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[Sy Borg]

What is that difference?

Isn't that obvious?

Nothing in quantum physics is obvious. Even at the best of times, physics is a bizarre field, full of mathematical constructs and models that are not actual reality, but that align to it enough to allow predictions to be made.

As far as I can tell, given that everything is ultimately energy, these seem to be artificial boundaries, akin to that between single celled organisms and animals. The divisions are useful, but also ultimately just mental constructs that do little to clarify what the realities are, being just building blocks of larger schemas.

BTW, how does this debate relate to consciousness?

[Terrapin Station]

Even if that's true, it doesn't follow that there can be object-/subjectless processes.

Right, but that doesn't imply that processes and objects/subjects are different.

If processes and objects/subjects aren't different, then of course you can't have a process that's "objectless/subjectless." If you have a process, you have an object/subject, and vice versa.

[Gertie]

Consul

Gertie wrote: ↑
Yesterday, 6:50 pm
As regards ''Subject'', I'd be happy to call any critter which has any experiential state a Subject, whether or not she has a sense of self.

The point of the different labels is then to mark significant distinctions (probably inevitably blurry)

Subject - any entity which has any kind of experiential states.
Sense of self - see my definition.
Personhood - a more sophisticated, individualised model of self.

But I'm not that fussed about which labels we use, as long as they help us agree what we're talking about.

Okay, but what is important is the distinction between subjects/selves/egos/persons and the mental representations (perceptions or conceptions) they have of themselves, including a "self-model" or self-image, or an autobiographical narrative (one's first-personal life-story). For self-representations aren't selves!

I'm saying that what being a Self means is no different than the Sense of Self which is a feature of how experiential states manifest. (as per my definition).

Likewise being a Subject, Person, self-awareness - all different (more or less rich and complex) ways experiential states can manifest.

And if these different variations, like subject, personhood and self-awareness, still all boil down to different ways that experiential states manifest... then that's the full account.

There isn't any additional Self or Subject which 'has' or 'does' the experiential states, because Selves and Subjects are the process of having particular types of experiences. (Unless you want to call the material substrate the Self).

To repeat my central point, selves/subjects/egos/persons are neither complexes of experiential processes nor complexes of nonexperiential mental processes. To use John Foster's terms, mental subjects or subjects of mentality are never composed of mental items or items of mentality—but mental representations of mental subjects certainly are.

We can categorise experiential states in all types of ways. But to label certain aspects of (self related) experiential states an Entity (noun) which has experience (verb), or is the subject of experience, creates a distinction of kind which I don't think is appropriate. And I suspect is largely influenced by our materialist based grammatical habits.

As I already stressed, the experience/experiencer distinction doesn't require that experiencers be physical entities. Substance-selves could be immaterial substances, and process-selves could be immaterial processes.

Fair enough, I wasn't clear on what you could mean.

But when you say 'immaterial substance', I don't see that you're saying anything more than a particular way experiential states can manifest? That's my main query really. Adding the word 'substance' doesn't change that.

[Consul]

Isn't that obvious?

Nothing in quantum physics is obvious. Even at the best of times, physics is a bizarre field, full of mathematical constructs and models that are not actual reality, but that align to it enough to allow predictions to be made.

The ontology of quantum physics is an obscure field, but the general ontological distinction between having an attribute (such as energy) and being an attribute or complex of attributes is clear.

As far as I can tell, given that everything is ultimately energy,…

That's not a given!

BTW, how does this debate relate to consciousness?

I know we're being off-topic again. By the way, the whole thread is in the wrong subforum, because the question of the possibility of brain-independent consciousness is not one in the philosophy of science.

[Consul]

Even if that's true, it doesn't follow that there can be object-/subjectless processes.

Right, but that doesn't imply that processes and objects/subjects are different.
If processes and objects/subjects aren't different, then of course you can't have a process that's "objectless/subjectless." If you have a process, you have an object/subject, and vice versa.

According to event/process ontology, if there are objects or substances at all, they are composed of "free" or "pure" events/processes, which don't have any (irreducible) objects or substances as components.

[The Beast]

It is a formal question. Another way: Some modeling schemes use the time window of integration. Contents in subconscious processes are presented to the filter of self awareness. In humans, self-awareness is not a given and could be shot down or modified at any given moment. False outrageous information given by malfunctioning filters might result in psychosis. What or who self-awareness serve? It might also be that self awareness is a collection of entities with their own sub-processes in competition at the window of integration. It is my opinion that many of this entities are coded by self-awareness but the resources are not readily available and sequestered by more established entities serving the needs of the primitive brain. It is Science to keep a brain with self awareness dead... alive.

[Consul]

Okay, but what is important is the distinction between subjects/selves/egos/persons and the mental representations (perceptions or conceptions) they have of themselves, including a "self-model" or self-image, or an autobiographical narrative (one's first-personal life-story). For self-representations aren't selves!

I'm saying that what being a Self means is no different than the Sense of Self which is a feature of how experiential states manifest. (as per my definition).

