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[Terrapin Station]

Per Dr. A. Ladenburg's Lectures on the History of the Development of Chemistry since the Time of Lavoisier (University of Chicago Press, 1911, p. 6), "[Georg Ernst Stahl] shows here, how a sulphate can be converted by means of charcoal into liver of sulphur, from which sulphur is precipitated by the action of an acid. From the reduction of the metallic calces by the means of soot, Stahl further infers the identity of the phlogiston of the metals with the inflammable principle in soot and in sulphur; and thus he arrives at a proof that there exists only one such principle, which he calls simply Phlogiston."

So per you, that's not a "proof" a la "1a: to establish the existence, truth, or validity of (as by evidence or logic)"?

(And note that Ladenburg even uses the word "proof"--though I'd advise him against that usage, which is careless in my view.)

[GE Morton]

So you're saying that in the 1700s, we did nothing to establish the existence, truth, or validity of (as by evidence or logic) phlogiston?

Well, now you're switching from the meaning of "prove" to the meanings of "valid" and "true." They don't mean the same thing.

The proof of an empirical proposition is the existence of the state of affairs which renders it true. If I say "There are 223 beans in that jar," and you count the beans and get 223, then you've proved my my statement.

Theories, and the hypothetical entities they postulate, are neither true nor false, valid or invalid. They are only good or bad, sound or unsound, adequate or inadequate, depending upon how completely and accurately they explain the phenomena within their domains. When a theory is supplanted by a theory that betters unifies and explains the phenomena in its domain any entities or processes it postulated either go away --- cease to exist --- or they're incorporated into the new theory, likely with somewhat different definitions.

No, no one ever "proved" the existence of phlogiston. I doubt (though I'm not sure) that anyone ever claimed they did. It was a theoretical substance postulated to explain combustion.

[GE Morton]

Per Dr. A. Ladenburg's Lectures on the History of the Development of Chemistry since the Time of Lavoisier (University of Chicago Press, 1911, p. 6), "[Georg Ernst Stahl] shows here, how a sulphate can be converted by means of charcoal into liver of sulphur, from which sulphur is precipitated by the action of an acid. From the reduction of the metallic calces by the means of soot, Stahl further infers the identity of the phlogiston of the metals with the inflammable principle in soot and in sulphur; and thus he arrives at a proof that there exists only one such principle, which he calls simply Phlogiston."

So per you, that's not a "proof" a la "1a: to establish the existence, truth, or validity of (as by evidence or logic)"?

(And note that Ladenburg even uses the word "proof"--though I'd advise him against that usage, which is careless in my view.)

Yes, it is a careless use.

[Terrapin Station]

So you're saying that in the 1700s, we did nothing to establish the existence, truth, or validity of (as by evidence or logic) phlogiston?

Well, now you're switching from the meaning of "prove" to the meanings of "valid" and "true." They don't mean the same thing.

What a drag to keep seeing that I have replies but they're from you, by the way.

I simply pasted the definition of "prove" that you gave earlier. Are you saying that's not the definition of "prove" now?

[Sy Borg]

Well, now you're switching from the meaning of "prove" to the meanings of "valid" and "true." They don't mean the same thing.

What a drag to keep seeing that I have replies but they're from you, by the way.

I simply pasted the definition of "prove" that you gave earlier. Are you saying that's not the definition of "prove" now?

But only fourteen pages to go for the century!

This thread very much reminds me of the old school punishment, where errant students were expected to write at length about the inside of a ping pong ball.

[Belindi]

Proof ' properly ' belongs with analytic proof but not with synthetic, empirical proof. However it depends on what sort of conversation one is having. During everyday talk
it would not raise any eyebrows if somebody said " I can prove your car tyres are underinflated", or even " If you find the causal organism you will prove whether or not this is a case of typhoid ."

Can GE Morton give an example of any potentially real life situation where it's not immediately obvious whether the context is either Euclidean or diagnostic?

[Peter Holmes]

Proof ' properly ' belongs with analytic proof but not with synthetic, empirical proof. However it depends on what sort of conversation one is having. During everyday talk
it would not raise any eyebrows if somebody said " I can prove your car tyres are underinflated", or even " If you find the causal organism you will prove whether or not this is a case of typhoid ."

Can GE Morton give an example of any potentially real life situation where it's not immediately obvious whether the context is either Euclidean or diagnostic?

Pending that ... some thoughts on meaning, relevant to this argument about the meaning of 'proof' and 'prove'.

1 Words (and all signs) can mean only what we (some people) use them to mean. So if some people use 'prove' to mean 'test' in some contexts, that's just the way it is. And the expressions 'the proof of the pudding is in the eating', 'the exception proves the rule' and 'proof spirit' use 'prove' and 'proof' to mean 'test' or 'tested'.

2 We use many words, including 'prove' and 'proof' in different ways in different contexts. For example, proving (testing) a factual (empirical) assertion is different from proving (demonstrating) a logical or mathematical deduction. It's absurd to insist that one way of using a word is the correct, accurate or precise use of the word.

