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[Terrapin Station]

A value judgment is merely an expression of the strength of someone's desire for something.

This is Humpty-Dumptyism - you're redefining the term 'value judgment' to suit your own ends. Philosophers traditionally distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic value: intrinsic value is the value or worth that something has in itself, while extrinsic value is any other value a thing may be given, e.g. by our judgments about the thing. Your definition only covers extrinsic value, and is therefore so far adrift from standard philosophical usage as to be useless for communicating with other students of philosophy, as in this forum. If you want to be understood, you should stick to standard usage: departing from it so radically just acts as an obstacle to sensible discussion.

But rational moral judgments are not value judgments. They do not express anyone's feelings or desires regarding, say, slavery. They declare that slavery is inconsistent with some overriding, universal moral principle.

On the standard definition of 'value judgment', moral judgments, whether rational or not, are value judgements, generally presupposing some intrinsic value in something, e.g. pleasure, freedom, health, etc..

I can see that one might derive an 'overriding, universal moral principle' from the fact that something has intrinsic value. For example, if pleasure has intrinsic value, then perhaps, with the addition of further plausible assumptions, we might derive the universal principle that one ought to try to promote pleasure. (In fact this is more or less the position I hold.) But I do not see how there could be any moral principle that does not ultimately depend on something having intrinsic value; and it seems to me that the title question of this thread, 'What could make morality objective?', in the end boils down to 'Does anything have intrinsic value?'

The problem with all of this is that there is no intrinsic value. The value of anything is simply a matter of how much something matters to individuals, how much they care about it.

[GE Morton]

A value judgment is merely an expression of the strength of someone's desire for something.

This is Humpty-Dumptyism - you're redefining the term 'value judgment' to suit your own ends. Philosophers traditionally distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic value: intrinsic value is the value or worth that something has in itself, while extrinsic value is any other value a thing may be given, e.g. by our judgments about the thing.

Some philosophers have indeed made that distinction. But it is vacuous. There is no such thing as "intrinsic value." There is no means of determining it or measuring it. Any proposition of the form, "The intrinsic value of X is V" is non-cognitive; it has no public truth conditions and hence no truth value.

"Value" is not a property of things; it is a pseudo-property imputed to things by some person, some valuer. It merely denotes that a thing is desired by some person and is worth pursuing. Propositions asserting values are cognitive only when a valuer is specified. I.e.,

"The value of X is V" is non-cognitive and meaningless.

"The value of X to P is V" is cognitive.

I can see that one might derive an 'overriding, universal moral principle' from the fact that something has intrinsic value. For example, if pleasure has intrinsic value, then perhaps, with the addition of further plausible assumptions, we might derive the universal principle that one ought to try to promote pleasure. (In fact this is more or less the position I hold.) But I do not see how there could be any moral principle that does not ultimately depend on something having intrinsic value; and it seems to me that the title question of this thread, 'What could make morality objective?', in the end boils down to 'Does anything have intrinsic value?'

Well, if that is what is required for morality to be objective, then it will forever remain subjective. But, of course, the objectivity of moral propositions does not presume or depend upon the nonsensical notion of "intrinsic value."

The above analysis of value, BTW, is essentially that of Spinoza, Ralph Barton Perry, and others.

[Peter Holmes]

This is Humpty-Dumptyism - you're redefining the term 'value judgment' to suit your own ends. Philosophers traditionally distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic value: intrinsic value is the value or worth that something has in itself, while extrinsic value is any other value a thing may be given, e.g. by our judgments about the thing.

Some philosophers have indeed made that distinction. But it is vacuous. There is no such thing as "intrinsic value." There is no means of determining it or measuring it. Any proposition of the form, "The intrinsic value of X is V" is non-cognitive; it has no public truth conditions and hence no truth value.

"Value" is not a property of things; it is a pseudo-property imputed to things by some person, some valuer. It merely denotes that a thing is desired by some person and is worth pursuing. Propositions asserting values are cognitive only when a valuer is specified. I.e.,

"The value of X is V" is non-cognitive and meaningless.

