Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Peter Holmes]

A meta-language is just another language, so it's as foundationless as all languages.

"Foundationless"? I wasn't aware that a language required a foundation to be functional or useful. What sort of foundation do you think it should have? A language is a communication tool. What sort of foundation does any tool have?

I think you have some category confusion there (applying predicates to a class of subjects that only apply to some other class).

And what we call truth isn't a thing that can be described in any language. All we can do is explain how we use or could use thw word 'truth' and its cognates and related words.

The formula I gave is a definition of "truth-in-L," with "L" being the target language. Definitions are one way --- the most common way --- we explain the uses of terms.

And the theorum states 'p is true iff...' - not 'p can be assigned the truth-value true iff... So, as I said, confirmability is otiose.

I think the word you want there is "redundant," not "otiose" (which means "lazy", or "pointless"). Yes, it is redundant. I mention it to point out that confirmation is entailed, necessitated, by the theorem.

Thanks, but otiose is the word I want. It only rarely means lazy.

But anyway, you agree that your preferred theory of truth has a redundant condition: confirmability. And anyway, confirmability isn't confirmation, so the condition is ill-defined. I suggest you move to a different theory. Or, better still, recognise that truth isn't a thing about which theorising makes sense. That's a category confusion.

I think there's progress here. You agree that correspondence theories of truth don't work, and that languages - including linguistic truth-claims - require no foundation beneath our linguistic practices.

[Peter Holmes]

Just a thought about Tarski's so-called solution to the circularity of truth.

Defining truth in a target language by using a meta-language obviously doesn't solve the problem of circularity or infinite regress, because a meta-language is just another language.

And yet, and yet - we stubbornly talk about true and false assertions - and we understand what it means to say an assertion is true or false.

Conclusion. The 'problem' of circularity or infinite regress is a delusion - a confected fantasy born of a misconception as to the nature of truth - which is, and can only be, of course, what we call 'truth' - what we mean when we say an assertion is true. The verdict from the kangaroo court down the rabbit hole where metaphysicians furkle - is inconsequential.

[GE Morton]

But anyway, you agree that your preferred theory of truth has a redundant condition: confirmability. And anyway, confirmability isn't confirmation, so the condition is ill-defined.

No. The theory, or definition of "truth in L," does not have a redundant condition. The redundancy was in my explication of it. Confirmation is implied by the definition, necessary to establish s.

Or, better still, recognise that truth isn't a thing about which theorising makes sense. That's a category confusion.

"Theory of truth" is a bit pompous. It is not much of a theory; it is merely a definition, not much different than the definition of any other word. It merely states what it means to say that a proposition is true or false.

In what sense is it a category confusion? What categories are being confused?

You agree that correspondence theories of truth don't work, and that languages - including linguistic truth-claims - require no foundation beneath our linguistic practices.

Yes, I agree that correspondence theories don't work. As for "foundations," I don't even know what a "foundation" for a language might be, or mean.

[GE Morton]

Just a thought about Tarski's so-called solution to the circularity of truth.

Defining truth in a target language by using a meta-language obviously doesn't solve the problem of circularity or infinite regress, because a meta-language is just another language.

Of course it solves the circularity problem. A definition is circular only if it uses the term to be defined in the definition. That cannot happen if the definiens is expressed in a different language than the definiendum.

The infinite regress problem arises when the terms in the definiens must first be defined, and the terms in the definiens for those terms, etc. Which leads to the reductio ad absurdum that no terms can be defined.

. . . the nature of truth - which is, and can only be, of course, what we call 'truth' - what we mean when we say an assertion is true.

Of course. Which is the point of Tarski's definition --- to state what we mean when we say "Proposition P is true."

[Peter Holmes]

But anyway, you agree that your preferred theory of truth has a redundant condition: confirmability. And anyway, confirmability isn't confirmation, so the condition is ill-defined.

No. The theory, or definition of "truth in L," does not have a redundant condition. The redundancy was in my explication of it. Confirmation is implied by the definition, necessary to establish s.

But the definition - p is true iff s - assumes a verifiable (confirmable) relationship between p and s - which is precisely the moot point. It assumes a correspondence, which is why I said earlier that it's a form of the correspondence theory of truth - which you agree doesn't work.

