Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

At the beginning that last thing that I wanted was another old white man. I only donated to the women candidates. But now I donate to Biden. He has a good heart. Probably better than his head. Personally, I'd have liked to see Jennifer Granholm run.

Skin tone, age, or gender is not relevant, It is this sort of perspective that clouds the real issues of inequality, homelessness, poor policing, poor schooling and a bad health service provision.

In my view it doesn't matter because only Republicans and Democrats have a real possibility of winning and I can't stand either. For my interests those two parties are far more alike than different in any significant way. We won't have change of the sort that I care about until we get rid of only two parties being viable. (I consider myself a very idiosyncratic sort of libertarian socialist, by the way.)

[Sculptor1]

Skin tone, age, or gender is not relevant, It is this sort of perspective that clouds the real issues of inequality, homelessness, poor policing, poor schooling and a bad health service provision.

In my view it doesn't matter because only Republicans and Democrats have a real possibility of winning and I can't stand either. For my interests those two parties are far more alike than different in any significant way. We won't have change of the sort that I care about until we get rid of only two parties being viable. (I consider myself a very idiosyncratic sort of libertarian socialist, by the way.)

Difficult bedfellows; libertarianism and socialism.

But I agree. The system that pertains in the US is plutocracy. Even those that pay lip service to social programs and welfare tend to award the contracts to their buddies. New housing project? Property developers laughing all the way to the bank, poor get dodgy houses that don't last. New Health Care Bill? Insurance Companies, big pharma laughing all the way to the bank...


Gore Vidal used to call it socialism for the rich and free enterprise for the poor.

[Belindi]

An American sociologist I know said Obama was not really left wing but was more so than the other lot.

[Peter Holmes]

But the definition - p is true iff s - assumes a verifiable (confirmable) relationship between p and s - which is precisely the moot point. It assumes a correspondence, which is why I said earlier that it's a form of the correspondence theory of truth - which you agree doesn't work.

Of course there is a confirmable relationship between P and s. Are you suggesting there is no relationship? Or if there is one, it is not confirmable? If so, how does any proposition manage to convey information? That claim puts you in the same position as TP --- facing a reductio ad absurdum. If you say, "There are 223 beans in this jar," I count them and get 223, there is obviously some relationship between my statement and the number of beans in that jar.

That is indeed a form of correspondence. There are many kinds of correspondences. It may even be a "form of correspondence theory" --- but not of the classical theory articulated by Russell et al, which presumes an structural isomorphism between a proposition and a state-of-affairs.

Correspondence "theories" which presume some sort of structural isomorphism between propositions and states-of-affairs are problematic. Those that assert merely that there can be a correlation between a proposition and a confirmable state-of-affairs are not problematic; indeed that there is one is self-evident (if not, it would be impossible to convey information via language).

It's the nature of the claimed correspondence that's the problem. (And calling it 'correlation' doesn't solve the problem.)

An explanation (definition) of the way we use a word is not a description of a thing.

Yes, it is. That dogs are referents of the English word "dog" is a property of dogs. That is a fact that adds to the description of those animals, just as "Dogs are popular household pets" does. Apparently you're still restricting "property" to local physical properties.

I disagree that names are normally considered to be properties, which are more usually thought of as attributes or qualities. I believe that's the standard philosphical definition of 'property'. But perhaps this isn't a crucial point - though I suspect it may be relevant.

Anyway, you're confusing - or conflating - two very different linguistic operations: naming and describing. To define a word is to explain the way(s) we use it. So we use the word 'dog' to name and talk about the things we call dogs. But to define a thing, such as a dog, is to describe it - which we can do in many different ways - using the names of other things, such as 'snout' and 'non-retractile claws'. The word 'dog' doesn't describe a dog in any way whatsoever. The two questions - 'what does the word 'dog' mean?' and ' what is a dog?' are completely different - but a dictionary treats them as the same question - which is part of the conflation problem.

[Quote missing here for some reason - about truth not being a thing of some kind.]

Well, that is puzzling. Are you suggestion that word cannot be defined? And of course it is a "thing of some kind." Everything is a thing of some kind, "thing" being the universal noun. BTW, we don't "describe" words, except perhaps in the sense of stating their phonemic structure. We define them.