"The value of X to P is V" is cognitive.

I can see that one might derive an 'overriding, universal moral principle' from the fact that something has intrinsic value. For example, if pleasure has intrinsic value, then perhaps, with the addition of further plausible assumptions, we might derive the universal principle that one ought to try to promote pleasure. (In fact this is more or less the position I hold.) But I do not see how there could be any moral principle that does not ultimately depend on something having intrinsic value; and it seems to me that the title question of this thread, 'What could make morality objective?', in the end boils down to 'Does anything have intrinsic value?'

Well, if that is what is required for morality to be objective, then it will forever remain subjective. But, of course, the objectivity of moral propositions does not presume or depend upon the nonsensical notion of "intrinsic value."

The above analysis of value, BTW, is essentially that of Spinoza, Ralph Barton Perry, and others.

I agree that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction with regard to value, including moral value, is incoherent.

But, in a way, CIN is right. The claim that there is such a thing as an 'overriding, universal moral principle', independent from the opinion of a valuer or valuers, is precisely the claim that moral value can be objective. And that claim is false.

[CIN]

There is no such thing as "intrinsic value." There is no means of determining it or measuring it.

False assumption. A thing can be real and yet not measurable. My irritation at the laziness of these replies is real, yet it can't be measured.

Any proposition of the form, "The intrinsic value of X is V" is non-cognitive; it has no public truth conditions and hence no truth value.

False assumption. 'CIN is irritated' has no public truth conditions, yet it has a truth value , i.e. 'true'.

"Value" is not a property of things; it is a pseudo-property imputed to things by some person, some valuer. It merely denotes that a thing is desired by some person and is worth pursuing. Propositions asserting values are cognitive only when a valuer is specified. I.e.,

"The value of X is V" is non-cognitive and meaningless.

"The value of X to P is V" is cognitive.

Unsupported assertions.

IBut, of course, the objectivity of moral propositions does not presume or depend upon the nonsensical notion of "intrinsic value."

Do some work. Tell us what it does presume or depend on.

The above analysis of value, BTW, is essentially that of Spinoza, Ralph Barton Perry, and others.

Irrrelevant. All the greatest philosophers have talked crap at some point.

[Terrapin Station]

There is no such thing as "intrinsic value." There is no means of determining it or measuring it.

False assumption. A thing can be real and yet not measurable. My irritation at the laziness of these replies is real, yet it can't be measured.

It's not that it's not real because it can't be measured. It can't be measured because it's not real.

[GE Morton]

There is no such thing as "intrinsic value." There is no means of determining it or measuring it.

False assumption. A thing can be real and yet not measurable. My irritation at the laziness of these replies is real, yet it can't be measured.

You left out the "determined" part.

Alfie says, "The intrinsic value of X is V."

Bruno says, "No, the intrinsic value of X is V/2."

Chauncey says, "You're both wrong. The intrinsic value of X is zero."

How do you decide who is right?

On the other hand, if Alfie says, "The value of X to Bruno is V," we can observe Bruno's behavior and see whether he gives up V to obtain X. That proposition is cognitive.

False assumption. 'CIN is irritated' has no public truth conditions, yet it has a truth value , i.e. 'true'.

Oh, you're right. Subjective propositions, such as "CIN is irritated," also have truth conditions. But they are private, accessible only to the speaker. But if the truth conditions for "X has intrinsic value V" are private, they are subjective. Which is the same as saying "X has value V to me."

"Value" is not a property of things; it is a pseudo-property imputed to things by some person, some valuer. It merely denotes that a thing is desired by some person and is worth pursuing. Propositions asserting values are cognitive only when a valuer is specified. I.e.,

"The value of X is V" is non-cognitive and meaningless.

"The value of X to P is V" is cognitive.

Unsupported assertions.

Well, if you deny them, you'll need to tell us how you would go about settling the disagreement above.

