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[Atla]

What do you think materialism actually is?

Materialism is the view that reality (the world) consists of matter.

(Earlier it was more like the view that the reality-separate-from-the-mind consists of matter, but since then this kind of objective/subjective dichotomy was scientifically refuted, much to the horror of some scientist. Nowadays fewer and fewer remain in denial about this.)

So reality consists of matter, "mere stuff." (Energy/information/etc. can also be seen as a form of matter under this definition of matter.) One small problem with this is that matter itself doesn't actually exist. Matter is yet another ancient concept that got reified. Again, such reifications are extremely useful, even kinda necessary, except when it comes to fundamental ontology.

So for a long time physicists tried to figure out what matter actually is, without success, and many of them eventually gave up. They even stopped asking the question. Now matter is usually just values we plug into equations.

There is no matter, yet direct experience undeniably exists, the world undeniably exists. We use the concept of matter to describe what happens in this direct existence, or in the noumenal world represented in our direct experience.

Now what are you, your neuroscientists, and many philosophers trying to accomplish?

They try to solve how matter, which is a description based on direct experience, creates direct experience. Some have commented that this is the definiton of insanity.

Personally I think it's just very misguided, it only qualifies as insane when, once they inevitably fail to solve the problem, as a result therefore they in some way dismiss the existence of direct experience. Thus denying that there is any problem at all.

-----------------------------

Here's a good read from Galen Strawson by the way, he calls it the silliest claim ever made:
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/1 ... s-deniers/

Or I could also quote Witten, who is sometimes considered the smartest physician-mathematician alive (the guy who unified the 5 string theories), saying that he thinks science will probably not explain consciousness, only its correlates.

So no, contrary to popular belief, "some day neuroscience/physics will figure it out" may not even be an existing option.

[Faustus5]

Well it is A term being used to describe the study of using neural networks(the communication process the brain uses) in the newest quantum computers. I brought it up because I am attempting to narrow down where we will be looking for evidence of emergent conciousness

Well, that's very different, and not New Age nonsense at all! I was thinking you were referring to various speculative (and very bad) theories about quantum events in the brain somehow explaining consciousness.

[Faustus5]

And this Four-Horseman-guy is supposed to be a role model for rationally thinking young people I guess. I think he even knows that he misrepresents what information is, but he's getting more publicity this way.

This is a prime example of fundamentally not even making an attempt to understand what someone is trying to tell you. You heard the words and then made no effort to get the point. So I'm here to help.

The key is when he said he was not proposing a form of dualism, or that that if this was dualism, then the software/hardware distinction was also dualism. No one who talks about information this way would deny that in each case of a specific bit of information, it is always carried/registered by some physical property. ("Information is physical" was the slogan of another pioneer of information theory.) For instance, no one would deny that every single line of code in a program consists of a series bits, each one requiring a physical system capable of existing in a binary state.

The point here is that the category "information" directs us to features of a system that while necessarily are physically instantiated, are important to us for reasons that are independent of that physical instantiation. For something to count as a spread sheet, you care about the features it has when you interface with it. The last thing you care about is how it is stored and managed in your computer, even though you know it must be to function. No, what matters is how it processes information.

By they way, this position is tied directly to Dennett's views on intentionality, his anti-reductionism when it comes to mental states, and his rejection of eliminativism, though to show how those stances are connected together would require a much longer essay.

[Faustus5]

Sure, you didn't understand what materialism actually is, but don't talk for others.

What do you think materialism actually is?

You didn't ask me, but as a materialist the best conception of materialism I ever encountered was culled together from J.C. Smart and David Armstrong. It is the guiding assumption that all entities, processes, and forces that exist are those which the study of physics reveals, are are composed of those physics reveals.

I like this way of understanding materialism because it is open ended while fundamentally capturing what always seemed intuitively right about what various early definitions of materialism were trying to get at.

