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[Peter Holmes]

Here's a way to understand why morality isn't and can't be objective - why there are no moral facts. Look at this argument:

We believe X is morally wrong; therefore X is morally wrong.

I hope no one thinks the conclusion follows from the premise - that the premise entails the conclusion. And notice that substituting 'I', 'some of us', 'many of us' or 'all of us' for 'We' in the premise makes no difference to the lack of entailment. It could always be that X is not morally wrong.

Now insert more information into the premise, as follows:

We believe X is morally wrong, because ... ; therefore X is morally wrong.

Now, what comes after 'because' can be anything at all: life begins at fertilisation, the murder rate is falling, a person own herself, humans are programmed not to do X, a god disapproves of X - and so on.

The point is, whatever reason(s) we have for believing X is morally wrong, it still doesn't follow that X is morally wrong. It could still always be that X is not morally wrong. Nothing does or can entail the moral conclusion except the main clause in the premise: we believe X is morally wrong - which, of course, makes the argument vacuous.

And if we delete the main clause - we believe X is morally wrong - we're left with numerous possible 'reasons' - countless possible facts - in a subordinate clause, with nothing for them to be reasons for anyway.

And that's the really hard thing for moral objectivists to grasp. Whatever reason we have to believe X is morally wrong, it could always be that X is not morally wrong, for some other reason. So 'X is morally wrong' can never be a fact. So there are no moral facts, and morality isn't and can't be objective.

[GE Morton]

Here's a way to understand why morality isn't and can't be objective - why there are no moral facts. Look at this argument:

We believe X is morally wrong; therefore X is morally wrong.

I hope no one thinks the conclusion follows from the premise - that the premise entails the conclusion. And notice that substituting 'I', 'some of us', 'many of us' or 'all of us' for 'We' in the premise makes no difference to the lack of entailment. It could always be that X is not morally wrong.

Quite correct. Whether X (which I assume is some act, practice, or policy) is morally wrong has nothing to do with anyone's beliefs. X is morally wrong if it is inconsistent with a sound moral theory. Whether it is or is not consistent with that theory is objective.

And that's the really hard thing for moral objectivists to grasp. Whatever reason we have to believe X is morally wrong, it could always be that X is not morally wrong, for some other reason. So 'X is morally wrong' can never be a fact. So there are no moral facts, and morality isn't and can't be objective.

That is a non sequitur. "'X is morally wrong' can never be a fact" does not follow from, "Whatever reason we have to believe X is morally wrong, it could always be that X is not morally wrong, for some other reason." All that follows from that premise is that "X is morally wrong" does not follow from any fact about beliefs. But there may be other reasons why X is morally wrong (whether anyone believes them or not).

That conclusion, BTW, is absurd: saying "'X is morally wrong' can never be a fact" is the same as saying "'X is morally wrong' can never be true." If there are no facts which can make a moral proposition true (or false), then the proposition is non-cognitive; meaningless.

[Peter Holmes]

Here's a way to understand why morality isn't and can't be objective - why there are no moral facts. Look at this argument:

We believe X is morally wrong; therefore X is morally wrong.

I hope no one thinks the conclusion follows from the premise - that the premise entails the conclusion. And notice that substituting 'I', 'some of us', 'many of us' or 'all of us' for 'We' in the premise makes no difference to the lack of entailment. It could always be that X is not morally wrong.

Quite correct. Whether X (which I assume is some act, practice, or policy) is morally wrong has nothing to do with anyone's beliefs. X is morally wrong if it is inconsistent with a sound moral theory. Whether it is or is not consistent with that theory is objective.

And that's the really hard thing for moral objectivists to grasp. Whatever reason we have to believe X is morally wrong, it could always be that X is not morally wrong, for some other reason. So 'X is morally wrong' can never be a fact. So there are no moral facts, and morality isn't and can't be objective.

That is a non sequitur. "'X is morally wrong' can never be a fact" does not follow from, "Whatever reason we have to believe X is morally wrong, it could always be that X is not morally wrong, for some other reason." All that follows from that premise is that "X is morally wrong" does not follow from any fact about beliefs. But there may be other reasons why X is morally wrong (whether anyone believes them or not).

