Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Philosophy Club

[psyreporter]

Nothing about the vast majority of states of affairs hinges on being named. Again, states of affairs would obtain whether there was anyone around to do any naming or not.

When one declares something a fact it has been named. Whether one uses a philosophical method to do the naming, by which one argues that the naming will obtain whether there is anyone around or not, or uses a different method to declare something a truth (i.e. a proposition), is not relevant. One can argue that there is a difference in qualitative value, e.g. utilitarian value, but that would be something else than the claim that facts are intrinsically otherwise than truth.

it requires the formulation of a perspective which implies the requirement of truth conditions.

Names aren't true or false, they're just sounds/text strings we associate with something else.

The method used for naming originates from a perspective on reality which requires truth conditions to determine its validity. The truth conditions originate from a philosophical method and that implies that a certain belief is involved. At question would be: is it valid to assume that what is established a fact will remain so in time? As it appears, based on mounting evidence, the answer is no.

A question that may provide an insight: could existence, the Universe and beyond, be summed in a single fact? If not, then that disproves the ground for the claim that facts are intrinsically different from truths.

[Terrapin Station]

When one declares something a fact it has been named.

Facts in no way depend on any declarations or naming.

[psyreporter]

Facts in no way depend on any declarations or naming.

Such a statement is based on a belief that facts have always been there, independent from time and thus from being named. I have been trying to show that such a conviction is based on a belief in uniformitarianism, a dogma.

A philosophical method by itself is a perspective based on truth conditions. Truth conditions of a perspective on reality are questionable just like the truth conditions of a proposition.

In the case of facts, a truth condition is that facts are synthetic propositions predicated by existence in the real world (i.e. your argument: facts obtain whether people exist or not). Before one could consider this condition one will need to accept a certain truth about "reality" which is questionable.

The value in relation to people does not suffice as a ground for the claim that facts are intrinsically different from truths or that they exist outside of the scope of a perspective. One would merely be able to hold a strong belief or faith in a philosophical method but that would be similar to holding faith in the existence of God with the evidence being intelligent design.

In a time span of 1000 years it may be that 99% of the facts remain the same but there is no theoretical ground for the idea that facts are intrinsically different from truths in time. It follows that one cannot pose that facts are intrinsically different from truths. Facts differ only on the basis of assumed qualitative value in relation to the human. Thus, without the human, facts will not obtain.

[Terrapin Station]

Facts in no way depend on any declarations or naming.

Such a statement is based on a belief that facts have always been there, independent from time and thus from being named. I have been trying to show that such a conviction is based on a belief in uniformitarianism, a dogma.

It has nothing to do with facts being independent from time.

It also has nothing to do with uniformitarianism.

Changing states of affairs, where there are no real physical laws, no uniform processes, etc. would be facts, and they would occur whether any people exist or not.

[psyreporter]

States of affairs = reality = bound by a perspective = truth conditions that are questionable.

One cannot pose that facts obtain when people exist or not because the declaration of facts originates from a perspective (the result of a philosophical method is a perspective).

Why would one be able to argue that the states of affairs i.e. "reality" is real or definitive? One could only use empirical evidence for such a claim (the result of the scientific method) and that implies that it is not known what causes reality to exist, by which it is to be implied that one cannot know if reality is real or definitive and thus it is not possible to claim that facts obtain when people (as an observer) exist or not.

A belief in uniformitarianism is the only way that one could pose that truths obtain outside the scope of any perspective, i.e. that states of affairs are "real" beyond the observer.

[Terrapin Station]

States of affairs = reality = bound by a perspective = truth conditions that are questionable.

No, that's not what it refers to. I defined it a number of times above. It simply refers to some arrangement of existents. That arrangement can be dynamic rather than static. And it no way suggests that we're talking about uniform processes or physical laws or anything like that.

It's nothing about being bound by a perspective or having truth conditions, etc.

[psyreporter]

States of affairs is essentially another term for "reality".

In philosophy, a state of affairs, also known as a situation, is a way the actual world must be in order to make some given proposition about the actual world true; in other words, a state of affairs (situation) is a truth-maker, whereas a proposition is a truth-bearer.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_ ... hilosophy)

"actual world" will need to be established before facts can be determined. "actual world" implies a perspective with truth conditions. One assumes that a certain "actuality" is applicable in time while that may not be correct.

[Terrapin Station]

States of affairs is essentially another term for "reality".

In philosophy, a state of affairs, also known as a situation, is a way the actual world must be in order to make some given proposition about the actual world true; in other words, a state of affairs (situation) is a truth-maker, whereas a proposition is a truth-bearer.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_ ... hilosophy)

"actual world" will need to be established before facts can be determined. "actual world" implies a perspective with truth conditions. One assumes that a certain "actuality" is applicable in time while that may not be correct.

So you're saying that I shouldn't be using "state of affairs" the way I was using it? Is that the gist of your comment here? It's basically disagreeing with my usage based on text you found, where you're essentially saying that I should be using the term just like the text you found?

[psyreporter]

I am not certain how you could have intended it otherwise. The Wikipedia article presents how State of affairs is used in philosophy.

The following article about Truth also mentions that State of affairs is an alternative reference for "reality:

https://philosophynews.com/post/2015/01 ... Truth.aspx (Correspondence Theory of Truth)

correspondence theorists hold that there are a set of "truth-bearing" representations (or propositions) about the world that align to or correspond with reality or states of affairs in the world. A state of affairs just is a particular way the world or reality is. When a proposition aligns to the world, the proposition is said to be true.

[Terrapin Station]

The Wikipedia article presents how State of affairs is used in philosophy.

Nope. That's incorrect that that's the most common way to parse the term in philosophy.

So is that what you want to argue about, how the term is used in philosophy?

[Terrapin Station]

The Wikipedia article presents how State of affairs is used in philosophy.

If you want to argue about how the term is used in philosophy, by the way, then why, when I first gave the definition, didn't you say, "I don't agree that that's how that term is commonly used in philosophy."

Why did it take so many posts where I'm repeating the same thing for you to even say that you have a problem with the definition I'm presenting?

Not that what I'm saying hinges on how the term is commonly used, but if that's what you want to argue about . . .

[Actioninmind23]

Nowhere and everywhere aren't the same.

We have a set of locations, A, B, C, D, E . . . Z.

Re that set of locations, x is located nowhere. That means that there is no x in A, no x in B, etc. all the way to no x in Z.

Re that set of locations, y is (or Ys are) located everywhere. That means that there is a y (or a part of y) in A, a y (or a part of y) in B, etc., all the way through Z.

So there's a difference.

In my opinion I think as you say that there is physical difference and as well in the semantic meaning of the word nowhere and everywhere, but for me metaphysically both words can be or not be at the same time, so means symmetric distribution in the same thing, nowhere constitutes in fact the posibility non-existential where it is determined that is at the same time something (existence) because of the fact itself and everywhere is all the parts defined as they are and at the same time non parts because the scope of it is relative.

[psyreporter]

Perhaps our discussion is hijacking the topic The author hasn't replied since his first post.

My pending question: Is Somewhere a valid concept if time is ought to be considered a conjuration by the mind?

[Terrapin Station]

Perhaps our discussion is hijacking the topic The author hasn't replied since his first post.

My pending question: Is Somewhere a valid concept if time is ought to be considered a conjuration by the mind?

What would you think that "somewhere" has to do with time?

[psyreporter]

It is just that when time is considered a conjuration by the mind, why not space as well?

I did not intend to imply anything about time or the validity of the statement in the OP, my question was merely intended to address the validity of the reasoning in the OP.