As above, you're muddling up two different uses of the word 'definition' and its cognates. I agree that we can describe words in different ways - functionally, grammatically, etymologically, and so on. But to define a word is to show how we use it or could use it. And defining the 'truth' and its cognates is to do precisely that. It's not to describe a thing of some kind.

What we call a dog is a real thing that can be described. But what we call truth is not such a thing. The very expression 'abstract thing' causes the confusion. Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, there's no reason to believe they exist. More likely, we mistake abstract nouns for things of some kind that, therefore, are things that may or may not exist. That's the delusion at the heart of metaphysics.

By all means, demonstrate what and where abstract things are. And please don't bother saying they're concepts - more abstract things - in minds - more abstract things.

You're indulging in a 4-term fallacy. I denied knowing what might be the "foundation" for a language, not for particular propositions. Yes, for a proposition to be deemed "true" some particular state-of-affairs must be confirmable. Are you denying that? If so, how do you suggest we distinguish true propositions from false ones? Or are those two terms meaningless?

So you think language has and needs no foundation. I prefer to say there's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices - one of which is to make factual assertions about features of reality. But you also think a particular factual assertion does have a non-linguistic foundation, which is a feature of reality. How can those two claims be true?: language has no foundation, but factual assertions do. Flat contradiction.

[GE Morton]

Right. But our induction assumes that the reality we observe is real. The brain organizes sensory input into a model of reality consisting of objects and events. When the model is accurate enough to be useful, as when we navigate our bodies through a doorway, we call it "reality", because the model is our only access to it. And when it is inaccurate enough to create problems, like when we walk into a glass door thinking it is open, then we call that an "illusion".

I agree. But that is somewhat at odds with your previous statement, to wit, "And we are people assigning meaning to suit our purpose, which is to understand objective reality in a way that enhances our survival and that of our species."

The latter suggests that "objective reality" is something independent from us, something to be understood, while the first suggests it is something we invent.

As Belindi points out, "Objective reality [in the first sense], if it exists at all, is not available for anybody to know."

That phrase, "objective reality," has been a source of much confusion, not to mention nonsense, throughout the history of philosophy.

[GE Morton]

(I consider myself a very idiosyncratic sort of libertarian socialist, by the way.)

"Libertarian socialist" is an oxymoron.

[Marvin_Edwards]

I agree. But that is somewhat at odds with your previous statement, to wit, "And we are people assigning meaning to suit our purpose, which is to understand objective reality in a way that enhances our survival and that of our species."

The latter suggests that "objective reality" is something independent from us, something to be understood, while the first suggests it is something we invent.

Ironically, both are correct.

As Belindi points out, "Objective reality [in the first sense], if it exists at all, is not available for anybody to know."

And if it is not available for anyone to know, then why bring it up?

That phrase, "objective reality," has been a source of much confusion, not to mention nonsense, throughout the history of philosophy.

Yeah...there's a lot of that going around in academic philosophy. Sometimes it seems to me that it catalogs every idea that has ever occurred to anyone, and makes a whole school out of it. Try reading the SEP article on "Supervenience" or even the "Laws of Nature".

[Terrapin Station]

(I consider myself a very idiosyncratic sort of libertarian socialist, by the way.)

"Libertarian socialist" is an oxymoron.

"very idiosyncratic sort of"

[GE Morton]

It's the nature of the claimed correspondence that's the problem. (And calling it 'correlation' doesn't solve the problem.)

What, exactly, is that problem?

I disagree that names are normally considered to be properties, which are more usually thought of as attributes or qualities. I believe that's the standard philosphical definition of 'property'. But perhaps this isn't a crucial point - though I suspect it may be relevant.

Again, you seem to be restricting the term "property" to local physical properties. And of course I agree that a name does not fall into that category. But your name, Peter, is an attribute of you, one that will help others recognize and identify you. So will various other non-local attributes, such as your street address, or your marital status, or your profession.

I use the term "property of X" to denote any predicate of any true proposition with X as the subject. We can sort those properties into sub-categories when necessary or useful.