That conclusion, BTW, is absurd: saying "'X is morally wrong' can never be a fact" is the same as saying "'X is morally wrong' can never be true." If there are no facts which can make a moral proposition true (or false), then the proposition is non-cognitive; meaningless.

Moral non-cognitivism is the view that moral assertions don't make factual claims with truth-value - not that they're meaningless.

If moral assertions are non-factual, and are therefore neither true nor false, it follows that there can be no moral facts - whatever facts are deployed to justify them. A fact (even a fact about beliefs) can't entail a moral assertion.

[Peter Holmes]

Here's a way to understand why morality isn't and can't be objective - why there are no moral facts. Look at this argument:

We believe X is morally wrong; therefore X is morally wrong.

I hope no one thinks the conclusion follows from the premise - that the premise entails the conclusion. And notice that substituting 'I', 'some of us', 'many of us' or 'all of us' for 'We' in the premise makes no difference to the lack of entailment. It could always be that X is not morally wrong.

Quite correct. Whether X (which I assume is some act, practice, or policy) is morally wrong has nothing to do with anyone's beliefs. X is morally wrong if it is inconsistent with a sound moral theory. Whether it is or is not consistent with that theory is objective.

The assertion that a moral assertion is consistent with a moral theory is indeed objective. But it's not a moral assertion. 'X is consistent with theory Y' makes no moral claim. (I believe we've done this to death already.)

And I believe we've wrangled over your 'sound moral theory' to exhaustion.

[GE Morton]

Moral non-cognitivism is the view that moral assertions don't make factual claims with truth-value - not that they're meaningless.

They are cognitively meaningless, which means they convey no information "about the world." They can be meaningful in other senses, of course --- they can reveal someone's feelings about something. Per the "emotivist school," that is all that moral statements ever do.

[quote[If moral assertions are non-factual, and are therefore neither true nor false, it follows that there can be no moral facts - whatever facts are deployed to justify them. A fact (even a fact about beliefs) can't entail a moral assertion.
[/quote]

That's quite true. But if moral judgments and propositions convey nothing more than someone's subjective feelings about something they fall outside the purview of philosophical inquiry. The proposition "Slavery is wrong" is no more substantive than, "I prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla."

And, of course, all the philosophers who have devoted much thought to moral questions, not to mention people who render moral judgments every day, obviously thought they were making some sort of cognitive statements --- propositions with truth values determinable via evidence or argument.

[GE Morton]

The assertion that a moral assertion is consistent with a moral theory is indeed objective. But it's not a moral assertion. 'X is consistent with theory Y' makes no moral claim. (I believe we've done this to death already.)

You're correct that your proposition 'X is consistent with theory Y' is not a moral statement. It is a logical statement (we can call it "P") about a moral statement. "The results of the Michaelson-Morley experiment is consistent with Relativity Theory" is not a statement of relativity theory either.

However, if X is consistent with moral theory Y, it is indeed a moral statement.

And I believe we've wrangled over your 'sound moral theory' to exhaustion.

A sound moral theory, or any sound theory, is one whose postulates are true and whose theorems follow logically from them.

[Peter Holmes]

The assertion that a moral assertion is consistent with a moral theory is indeed objective. But it's not a moral assertion. 'X is consistent with theory Y' makes no moral claim. (I believe we've done this to death already.)

You're correct that your proposition 'X is consistent with theory Y' is not a moral statement. It is a logical statement (we can call it "P") about a moral statement. "The results of the Michaelson-Morley experiment is consistent with Relativity Theory" is not a statement of relativity theory either.

However, if X is consistent with moral theory Y, it is indeed a moral statement.

I disagree. Its status as a moral assertion is independent from its consistency with another moral assertion or theory. Consistency with a moral theory isn't a sufficient condition.

And I believe we've wrangled over your 'sound moral theory' to exhaustion.

A sound moral theory, or any sound theory, is one whose postulates are true and whose theorems follow logically from them.

1 I don't believe 'sound' has a specific, technical meaning with regard to a theory. It just means solid or justifiable or consistent.