Likewise being a Subject, Person, self-awareness - all different (more or less rich and complex) ways experiential states can manifest.

And if these different variations, like subject, personhood and self-awareness, still all boil down to different ways that experiential states manifest... then that's the full account.

There isn't any additional Self or Subject which 'has' or 'does' the experiential states, because Selves and Subjects are the process of having particular types of experiences. (Unless you want to call the material substrate the Self).

* Even if being a self is the same as having a sense of self, a sense of self is not itself a self: awareness of x ≠ x!

* It's unclear to me what "ways that experiential states manifest" are. What is clear to me is that there are both ways of experiencing and ways of being aware of one's experiences, and of oneself as their experiencer.

* I still disagree, because…

QUOTE>
"…there is no getting around the point that our very concept of any type of mental item is the concept of a certain form of ‘mentalizing’ by a subject. Whatever the introspective situation, it simply makes no sense to envisage the occurrence of an experience without someone who has it, or the occurrence of a belief without someone who holds it, or the occurrence of a decision without someone who makes it. If the recognition of an ontology of subjects fails to pass some empiricist test of respectability, this serves to show only that the test is misconceived.
…
There should be no issue, then, over the need for an ontology of mental subjects. One has only to focus on the nature of any type of mental item as our concept of that type reveals it—be it pain, visual experience, belief, decision making, desire, anger, or whatever—to be able to see quite plainly that that sort of thing can be realized only as an instance of mentalizing by a subject. And one has only to think about introspective awareness in the right way to see quite plainly that someone’s introspective awareness of a mental item includes the awareness of himself as its subject."

(Foster, John. "Subjects of Mentality." In After Physicalism, edited by Benedikt Paul Göcke, 72-103. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012. pp. 72-4)
<QUOTE

As I already stressed, the experience/experiencer distinction doesn't require that experiencers be physical entities. Substance-selves could be immaterial substances, and process-selves could be immaterial processes.

Fair enough, I wasn't clear on what you could mean.
But when you say 'immaterial substance', I don't see that you're saying anything more than a particular way experiential states can manifest? That's my main query really. Adding the word 'substance' doesn't change that.

It's part of the very ontological concept of a state that states are states of something (different from themselves). Well, if there are higher-order states, the entities they are states of are states themselves; but I'm talking about first-order states, which are states of nonstates, of things (objects/substances) or stuffs (materials).

Footnote:
I don't think there's a coherently intelligible ontology of immaterial (mental/spiritual) substances.

[Sculptor1]

Footnote:
I don't think there's a coherently intelligible ontology of immaterial (mental/spiritual) substances.

"substance" is most often synonymous with "material". There is a good reason for this since mental states only exist in matter.

[Sy Borg]

As far as I can tell, given that everything is ultimately energy,…

That's not a given!

Yes, how could I have forgotten the field of universal consciousness that underpins universal energy? ;)

This is my way of asking what else might there be in reality, aside from energy? Even space itself is energy, being virtual particles instantaneously popping in and out of existence.

[Consul]

That's not a given!

Yes, how could I have forgotten the field of universal consciousness that underpins universal energy?
This is my way of asking what else might there be in reality, aside from energy? Even space itself is energy, being virtual particles instantaneously popping in and out of existence.

Space itself may be a physical substance having energy rather than being energy; and it may even be the only physical substance there is. If it is, virtual particles are nonsubstantial sparks of energy whose substantial substratum is space itself.

By the way, you're certainly free to side with Wilhelm Ostwald and his physical energeticism, according to which energy is "the most general substance", and "matter is a complex of different energies"; but this is a speculative metaphysical theory rather than a physical fact.

One of the fathers of quantum physics, Werner Heisenberg, endorsed an energeticist view of physical reality too.
I disagree with him, because even if "we may say that all elementary particles consist of energy", this mustn't "be interpreted as defining energy as the primary substance of the world." For the primary substance of the world can only be a materia prima that has energy without being energy. An energeticist reductionism about elementary particles doesn't entail an energeticist reductionism about prime matter or spacetime (qua substance).

QUOTE>
"[A]ll different elementary particles could be reduced to some universal substance which we may call energy or matter…"
(p. 61)

"We may remark at this point that modern physics is in some way extremely near to the doctrines of Heraclitus. If we replace the word 'fire' by the word 'energy' we can almost repeat his statements word for word from our modern point of view. Energy is in fact the substance from which all elementary particles, all atoms and therefore all things are made, and energy is that which moves. Energy is a substance, since its total amount does not change, and the elementary particles can actually be made from this substance as is seen in many experiments on the creation of elementary particles. Energy can be changed into motion, into heat, into light and into tension. Energy may be called the fundamental cause for all change in the world."
(p. 63)

"Since mass and energy are, according to the theory of relativity, essentially the same concepts, we may say that all elementary particles consist of energy. This could be interpreted as defining energy as the primary substance of the world. It has indeed the essential property belonging to the term 'substance', that it is conserved. Therefore, it has been maintained before that the views of modern physics are in this respect very close to those of Heraclitus if one interprets his element fire as meaning energy. Energy is in fact that which moves; it may be called the primary cause of all change, and energy can be transformed into matter or heat or light. The strife between opposites in the philosophy of Heraclitus can be found in the strive between two different forms of energy.