3 The meaning of a word is not the thing (real or unreal) named by the word. So the meaning of the word 'dog' is not a dog, because a dog is a real thing - a feature of reality - and not the meaning of a word. We use the word 'dog' to name and talk about the things we call dogs. Full stop. And similarly, the meaning of the word 'proof' is what we do with it: we call this, that and the other a proof.

4 Pari passu with the word 'truth' and its cognates. We say a factual assertion such as 'the earth orbits the sun' can be shown to be true, just as 'the sun orbits the earth' and 'the earth is flat' can be shown to be false - given the way we use those words in context. It's absurd to insist that we can't or shouldn't call those assertions true and false. It's demonstrably true that I'm typing on a laptop atm.

5 The methodological provisionality of some scientific assertions - theoretical conclusions from available data - doesn't mean that scientists don't deal with true and false assertions. The falsifiability of the assertion 'the earth orbits the sun' doesn't mean we can't know if it's true, or that it can't in fact be true. And if it turns out to be false - because new evidence comes in - then it was false all along, for exactly the same reason that it would have been true all along if, in fact, the earth does indeed orbit the sun.

[GE Morton]

Proof ' properly ' belongs with analytic proof but not with synthetic, empirical proof.

What makes the former "proper" and the latter (presumably) improper? Both are commonplace uses, equally legitimate.

Can GE Morton give an example of any potentially real life situation where it's not immediately obvious whether the context is either Euclidean or diagnostic?

I don't understand the point of the question, Belindi. Are you asking for an example wherein it is not clear whether an alleged "proof" is analytical or empirical?

[GE Morton]

1 Words (and all signs) can mean only what we (some people) use them to mean. So if some people use 'prove' to mean 'test' in some contexts, that's just the way it is. And the expressions 'the proof of the pudding is in the eating', 'the exception proves the rule' and 'proof spirit' use 'prove' and 'proof' to mean 'test' or 'tested'.

Agree.

2 We use many words, including 'prove' and 'proof' in different ways in different contexts. For example, proving (testing) a factual (empirical) assertion is different from proving (demonstrating) a logical or mathematical deduction. It's absurd to insist that one way of using a word is the correct, accurate or precise use of the word.

Agree.

3 The meaning of a word is not the thing (real or unreal) named by the word. So the meaning of the word 'dog' is not a dog, because a dog is a real thing - a feature of reality - and not the meaning of a word. We use the word 'dog' to name and talk about the things we call dogs. Full stop. And similarly, the meaning of the word 'proof' is what we do with it: we call this, that and the other a proof.

That the dog is a "real thing" does not preclude it also being the meaning of a word. A dog is --- can be --- many other things as well, e.g., man's best friend, the heroine of "Lassie," a K9 "officer," a mother of puppies, etc. To say that a dog is the meaning of "dog" simply means it is what is denoted by that word.

4 Pari passu with the word 'truth' and its cognates. We say a factual assertion such as 'the earth orbits the sun' can be shown to be true, just as 'the sun orbits the earth' and 'the earth is flat' can be shown to be false - given the way we use those words in context. It's absurd to insist that we can't or shouldn't call those assertions true and false. It's demonstrably true that I'm typing on a laptop atm.

Agree.

5 The methodological provisionality of some scientific assertions - theoretical conclusions from available data - doesn't mean that scientists don't deal with true and false assertions. The falsifiability of the assertion 'the earth orbits the sun' doesn't mean we can't know if it's true, or that it can't in fact be true. And if it turns out to be false - because new evidence comes in - then it was false all along, for exactly the same reason that it would have been true all along if, in fact, the earth does indeed orbit the sun.

Every synthetic proposition is falsifiable in principle. That is what distinguishes synthetic propositions from analytical ones. Whether a given proposition is true or false depends on the state of the world at the moment --- which could change tomorrow.

[Peter Holmes]

That the dog is a "real thing" does not preclude it also being the meaning of a word. A dog is --- can be --- many other things as well, e.g., man's best friend, the heroine of "Lassie," a K9 "officer," a mother of puppies, etc. To say that a dog is the meaning of "dog" simply means it is what is denoted by that word.

Nope. And I think it's very important to realise that a real thing - a feature of reality - is not the meaning of a word, any more than it consists of any of the limitless number of ways in which it can be described.

There are real things, such as dogs, on the one hand; and on the other, there are names such as 'dog' and descriptions of the things we call dogs. And these are two radically different things. Your conflating them is a fundamental ontological mistake. But I know we don't agree about this.

[GE Morton]

That the dog is a "real thing" does not preclude it also being the meaning of a word. A dog is --- can be --- many other things as well, e.g., man's best friend, the heroine of "Lassie," a K9 "officer," a mother of puppies, etc. To say that a dog is the meaning of "dog" simply means it is what is denoted by that word.

Nope. And I think it's very important to realise that a real thing - a feature of reality - is not the meaning of a word, any more than it consists of any of the limitless number of ways in which it can be described.

When we say that "This animal is the meaning of the word, 'dog,'" we are not saying that dogs "consist" of meanings. We are just saying that the word denotes that animal. The "is" there is not the "is" of composition, but the "is" of predication. Being the meaning of that word is a property dogs have in that speech community, just like, "Dogs are the 2nd most popular pet in America" is a property they have.