2 A postulate, principle, or premise need not be factual and therefore have a truth-value at all, let alone the truth-value 'true'. And if a postulate, principle or premise is a moral assertion, then it has no truth-value.

3 If a postulate or premise is a factual assertion, or a fact, it can't entail a moral assertion.

Again, I think we know each other's positions on all this.

[GE Morton]

You're correct that your proposition 'X is consistent with theory Y' is not a moral statement. It is a logical statement (we can call it "P") about a moral statement. "The results of the Michaelson-Morley experiment is consistent with Relativity Theory" is not a statement of relativity theory either.

However, if X is consistent with moral theory Y, it is indeed a moral statement.

I disagree. Its status as a moral assertion is independent from its consistency with another moral assertion or theory.

Straw man. I didn't claim that only statements consistent with a (given) moral theory are moral statements. I only said that a statement that is consistent with one is a moral statement.

Consistency with a moral theory isn't a sufficient condition.

You're right. A moral statement is any statement that asserts that something is morally right or wrong. However, any such statement asserted without reference to some moral theory is non-cognitive. The truth or falsity of such statements can only be determined via their consistency or inconsistency with some moral theory.

A sound moral theory, or any sound theory, is one whose postulates are true and whose theorems follow logically from them.

I don't believe 'sound' has a specific, technical meaning with regard to a theory. It just means solid or justifiable or consistent.

"Solid, justifiable, consistent" says the same thing as, "whose postulates are true and whose theorems follow logically from them."

A postulate, principle, or premise need not be factual and therefore have a truth-value at all, let alone the truth-value 'true'.

You're right. But if it doesn't then no conclusions can logically be derived from it. It is a vacuous premise. The truth of the axioms and postulates of a theory must be self-evident.

And if a postulate, principle or premise is a moral assertion, then it has no truth-value.

False. And it begs the question.

If a postulate or premise is a factual assertion, or a fact, it can't entail a moral assertion.

That's true. That is the "is-ought" gap. The implication of all this is that a moral theory must contain at least one moral premise, or axiom, accepted as true without proof.

[Peter Holmes]

I disagree. Its status as a moral assertion is independent from its consistency with another moral assertion or theory.

Straw man. I didn't claim that only statements consistent with a (given) moral theory are moral statements. I only said that a statement that is consistent with one is a moral statement.

But this is false, because, as I pointed out...

Consistency with a moral theory isn't a sufficient condition.

You're right. A moral statement is any statement that asserts that something is morally right or wrong. However, any such statement asserted without reference to some moral theory is non-cognitive. The truth or falsity of such statements can only be determined via their consistency or inconsistency with some moral theory.

Your mistake is assuming that a moral assertion has a truth-value, which begs the question. And your use of the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction seems to make the same assumption. (And 'non-cognitive' doesn't mean 'meaningless - of course.)

I don't believe 'sound' has a specific, technical meaning with regard to a theory. It just means solid or justifiable or consistent.

"Solid, justifiable, consistent" says the same thing as, "whose postulates are true and whose theorems follow logically from them."

A postulate, principle, or premise need not be factual and therefore have a truth-value at all, let alone the truth-value 'true'.

You're right. But if it doesn't then no conclusions can logically be derived from it. It is a vacuous premise. The truth of the axioms and postulates of a theory must be self-evident.

False. The whole point of a moral theory is that it has moral postulates, principles or premises - which are non-factual, and from which other moral assertions can be deduced.

And if a postulate, principle or premise is a moral assertion, then it has no truth-value.

False. And it begs the question.

False. A moral assertion has no truth-value. What's the truth-value of 'capital punishment is morally wrong' or 'eating animals is not morally wrong'? It's precisely your assumption that they do, and that therefore a moral theory must have postulates that are true, that begs the question.

If a postulate or premise is a factual assertion, or a fact, it can't entail a moral assertion.

That's true. That is the "is-ought" gap. The implication of all this is that a moral theory must contain at least one moral premise, or axiom, accepted as true without proof.

And there's your mistake in a nutshell. A factual postulate can't entail a moral assertion, but only a factual assertion has a truth-value. Your 'sound moral theory' is dead in the water.

