Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

We've covered this also. Ontology presupposes epistemology. What we can claim exists depends upon what we know. If it does not it is nonsense.

In other words, determinism would be a property of the world, whether we exist or not.

Well, we can always hypothesize that. But we can't prove it.

You're focusing on claims as claims.

Yes. Your statement above is a claim. In any debate claims are the things being debated. I can have no idea of what you think, or imagine, the world is like, because I can't see into your head. All I can know, or examine, is what you say about it.

[GE Morton]

For an omniscient being determinism would be predictable.

Sure; that is a tautology.

For us, the future looks so chaotic we cannot be sure what to predict, even when we have tight control over variables. For us, determinism is a frame of reference, the end point of causes and effects. As for all frames of reference determinism is a faith position.

Well, I'd call it, not a "faith" position, but a useful working hypothesis. I'm a determinist too --- I assume a priori that every event has a cause. But I'm willing to accept the possibility that some may not. For example, the fissioning of a specific radium atom at a specific time has no known cause. We can predict, statistically, how many will fission in a given interval, but not when any particular atom will fission. When any particular atom will fission appears to be indeterminate.

I guessed you and I use different lexicons. In the British Isles socialist is not the same as communist.

Nor is it in the US.

Socialism is an attitude that biases political and economic decisions towards people's welfare and includes tough controls over profiteering.
industry.

But not all people's welfare, and hence it is not universal, and those "tough controls" are repressive of those they effect. Socialism, in all of its variations, involves improving the welfare of some at others' expense.

[Belindi]

Life or death is the measure of what makes morality objective. No life: no morality.

[GE Morton]

Life or death is the measure of what makes morality objective. No life: no morality.

That is awfully vague, Belindi.

"Objective" and "subjective" are properties of propositions. A moral proposition, as with any other proposition, is objective if its truth conditions are public. So if promoting/preserving life is your moral goal, then "You ought to do X" is objective if doing X in fact promotes/preserves life.

But that goal, preserving/promoting life, is much too broad.

[Peter Holmes]

"Objective" and "subjective" are properties of propositions. A moral proposition, as with any other proposition, is objective if its truth conditions are public. So if promoting/preserving life is your moral goal, then "You ought to do X" is objective if doing X in fact promotes/preserves life.

Not so. The whole assertion is 'If we want goal Y, then we ought to do X'.

The objective assertion here is: 'Action X aims at / promotes / leads to goal Y'. Or: 'This action leads to this outcome'.

So, if we want this outcome, we can or could take this action. But that we ought to or should take this action is a matter of opinion.

The assertion 'If we have a goal, then we ought to take action to achieve it' is not objective, because it hs no public truth condition. And this applies to any goal whatsoever, moral or otherwise.

[Belindi]

Life or death is the measure of what makes morality objective. No life: no morality.

That is awfully vague, Belindi.

"Objective" and "subjective" are properties of propositions. A moral proposition, as with any other proposition, is objective if its truth conditions are public. So if promoting/preserving life is your moral goal, then "You ought to do X" is objective if doing X in fact promotes/preserves life.

But that goal, preserving/promoting life, is much too broad.

Well, yes, there are many contenders for which particular policy promotes life or promotes death.
"What could make morality objective?" is a question about the basic principle/criterion , it's not a question about politics.

Some moral codes are more prescriptive than other moral codes. The title of this thread is not about moral codes it's about morality. So let us not shift the goal posts.

[Terrapin Station]

Well, we can always hypothesize that. But we can't prove it.

"Proof" has nothing to do with any of this, it's not at all required for knowledge, etc.

Yes. Your statement above is a claim.

Sure. Which doesn't change anything I said. You need to be able to make a use/mention distinction, and not just focus on claims as claims, where you have "mention" tunnel-vision. A finger pointing at the moon can't be anything other than a finger, but if all we can focus on is the finger as the finger then we can never see the moon from it.

[GE Morton]

Not so. The whole assertion is 'If we want goal Y, then we ought to do X'.

The objective assertion here is: 'Action X aims at / promotes / leads to goal Y'. Or: 'This action leads to this outcome'.

All three of those formulations are truth-value equivalent. What is explicitly missing in your second two is the "we want goal Y." But that we want goal Y is implicit in the concept of a goal --- a goal is something we seek, that we want. Hence, that we want goal Y is implicit in your two formulations.