In the philosophy of Democritus the atome are eternal and indestructible units of matter, they can never be transformed into each other. With regard to this question modern physics takes a definite stand against the materialism of Democritus and for Plato and the Pythagoreans. The elementary particles are certainly not eternal and indestructible units of matter, they can actually be transformed into each other. As a matter of fact, if two such particles, moving through space with a very high kinetic energy, collide, then many new elementary particles may be created from the available energy and the old particles may have disappeared in the collision. Such events have been frequently observed and offer the best proof that all particles are made of the same substance: energy."
(pp. 70-71)

(Heisenberg, Werner. Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958.)
<QUOTE

[Terrapin Station]

Right, but that doesn't imply that processes and objects/subjects are different.
If processes and objects/subjects aren't different, then of course you can't have a process that's "objectless/subjectless." If you have a process, you have an object/subject, and vice versa.

According to event/process ontology, if there are objects or substances at all, they are composed of "free" or "pure" events/processes, which don't have any (irreducible) objects or substances as components.

So, we need to pay attention to what I write and not try to squeeze it into the template of what someone else wrote.

[Sy Borg]

Yes, how could I have forgotten the field of universal consciousness that underpins universal energy? ;)
This is my way of asking what else might there be in reality, aside from energy? Even space itself is energy, being virtual particles instantaneously popping in and out of existence.

Space itself may be a physical substance having energy rather than being energy; and it may even be the only physical substance there is. If it is, virtual particles are nonsubstantial sparks of energy whose substantial substratum is space itself.

By the way, you're certainly free to side with Wilhelm Ostwald and his physical energeticism, according to which energy is "the most general substance", and "matter is a complex of different energies"; but this is a speculative metaphysical theory rather than a physical fact.

One of the fathers of quantum physics, Werner Heisenberg, endorsed an energeticist view of physical reality too.
I disagree with him, because even if "we may say that all elementary particles consist of energy", this mustn't "be interpreted as defining energy as the primary substance of the world." For the primary substance of the world can only be a materia prima that has energy without being energy. An energeticist reductionism about elementary particles doesn't entail an energeticist reductionism about prime matter or spacetime (qua substance).

Thanks, I like the Heisenberg quote.

Do you see any philosophical significance in the difference between matter and energy is the view in current mainstream science? I don't know enough about it to say, myself.

[The Beast]

To the OP. Self -awareness is the source of rationality and intelligence. The memetic content assigns a human category.
Person with half a brain might or not have entities associated with self-awareness. Besides the ownership of the self it may have the possibilities assigned to human category. As such, it may be self-aware for 5 sec in a year the same as a drunk loses the self- awareness and recovers it later. The collected evidence of signs, reasons and examples is used to also generalized a judgement (assuming we know what human self-awareness is other than complicated with infinite details and evolving). So, is there another possibility for two persons with the same ailment? And finally: What is the goal? If there is one half brain or one drunk or one person with hallucinatory conditions experiencing self-awareness as noted then… well, then what? For having self-awareness to make you happy is not a generalized goal in a drunk. But the human category exist and is based on inheritance.

[Consul]

Thanks, I like the Heisenberg quote.
Do you see any philosophical significance in the difference between matter and energy is the view in current mainstream science? I don't know enough about it to say, myself.

Recommended reading: The Equivalence of Mass and Energy

The important point is still that when "one hears of Einstein’s equation entailing that matter can be converted into energy,…this constitutes an elementary category mistake." The Oxford Dictionary of Physics defines "energy" as "a measure of a system's ability to do work", and abilities are a kind of properties, which cannot exist without things having them.

QUOTE>
"Ask a physicist what physics is all about and he or she might reply that it’s something to do with the study of matter and energy. ‘Matter’ is dispensed with quite swiftly—it is stuff , substance, what things are made from. But ‘energy’ is a much more difficult idea.…"
(p. 1)

"In one sentence, energy is: the ceaseless jiggling motion, the endless straining at the leash, even in apparently empty space, the rest mass and the radiation, the curvature of space–time, the foreground activity, the background hum, the sine qua non."
(p. 360)

(Coopersmith, Jennifer. Energy: The Subtle Concept; The Discovery of Feynman's Blocks from Leibniz to Einstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

The important point is still that when "one hears of Einstein’s equation entailing that matter can be converted into energy,…this constitutes an elementary category mistake." The Oxford Dictionary of Physics defines "energy" as "a measure of a system's ability to do work", and abilities are a kind of properties, which cannot exist without things having them.

Abilities, capabilities, capacities, faculties, forces, powers all belong to the ontological category attribute (property), being "adherences" or "inherences" rather than substances.