[GE Morton]

Straw man. I didn't claim that only statements consistent with a (given) moral theory are moral statements. I only said that a statement that is consistent with one is a moral statement.

But this is false, because, as I pointed out...

You're right. A moral statement is any statement that asserts that something is morally right or wrong. However, any such statement asserted without reference to some moral theory is non-cognitive. The truth or falsity of such statements can only be determined via their consistency or inconsistency with some moral theory.

The second quoted statement doesn't contradict the first, Peter.

Your mistake is assuming that a moral assertion has a truth-value, which begs the question.

That is not an assumption, and it doesn't beg the question. It has a truth value if it follows from premises which have truth values. Which, if the premises are those of a sound moral theory, it does. But see below.

False. The whole point of a moral theory is that it has moral postulates, principles or premises - which are non-factual, and from which other moral assertions can be deduced.

The postulates of a moral theory are factual, although they are not all empirical (though some are). Not all facts are empirical facts.

False. A moral assertion has no truth-value. What's the truth-value of 'capital punishment is morally wrong' or 'eating animals is not morally wrong'? It's precisely your assumption that they do, and that therefore a moral theory must have postulates that are true, that begs the question.

Whether those propositions are true or false depends upon the moral theory against which they're tested.

A factual postulate can't entail a moral assertion, but only a factual assertion has a truth-value. Your 'sound moral theory' is dead in the water.

Methinks you don't understand how theories work. They all proceed from some postulates, axioms, which are taken to be self-evident, which are assumed to be true without proof. This must be, lest you embark on an infinite regress.

Some of the postulates of a sound moral theory are empirical; they state readily verifiable facts about human nature and the social setting. The axiom codifies the aim, the goal, of the theory.

I take a "morality," a moral system, to be a set of principles and rules governing interactions between agents in a "moral field" (a social setting). I take the aim of those principles and rules to be enabling all agents in that field to maximize their welfare, to the extent that is facilitated or hampered by interactions between agents, as evidenced by the content of most moralities over the centuries. So we choose an axiom codifying that aim: Develop principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, with the aim of enabling all agents to maximize their welfare.

It is possible, of course, to conceive the aim of morality quite differently. Perhaps the most common alternative axiom would be, "Develop principles and rules for conforming human behavior more closely to the will of God." But since that one depends upon unverifiable and unfalsifiable supernatural assumptions it is hardly self-evident.

It is self-evident, on the other hand, that human actions are goal-directed; every action an agent takes aim at some end, some result he anticipates will fulfill some desire, deliver some sort of satisfaction --- that will improve his welfare. It is also self-evident that in a social setting the actions of one agent can enhance or reduce the ability of other agents to improve their own welfare, and hence that some rules of interaction are necessary if all are to be able to do so.

There is nothing mysterious, arcane, or even difficult, in principle, about devising a morality. It is similar to developing a set of traffic rules for a highway system. Their aim is to enable all drivers to get wherever they're going as quickly, conveniently, and safely as possible. It is a pragmatic endeavor. So is morality.

So a moral proposition is true or false depending upon whether it does or does not futher the aim set forth in that axiom (which is usually an empirical question). But if you don't take that as the aim of moral principles and rules then for you the term "moral" will have some entirely different meaning, and would require an entirely different theory.

[Peter Holmes]

But this is false, because, as I pointed out...

The second quoted statement doesn't contradict the first, Peter.

Your mistake is assuming that a moral assertion has a truth-value, which begs the question.

That is not an assumption, and it doesn't beg the question. It has a truth value if it follows from premises which have truth values. Which, if the premises are those of a sound moral theory, it does. But see below.

False. The whole point of a moral theory is that it has moral postulates, principles or premises - which are non-factual, and from which other moral assertions can be deduced.

The postulates of a moral theory are factual, although they are not all empirical (though some are). Not all facts are empirical facts.

False. A moral assertion has no truth-value. What's the truth-value of 'capital punishment is morally wrong' or 'eating animals is not morally wrong'? It's precisely your assumption that they do, and that therefore a moral theory must have postulates that are true, that begs the question.

Whether those propositions are true or false depends upon the moral theory against which they're tested.

A factual postulate can't entail a moral assertion, but only a factual assertion has a truth-value. Your 'sound moral theory' is dead in the water.