[Terrapin Station]

("thing" here in the object/matter/"stuff" sense)

So, in the current context, you define "thing" to mean the same as "mass", yes? i.e. in your usage, only a mass can be a thing?

Again, I'm not saying anything about definitions. I'm simply trying to communicate with you. I have to give you an idea of what I'm talking about So that you can understand why the idea is incoherent or inconceivable on my view.

at any rate, re physics, "mass" is defined quantitatively, and it's about inertia. I wasn't saying anything about quantities or inertia.

[Terrapin Station]

Re not saying anything about definitions, I'm not saying anything about words per se or how we demarcate what words refer to (in other words, how we define words).

I'm saying something about the world independent of us. Of course, I need to use words to do this, but it's like when we're pointing at the moon. We're trying to get someone to look at the moon. If they can only look at our fingers, we have a problem. But of course we can't point at the moon without using fingers.

[Consul]

Materialism is the view that reality (the world) consists of matter.

(Earlier it was more like the view that the reality-separate-from-the-mind consists of matter, but since then this kind of objective/subjective dichotomy was scientifically refuted, much to the horror of some scientist. Nowadays fewer and fewer remain in denial about this.)

So reality consists of matter, "mere stuff." (Energy/information/etc. can also be seen as a form of matter under this definition of matter.) One small problem with this is that matter itself doesn't actually exist. Matter is yet another ancient concept that got reified. Again, such reifications are extremely useful, even kinda necessary, except when it comes to fundamental ontology.

So for a long time physicists tried to figure out what matter actually is, without success, and many of them eventually gave up. They even stopped asking the question. Now matter is usually just values we plug into equations.

There is no matter, yet direct experience undeniably exists, the world undeniably exists. We use the concept of matter to describe what happens in this direct existence, or in the noumenal world represented in our direct experience.

Now what are you, your neuroscientists, and many philosophers trying to accomplish?

They try to solve how matter, which is a description based on direct experience, creates direct experience. Some have commented that this is the definiton of insanity.

Personally I think it's just very misguided, it only qualifies as insane when, once they inevitably fail to solve the problem, as a result therefore they in some way dismiss the existence of direct experience. Thus denying that there is any problem at all.

-----------------------------

Here's a good read from Galen Strawson by the way, he calls it the silliest claim ever made:
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/1 ... s-deniers/

Or I could also quote Witten, who is sometimes considered the smartest physician-mathematician alive (the guy who unified the 5 string theories), saying that he thinks science will probably not explain consciousness, only its correlates.

So no, contrary to popular belief, "some day neuroscience/physics will figure it out" may not even be an existing option.

1. The noun "matter" has different meanings: In the context of physics it refers either to the totality of material things or masses of stuff, or to a basic space-filling world-matter or world-stuff, with all elementary particles and all bodies composed of them being reducible to locally or regionally compresent complexes of physical properties inhering somewhere in the one omnipresent world-stuff.

2. There are different versions of materialism about mental entities (psychological materialism):

* eliminative materialism: mental entities don't exist.

* equative/reductive materialism: mental entities exist, and they are identical to physical entities.

* compositive/constitutive materialism: mental entities exist, and they are (fundamentally) composed of or constituted by (nothing but) physical entities.
(If composition/constitution entails identity, then compositive/constitutive materialism is the same as equative/reductive materialism.)

* causative/productive materialism: mental entities exist, and they are caused or produced by (nothing but) physical entities.

* emergentive materialism: mental entities exist, and they emerge/are emergent from (nothing but) physical entities.
(If emergence is no different from causation, then emergentive materialism is the same as causative/productive materialism.)

Note that what Strawson calls "the silliest claim ever made" is only eliminative materialism about subjective experience! (I think he's right.)