Anyway, you're confusing - or conflating - two very different linguistic operations: naming and describing. To define a word is to explain the way(s) we use it. So we use the word 'dog' to name and talk about the things we call dogs. But to define a thing, such as a dog, is to describe it - which we can do in many different ways - using the names of other things, such as 'snout' and 'non-retractile claws'. The word 'dog' doesn't describe a dog in any way whatsoever. The two questions - 'what does the word 'dog' mean?' and ' what is a dog?' are completely different - but a dictionary treats them as the same question - which is part of the conflation problem.

I agree that naming and describing are two different operations. Painting a house is a different operation than describing the house. But once painted the new color becomes part of the description --- just as "Peter" becomes part of your description.

Well, that is puzzling. Are you suggestion that word cannot be defined? And of course it is a "thing of some kind." Everything is a thing of some kind, "thing" being the universal noun. BTW, we don't "describe" words, except perhaps in the sense of stating their phonemic structure. We define them.

As above, you're muddling up two different uses of the word 'definition' and its cognates. I agree that we can describe words in different ways - functionally, grammatically, etymologically, and so on. But to define a word is to show how we use it or could use it. And defining the 'truth' and its cognates is to do precisely that. It's not to describe a thing of some kind.

I agree that defining a word is explaining how it is used (in a given speech community). That is precisely what Tarski's definition does. And, yes, it is "describing a thing of some kind." Everything is a thing of some kind (that is a tautology). And, yes it is a description too --- explaining how a word is used is itself a description --- of the use of that word.

Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, there's no reason to believe they exist.

Truth doesn't exist? There are no true propositions; the terms "true" and "truth" are meaningless? Those are the implications of your claim. You're not still confusing "exists" with, "Having local physical properties," are you?

The evidence for the existence of abstract things is the same as for the existence of concrete things. They exist if they serve some descriptive or explanatory purpose. Stones exist because they explain certain coherencies and regularities in sensory data. Gravitational fields exist because they help explain some of the behaviors of those stones. Truth exists because it helps us distinguish informative propositions from uninformative ones.

So you think language has and needs no foundation. I prefer to say there's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices - one of which is to make factual assertions about features of reality.

How we use a language is not a "foundation" for a language. A foundation is something upon which something is built; it precedes the structure atop it. Linguistic practices don't precede a language; they follow from it. Languages have nothing that can be described as a "foundation;" their semantics and syntax are arbitrary, adopted by convention.

But you also think a particular factual assertion does have a non-linguistic foundation, which is a feature of reality. How can those two claims be true?: language has no foundation, but factual assertions do. Flat contradiction.

I never said a true proposition has a "foundation." That is an inapplicable term. It will have a relationship, a correlation or correspondence with, some feature of "reality," however --- the one it picks out for consideration by others. That "feature of reality" is itself a linguistic construct. The proposition picks it out by virtue of the conventions governing the uses of its terms and syntax.

[GE Morton]

As Belindi points out, "Objective reality [in the first sense], if it exists at all, is not available for anybody to know."

And if it is not available for anyone to know, then why bring it up?

We shouldn't. The expression is so laden with ambiguities and encrusted with metaphysical nonsense that it is useless for explaining phenomena or conveying other information.

[Marvin_Edwards]

And if it is not available for anyone to know, then why bring it up?

We shouldn't. The expression is so laden with ambiguities and encrusted with metaphysical nonsense that it is useless for explaining phenomena or conveying other information.

ROTFLMAO!

[Sculptor1]

And if it is not available for anyone to know, then why bring it up?

We shouldn't. The expression is so laden with ambiguities and encrusted with metaphysical nonsense that it is useless for explaining phenomena or conveying other information.

But you seem to know what it is whilst all others are ignoramuses.

[Peter Holmes]

It's the nature of the claimed correspondence that's the problem. (And calling it 'correlation' doesn't solve the problem.)

What, exactly, is that problem?

The problem is that, as you agree, most features of reality don't identify themselves. For example, what we call blue isn't a self-defined thing, because the visible colour spectrum is continuous. So to say the name 'blue' corresponds with the thing that is blueness is false. And if one person says a colour patch is blue that another person says is green, they're not arguing about the thing to which the words 'blue' and 'green' supposedly correspond, because if they were, there could be no argument about which correspondence is 'correct'.

I disagree that names are normally considered to be properties, which are more usually thought of as attributes or qualities. I believe that's the standard philosphical definition of 'property'. But perhaps this isn't a crucial point - though I suspect it may be relevant.