The truth condition for a proposition is that state of affairs which must obtain in order for the proposition to be true. You need to explain what state of affairs --- one discernible by all suitably situated observers --- would make "The value of X is V" true.

[GE Morton]

Will get to your two latest shortly, Peter.

[GE Morton]

GE Morton claims that a moral assertion, such as 'slvery is morally wrong' can be objective. The argument is something like this:

P1: If action X is contrary to goal Y, then action X is wrong.
P2: Action X is contrary to goal Y.
C: Therefore, action X is wrong.

This inference is valid. And needless to say, P1: If action X is consistent with goal Y, then action X is right, and so on, is also valid.

So far, so good.

GEM's argument is that:

a) the nature of goal Y is irrelevant - it could be driving safely, playing football, promotong the well-being of all agents, and so on; and
b) if action X is demonstrably contrary to (or consistent with) goal Y, then the assertion of its 'wrongness' or 'rightness' is objective.

Yes.

But, crucially, 'wrong' and 'right' are instrumental here, and have no moral significance. In effect, 'right' means 'consistent with goal Y'; and 'wrong' means 'contrary to goal Y'. And, by substitution, that renders the argument useless, as follows:

P1: If action X is contrary to goal Y, then action X is contrary to goal Y [ie, wrong].
P2: Action X is contrary to goal Y.
C: Therefore, action X is contrary to goal Y [ie, wrong].

Why put the "wrong" in brackets, and then re-state the argument as a tautology? The point, after all, is to define "right" and "wrong" with respect to a certain goal (and "right" and "wrong" have no meaning EXCEPT with reference to a certain goal).

And you seem to be assuming that if "right" and "wrong" are instrumental, then they cannot have moral significance. But the only way they can have moral significance is by reference to a moral goal. You (apparently) continue to assume there is some "special," distinct meaning of "morally wrong" that is not instrumental. But there isn't. If you disagree, please set forth the non-instrumental truth conditions for propositions asserting something is "morally wrong."

We see this again here:

Now, GEM wants to use this brilliant reasoning to establish the objectivity of a moral assertion such as 'slavery (enslaving people) is morally wrong'. And here, goal Y is something like 'promoting the well-being of all agents'. So, here goes.

P1: If enslaving people is contrary to the goal of promoting the well-being of all agents, then enslaving people is wrong.
P2: Enslaving people is contrary to the goal of promoting the well-being of all agents.
C: Therefore, enslaving people is wrong.

Notice that 'wrong' here DOES NOT MEAN 'MORALLY WRONG'. 'Wrong' and 'right' here are purely instrumental, meaning just 'contrary to' and 'consistent with' the goal, whose nature is irrelevant.'

The nature of the goal --- promoting the well-being of all agents --- is irrelevant? Really? That has nothing to do with morality?

Again, please tell us what "morally wrong" DOES mean, as you understand it. Please be sure that definition yields propositions which are cognitive.

[GE Morton]

But, in a way, CIN is right. The claim that there is such a thing as an 'overriding, universal moral principle', independent from the opinion of a valuer or valuers, is precisely the claim that moral value can be objective. And that claim is false.

Whether a moral principle is objective has nothing to do with anyone's opinions. "Universal," above, BTW, does not refer to universally embraced or believed. It means universally applicable to all creatures qualifying as moral agents. It is objective if it demonstrably advances a stipulated moral goal, whether or not anyone accepts it or follows it.

[Peter Holmes]

But, in a way, CIN is right. The claim that there is such a thing as an 'overriding, universal moral principle', independent from the opinion of a valuer or valuers, is precisely the claim that moral value can be objective. And that claim is false.

Whether a moral principle is objective has nothing to do with anyone's opinions. "Universal," above, BTW, does not refer to universally embraced or believed. It means universally applicable to all creatures qualifying as moral agents. It is objective if it demonstrably advances a stipulated moral goal, whether or not anyone accepts it or follows it.