Methinks you don't understand how theories work. They all proceed from some postulates, axioms, which are taken to be self-evident, which are assumed to be true without proof. This must be, lest you embark on an infinite regress.

Some of the postulates of a sound moral theory are empirical; they state readily verifiable facts about human nature and the social setting. The axiom codifies the aim, the goal, of the theory.

I take a "morality," a moral system, to be a set of principles and rules governing interactions between agents in a "moral field" (a social setting). I take the aim of those principles and rules to be enabling all agents in that field to maximize their welfare, to the extent that is facilitated or hampered by interactions between agents, as evidenced by the content of most moralities over the centuries. So we choose an axiom codifying that aim: Develop principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, with the aim of enabling all agents to maximize their welfare.

It is possible, of course, to conceive the aim of morality quite differently. Perhaps the most common alternative axiom would be, "Develop principles and rules for conforming human behavior more closely to the will of God." But since that one depends upon unverifiable and unfalsifiable supernatural assumptions it is hardly self-evident.

It is self-evident, on the other hand, that human actions are goal-directed; every action an agent takes aim at some end, some result he anticipates will fulfill some desire, deliver some sort of satisfaction --- that will improve his welfare. It is also self-evident that in a social setting the actions of one agent can enhance or reduce the ability of other agents to improve their own welfare, and hence that some rules of interaction are necessary if all are to be able to do so.

There is nothing mysterious, arcane, or even difficult, in principle, about devising a morality. It is similar to developing a set of traffic rules for a highway system. Their aim is to enable all drivers to get wherever they're going as quickly, conveniently, and safely as possible. It is a pragmatic endeavor. So is morality.

So a moral proposition is true or false depending upon whether it does or does not futher the aim set forth in that axiom (which is usually an empirical question). But if you don't take that as the aim of moral principles and rules then for you the term "moral" will have some entirely different meaning, and would require an entirely different theory.

I'm sorry, but you're making a fundamental mistake. A moral assertion, such as 'capital punishment is morally wrong' has no truth-value, as neither does 'capital punishment is not morally wrong'. There's nothing in reality that can verify or falsify either assertion, because they're non-factual. And that's why people can rationally hold to either belief.

The consistency of a moral assertion with a moral postulate doesn't magically bestow truth-value on it. Only factual assertions can be true or false.

And here's your axiom: 'Develop principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, with the aim of enabling all agents to maximize their welfare.' That is not a factual assertion with a truth-value. So if a sound moral theory must have an axiom that is taken to be true, then this example fails.

You're confusing 'adopted as a postulate, axiom, principle or premise' with 'taken to be, or being, true'. If a postulate is indeed a true factual assertion - a fact - then, as you agree, it can't entail any moral assertion. And if a postulate is a moral assertion, all it can entail is another moral assertion. Either way, objectivity is out of the window.

As it happens, I largely agree with your description of a desirable moral system or framework. But both adopting it, and that we should adopt it, are matters of judgement, and therefore subjective - as is any moral assertion within it.

Earlier you agreed that a moral assertion is one that asserts something is morally right or wrong. Given that, if you think a moral assertion can have a truth-value, please produce an example to demonstrate your claim. (It seems to me this could be the crux in our disagreement.)

[GE Morton]

I'm sorry, but you're making a fundamental mistake. A moral assertion, such as 'capital punishment is morally wrong' has no truth-value, as neither does 'capital punishment is not morally wrong'. There's nothing in reality that can verify or falsify either assertion, because they're non-factual. And that's why people can rationally hold to either belief.

The consistency of a moral assertion with a moral postulate doesn't magically bestow truth-value on it. Only factual assertions can be true or false.

I'm afraid it is you who is making a fundamental mistake. It seems to derive from an eccentric conception of what constitutes a "fact."

Your last sentence above reveals the problem: you assume that what counts as a "fact" can be determined prior to knowing whether the proposition asserting it is true. That is mistaken. A "fact" is whatever is asserted by a true proposition, and whatever a true proposition asserts is a "fact." I.e., "true" and "factual" are logically equivalent. Hence any proposition which follows logically from a true proposition is a "fact." That last statement of yours is vacuous --- if you don't know whether a proposition is true you won't know whether it is "factual" either. A factual assertion, BTW, cannot be false, contrary to that statement of yours. It can only be true. A false proposition does not assert a fact (though that it is false is a fact).