3. Witten is one of the greatest physicists in the world, but he is not a neurophysiologist or neuroscientist; so his opinion is not an expert opinion in the relevant field of scientific inquiry. Anyway, mysterianism—the view that "consciousness is a mystery that cannot be solved by our existing scientific methods," and that "we will never be able to understand how consciousness could be explained by brain processes" (J. Searle)—is perfectly compatible with (ontological) materialism about it—the view that consciousness is a physical phenomenon, and that it is somehow caused or constituted by brain processes.

4. Your definition of materialism is inadequate, because modern, contemporary materialism qua physicalism isn't that simplistic. So, for example, I define equative/reductive materialism (= compositive/constitutive materialism—I think composition/constitution entails identity!) as follows:

All (real) entities are either narrowly physical by directly belonging to the ontology of physics, or broadly physical by indirectly belonging to the ontology of physics by virtue of being fundamentally composed of or constituted by (nothing but) narrowly physical entities.

[Terrapin Station]

Here's a good read from Galen Strawson by the way, he calls it the silliest claim ever made:
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/1 ... s-deniers/

Weird that you're endorsing that when a big chunk of it is stuff that I said, sometimes directly to you.

[Terrapin Station]

All (real) entities are either narrowly physical by directly belonging to the ontology of physics, or broadly physical by indirectly belonging to the ontology of physics by virtue of being fundamentally composed of or constituted by (nothing but) narrowly physical entities.

That definition is "evil" because it results in people thinking that physicalism basically amounts to subservience to the science of physics--as if it were somehow "physics apologetics."

[Atla]

Materialism is the view that reality (the world) consists of matter.

(Earlier it was more like the view that the reality-separate-from-the-mind consists of matter, but since then this kind of objective/subjective dichotomy was scientifically refuted, much to the horror of some scientist. Nowadays fewer and fewer remain in denial about this.)

So reality consists of matter, "mere stuff." (Energy/information/etc. can also be seen as a form of matter under this definition of matter.) One small problem with this is that matter itself doesn't actually exist. Matter is yet another ancient concept that got reified. Again, such reifications are extremely useful, even kinda necessary, except when it comes to fundamental ontology.

So for a long time physicists tried to figure out what matter actually is, without success, and many of them eventually gave up. They even stopped asking the question. Now matter is usually just values we plug into equations.

There is no matter, yet direct experience undeniably exists, the world undeniably exists. We use the concept of matter to describe what happens in this direct existence, or in the noumenal world represented in our direct experience.

Now what are you, your neuroscientists, and many philosophers trying to accomplish?

They try to solve how matter, which is a description based on direct experience, creates direct experience. Some have commented that this is the definiton of insanity.

Personally I think it's just very misguided, it only qualifies as insane when, once they inevitably fail to solve the problem, as a result therefore they in some way dismiss the existence of direct experience. Thus denying that there is any problem at all.

-----------------------------

Here's a good read from Galen Strawson by the way, he calls it the silliest claim ever made:
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/1 ... s-deniers/

Or I could also quote Witten, who is sometimes considered the smartest physician-mathematician alive (the guy who unified the 5 string theories), saying that he thinks science will probably not explain consciousness, only its correlates.

So no, contrary to popular belief, "some day neuroscience/physics will figure it out" may not even be an existing option.

1. The noun "matter" has different meanings: In the context of physics it refers either to the totality of material things or masses of stuff, or to a basic space-filling world-matter or world-stuff, with all elementary particles and all bodies composed of them being reducible to locally or regionally compresent complexes of physical properties inhering somewhere in the one omnipresent world-stuff.

2. There are different versions of materialism about mental entities (psychological materialism):

* eliminative materialism: mental entities don't exist.

* equative/reductive materialism: mental entities exist, and they are identical to physical entities.

* compositive/constitutive materialism: mental entities exist, and they are (fundamentally) composed of or constituted by (nothing but) physical entities.
(If composition/constitution entails identity, then compositive/constitutive materialism is the same as equative/reductive materialism.)

* causative/productive materialism: mental entities exist, and they are caused or produced by (nothing but) physical entities.