Again, you seem to be restricting the term "property" to local physical properties. And of course I agree that a name does not fall into that category. But your name, Peter, is an attribute of you, one that will help others recognize and identify you. So will various other non-local attributes, such as your street address, or your marital status, or your profession.

I use the term "property of X" to denote any predicate of any true proposition with X as the subject. We can sort those properties into sub-categories when necessary or useful.

Okay. But that demonstrates the pervasive conflation of what we say about things (in predicates, which are linguistic expressions) with the way things are. It's a powerful and deep delusion, which is why it has seemed natural to believe the two different things are the same, for so long. (And, btw, do you think existence is a predicate?)

Anyway, you're confusing - or conflating - two very different linguistic operations: naming and describing. To define a word is to explain the way(s) we use it. So we use the word 'dog' to name and talk about the things we call dogs. But to define a thing, such as a dog, is to describe it - which we can do in many different ways - using the names of other things, such as 'snout' and 'non-retractile claws'. The word 'dog' doesn't describe a dog in any way whatsoever. The two questions - 'what does the word 'dog' mean?' and ' what is a dog?' are completely different - but a dictionary treats them as the same question - which is part of the conflation problem.

I agree that naming and describing are two different operations. Painting a house is a different operation than describing the house. But once painted the new color becomes part of the description --- just as "Peter" becomes part of your description.

False analogy. Painting a house is nothing like naming it. 'The house is white' ascribes a property - it describes the house. But I still think it would be odd to say that being called a house is one of the properties of houses. 'List the properties of those things.' 'Well, we call them houses'. Perhaps that sounds natural to you, but it doesn't to me.

As above, you're muddling up two different uses of the word 'definition' and its cognates. I agree that we can describe words in different ways - functionally, grammatically, etymologically, and so on. But to define a word is to show how we use it or could use it. And defining the 'truth' and its cognates is to do precisely that. It's not to describe a thing of some kind.

I agree that defining a word is explaining how it is used (in a given speech community). That is precisely what Tarski's definition does. And, yes, it is "describing a thing of some kind." Everything is a thing of some kind (that is a tautology). And, yes it is a description too --- explaining how a word is used is itself a description --- of the use of that word.

This is confused. Explaining (describing) how we use the word 'truth' and its cognates is nothing like describing a thing such as a dog or a house. And your equivocation - 'everything is a thing of some kind (that is a tautology)' - is laughable: if a thing is a thing, then it exists and can be described. Please.

Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, there's no reason to believe they exist.

Truth doesn't exist? There are no true propositions; the terms "true" and "truth" are meaningless? Those are the implications of your claim. You're not still confusing "exists" with, "Having local physical properties," are you?

I really can't believe you're being serious - or honest - here. 'What we call truth is not a thing of some kind that exists and can be described'. 'So, you're saying truth doesn't exist?' I'm inclined to say - grow up. If you don't see how childish that is, we may as well stop now.

The evidence for the existence of abstract things is the same as for the existence of concrete things. They exist if they serve some descriptive or explanatory purpose. Stones exist because they explain certain coherencies and regularities in sensory data. Gravitational fields exist because they help explain some of the behaviors of those stones. Truth exists because it helps us distinguish informative propositions from uninformative ones.

This is incoherent nonsense, glossing over the equivocation on 'existence' and its cognates, and getting the whole business back to front.

So you think language has and needs no foundation. I prefer to say there's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices - one of which is to make factual assertions about features of reality.

How we use a language is not a "foundation" for a language. A foundation is something upon which something is built; it precedes the structure atop it. Linguistic practices don't precede a language; they follow from it. Languages have nothing that can be described as a "foundation;" their semantics and syntax are arbitrary, adopted by convention.

Again, I find your misunderstanding hard to credit. A language is nothing other than linguistic practices. So how can those practices follow from a language? This is more nonsense.

But you also think a particular factual assertion does have a non-linguistic foundation, which is a feature of reality. How can those two claims be true?: language has no foundation, but factual assertions do. Flat contradiction.

