Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

So just to clarify, it's not that I think there are no unconscious brain processes.

There certainly are unconscious neural processes.

It's that there are no good reasons to posit unconscious mental phenomena--so anything like desires, beliefs, concepts, ideas, rational deductions, etc. that someone has but simply isn't aware of. Insofar as folks have any of those sorts of phenomena, they're aware of them.

There's a misunderstanding, because by "nonconscious mental item" I mean a nonexperiential mental item, i.e. one which is not a subjective experience, rather than a mental item of which its subject isn't aware, the latter of which which I call non-metaconscious rather than non-conscious. For there may be experiences too of which their subjects are not aware. So, in other words, by "nonconscious mental item" I mean a mental item which is not part of the field or stream of subjective experience/phenomenal consciousness.

If mental attitudes such as beliefs and desires exist—and I think they do—, I think they are all nonconscious mental states. There are no belief-experiences or desire-experiences, but only conscious thinkings or inner speakings of the form "I believe/desire that p". However, this is not to say that nonconscious mental attitudes aren't realized by and "stored in" neural networks of the brain.

That seems very fuzzily futzy.

Obviously we have beliefs. The issue is that there's no reason to say that we "have beliefs that aren't present-to-consciousness." You have a belief insofar as you have something like "I believe that my car is parked on Main Street" as a conscious phenomenon in your head. There's no reason to say that you don't have "I believe that my car is parked on Main Street" present-to-consciousness, yet that belief is still present somehow, just where it's not present-to-consciousness.

[Consul]

That seems very fuzzily futzy.
Obviously we have beliefs. The issue is that there's no reason to say that we "have beliefs that aren't present-to-consciousness." You have a belief insofar as you have something like "I believe that my car is parked on Main Street" as a conscious phenomenon in your head. There's no reason to say that you don't have "I believe that my car is parked on Main Street" present-to-consciousness, yet that belief is still present somehow, just where it's not present-to-consciousness.

To think or innerly say something is to use linguistic imagery; so I subsume thought and inner speech under imagination, with imagination being one of the three basic kinds of experience beside sensation and emotion. (Actually, I think sensation is more basic than emotion and imagination, because I think emotion is corporeal (bodily) sensation and imagination is imaginal or "virtual" sensation. For example, to think or innerly say something is to imagine saying it aloud.)

You do experience your thinking or innerly saying the sentence "I believe that my car is parked on Main Street"; but this is not your belief itself, because it's just an experiential expression or indication of it. Belief-expressing/-indicating thoughts are part of the stream of your experience, but the beliefs themselves are not—never.

[Consul]

You do experience your thinking or innerly saying the sentence "I believe that my car is parked on Main Street"; but this is not your belief itself, because it's just an experiential expression or indication of it. Belief-expressing/-indicating thoughts are part of the stream of your experience, but the beliefs themselves are not—never.

By the way, not all thinkings or inner sayings of "I believe that p" are really expressions of beliefs, since you can think or innerly say so without really believing so. For instance, when I think or innerly say the sentence "I believe that 1+1=3", this is not an expression of a belief of mine, since I don't believe that 1+1=3. So what must be added to a belief-thought in order for there to be an experiential expression of a real belief? Russell would say a "yes-feeling", but I'm not sure what that is; and I'm not sure I can introspectively discover such a distinctive feeling in my consciousness.

[Consul]

From the perspectives of cognitive psychology and behavioral psychology, phenomenal consciousness/subjective experience is a sideshow in the sphere of the mental.

What matters to cognitive-behavioral psychology is the causal-functional-informational-representational mind, which causes and controls behavior or action. Chalmers distinguishes between…

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"The Phenomenal and the Psychological Concepts of Mind

Conscious experience is not all there is to the mind. To see this, observe that although modern cognitive science has had almost nothing to say about consciousness, it has had much to say about mind in general. The aspects of mind with which it is concerned are different. Cognitive science deals largely in the explanation of behavior, and insofar as it is concerned with mind at all, it is with mind construed as the internal basis of behavior, and with mental states construed as those states relevant to the causation and explanation of behavior. Such states may or may not be conscious. From the point of view of cognitive science, an internal state responsible for the causation of behavior is equally mental whether it is conscious or not.

