Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

"Artificial separation" doesn't make much sense here. The phenomenon of meaning is a phenomenon that only occurs as a brain activity. It doesn't occur elsewhere.

The metaphysical delusion is that the abstract noun 'meaning' is the name of a thing of any kind whatsoever - an entity, an activity or what you call a phenomenon - that therefore 'is' or 'goes on' anywhere, inside or outside minds or brains. Do you really think that what we call the meaning of something is a kind of thing or activity that has a location? It's an absurd idea.

Nothing exists that is not a phenomenon with a location. The idea of real abstracts is what's an absurd idea.

[Terrapin Station]

The idea of real abstracts is a reification of concepts and a reification of the way we think about concepts in relation to language usage.

[GE Morton]

1 Only assertions can be objective - not principles or values or goals. So the claim that a moral principle 'is objective if it demonstrably advances a stipulated moral goal' is incoherent. It makes a category error.

???

Well, I agree that goals are not propositions, and that values are inherently subjective. But principles? Of course they're propositions. Or, at least, any articulation of a principle is a proposition.

2 The adoption of a moral principle, value or goal is a matter of choice, judgement or opinion. That an action is demonstrably consistent with or contrary to that chosen principle, value or goal has no bearing on the 'subjectivity' of that choice.

Yes, the adoption of any of those is a choice. But that a principle is adopted (followed, accepted, etc.) has no bearing on whether it is objective. It is objective if its truth conditions are public. Whether a principle or rule does or does not further a moral goal is (usually) empirically determinable, and hence is objective.

3 Assertions as to the applicability of a moral principle, and as to which creatures do qualify as moral agents, are subjective.

Well, no. What counts as a moral agent is a matter of definition. Definitions don't have truth conditions; they are stipulations. Subjective/objective don't apply. I gave the definition I use earlier, which is consistent with the one generally assumed in the literature.

[Terrapin Station]

1 Only assertions can be objective - not principles or values or goals. So the claim that a moral principle 'is objective if it demonstrably advances a stipulated moral goal' is incoherent. It makes a category error.

???

Well, I agree that goals are not propositions, and that values are inherently subjective. But principles? Of course they're propositions. Or, at least, any articulation of a principle is a proposition.

First, he probably means "principle" in a moral sense.

But aside from that, one can only think that principles are true or false (other than stipulatively so in the context of logic or mathematics) if one buys that there are real abstracts. If there are no real abstracts, there are no true principles. Principles would be noncognitive.

[GE Morton]

Nothing exists that is not a phenomenon with a location. The idea of real abstracts is what's an absurd idea.

That depends on how you understand the term "real." If you limit it in the way you suggest many ubiquitous phenomena become "unreal," and many sound explanations become vacuous.

Whatever we say is real is real, as long as what we say has some descriptive or explanatory value.

[Terrapin Station]

That depends on how you understand the term "real."

I'm using the standard philosophical distinction where "real" is the same as my "objective"--"real" refers to extramental phenomena. This is the sense in which anyone who is an "antirealist" on any x is using the term. Antirealists are denying that x occurs extramentally. They're not necessarily denying that x is a mental phenomenon.

[GE Morton]

First, he probably means "principle" in a moral sense.

The only thing that distinguishes a moral principle from any other principle is that it relates to a moral goal, just as an engineering principle relates to some engineering goal.

But aside from that, one can only think that principles are true or false (other than stipulatively so in the context of logic or mathematics) if one buys that there are real abstracts. If there are no real abstracts, there are no true principles. Principles would be noncognitive.

There are "real abstracts." Any abstract that serves some descriptive or explanatory purpose is "real." But that is immaterial. Any assertion of a principle is a proposition, and it is either true or false.

[Terrapin Station]

The only thing that distinguishes a moral principle from any other principle is that it relates to a moral goal

Well, and even if you believe that other principles are somehow part of the extramental world, there's no reason to believe that moral principles are--there's zero evidence of this, etc. Moral principles are simply akin to "trump card" pledges.

There are "real abstracts."

There are no extramental abstracts. That's the sense that "real" is being used there.

[Peter Holmes]

The metaphysical delusion is that the abstract noun 'meaning' is the name of a thing of any kind whatsoever - an entity, an activity or what you call a phenomenon - that therefore 'is' or 'goes on' anywhere, inside or outside minds or brains. Do you really think that what we call the meaning of something is a kind of thing or activity that has a location? It's an absurd idea.

Nothing exists that is not a phenomenon with a location. The idea of real abstracts is what's an absurd idea.

Do you think that what we call 'meaning' or 'the meaning of something' is a thing that exists in a location in the way that an electrochemical process is a thing that exists in a location? And if so, would you see no equivocation on the word 'exists' with reference to meaning in this context?

[Peter Holmes]

1 Only assertions can be objective - not principles or values or goals. So the claim that a moral principle 'is objective if it demonstrably advances a stipulated moral goal' is incoherent. It makes a category error.

???

Well, I agree that goals are not propositions, and that values are inherently subjective. But principles? Of course they're propositions. Or, at least, any articulation of a principle is a proposition.