I suspect you're restricting "facts" to propositions which are empirically verifiable. But that restriction is arbitrary and contrary to common usages of "fact." (The same goes, BTW, for the meaning of "reality" --- it appears that by "nothing in reality" you mean "nothing empirically verifiable." That is a similarly arbitrary and unconventional conception of "reality").

So, contrary to your "The consistency of a moral assertion with a moral postulate doesn't magically bestow truth-value on it," the consistency of a moral assertion with a moral postulate does indeed bestow a truth value on it --- the value "true," if that postulate is true. And we take the axiom of a moral theory to be true, as a "fact".

And here's your axiom: 'Develop principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, with the aim of enabling all agents to maximize their welfare.' That is not a factual assertion with a truth-value.

It is a goal statement. That it is the chosen goal or aim of a theory is a fact, a true proposition. Whether any given action furthers, retards, or has no effect on attaining that goal are also facts, and propositions asserting whether they are "morally right," "morally wrong," or "morally neutral" have truth values.

If a postulate is indeed a true factual assertion - a fact - then, as you agree, it can't entail any moral assertion. And if a postulate is a moral assertion, all it can entail is another moral assertion.

Moral truths can't be derived from non-moral facts. But they can certainly be derived from moral facts, such as a moral goal.

As it happens, I largely agree with your description of a desirable moral system or framework. But both adopting it, and that we should adopt it, are matters of judgement, and therefore subjective - as is any moral assertion within it.

You're quite right there. Whether we should adopt a moral theory, and what we take to be the goal, or aim, of that theory is subjective. Those are meta-ethical questions. But once we decide what we desire to accomplish with that theory we set that goal as an axiom, and can then explore what is required to accomplish it, what theorems can be derived from it. Those will be objective, in the sense that they either do or do not further that goal.

All theories, in all fields, presuppose some subjective goal. Newton's theory of gravitation presupposes a desire to predict and control the behavior of moving bodies; Euclid's theory was motivated by a desire to accurately compute the areas and volumes of geometric shapes. Some subjective, pragmatic goal underlies all of them. Morality is no different.

[Peter Holmes]

I'm sorry, but you're making a fundamental mistake. A moral assertion, such as 'capital punishment is morally wrong' has no truth-value, as neither does 'capital punishment is not morally wrong'. There's nothing in reality that can verify or falsify either assertion, because they're non-factual. And that's why people can rationally hold to either belief.

The consistency of a moral assertion with a moral postulate doesn't magically bestow truth-value on it. Only factual assertions can be true or false.

I'm afraid it is you who is making a fundamental mistake. It seems to derive from an eccentric conception of what constitutes a "fact."

Your last sentence above reveals the problem: you assume that what counts as a "fact" can be determined prior to knowing whether the proposition asserting it is true. That is mistaken. A "fact" is whatever is asserted by a true proposition, and whatever a true proposition asserts is a "fact." I.e., "true" and "factual" are logically equivalent. Hence any proposition which follows logically from a true proposition is a "fact." That last statement of yours is vacuous --- if you don't know whether a proposition is true you won't know whether it is "factual" either. A factual assertion, BTW, cannot be false, contrary to that statement of yours. It can only be true. A false proposition does not assert a fact (though that it is false is a fact).

I suspect you're restricting "facts" to propositions which are empirically verifiable. But that restriction is arbitrary and contrary to common usages of "fact." (The same goes, BTW, for the meaning of "reality" --- it appears that by "nothing in reality" you mean "nothing empirically verifiable." That is a similarly arbitrary and unconventional conception of "reality").

So, contrary to your "The consistency of a moral assertion with a moral postulate doesn't magically bestow truth-value on it," the consistency of a moral assertion with a moral postulate does indeed bestow a truth value on it --- the value "true," if that postulate is true. And we take the axiom of a moral theory to be true, as a "fact".