1 Only assertions can be objective - not principles or values or goals. So the claim that a moral principle 'is objective if it demonstrably advances a stipulated moral goal' is incoherent. It makes a category error.

2 The adoption of a moral principle, value or goal is a matter of choice, judgement or opinion. That an action is demonstrably consistent with or contrary to that chosen principle, value or goal has no bearing on the 'subjectivity' of that choice.

3 Assertions as to the applicability of a moral principle, and as to which creatures do qualify as moral agents, are subjective.

[Terrapin Station]

Whether a moral principle is objective has nothing to do with anyone's opinions. "Universal," above, BTW, does not refer to universally embraced or believed. It means universally applicable to all creatures qualifying as moral agents. It is objective if it demonstrably advances a stipulated moral goal, whether or not anyone accepts it or follows it.

1 Only assertions can be objective - not principles or values or goals. So the claim that a moral principle 'is objective if it demonstrably advances a stipulated moral goal' is incoherent. It makes a category error.

2 The adoption of a moral principle, value or goal is a matter of choice, judgement or opinion. That an action is demonstrably consistent with or contrary to that chosen principle, value or goal has no bearing on the 'subjectivity' of that choice.

3 Assertions as to the applicability of a moral principle, and as to which creatures do qualify as moral agents, are subjective.

An assertion can only be objective in the sense that text or sound can be objective, if we're going to call some text or sounds assertions. But there would be no semantic component to assertions in that case, insofar as they're objective, which makes calling them "assertions" odd relative to the normal usage of that term.

[Peter Holmes]

1 Only assertions can be objective - not principles or values or goals. So the claim that a moral principle 'is objective if it demonstrably advances a stipulated moral goal' is incoherent. It makes a category error.

2 The adoption of a moral principle, value or goal is a matter of choice, judgement or opinion. That an action is demonstrably consistent with or contrary to that chosen principle, value or goal has no bearing on the 'subjectivity' of that choice.

3 Assertions as to the applicability of a moral principle, and as to which creatures do qualify as moral agents, are subjective.

An assertion can only be objective in the sense that text or sound can be objective, if we're going to call some text or sounds assertions. But there would be no semantic component to assertions in that case, insofar as they're objective, which makes calling them "assertions" odd relative to the normal usage of that term.

I think your distinction - subjective = mental, objective = extramental - breaks down at precisely points like this, where you artificially separate out the 'semantic component' of an assertion - its meaning - and call that 'mental'. That's a dead-end, in my opinion.

[Terrapin Station]

An assertion can only be objective in the sense that text or sound can be objective, if we're going to call some text or sounds assertions. But there would be no semantic component to assertions in that case, insofar as they're objective, which makes calling them "assertions" odd relative to the normal usage of that term.

I think your distinction - subjective = mental, objective = extramental - breaks down at precisely points like this, where you artificially separate out the 'semantic component' of an assertion - its meaning - and call that 'mental'. That's a dead-end, in my opinion.

"Artificial separation" doesn't make much sense here. The phenomenon of meaning is a phenomenon that only occurs as a brain activity. It doesn't occur elsewhere.

[Terrapin Station]

It's like saying that the phenomenon of taking a set of programming statements and turning them into something that looks and performs like a video game only takes place in a computer. It's simply pegging the location where a particular phenomenon occurs.

[Peter Holmes]

I think your distinction - subjective = mental, objective = extramental - breaks down at precisely points like this, where you artificially separate out the 'semantic component' of an assertion - its meaning - and call that 'mental'. That's a dead-end, in my opinion.

"Artificial separation" doesn't make much sense here. The phenomenon of meaning is a phenomenon that only occurs as a brain activity. It doesn't occur elsewhere.

The metaphysical delusion is that the abstract noun 'meaning' is the name of a thing of any kind whatsoever - an entity, an activity or what you call a phenomenon - that therefore 'is' or 'goes on' anywhere, inside or outside minds or brains. Do you really think that what we call the meaning of something is a kind of thing or activity that has a location? It's an absurd idea.