* emergentive materialism: mental entities exist, and they emerge/are emergent from (nothing but) physical entities.
(If emergence is no different from causation, then emergentive materialism is the same as causative/productive materialism.)

Note that what Strawson calls "the silliest claim ever made" is only eliminative materialism about subjective experience! (I think he's right.)

3. Witten is one of the greatest physicists in the world, but he is not a neurophysiologist or neuroscientist; so his opinion is not an expert opinion in the relevant field of scientific inquiry. Anyway, mysterianism—the view that "consciousness is a mystery that cannot be solved by our existing scientific methods," and that "we will never be able to understand how consciousness could be explained by brain processes" (J. Searle)—is perfectly compatible with (ontological) materialism about it—the view that consciousness is a physical phenomenon, and that it is somehow caused or constituted by brain processes.

4. Your definition of materialism is inadequate, because modern, contemporary materialism qua physicalism isn't that simplistic. So, for example, I define equative/reductive materialism (= compositive/constitutive materialism—I think composition/constitution entails identity!) as follows:

All (real) entities are either narrowly physical by directly belonging to the ontology of physics, or broadly physical by indirectly belonging to the ontology of physics by virtue of being fundamentally composed of or constituted by (nothing but) narrowly physical entities.

So in short you don't understand what materialism actually is, and you didn't understand my comment either. You only see the surface.

[Terrapin Station]

So in short you don't understand what materialism actually is, and you didn't understand my comment either. You only see the surface.

creation/evolution under another name . . .

[Atla]

Here's a good read from Galen Strawson by the way, he calls it the silliest claim ever made:
https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/1 ... s-deniers/

Weird that you're endorsing that when a big chunk of it is stuff that I said, sometimes directly to you.

I told you to try to think deeper, but you think you already know it all.

[Atla]

So in short you don't understand what materialism actually is, and you didn't understand my comment either. You only see the surface.

creation/evolution under another name . . .

Just how much effort do you put into this if you can't even tell people apart from that guy

[Consul]

All (real) entities are either narrowly physical by directly belonging to the ontology of physics, or broadly physical by indirectly belonging to the ontology of physics by virtue of being fundamentally composed of or constituted by (nothing but) narrowly physical entities.

That definition is "evil" because it results in people thinking that physicalism basically amounts to subservience to the science of physics--as if it were somehow "physics apologetics."

According to ontological materialism/physicalism, physics is the basic science of reality. It doesn't say it's the only science of reality, that all sciences other than physics—especially chemistry, biology, psychology, and sociology—are reducible to and replaceable by physics, or that all sciences other than physics are just pseudosciences. For ontological (existential) reductionism about the respective subject matters of chemistry, biology, psychology, and sociology isn't the same as and doesn't even entail scientific reductionism or linguistic/semantic (representational/conceptual) reductionism, according to which all concepts or terms used in the theories of the nonphysical sciences are translatable into and replaceable by physical concepts or terms. So materialism/physicalism can consistently be both ontologically monistic and scientifically pluralistic.

QUOTE>
"Physicalism may be characterized as a reductionist thesis. However, it is reductionist in an ontological sense, not as a thesis that all statements can be translated into statements about physical particles, and so on."

(Smart, J. J. C. Our Place in the Universe: A Metaphysical Discussion. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989. p. 81)

"In taking the identity theory (in its various forms) as a species of physicalism, I should say that this is an ontological, not a translational physicalism. It would be absurd to try to translate sentences containing the word ‘brain’ or the word ‘sensation’ into sentences about electrons, protons and so on. Nor can we so translate sentences containing the word ‘tree’. After all ‘tree’ is largely learned ostensively, and is not even part of botanical classification. If we were small enough a dandelion might count as a tree. Nevertheless a physicalist could say that trees are complicated physical mechanisms."
—J. J. C. Smart: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/
<QUOTE

[Consul]

So in short you don't understand what materialism actually is, and you didn't understand my comment either. You only see the surface.