At the root of all this lie two quite distinct concepts of mind. The first is the phenomenal concept of mind. This is the concept of mind as conscious experience, and of a mental state as a consciously experienced mental state. This is the most perplexing aspect of mind and the aspect on which I will concentrate, but it does not exhaust the mental. The second is the psychological concept of mind. This is the concept of mind as the causal or explanatory basis for behavior. A state is mental in this sense if it plays the right sort of causal role in the production of behavior, or at least plays an appropriate role in the explanation of behavior. According to the psychological concept, it matters little whether a mental state has a conscious quality or not. What matters is the role it plays in a cognitive economy.

On the phenomenal concept, mind is characterized by the way it feels; on the psychological concept, mind is characterized by what it does. There should be no question of competition between these two notions of mind. Neither of them is the correct analysis of mind. They cover different phenomena, both of which are quite real.

I will sometimes speak of the phenomenal and psychological 'aspects' of mind, and sometimes of the 'phenomenal mind' and the 'psychological mind.' At this early stage, I do not wish to beg any questions about whether the phenomenal and the psychological will turn out to be the same thing. Perhaps every phenomenal state is a psychological state, in that it plays a significant role in the causation and explanation of behavior, and perhaps every psychological state has an intimate relation to the phenomenal. For now, all that counts is the conceptual distinction between the two notions: what it means for a state to be phenomenal is for it to feel a certain way, and what it means for a state to be psychological is for it to play an appropriate causal role. These distinct notions should not be conflated, at least at the outset.

A specific mental concept can usually be analyzed as a phenomenal concept, a psychological concept, or as a combination of the two. For instance, sensation, in its central sense, is best taken as a phenomenal concept: to have a sensation is to have a state with a certain sort of feel. On the other hand, the concepts of learning and memory might best be taken as psychological. For something to learn, at a first approximation, is for it to adapt its behavioral capacities appropriately in response to certain kinds of environmental stimulation. In general, a phenomenal feature of the mind is characterized by what it is like for a subject to have that feature, while a psychological feature is characterized by an associated role in the causation and/or explanation of behavior.

Of course, this usage of the term 'psychological' is a stipulation: it arises from identifying psychology with cognitive science as described above. The everyday concept of a 'psychological state' is probably broader than this, and may well include elements of the phenomenal. But nothing will rest on my use of the term."

(Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. pp. 11-2)
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[Pattern-chaser]

Do plants deserve a moral status as "animal"?

No, I don't think so. We use the terms "plant" and "animal" to distiguish them. Should we regard plants as equal to animals, in the living-things stakes? Yes, I would say so.

[Consul]

If plants aren't subjects of morality or moral subjects—which they arguably aren't—, it doesn't follow that they aren't or oughtn't be objects of morality or moral objects (objects of moral concern). Something or somebody is a moral subject if and only if it or s/he has moral properties (moral goodness or badness, virtues or vices), rights and duties, and it or s/he can be held accountable or responsible for its/her/his behavior or actions.
For example, rain forests aren't moral subjects, but it doesn't follow that it's morally right to destroy them for economic reasons.

[Consul]

We use the terms "plant" and "animal" to distiguish them. Should we regard plants as equal to animals, in the living-things stakes? Yes, I would say so.

Of course, both animals and plants are basic kinds of living organisms—and they're not the only ones.

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"We are proposing a two-superkingdom (Prokaryota and Eukaryota), seven-kingdom classification that is a practical extension of Cavalier-Smith’s six-kingdom schema…. For each of these kingdoms we had to exercise our taxonomic judgment and reach a practical compromise among diverse opinions and usages and conflicting evidence about certain phylogenetic questions important for defining the boundaries between and ranks of major taxa, including kingdoms. Our schema includes: the prokaryotic kingdoms Archaea (Archaebacteria) and Bacteria (Eubacteria), and the eukaryotic kingdoms Protozoa, Chromista, Fungi, Plantae, and Animalia."

