Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[LuckyR]

I put "wrong" in quotes because it is such a vague word, so open to interpretation that it has more of a chance of confusing than clarifying. As it has in your case, specifically.

To delve deeper into the example we are using, murder is (subjectively) against most, but not all of folk's moral codes, we all agree, right? It is also a violation of essentially all society's ethical standards (no matter if we can find some where it doesn't, the same issue applies). The reality that within those societies, there are individuals where murder is not against their moral code doesn't change the, I would call: objective fact, that murder is still a violation of that society's ethical standard.

Sure, but it's not wrong to be unconventional, even highly unconventional.

It would be an objective fact that most people in the society feel that murder is wrong (or rather an objective fact that they say such things), and an objective fact that the society has laws against murder, but that doesn't equate to it being an objective fact that murder is wrong (even just in that society). In other words, it's not an objective fact if we don't make the qualifications re "This is what most people say," "There are laws against this," etc.

You can see this sort of thing more clearly if you make an analogy to, say, music that's popular but that you don't like. "Most people say that artist x is great," "Radio stations plays artist x at least once every two hours," etc., but those facts do not equate to saying that "Artist x is great (unqualified)."

An excellent illustration of my red comment. Your example of "wrong" in respect to murder and "great" in relation to music are equally vague, confusing and ultimately practically meaningless

[LuckyR]

You are approaching it incorrectly. I didn't stipulate that 100% of the citizenry agreed (I wrote 95% for a reason). I specifically implied that 5% are fine with murder. That 5% is exercising their subjective opinion ie moral code, that murder is AOK. Almost no one disputes that morality is subjective. I am speaking of a different animal, namely a group's ethical standard. A group's consensus on ethical standards absolutely does NOT require 100% agreement, 50% + 1 will do. True, you refer to the time issue. Yes, I agree that an ethical standard will change over time, thus it is (obviously) not objective in the sense of "never changing", rather it is objective in the sense of "quantifiable and reproducible".

I understand now. Is this what the original poster was seeking, or was he asking if God exists?

I believe the OP (back in 2018) has been pretty resoundingly answered that morality is subjective and cannot be made objective (without the use of an arbitrary "objective" authority whose whim is agreed upon to constitute the objective truth, such as a god or other mythical authority).

Of course 73 pages later there isn't a whole lot to go on about it. I just brought up the (to me much more interesting) related topic of ethical standards (as opposed to moral codes) being objective of a sort, since an argument as I have articulated can be made.

[Peter Holmes]

Belindi

I don't know if you wanted an answer from me, but anyway -

I wasn't asking if a god exists - but its existence would obviously be irrelevant if morality were objective.

And I think morality isn't and can't be objective anyway.

[Terrapin Station]

An excellent illustration of my red comment. Your example of "wrong" in respect to murder

"Something one shouldn't do" in other words.

[GE Morton]

The reality that within those societies, there are individuals where murder is not against their moral code doesn't change the, I would call: objective fact, that murder is still a violation of that society's ethical standard.

I'd agree, with a slight modification: Murder is still a violation of the dominant ethical standard in that society. (Strictly speaking, "societies" don't have ethical standards; only the individuals comprising them do). I'd also agree that proposition is objective.

But . . . that proposition is not equivalent to, "Murder is morally wrong."

[GE Morton]

We've been using 'slavery is morally wrong' as an example of a moral assertion. And the point is, that assertion isn't and can't be objective, because it expresses a value-judgement, which is subjective. And that applies to all moral assertions.

It may express a value judgment, but it also may not. It may also declare that murder is contrary to some accepted or postulated moral goal or axiom, and thus may be objective --- it either is or is not. Hence your claim does not apply to "all moral assertions."

[GE Morton]

I put "wrong" in quotes because it is such a vague word, so open to interpretation that it has more of a chance of confusing than clarifying. As it has in your case, specifically.

I disagree that the word "wrong" is vague, which is not to deny that it may at times be used in a vague way. But in most common uses it is quite clear --- it indicates that some act or method or proposition is inconsistent with, or contrary to, some known fact or or accepted standard --- giving the wrong answer on a geography quiz, driving the wrong way on a one-way street, using the wrong tool for a certain job, etc. Moral "rights" and "wrongs" should be understood in the same way.