So. let's be precise. A principle is not a proposition, so it can't be objective or subjective. We 're discussing the status or function of moral assertions.

2 The adoption of a moral principle, value or goal is a matter of choice, judgement or opinion. That an action is demonstrably consistent with or contrary to that chosen principle, value or goal has no bearing on the 'subjectivity' of that choice.

Yes, the adoption of any of those is a choice. But that a principle is adopted (followed, accepted, etc.) has no bearing on whether it is objective. It is objective if its truth conditions are public. Whether a principle or rule does or does not further a moral goal is (usually) empirically determinable, and hence is objective.

Hold on. This is muddled, again. To clarify, please can you state a moral principle using an assertion that you think has a truth-value - one that, say, you think is true, but which would be false if things were different? And please can you also state a moral rule with the same property? I obviously don't understand what such things are, so clear examples would be useful.

3 Assertions as to the applicability of a moral principle, and as to which creatures do qualify as moral agents, are subjective.

Well, no. What counts as a moral agent is a matter of definition. Definitions don't have truth conditions; they are stipulations. Subjective/objective don't apply. I gave the definition I use earlier, which is consistent with the one generally assumed in the literature.

So the definition of a moral agent, and therefore the applicability of moral principles, are stipulative, have no truth-value, and are not objective. Good to get that sorted.

[Terrapin Station]

Do you think that what we call 'meaning' or 'the meaning of something' is a thing that exists in a location in the way that an electrochemical process is a thing that exists in a location?

Yes, of course.

I don't see how it's not clearly incoherent to suppose otherwise.

What I think rather happens is that a lot of people simply choose not to think about just how it exists/just what it exists as, etc., in ontological terms, if they're going to say that it's not a "thing" that has a location a la an electrochemical process, say.

And if so, would you see no equivocation on the word 'exists' with reference to meaning in this context?

What would the other sense of "exist" be on your view here?

[Peter Holmes]

Do you think that what we call 'meaning' or 'the meaning of something' is a thing that exists in a location in the way that an electrochemical process is a thing that exists in a location?

Yes, of course.

I don't see how it's not clearly incoherent to suppose otherwise.

I find what you say utterly incredible. What and where do you think meaning is? And do you think other abstract nouns are names of things? Do you think the word 'justice' is the name of a thing of some kind? And if so, what and where is that thing? The myth of abstract things is indeed potent and pervasive.

What I think rather happens is that a lot of people simply choose not to think about just how it exists/just what it exists as, etc., in ontological terms, if they're going to say that it's not a "thing" that has a location a la an electrochemical process, say.

And if so, would you see no equivocation on the word 'exists' with reference to meaning in this context?

What would the other sense of "exist" be on your view here?

I have absolutely no idea. And that you think meaning exists in the way an electrochemical process exists - physically, measurably - is so ridiculous that I feel we can have nothing useful to say to each other.

[Belindi]

When someone thingifies an abstract concept the error is sometimes due to the concept's being denoted by a noun.

If,say, justice did not exist as a word but instead we had a verb 'justicing' or a verb phrase 'behave justly' then Peter would not thingify that concept.

[Peter Holmes]

When someone thingifies an abstract concept the error is sometimes due to the concept's being denoted by a noun.

If,say, justice did not exist as a word but instead we had a verb 'justicing' or a verb phrase 'behave justly' then Peter would not thingify that concept.

Maybe. But a concept is just another fictional abstract thing. Saying the supposed thing named by the word 'justice' is a concept explains absolutely nothing. What and where is a concept supposed to be? In the mind - another fictional abstract thing? That this metaphysical nonsense still passes muster is astonishing.

[GE Morton]

I'm using the standard philosophical distinction where "real" is the same as my "objective"--"real" refers to extramental phenomena. This is the sense in which anyone who is an "antirealist" on any x is using the term. Antirealists are denying that x occurs extramentally. They're not necessarily denying that x is a mental phenomenon.

TP, this entire "mental/extramental" dichotomy of yours is a postulate of a particular ontological theory, which, like most ontological theories, is nonsense. The only evidence you can possibly have for any "extramental" phenomena --- entities, events, properties, etc. --- is sensory phenomena, which are all "mental phenomena." ALL of those entities, events, properties are constructs of your brain, constructed from the raw material of sensory impressions. Rocks, stars, trees, colors, odors, sounds, cats, butterflies, other humans are no more "real" (in the transcendental sense I think you mean) than ideas, love, joy, meanings, theories, laws, principles, electromagnetic and gravitational fields, photons, quarks, virtual particles, money, religions, minutes and seconds, and endless other hypothetical and abstract entities. Those are all entities --- including the rocks and trees --- invented or postulated by us to impose some order, some coherence, on the kaleidoscope of sensory experience. They are all "real" if they play some useful role in that endeavor.

"Real" things do, of course, fall into different classes, and propositions asserting the existence of something have different kinds of truth conditions, depending on the class to which the thing belongs. You can't confirm "Alfie loves Annabelle" by the same method you would confirm "It's raining outside," or "There is no largest prime," or "Slavery is morally wrong." But all of those propositions have public truth conditions of some sort.