Or, better still, recognise that truth isn't a thing about which theorising makes sense. That's a category confusion.

"Theory of truth" is a bit pompous. It is not much of a theory; it is merely a definition, not much different than the definition of any other word. It merely states what it means to say that a proposition is true or false.

In what sense is it a category confusion? What categories are being confused?

An explanation (definition) of the way we use a word is not a description of a thing. Truth is not a thing of some kind that can be described, and to think it is is to confuse categories. If you don't, that's fine.

You agree that correspondence theories of truth don't work, and that languages - including linguistic truth-claims - require no foundation beneath our linguistic practices.

Yes, I agree that correspondence theories don't work. As for "foundations," I don't even know what a "foundation" for a language might be, or mean.

Good. So you agree that 'p is true iff s' - where s grounds the truth of p - where the foundation for truth-claims is states-of-affairs - is incorrect. I call that progress.

[Marvin_Edwards]

The object of morality is to achieve the best good and the least harm for everyone. This is the criteria that people with different subjective opinions must fall back to, because it is the only goal that everyone can safely agree to.

Moral judgment compares two rules or courses of action by this criteria. For example, suppose we have two laws. Law-1 requires everyone to return runaway slaves to their owners. Law-2 makes it illegal for anyone to own slaves. Which law produces the best good and the least harm for everyone? It doesn't necessarily simplify the judgment. People can still argued for slavery on the basis of economics, saving the souls of pagans, racial prejudice, etc. But the temporary harms of changing a way of life are outweighed by the improvement in the quality of the lives of all black people.

So, the criteria, though not simple, at least points the way to an objective answer to moral questions. As it is said, "A problem well-defined is half-solved". The criteria at least defines the problem to be solved.

[Peter Holmes]

The object of morality is to achieve the best good and the least harm for everyone. This is the criteria that people with different subjective opinions must fall back to, because it is the only goal that everyone can safely agree to.

1 That the object of morality is ...etc.. is a matter of opinion, and is therefore subjective.
2 What constitutes 'the best good' (?) and 'the least harm' for anyone - let alone everyone - is a matter of opinion, and is therefore subjective.
3 That we should try to achieve 'the best good...etc' is a matter of opinion, and is therefore subjective.

Moral judgment compares two rules or courses of action by this criteria. For example, suppose we have two laws. Law-1 requires everyone to return runaway slaves to their owners. Law-2 makes it illegal for anyone to own slaves. Which law produces the best good and the least harm for everyone? It doesn't necessarily simplify the judgment. People can still argued for slavery on the basis of economics, saving the souls of pagans, racial prejudice, etc. But the temporary harms of changing a way of life are outweighed by the improvement in the quality of the lives of all black people.

So, the criteria, though not simple, at least points the way to an objective answer to moral questions. As it is said, "A problem well-defined is half-solved". The criteria at least defines the problem to be solved.

Your description demonstrates the subjectivity of moral judgement, from start to finish: choose a moral goal (criterion); choose to pursue that goal; choose which course of action is most consistent with that goal. Nothing here is independent from opinion.

[Belindi]

Only a subject can associate with an object. Who makes morality objective? Boss people, that's who.

Theres is nothing wrong with boss people. Every society has ruling elites who make the rules for the others.

Some people will say "It's only natural that we think murder is wrong." They typically mean murder is against the laws of nature or of God. Either might be right, or both might be wrong, however we can never know for sure.

[Terrapin Station]

The object of morality is to achieve the best good and the least harm for everyone. This is the criteria that people with different subjective opinions must fall back to, because it is the only goal that everyone can safely agree to.

Why would we even have to think that there is an "object of morality"? That's not something that I think. Moral judgments are simply a way that (at least) human brains work. We can't help but have our brains work that way (as long as we're a normally functioning human). Part of the way our brains work in connection with morality is that different people have different overarching goals in mind with morality, and some people (like me) have no overarching goals in mind with it.

[Marvin_Edwards]

The object of morality is to achieve the best good and the least harm for everyone. This is the criteria that people with different subjective opinions must fall back to, because it is the only goal that everyone can safely agree to.

Why would we even have to think that there is an "object of morality"? That's not something that I think. Moral judgments are simply a way that (at least) human brains work. We can't help but have our brains work that way (as long as we're a normally functioning human). Part of the way our brains work in connection with morality is that different people have different overarching goals in mind with morality, and some people (like me) have no overarching goals in mind with it.