You also said in another post, "Yes, I agree that an ethical standard will change over time, thus it is (obviously) not objective in the sense of 'never changing', rather it is objective in the sense of 'quantifiable and reproducible'".

We certainly need to agree on the meaning of "objective" before we can begin to answer the OP's question.

[Peter Holmes]

We've been using 'slavery is morally wrong' as an example of a moral assertion. And the point is, that assertion isn't and can't be objective, because it expresses a value-judgement, which is subjective. And that applies to all moral assertions.

It may express a value judgment, but it also may not. It may also declare that murder is contrary to some accepted or postulated moral goal or axiom, and thus may be objective --- it either is or is not. Hence your claim does not apply to "all moral assertions."

Once again. (And let's stick to slavery.) (We could stretch this out to the crack of doom.)

The moral assertion is 'slavery is morally wrong'. And that assertion expresses a value-judgement, and is therefore subjective.

But 'slavery is contrary to some accepted or postulated moral goal or axiom' is not a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion.

It may well be objective and true, but it doesn't make any moral claim, such as 'it is morally wrong to act in a way contrary to some accepted moral goal or axiom'.

Now, that is a moral assertion, and is therefore subjective.

[Belindi]

Peter, I understand you did not ask if God exists. My point is if some knowledge is absolutely objectively true it can be only God's knowledge, or else a law of nature.

[Peter Holmes]

Belindi

Sorry - my mistake.

But as I may have said earlier more than once - I've lost track! - the only things that can be true or false - that have truth-value - are factual assertions - typically, linguistic expressions. So the claim that knowledge can be 'absolutely objectively true' is incoherent. What we call knowledge - such as knowing things are the case - has no truth-value.

And anyway, I don't understand why a god's knowledge would be uniquely and exclusively objective. And 'a law of nature' isn't knowledge, objective or otherwise. That's a category error. - But it looks like I don't follow your use of these words.

[Belindi]

Belindi

Sorry - my mistake.

But as I may have said earlier more than once - I've lost track! - the only things that can be true or false - that have truth-value - are factual assertions - typically, linguistic expressions. So the claim that knowledge can be 'absolutely objectively true' is incoherent. What we call knowledge - such as knowing things are the case - has no truth-value.

And anyway, I don't understand why a god's knowledge would be uniquely and exclusively objective. And 'a law of nature' isn't knowledge, objective or otherwise. That's a category error. - But it looks like I don't follow your use of these words.

I did not say "a god". No Greek or Roman god knew everything. The Christian, Muslim, Jewish God is believed to know everything.

[Peter Holmes]

Belindi

Sorry - my mistake.

But as I may have said earlier more than once - I've lost track! - the only things that can be true or false - that have truth-value - are factual assertions - typically, linguistic expressions. So the claim that knowledge can be 'absolutely objectively true' is incoherent. What we call knowledge - such as knowing things are the case - has no truth-value.

And anyway, I don't understand why a god's knowledge would be uniquely and exclusively objective. And 'a law of nature' isn't knowledge, objective or otherwise. That's a category error. - But it looks like I don't follow your use of these words.

I did not say "a god". No Greek or Roman god knew everything. The Christian, Muslim, Jewish God is believed to know everything.

1 Okay. But the Abrahamic god they call God is just a god - one of the thousands invented by our ancestors. I don't think it makes sense to call that god 'God', any more than it makes sense to call their invented devils 'Devil'.

2 I don't understand why omniscience - whatever that is - means absolute objectivity - so that ordinary (human) knowledge can't be truly or absolutely objective. This looks like a conceptual mess to me.

[GE Morton]

The moral assertion is 'slavery is morally wrong'. And that assertion expresses a value-judgement, and is therefore subjective.

Well, you're just dogmatically re-restating your previous claim. "Slavery is morally wrong" does not NECESSARILY express a value judgment. It may also express the fact that slavery is inconsistent with some moral goal, in the same way that ""You're going the wrong way" means the traveler's current path will not get him where he wants to go. And, yes, the claim is morally wrong if the goal in question is a moral one.