And here's your axiom: 'Develop principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, with the aim of enabling all agents to maximize their welfare.' That is not a factual assertion with a truth-value.

It is a goal statement. That it is the chosen goal or aim of a theory is a fact, a true proposition. Whether any given action furthers, retards, or has no effect on attaining that goal are also facts, and propositions asserting whether they are "morally right," "morally wrong," or "morally neutral" have truth values.

If a postulate is indeed a true factual assertion - a fact - then, as you agree, it can't entail any moral assertion. And if a postulate is a moral assertion, all it can entail is another moral assertion.

Moral truths can't be derived from non-moral facts. But they can certainly be derived from moral facts, such as a moral goal.

As it happens, I largely agree with your description of a desirable moral system or framework. But both adopting it, and that we should adopt it, are matters of judgement, and therefore subjective - as is any moral assertion within it.

You're quite right there. Whether we should adopt a moral theory, and what we take to be the goal, or aim, of that theory is subjective. Those are meta-ethical questions. But once we decide what we desire to accomplish with that theory we set that goal as an axiom, and can then explore what is required to accomplish it, what theorems can be derived from it. Those will be objective, in the sense that they either do or do not further that goal.

All theories, in all fields, presuppose some subjective goal. Newton's theory of gravitation presupposes a desire to predict and control the behavior of moving bodies; Euclid's theory was motivated by a desire to accurately compute the areas and volumes of geometric shapes. Some subjective, pragmatic goal underlies all of them. Morality is no different.

If I have time, I want to critique all of this. But for now, some clarification of usage.

We use the word fact in two completely different ways, to mean 'a state-of-affairs that is or was the case' or 'a description of a state-of-affairs with the truth-vakue true. And it's a mistake to confuse or conflate the two uses.

I use the term factual assertion to denote an assertion that claims to describe a state-of-affairs that is or was the case. If it it or was the case, the factual assertion is true, and we call it a fact. So a factual assertion may be true or false.

By contrast, a non-factual assertion doesn't claim to describe a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, so it has no truth-value. Instead, it expresses a value-judgement about a state-of-affairs. Moral and aesthetic assertions are prominent examples.

So you can see why I think moral assertions have no truth-value, and so why there can be no moral facts.

Hence my question. Please can you provide an example of what you think is a moral fact - given that a moral assertion is one that says something is morally right or wrong? (I believe no such thing exists, which is why morality isn't and can't be objective.)

[Belindi]

I'm afraid it is you who is making a fundamental mistake. It seems to derive from an eccentric conception of what constitutes a "fact."

Your last sentence above reveals the problem: you assume that what counts as a "fact" can be determined prior to knowing whether the proposition asserting it is true. That is mistaken. A "fact" is whatever is asserted by a true proposition, and whatever a true proposition asserts is a "fact." I.e., "true" and "factual" are logically equivalent. Hence any proposition which follows logically from a true proposition is a "fact." That last statement of yours is vacuous --- if you don't know whether a proposition is true you won't know whether it is "factual" either. A factual assertion, BTW, cannot be false, contrary to that statement of yours. It can only be true. A false proposition does not assert a fact (though that it is false is a fact).

I suspect you're restricting "facts" to propositions which are empirically verifiable. But that restriction is arbitrary and contrary to common usages of "fact." (The same goes, BTW, for the meaning of "reality" --- it appears that by "nothing in reality" you mean "nothing empirically verifiable." That is a similarly arbitrary and unconventional conception of "reality").

So, contrary to your "The consistency of a moral assertion with a moral postulate doesn't magically bestow truth-value on it," the consistency of a moral assertion with a moral postulate does indeed bestow a truth value on it --- the value "true," if that postulate is true. And we take the axiom of a moral theory to be true, as a "fact".



It is a goal statement. That it is the chosen goal or aim of a theory is a fact, a true proposition. Whether any given action furthers, retards, or has no effect on attaining that goal are also facts, and propositions asserting whether they are "morally right," "morally wrong," or "morally neutral" have truth values.



Moral truths can't be derived from non-moral facts. But they can certainly be derived from moral facts, such as a moral goal.



