not (and if not, then the ensuing theory will be moot). A different goal would entail a different theory.

Again, every human activity presupposes some goal. We may decide, for example, to build a highway between two towns. Given that goal we explore what we must do, and must not do, to achieve it. Certain things we might do will be "right," and others "wrong," given that goal. For someone who has no desire to build that highway those "rights" and "wrongs" will be moot. But whether or not the goal is adopted, the "right" and "wrong" ways to pursue it will be objective (or at least can be).

[Terrapin Station]

"Slavery is wrong" may very well, and indeed often does, express nothing more than a value judgment. It may merely mean, "I disapprove of slavery," Which falls in the same category as, "I don't like onions."

But if we modify that assertion slightly, to, "Slavery is morally wrong," then the speaker is not saying merely that he dislikes slavery; he is claiming that slavery is inconsistent with some moral principle. It is no longer a value judgment; it is logical conclusion, or purports to be. It may or may not be valid (there may be some non-sequitur involved), or it may not be sound (the principle which serves as the premise may be false, or dubious). The speaker would have the burden of defending that principle. A person may argue, sincerely, that slavery is morally wrong while personally accepting it (think of Thomas Jefferson).

That would only be if you parse morality necessarily in terms of being principle-based, but it need not be.

And at any rate, moral principles would have to be value judgments in that case. So you're just pushing the value judgment back a step.

[GE Morton]

Yes, a state of affairs is identical what is asserted by a true proposition. E.g., "Paris is the capital of France" asserts that Paris is the capital of France. That Paris is the capital of France is a state of affairs. That state of affairs is what "Paris is the capital of France" asserts.

A state of affairs is not identical with the proposition asserting it, of course. A proposition is a certain form of words. But it is identical with what that proposition asserts.

Except, again, that the above is wrong. There were states of affairs 4 billion years ago. There were no assertions 4 billion years ago. So the relationship isn't one of identity.

Identity between members of two sets doesn't require the two sets to have the same cardinality. It only requires that each member of one set is identical with its counterpart in the second set, if there is one.

And of course, whether there were states of affairs 4 billion years ago is conjecture on your part, and any state of affairs you claim existed then would be identical to what your claim asserts (if it existed).

[GE Morton]

That would only be if you parse morality necessarily in terms of being principle-based, but it need not be.

If it is not it is not "morality," as commonly understood.

[Terrapin Station]

Identity between members of two sets doesn't require the two sets to have the same cardinality.

Presumably you're talking about some mathematical definition of identity then rather than the more traditional sense of logical identity?

And of course, whether there were states of affairs 4 billion years ago is conjecture on your part

Conjecture as opposed to?

[Terrapin Station]

That would only be if you parse morality necessarily in terms of being principle-based, but it need not be.

If it is not it is not "morality," as commonly understood.

That amounts to this argument:

"I'm going to refuse to name x 'F' if you don't meet my requirements."

Which, of course, isn't really an argument, it's just a statement of stubbornness re terminology.

[GE Morton]

Identity between members of two sets doesn't require the two sets to have the same cardinality.

Presumably you're talking about some mathematical definition of identity then rather than the more traditional sense of logical identity?

No, although I'm not sure what "mathematical identity" is. I take two things to be identical if they have no properties by which they can be distinguished, other than spatio-temporal coordinates. Or (in other words), every proposition true of X will be true of Y also (other than those asserting spatio-temporal coordinates). BTW, without a spatio-temporal difference we don't have 2 things at all; only one thing.

Conjecture as opposed to?

As opposed to knowledge.

[GE Morton]

That amounts to this argument:

"I'm going to refuse to name x 'F' if you don't meet my requirements."

Which, of course, isn't really an argument, it's just a statement of stubbornness re terminology.

Yes indeed. Stubbornness re: terminology is required for substantive communication --- wherein some information is conveyed --- to be possible. If "Words mean whatever I want them to mean," a la Humpty Dumpty, then we have a Tower of Babel, and no information can be communicated.

[Terrapin Station]

No, although I'm not sure what "mathematical identity" is. I take two things to be identical if they have no properties by which they can be distinguished, other than spatio-temporal coordinates.

So one way to make a distinction here is that arrangements and properties of external particulars--like say, the composition of a rock--is nothing like an utterance.

every proposition true of X will be true of Y also (other than those asserting spatio-temporal coordinates). BTW, without a spatio-temporal difference we don't have 2 things at all; only one thing.

Identity is an ontological fact that doesn't at all hinge on persons, including persons thinking propositions, persons making judgments about the propositions they think (which is what truth is), etc.

Conjecture as opposed to?

As opposed to knowledge.

We have knowledge that the world existed billions of years ago, when people did not exist. So no, it's not just conjecture.

[Terrapin Station]

Stubbornness re: terminology is required for substantive communication

Not only is that not at all the case--there's simply a necessity to understand the different ways that people are using terms, but terminological stubbornness will only get in one's way re understanding what the world is really like. You'll be focused on squeezing things into the uncompromising way you use terms rather than focused on making accurate observations and adjusting your concepts and terms accordingly.

[GE Morton]

So one way to make a distinction here is that arrangements and properties of external particulars--like say, the composition of a rock--is nothing like an utterance.

You're right, but you're repeating the same confusion I clarified earlier. Of course a rock, being a physical object composed of certain elements and having a certain complex geometric shape, has little, if anything, in common with an utterance, which is a sequence of sounds. But what that utterance asserts can be identical with some feature of the rock. Propositions assert that some external state of affairs exists. If they did not they would not communicate information.

Identity is an ontological fact that doesn't at all hinge on persons, including persons thinking propositions, persons making judgments about the propositions they think (which is what truth is), etc.

That is false prima facie. "Identity" is a concept. Like all concepts it is a creation of some sentient being. What counts as an "ontological fact" depends upon the ontological theory you adopt. Those theories are also human constructs. Likewise with "states of affairs." What counts as one depends upon the ontological theory you adopt or assume.

We have knowledge that the world existed billions of years ago, when people did not exist. So no, it's not just conjecture.

We don't have knowledge by acquaintance of that "fact," and will never have it. We may claim theoretical knowledge of it, and have at present reason to believe that theory is sound. But like all theories it is subject to obsolescence by future experience. Per a theory abandoned not long ago the world was 4004 years old.