Why would our brains automatically include moral judgments? Why would they work that way?

[Marvin_Edwards]

The object of morality is to achieve the best good and the least harm for everyone. This is the criteria that people with different subjective opinions must fall back to, because it is the only goal that everyone can safely agree to.

1 That the object of morality is ...etc.. is a matter of opinion, and is therefore subjective.
2 What constitutes 'the best good' (?) and 'the least harm' for anyone - let alone everyone - is a matter of opinion, and is therefore subjective.
3 That we should try to achieve 'the best good...etc' is a matter of opinion, and is therefore subjective.

Moral judgment compares two rules or courses of action by this criteria. For example, suppose we have two laws. Law-1 requires everyone to return runaway slaves to their owners. Law-2 makes it illegal for anyone to own slaves. Which law produces the best good and the least harm for everyone? It doesn't necessarily simplify the judgment. People can still argued for slavery on the basis of economics, saving the souls of pagans, racial prejudice, etc. But the temporary harms of changing a way of life are outweighed by the improvement in the quality of the lives of all black people.

So, the criteria, though not simple, at least points the way to an objective answer to moral questions. As it is said, "A problem well-defined is half-solved". The criteria at least defines the problem to be solved.

Your description demonstrates the subjectivity of moral judgement, from start to finish: choose a moral goal (criterion); choose to pursue that goal; choose which course of action is most consistent with that goal. Nothing here is independent from opinion.

Ironically, all objectivity is based in subjective experience, because all experience is by its nature subjective. Scientific objectivity improves the accuracy of our knowledge by the confirmation of multiple subjective observers and laboratory trials that can be reproduced and checked. So, meaningful objectivity is the result of confirmation via the subjective experience of multiple observers. As individuals we are equipped with multiple senses which allow us to confirm whether something that looks like an apple is truly an apple, by taste, smell, weight, etc. So, the fact that everything is a matter of subjective experience does not invalidate the assertion of objective fact. Even an opinion can be objectively true or false.

A botanist can tell us what is objectively good for each plant species. Some thrive in full sunlight, others in partial shade. Too much water will kill some plants while too little water will kill others. These are usually considered matters of objective fact, because they can be confirmed by experimentation and multiple observers.

In a similar fashion, we can objectively state that it is morally good to give a glass of water to a man dying of thirst in the desert, and morally bad to give that same glass of water to someone drowning in the swimming pool. Not all moral issues are as simple and clear cut as this, of course, but it suggests that other issues might also have possible objective resolutions.

Morality is objectively grounded in life. We call something "good" if it meets a real need that we have as an individual, as a society, or as a species. The real needs of living organisms are what they need to survive, thrive, and reproduce. As with the plants, morality is species specific. For example, what is good for the lion hunting us for food is bad for us (and vice versa).

[Terrapin Station]

Why would we even have to think that there is an "object of morality"? That's not something that I think. Moral judgments are simply a way that (at least) human brains work. We can't help but have our brains work that way (as long as we're a normally functioning human). Part of the way our brains work in connection with morality is that different people have different overarching goals in mind with morality, and some people (like me) have no overarching goals in mind with it.

Why would our brains automatically include moral judgments? Why would they work that way?

There need not be any reason for it aside from evolutionary "accident." As long as it doesn't make it less likely that we'll survive to procreate--and it doesn't--then once it shows up during evolutionary development it can get passed on genetically.

However, it would make sense to say that it made it more likely that we'd survive to procreate by having an aversion to wantonly murdering others around us, for example.

[Marvin_Edwards]

Why would our brains automatically include moral judgments? Why would they work that way?

There need not be any reason for it aside from evolutionary "accident." As long as it doesn't make it less likely that we'll survive to procreate--and it doesn't--then once it shows up during evolutionary development it can get passed on genetically.

However, it would make sense to say that it made it more likely that we'd survive to procreate by having an aversion to wantonly murdering others around us, for example.

Exactly. The species survives, so the point of a morality in the brain is the continued life of the species. That's the objective, the grounding for morality. It's life. And, as you point out, the objective never existed in evolution. It only exists within the species and in each individual of the species. Those variations in the species which failed to pursue survival and reproduction became extinct. And when the vote was taken as to whether life was worthy of pursuit, none of them raised their hand to vote no.

