Peter Holmes wrote: ↑March 24th, 2020, 5:47 am
P1 This action leads to this outcome.
P2 We want this outcome.
C Therefore, we ought to/should/must perform this action.
This conclusion does not follow from the premises. All that follows is that we can or could perform this action. Your argument is invalid.
You're right; it doesn't, because the relationship ("leads to") between "this action" and "this outcome" is too vague.
You're not paying due heed to the instrumental meaning of "should" and "ought." "One should do X" means, "X is necessary to attain Y," or "X is the best available means of attaining Y" --- with "best" meaning the most effective, economical, or efficient. The "should" is an advisory based on some such claim, which claim is either true or false. An action that "leads to" an outcome is not necessarily necessary for or the best means of attaining the outcome.
BTW, "that we can or could" perform the action doesn't follow either.
Really? What do you think a goal is, other than something someone desires and seeks? Saying that Alfie's goal is Y, but he doesn't want Y, is self-contradictory.
Perhaps you're unaware of your mistake - or perhaps this is just dishonesty.
Of course, 'Alfie's goal is Y, but he doesn't want Y' is (at least close to) a contradiction.
Well, that is not what you said earlier: "And the claim that 'goal Y' implies 'wanting goal Y' is false."
But that misrepresents your claim, which is: 'If action X leads to goal Y, and Alfie wants goal Y, then Alfie should/must do X'. And that means something completely different, because Alfie's not doing X would not in any way mean his goal is no longer Y.
That is not what I said. I did not say "leads to." I said that if X is necessary for Y, or the best means of attaining Y, then Alfie should do X. I also pointed out that there can be circumstantial factors which falsify that conclusion, such that doing X will frustrate a higher-ranking goal Z. The conclusion follows
ceteris paribus: if Alfie does not do X, then he has either abandoned the goal Y or is pursuing Y via less-than-optimum means.
1 You claim your proposed moral goal is the only actually moral goal, and that those who disagree are amoral and have no interest in morality.
There are no "actual" moral goals. Anyone can claim any goal to be a "moral" goal. But if such a goal is not substantially equivalent to the one I suggested it would not be the goal of "morality" as that term has been understood in the West throughout history.
2 You've forgotten your claim that only assertions are objective or subjective. Moral theorums, principles, goals and rules aren't and can't be either - and they don't and can't have truth-value, as you know. And they don't magically become objective just because they advance a subjectively chosen goal. Your argument collapses at this point.
Oh, no; I never made any such claim. I said that theories and goals are not propositions and do not have truth values, but theorems, principles, and rules
are propositions and certainly do have truth values. The proposition, "If one seeks Y one ought to do X" is true if X is necessary for or the optimum means of attaining Y. That it is or is not is the truth condition for that proposition, and that question can (usually) be answered empirically.
3 Saying 'slavery is morally wrong' is a cognitive proposition merely begs the question, as you must know. So I call this out as patent dishonesty.
What question does it beg? If you have a moral goal that involves maximizing the welfare of all people, then "Slavery is morally wrong" is quite cognitive; it has a truth value --- slavery is wrong because it obviously conflicts with that goal.
Until you can show the feature of reality whose existence would make the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong' true, and whose non-existence would make it false, the argument for moral objectivism is dead in the water.
Goals are features of "reality." (If your impulse is to deny this, better think it through first).