Nouns denote things, or classes of things. What they denote is their denotative meaning.

[Peter Holmes]

Nope. And I think it's very important to realise that a real thing - a feature of reality - is not the meaning of a word, any more than it consists of any of the limitless number of ways in which it can be described.

When we say that "This animal is the meaning of the word, 'dog,'" we are not saying that dogs "consist" of meanings. We are just saying that the word denotes that animal. The "is" there is not the "is" of composition, but the "is" of predication. Being the meaning of that word is a property dogs have in that speech community, just like, "Dogs are the 2nd most popular pet in America" is a property they have.

Nouns denote things, or classes of things. What they denote is their denotative meaning.

But denotation is not a two-way relationship. Or do you hold to a mistaken correspondence theory? And this is definitely not the 'is' of predication. It's not a property of dogs that we call them dogs. What an absurd idea!

The glaringly obvious can be blinding. We use the word 'dog' to name and talk about the things we call dogs. But those things don't identify, categorise, name or describe - themselves. We do those things when we talk about them.

[GE Morton]

But denotation is not a two-way relationship.

Not sure what you're saying there. "Two-way relationship"?

Or do you hold to a mistaken correspondence theory?

Methinks you don't understand what the correspondence theory is. It is a theory that holds that the "structure of language" mirrors the "structure of reality," or that truth is the correspondence of a proposition with a fact:

"Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to, or with, a fact—a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified)."

The correspondence theory does not deal with the correspondence of nouns with the set of objects they denote, which is obvious and not controversial.

And this is definitely not the 'is' of predication. It's not a property of dogs that we call them dogs. What an absurd idea!

Ah, apparently you're restricting the term "property" to a narrow class of properties, similarly to the way you restrict "exists" to a narrow class of existents. Yes, it is the "is" of predication, and, yes, that dogs are the meaning of the word "dog" is a property of dogs, just as "Capital of France" is a property of Paris, "Home of the Mets" is a property of Shea Stadium, and if Bruno has a niece or nephew, "is an uncle" is a property of Bruno. Properties of things are simply those confirmable facts which can be truly predicated of them.

We use the word 'dog' to name and talk about the things we call dogs. But those things don't identify, categorise, name or describe - themselves. We do those things when we talk about them.

Well, you're right there. Things don't categorize, name, or describe themselves. And of course, I didn't suggest they did. Words are human inventions, coined, more or less arbitrarily, to denote things in the world. The class of things so denoted by a word is the denotational meaning of that word.

[GE Morton]

Ooops, forgot the reference for the above quote:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trut ... spondence/

[Peter Holmes]

But denotation is not a two-way relationship.

Not sure what you're saying there. "Two-way relationship"?

Or do you hold to a mistaken correspondence theory?

Methinks you don't understand what the correspondence theory is. It is a theory that holds that the "structure of language" mirrors the "structure of reality," or that truth is the correspondence of a proposition with a fact:

"Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to, or with, a fact—a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified)."

The correspondence theory does not deal with the correspondence of nouns with the set of objects they denote, which is obvious and not controversial.

But a correspondence theory of truth (relevant to factual assertions) depends on the supposed correspondence of terms with named things. There's no correspondence between the words 'snow' and 'white' and what we call snow and white(ness), so there can be no correspondence between the assertion 'snow is white' and the state-of-affairs that it asserts. Correspondence theories are attractively simple - and wrong.

And this is definitely not the 'is' of predication. It's not a property of dogs that we call them dogs. What an absurd idea!

Ah, apparently you're restricting the term "property" to a narrow class of properties, similarly to the way you restrict "exists" to a narrow class of existents. Yes, it is the "is" of predication, and, yes, that dogs are the meaning of the word "dog" is a property of dogs, just as "Capital of France" is a property of Paris, "Home of the Mets" is a property of Shea Stadium, and if Bruno has a niece or nephew, "is an uncle" is a property of Bruno. Properties of things are simply those confirmable facts which can be truly predicated of them.

No, this is an elementary mistake. We call the city 'Paris', then ascribe properties to Paris, such as 'capital city of France'. So the factual assertion 'Paris is the capital city of France' is true, given the way we use those signs. But the name 'Paris' is not a property we ascribe to (predicate of) the city. Calling a class of things 'dogs' doesn't predicate anything of them. Calling a colour 'yellow' doesn't describe the colour. Look at your claim again:

that dogs are the meaning of the word 'dog' is a property of dogs

This is gibberish.

We use the word 'dog' to name and talk about the things we call dogs. But those things don't identify, categorise, name or describe - themselves. We do those things when we talk about them.

Well, you're right there. Things don't categorize, name, or describe themselves. And of course, I didn't suggest they did. Words are human inventions, coined, more or less arbitrarily, to denote things in the world. The class of things so denoted by a word is the denotational meaning of that word.

But, crucially, things don't classify and quantify themselves in categories. Linguistic denotation is one-way. A name no more corresponds with what it names than an arrow corresponds with its target. There is no 'relationship'.