I agree that expressions of moral judgment can express no more than personal sentiments and values, conditioned responses, regurgitation of thoughtlessly accepted dogmas. When they do they are indeed subjective. And non-rational. But as philosophers we are interested in a rational basis for moral judgments.

When a philosopher declares, "X is morally wrong," he is not voicing a personal sentiment. He is saying that X is inconsistent with the theorems of a coherent, consistent, rationally defensible moral theory.

But 'slavery is contrary to some accepted or postulated moral goal or axiom' is not a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion.

Indeed it is. Rationally defensible moral judgments ARE factual assertions.

It may well be objective and true, but it doesn't make any moral claim, such as 'it is morally wrong to act in a way contrary to some accepted moral goal or axiom'.

That sentence is incomplete. Did you mean to add "true" to the end?

If so, of course it is true, by definition. "X is morally wrong" just means, "X is inconsistent with a sound moral theory." It doesn't mean, "I don't like X."

You seem unable to get past your entrenched conception of morality as merely an inchoate hodgepodge of personal sentiments. You apparently define "morality" as consisting of subjective feelings and values. And, of course, if you define it that way, then a rational morality is not just impossible, but nonsensical.

So stop defining it that way.

[Peter Holmes]

The moral assertion is 'slavery is morally wrong'. And that assertion expresses a value-judgement, and is therefore subjective.

Well, you're just dogmatically re-restating your previous claim. "Slavery is morally wrong" does not NECESSARILY express a value judgment. It may also express the fact that slavery is inconsistent with some moral goal, in the same way that ""You're going the wrong way" means the traveler's current path will not get him where he wants to go. And, yes, the claim is morally wrong if the goal in question is a moral one.

And you're merely dogmatically repeating your conceptual error in saying this.

I agree that expressions of moral judgment can express no more than personal sentiments and values, conditioned responses, regurgitation of thoughtlessly accepted dogmas. When they do they are indeed subjective. And non-rational. But as philosophers we are interested in a rational basis for moral judgments.

When a philosopher declares, "X is morally wrong," he is not voicing a personal sentiment. He is saying that X is inconsistent with the theorems of a coherent, consistent, rationally defensible moral theory.

I've never said subjectivity is to do with personal sentiments. What a ridiculous straw man.

But 'slavery is contrary to some accepted or postulated moral goal or axiom' is not a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion.

Indeed it is. Rationally defensible moral judgments ARE factual assertions.

Nope. 'Slavery is morally wrong' expresses a value-judgement. Whatever facts we deploy to justify that value-judgement, it remains a value-judgement, and can never magically become a factual assertion. You're just wrong about this.

It may well be objective and true, but it doesn't make any moral claim, such as 'it is morally wrong to act in a way contrary to some accepted moral goal or axiom'.

That sentence is incomplete. Did you mean to add "true" to the end?

Wake up. An 'accepted moral goal or axiom' isn't and can't be true or false. Moral goals and axioms don't have truth-value. You've agreed to this.

If so, of course it is true, by definition. "X is morally wrong" just means, "X is inconsistent with a sound moral theory." It doesn't mean, "I don't like X."

Wrong. 'X is inconsistent with a moral theory' ('soundness' is irrelevant) is NOT a moral assertion. Moral assertions contains words such as 'right', 'wrong', 'good', 'bad', 'should' or 'ought to'. Look at what you're saying. It's just wrong.

You seem unable to get past your entrenched conception of morality as merely an inchoate hodgepodge of personal sentiments. You apparently define "morality" as consisting of subjective feelings and values. And, of course, if you define it that way, then a rational morality is not just impossible, but nonsensical.

So stop defining it that way.

More nonsense. That slavery is inconsistent with some moral goal may be true. But that doesn't mean that 'slavery is morally wrong' is a fact - a true factual assertion - because the moral wrongness of slavery is a feature of reality. You're just evading my argument.

And your claim that my conception of morality is 'an incohate hodgepodge of personal sentiments' is a pathetic straw man. Grow up.

[Belindi]

Peter Holmes wrote:

I don't think it makes sense to call that god 'God', any more than it makes sense to call their invented devils 'Devil'.

It is generally agreed it is very confusing the Judeo-Christian's deity's personal name is God.