I never said a true proposition has a "foundation." That is an inapplicable term. It will have a relationship, a correlation or correspondence with, some feature of "reality," however --- the one it picks out for consideration by others. That "feature of reality" is itself a linguistic construct. The proposition picks it out by virtue of the conventions governing the uses of its terms and syntax.

If p is true iff s, and you say s is a linguistic construct (a p) - then the definition is useless: p is true iff p.

[GE Morton]

The problem is that, as you agree, most features of reality don't identify themselves.

You've said something along those lines several times. I don't understand what that means. Of course things don't identify themselves; that makes no sense. Identifying is something we --- us sentient, verbal creatures --- do, with regard to things. Are you claiming that in order for there to be a correspondence between A and B, those two things must somehow identify themselves? How would anything "identify itself"?

For example, what we call blue isn't a self-defined thing, because the visible colour spectrum is continuous.

I have no idea what a "self-defined thing" might be, either. As with identifying, defining is something we do, not that (non-sentient) things do.

So to say the name 'blue' corresponds with the thing that is blueness is false.

Well, that appears to be a conclusion derived from the two nonsensical statements above, regarding self-identifying and self-defining things. I find that argument incoherent. Perhaps you can explain what you mean by "self-identifying" and "self-defining."

With respect to the correspondence between the word "blue" and a range of colors, that the spectrum is continuous is irrelevant. Color words are inherently vague; where blue-green transitions into blue is not precisely defined and somewhat subjective. But that doesn't preclude a correspondence between the word "blue" and that portion of the spectrum. There is a correspondence if, when the customer says, "I'll take the blue one," the merchant hands him the blue baseball cap --- which will happen 99+% of the time.

Okay. But that demonstrates the pervasive conflation of what we say about things (in predicates, which are linguistic expressions) with the way things are. It's a powerful and deep delusion, which is why it has seemed natural to believe the two different things are the same, for so long. (And, btw, do you think existence is a predicate?)

What is the pervasive delusion is the belief that we have some knowledge of "the way things are" independent of what we perceive and what we say about those percepts. We don't. All I know of the way things are is what I perceive. All I know about what you perceive is what you say about it. There are simply no grounds for any claim that "the way things are" differs from what we perceive and say about them.

False analogy. Painting a house is nothing like naming it. 'The house is white' ascribes a property - it describes the house. But I still think it would be odd to say that being called a house is one of the properties of houses. 'List the properties of those things.' 'Well, we call them houses'. Perhaps that sounds natural to you, but it doesn't to me.

I suspected you'd challenge that analogy after I wrote it. I shouldn't have used a physical property. The question was whether there is a difference between naming and describing. I agreed those are two different operations. So instead of painting the house, how about building it? Building a house is a different operation that describing it. But is "built in 1890" not a property of the house? Living in a house is not describing it either. But is "Elvis once lived here" not a property of the house? Do those facts not describe the house? The realtor trying to sell it would certainly think so.

Of course it would sound odd to add "they are called 'houses'" to a list of properties, because in most cases that would be obvious to the listener. But how about, "It was named 'Falling Water' by the architect"? Is that a property of the house?

This is confused. Explaining (describing) how we use the word 'truth' and its cognates is nothing like describing a thing such as a dog or a house.

Really? In what relevant ways are they different? You just used the word "describing" yourself, to make your point. Of course, a description of the uses of a word will differ in substance from the description of a dog --- the desciptions of any two distinct things will differ from one another in substance --- but they are clearly both descriptions.

And your equivocation - 'everything is a thing of some kind (that is a tautology)' - is laughable: if a thing is a thing, then it exists and can be described. Please.

Well, again, you appear to be restricting "exists" to a subcategory of existents (those with physical properties and spacetime coordinates). But that restriction is at odds with ubiquitous, common uses of that term. So is restricting "thing" to that category of things: "What is this thing called love?," "Things that go bump in the night," "Is everything OK?," "He's doing his own thing," "The interesting thing about this idea is . . .," etc., etc.

I really can't believe you're being serious - or honest - here. 'What we call truth is not a thing of some kind that exists and can be described'. 'So, you're saying truth doesn't exist?' I'm inclined to say - grow up. If you don't see how childish that is, we may as well stop now.