[GE Morton]

But the definition - p is true iff s - assumes a verifiable (confirmable) relationship between p and s - which is precisely the moot point. It assumes a correspondence, which is why I said earlier that it's a form of the correspondence theory of truth - which you agree doesn't work.

Of course there is a confirmable relationship between P and s. Are you suggesting there is no relationship? Or if there is one, it is not confirmable? If so, how does any proposition manage to convey information? That claim puts you in the same position as TP --- facing a reductio ad absurdum. If you say, "There are 223 beans in this jar," I count them and get 223, there is obviously some relationship between my statement and the number of beans in that jar.

That is indeed a form of correspondence. There are many kinds of correspondences. It may even be a "form of correspondence theory" --- but not of the classical theory articulated by Russell et al, which presumes an structural isomorphism between a proposition and a state-of-affairs.

Correspondence "theories" which presume some sort of structural isomorphism between propositions and states-of-affairs are problematic. Those that assert merely that there can be a correlation between a proposition and a confirmable state-of-affairs are not problematic; indeed that there is one is self-evident (if not, it would be impossible to convey information via language).

An explanation (definition) of the way we use a word is not a description of a thing.

Yes, it is. That dogs are referents of the English word "dog" is a property of dogs. That is a fact that adds to the description of those animals, just as "Dogs are popular household pets" does. Apparently you're still restricting "property" to local physical properties.

Truth is not a thing of some kind that can be described, and to think it is is to confuse categories.

Well, that is puzzling. Are you suggestion that word cannot be defined? And of course it is a "thing of some kind." Everything is a thing of some kind, "thing" being the universal noun. BTW, we don't "describe" words, except perhaps in the sense of stating their phonemic structure. We define them.

Yes, I agree that correspondence theories don't work. As for "foundations," I don't even know what a "foundation" for a language might be, or mean.

Good. So you agree that 'p is true iff s' - where s grounds the truth of p - where the foundation for truth-claims is states-of-affairs - is incorrect. I call that progress.

You're indulging in a 4-term fallacy. I denied knowing what might be the "foundation" for a language, not for particular propositions. Yes, for a proposition to be deemed "true" some particular state-of-affairs must be confirmable. Are you denying that? If so, how do you suggest we distinguish true propositions from false ones? Or are those two terms meaningless?

[GE Morton]

1 That the object of morality is ...etc.. is a matter of opinion, and is therefore subjective.

Er, no. Of course, anyone may re-define any common term to mean anything he likes, as long as he is willing to be misunderstood, dismissed as confused, or ignored. The object of civil engineering is generally acknowledged to refer to the principles and methodology applicable to building safe, functional, and durable roads, bridges, and other large-scale structures. Now, Alfie can decide that to him the object of civil engineering is devising foolproof ways to cheat at poker.

Alfie obviously will not be constributing anything valuable, or even relevant, to that field of study.

2 What constitutes 'the best good' (?) and 'the least harm' for anyone - let alone everyone - is a matter of opinion, and is therefore subjective.

What Alfie counts as a good, or a harm, is indeed subjective. That he does count X as a good and Y as a harm is quite objective, however. We can determine that by observing his behaviors with respect to those things.

3 That we should try to achieve 'the best good...etc' is a matter of opinion, and is therefore subjective.

No; it is a matter of logic. If Alfie counts X as a good, then he will seek to achieve it, to the extent that is possible for him. Unless X is the only thing Alfie counts as a good, then he will be forced to rank his goods, from best to worst. Again, we can determine his ranking by observing his behavior, seeing how much time, effort, other resources he devotes to securing X, Y, and the other goods in his hierarchy. Since we're assuming there are multiple goods in that hierarchy, and also that he is rational, we know that he will be unwilling to invest any more time, effort, etc., than necessary to secure any given good, since that would leave him fewer resources for securing other goods in that hierarchy.

That the object of civil engineering is building safe, functional, and durable roads, bridges, and other large-scale structures is not subjective.

That Alfie deems X to be good is not subjective.

That Alfie considers X to be "better" than Y, i.e., would prefer X to Y and would be willing to invest more to obtain X than Y is not subjective either.

You've struck out there, Peter.