A Higher Level Classification of All Living Organisms: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4418965/
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[Sculptor1]

Given the way animals in factory "farms" are treated, being given similar status hardly guarantees wellbeing.

Ultimately we cannot avoid killing. If you don't kill weeds and vermin, they kill our plants and animals, or us.

Organisms kill organisms. That's nature. In terms of ethics, I would certainly not prioritise plants with animals even though the description of plants as "very slow animals" has occurred to me. However, I think tempo of life matters. Pain is pointless for an organisms that is unable to move, hence their lack of nociception.

I can envision the populations of the Earth someday progressing to the level of protein farming, such as with soy beans, peanuts, other beans, meal worms, etc.

But it would require a radical shift away from capitalism and warfare first.

I'm sure you think that the entire surface of the earth could be covered by artificial trees that grow proteins, fats, and carbohydrates for human consumption, and others that make electricity. That way we'd have no need or have to give any room for animals or real plants, and be able to maximise our populations.
This is all achievable with capitalism - and that is exactly the direction of travel.
The horror of this is just around the corner.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/arti ... nd-energy/

[Sculptor1]

Recent scientific discoveries increasingly indicate that plants are intelligent creatures

Why stop at plants.
I've heard that Covid -19 is considered to the pretty smart too.
Surely it has a moral right to survive?
Why should not all Corona Viruses not get free school meals, and legal aid?

[Terrapin Station]

You do experience your thinking or innerly saying the sentence "I believe that my car is parked on Main Street"; but this is not your belief itself,

???

I'm not literally saying that the belief is a sentence. I have to write a sentence to write.

The point is that there's no reason to say that one has beliefs (or any mental content) that are not conscious.

[Consul]

You do experience your thinking or innerly saying the sentence "I believe that my car is parked on Main Street"; but this is not your belief itself,

??? I'm not literally saying that the belief is a sentence. I have to write a sentence to write.

"This" in my above statement refers to your thinking or innerly saying the sentence "I believe that my car is parked on Main Street", and not to the sentence "I believe that my car is parked on Main Street".

The point is that there's no reason to say that one has beliefs (or any mental content) that are not conscious.

My contrary contention is that, as opposed to belief-thoughts, no belief (or any other propositional attitude) is ever a phenomenally conscious, experiential state, with experienced belief-thoughts being different from unexperienced beliefs. Having a nonconscious belief disposes me to consciously entertain corresponding belief-thoughts, but they are not the same thing. My conscious belief-thoughts are merely evidence for my nonconscious beliefs.

[Terrapin Station]

My contrary contention is that, as opposed to belief-thoughts, no belief (or any other propositional attitude) is ever a phenomenally conscious, experiential state, with experienced belief-thoughts being different from unexperienced beliefs. Having a nonconscious belief disposes me to consciously entertain corresponding belief-thoughts, but they are not the same thing. My conscious belief-thoughts are merely evidence for my nonconscious beliefs.

What could possibly be evidence of unconscious beliefs?

[Terrapin Station]

In other words, if I have a belief (represented by, not literally) a la "My car is parked on Main Street," then how could that possibly serve as evidence that I have (or had) an unconscious belief (represented by--and I'm not going to keep typing this stupid, unnecessary parenthetical) "My car is parked on Main Street"?

[Gee]

My contrary contention is that, as opposed to belief-thoughts, no belief (or any other propositional attitude) is ever a phenomenally conscious, experiential state, with experienced belief-thoughts being different from unexperienced beliefs. Having a nonconscious belief disposes me to consciously entertain corresponding belief-thoughts, but they are not the same thing. My conscious belief-thoughts are merely evidence for my nonconscious beliefs.

What could possibly be evidence of unconscious beliefs?

How about prejudice?

Gee

[Consul]

What could possibly be evidence of unconscious beliefs?

Silent or nonsilent (honest) affirmative answers to questions of the form "Do you believe that p?", and other, nonverbal forms of behavior.