Sorry, Peter, but "Truth doesn't exist" does indeed follow, quite obviously, from, "What we call truth is not a thing of some kind that exists and can be described." You're saying there that 1) truth doesn't exist, and 2) truth cannot be described. Both of those claims are obviously false. You fail to see that because you impose that arbitrary, idiosyncratic restriction on the term "exists."

Again, I find your misunderstanding hard to credit. A language is nothing other than linguistic practices. So how can those practices follow from a language? This is more nonsense.

Perhaps we have a different understanding of what counts as a linguistic practice. I take "linguistic practices" to denote the things we say. The language is the tool we use to use to say them. The practice of medicine is the treatment of patients; the practice of carpentry is building houses. The scalpels and syringes and instruments the doctor uses are tools of the trade, as are the hammers and saws the carpenter uses.

If p is true iff s, and you say s is a linguistic construct (a p) - then the definition is useless: p is true iff p.

Er, no. Though they are both linguistic constructs, P is not s. Those variables denote specific constructs.

[Peter Holmes]

The problem is that, as you agree, most features of reality don't identify themselves.

You've said something along those lines several times. I don't understand what that means. Of course things don't identify themselves; that makes no sense. Identifying is something we --- us sentient, verbal creatures --- do, with regard to things. Are you claiming that in order for there to be a correspondence between A and B, those two things must somehow identify themselves? How would anything "identify itself"?

For example, what we call blue isn't a self-defined thing, because the visible colour spectrum is continuous.

I have no idea what a "self-defined thing" might be, either. As with identifying, defining is something we do, not that (non-sentient) things do.

So to say the name 'blue' corresponds with the thing that is blueness is false.

Well, that appears to be a conclusion derived from the two nonsensical statements above, regarding self-identifying and self-defining things. I find that argument incoherent. Perhaps you can explain what you mean by "self-identifying" and "self-defining."

Since the things we talk about don't identify, categorise or describe themselves, the idea of correspondence being 'the agreement of things with one another' or 'a relation between sets in which each member of one set is associated with one or more members of the other' (Merriam-Webster definitions) obviously doesn't work with language. There is no 'other set', with which the names we use correspond, as it were, independently from the ways we use the names. There are just features of reality we can identify, name and describe in different ways for different purposes. And I think this is much more significant than we've tended to think. More anon.

With respect to the correspondence between the word "blue" and a range of colors, that the spectrum is continuous is irrelevant. Color words are inherently vague; where blue-green transitions into blue is not precisely defined and somewhat subjective. But that doesn't preclude a correspondence between the word "blue" and that portion of the spectrum. There is a correspondence if, when the customer says, "I'll take the blue one," the merchant hands him the blue baseball cap --- which will happen 99+% of the time.

I agree that's how language works - and it's straight out of 'Philosophical Investigations'. But notice what you said: 'Color words are inherently vague; where blue-green transitions into blue is not precisely defined and somewhat subjective.' In what way does blue transition into blue-green, and blue-green into green? How would precision differ from vagueness in the use of these words, and would precision mean objectivity? What would it mean to use the word 'blue' objectively? And if that question misfires, what can it possibly mean to say we can use the words 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong' objectively?

Okay. But that demonstrates the pervasive conflation of what we say about things (in predicates, which are linguistic expressions) with the way things are. It's a powerful and deep delusion, which is why it has seemed natural to believe the two different things are the same, for so long. (And, btw, do you think existence is a predicate?)

What is the pervasive delusion is the belief that we have some knowledge of "the way things are" independent of what we perceive and what we say about those percepts. We don't. All I know of the way things are is what I perceive. All I know about what you perceive is what you say about it. There are simply no grounds for any claim that "the way things are" differs from what we perceive and say about them.

Notice how you introduced perception as an issue, where I said nothing about knowledge or how we get it. I referred only to the way things are and what we say about them, and how we can conflate the two, as correspondence theories of truth demonstrate. Like you, I don't think knowledge - what we mean when we say we know things - is problematic - mainly because I think epistemology is a metaphysical backwater down the rabbit hole.

But I think your claim that there is no difference between the way things are and what we say about them is utterly extraordinary - and deeply revealing of the conflation and confusion I'm pointing out. How can there be 'no difference' between a feature of reality and the various ways there are of describing it? No difference between the assertion 'snow is white' and what we use the assertion to talk about? There's the myth of propositions at work. (And yet, you know that things don't identify, name or describe themselves!)