You're quite right there. Whether we should adopt a moral theory, and what we take to be the goal, or aim, of that theory is subjective. Those are meta-ethical questions. But once we decide what we desire to accomplish with that theory we set that goal as an axiom, and can then explore what is required to accomplish it, what theorems can be derived from it. Those will be objective, in the sense that they either do or do not further that goal.

All theories, in all fields, presuppose some subjective goal. Newton's theory of gravitation presupposes a desire to predict and control the behavior of moving bodies; Euclid's theory was motivated by a desire to accurately compute the areas and volumes of geometric shapes. Some subjective, pragmatic goal underlies all of them. Morality is no different.

If I have time, I want to critique all of this. But for now, some clarification of usage.

We use the word fact in two completely different ways, to mean 'a state-of-affairs that is or was the case' or 'a description of a state-of-affairs with the truth-vakue true. And it's a mistake to confuse or conflate the two uses.

I use the term factual assertion to denote an assertion that claims to describe a state-of-affairs that is or was the case. If it it or was the case, the factual assertion is true, and we call it a fact. So a factual assertion may be true or false.

By contrast, a non-factual assertion doesn't claim to describe a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, so it has no truth-value. Instead, it expresses a value-judgement about a state-of-affairs. Moral and aesthetic assertions are prominent examples.

So you can see why I think moral assertions have no truth-value, and so why there can be no moral facts.

Hence my question. Please can you provide an example of what you think is a moral fact - given that a moral assertion is one that says something is morally right or wrong? (I believe no such thing exists, which is why morality isn't and can't be objective.)

Moral facts and physical/material facts of science all relate to man -made frames and paradigms. There are no eternal moral facts, no eternal aesthetic facts, no eternal philosophical facts, and no eternal scientific facts that we can possibly know about. Moral facts, aesthetic facts, philosophical facts and scientific facts are all of them pro tem / working hypotheses.

[Peter Holmes]

If I have time, I want to critique all of this. But for now, some clarification of usage.

We use the word fact in two completely different ways, to mean 'a state-of-affairs that is or was the case' or 'a description of a state-of-affairs with the truth-vakue true. And it's a mistake to confuse or conflate the two uses.

I use the term factual assertion to denote an assertion that claims to describe a state-of-affairs that is or was the case. If it it or was the case, the factual assertion is true, and we call it a fact. So a factual assertion may be true or false.

By contrast, a non-factual assertion doesn't claim to describe a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, so it has no truth-value. Instead, it expresses a value-judgement about a state-of-affairs. Moral and aesthetic assertions are prominent examples.

So you can see why I think moral assertions have no truth-value, and so why there can be no moral facts.

Hence my question. Please can you provide an example of what you think is a moral fact - given that a moral assertion is one that says something is morally right or wrong? (I believe no such thing exists, which is why morality isn't and can't be objective.)

Moral facts and physical/material facts of science all relate to man -made frames and paradigms. There are no eternal moral facts, no eternal aesthetic facts, no eternal philosophical facts, and no eternal scientific facts that we can possibly know about. Moral facts, aesthetic facts, philosophical facts and scientific facts are all of them pro tem / working hypotheses.

I don't agree with your analysis. What we call truth, facts and objectivity are what we say they are. What we mean when we say a factual assertion is true is what constitutes what we call truth - and there's no other court of appeal.

All factual assertions are contextual and make a conventional use of signs. So yes, we construct the ways we talk about reality. But we don't construct the reality that we talk about. So there's no reason to think all truth-claims are 'pro tem / working hypotheses'. That's fashionable, post-structuralist, post-truth nonsense, recycling an ancient metaphysical delusion - the myth of abstract things.

The problem of induction means natural science conclusions may be false - but not that they must be. There's a difference between our knowing a factual assertion is true and it's being true - even eternally so.

And there's a radical distinction between factual and non-factual assertions, so it's wrong to lump them together. Moral and aesthetic assertions are non-factual, because they have a completely different function from factual assertions. They have no truth-value - true or false - so they can't be facts.

If you disagree, please produce a moral assertion that you thnk is a fact - and I'll show why it isn't. Or please produce an argument with a factual premise that you think entails a moral concluson - and I'll show why it doesn't.