False analogy. Painting a house is nothing like naming it. 'The house is white' ascribes a property - it describes the house. But I still think it would be odd to say that being called a house is one of the properties of houses. 'List the properties of those things.' 'Well, we call them houses'. Perhaps that sounds natural to you, but it doesn't to me.

I suspected you'd challenge that analogy after I wrote it. I shouldn't have used a physical property. The question was whether there is a difference between naming and describing. I agreed those are two different operations. So instead of painting the house, how about building it? Building a house is a different operation that describing it. But is "built in 1890" not a property of the house? Living in a house is not describing it either. But is "Elvis once lived here" not a property of the house? Do those facts not describe the house? The realtor trying to sell it would certainly think so.

Of course it would sound odd to add "they are called 'houses'" to a list of properties, because in most cases that would be obvious to the listener. But how about, "It was named 'Falling Water' by the architect"? Is that a property of the house?

I'm content that you acknowledge the functional difference between naming and describing as linguistic operations - and I've forgotten why it was an issue earlier on. It may come back to me - but sorry for now.{quote]

This is confused. Explaining (describing) how we use the word 'truth' and its cognates is nothing like describing a thing such as a dog or a house.

Really? In what relevant ways are they different? You just used the word "describing" yourself, to make your point. Of course, a description of the uses of a word will differ in substance from the description of a dog --- the desciptions of any two distinct things will differ from one another in substance --- but they are clearly both descriptions.

Describing how we use a word - or a hammer - is nothing like describing a word or a hammer. Back to dogs. We use the word 'dog' to talk about the things we call dogs. But that tells us nothing about what dogs are, because there's nothing canine about the word 'dog', or the word 'canine'. That requires a description.

And your equivocation - 'everything is a thing of some kind (that is a tautology)' - is laughable: if a thing is a thing, then it exists and can be described. Please.

Well, again, you appear to be restricting "exists" to a subcategory of existents (those with physical properties and spacetime coordinates). But that restriction is at odds with ubiquitous, common uses of that term. So is restricting "thing" to that category of things: "What is this thing called love?," "Things that go bump in the night," "Is everything OK?," "He's doing his own thing," "The interesting thing about this idea is . . .," etc., etc.

It's precisely this common usage that fooled and fools philosophers into fantasising about abstract things. To repeat, what and where are abstract things, and in what way do they exist? Please explain without equivocating on 'thing' and 'exist'.

I really can't believe you're being serious - or honest - here. 'What we call truth is not a thing of some kind that exists and can be described'. 'So, you're saying truth doesn't exist?' I'm inclined to say - grow up. If you don't see how childish that is, we may as well stop now.

Sorry, Peter, but "Truth doesn't exist" does indeed follow, quite obviously, from, "What we call truth is not a thing of some kind that exists and can be described." You're saying there that 1) truth doesn't exist, and 2) truth cannot be described. Both of those claims are obviously false. You fail to see that because you impose that arbitrary, idiosyncratic restriction on the term "exists."

See the above questions. There's no evidence that what we call truth is a thing of some kind that therefore may or may not exist, and that, if it does exist, can therefore be described. The belief that it is is a metaphysical delusion, from which you seem to be suffering. To repeat: what and where is this supposed abstract thing that you think exists in some way? Instead of just snorting 'of course truth exists', have a deep think about it.

Again, I find your misunderstanding hard to credit. A language is nothing other than linguistic practices. So how can those practices follow from a language? This is more nonsense.

Perhaps we have a different understanding of what counts as a linguistic practice. I take "linguistic practices" to denote the things we say. The language is the tool we use to use to say them. The practice of medicine is the treatment of patients; the practice of carpentry is building houses. The scalpels and syringes and instruments the doctor uses are tools of the trade, as are the hammers and saws the carpenter uses.

If p is true iff s, and you say s is a linguistic construct (a p) - then the definition is useless: p is true iff p.

Er, no. Though they are both linguistic constructs, P is not s. Those variables denote specific constructs.

We've obviously strayed a long way from my OP question - and I'm not sure how that happened. But along the way, I think we set out our arguments, and clarified our disagreements. So thanks for the engagement.