And the "ought" in the first formulation is the instrumental "ought": it simply means that X is necessary, or effective, for attaining Y. Or perhaps that X is the best available method, in the circumstances, for attaining Y. All of those claims can be objective.

There is no specifically "moral" sense of "ought," or "should." Those words in moral contexts have their usual instrumental meanings; they are only "moral" because the goal sought is a moral one.

So, if we want this outcome, we can or could take this action. But that we ought to or should take this action is a matter of opinion.

Well, as I said before, every proposition expresses an opinion. But the question of interest is whether the proposition is true or false, not how much confidence the speaker has in its truth.

Also implicit in every goal --- something we seek, that we want --- is that we also want whatever is necessary or most effective in attaining that goal. If Alfie declares that he seeks goal Y, and X is the best, or only, means of attaining Y, and Alfie elects not to do X, he contradicts himself --- he does not actually seek Y.

There is, to be sure, always room for opinions as to whether X is or is not the best means of attaining Y, or whether it is a better means than Z. But those questions can usually be answered empirically. Those answers will be objective.

[GE Morton]

Some moral codes are more prescriptive than other moral codes. The title of this thread is not about moral codes it's about morality. So let us not shift the goal posts.

I've always taken "morality" and "moral code" to mean the same thing. Can you spell out the difference you see between them?

[GE Morton]

"Proof" has nothing to do with any of this, it's not at all required for knowledge, etc.

Really? Methinks you don't acknowledge a difference between knowledge and belief. Proof is what differentiates the two.

Yes. Your statement above is a claim.

Sure. Which doesn't change anything I said. You need to be able to make a use/mention distinction, and not just focus on claims as claims, where you have "mention" tunnel-vision. A finger pointing at the moon can't be anything other than a finger, but if all we can focus on is the finger as the finger then we can never see the moon from it.

Poor analogy. I can see both your finger and the moon. They are both within my phenomenal field. But I can't see the external world your proposition asserts. I can only see your proposition and the phenomena you claim are caused by something external to me.

Of course, I think that an external world is a useful hypothesis for explaining those perceived phenomena. But it is still an hypothesis.

[Belindi]

Some moral codes are more prescriptive than other moral codes. The title of this thread is not about moral codes it's about morality. So let us not shift the goal posts.

I've always taken "morality" and "moral code" to mean the same thing. Can you spell out the difference you see between them?

What people mean by 'morality' or 'moral' can mean one of two things according to the context of the conversation.A cultures-specific morality is indeed sometimes accepted as synonymous with moral code. I have differentiated between moral code and morality in order to differentiate between culture-specific morality i.e. moral code on the one hand and the concept of non-specific morality on the other.

[Peter Holmes]

Not so. The whole assertion is 'If we want goal Y, then we ought to do X'.

The objective assertion here is: 'Action X aims at / promotes / leads to goal Y'. Or: 'This action leads to this outcome'.

All three of those formulations are truth-value equivalent. What is explicitly missing in your second two is the "we want goal Y." But that we want goal Y is implicit in the concept of a goal --- a goal is something we seek, that we want. Hence, that we want goal Y is implicit in your two formulations.

Not so. 'This action leads to this outcome' in no way implies that anyone wants this outcome. The 'if we want ...' is critical. And the claim that 'goal Y' implies 'wanting goal Y' is false. Substitute 'outcome' for 'goal', and that is evident. And being 'implicit in the concept of' is hopelessly vague anyway.

And the "ought" in the first formulation is the instrumental "ought": it simply means that X is necessary, or effective, for attaining Y. Or perhaps that X is the best available method, in the circumstances, for attaining Y. All of those claims can be objective.

So what? It's wanting Y that matters. That action X leads to outcome Y may well be true, so that the assertion that it does is objective. But that isn't what my OP was about. I'm asking what could make 'slavery is morally wrong' objective. Nothing you've said addresses that question.

There is no specifically "moral" sense of "ought," or "should." Those words in moral contexts have their usual instrumental meanings; they are only "moral" because the goal sought is a moral one.

So, if we want this outcome, we can or could take this action. But that we ought to or should take this action is a matter of opinion.

Well, as I said before, every proposition expresses an opinion. But the question of interest is whether the proposition is true or false, not how much confidence the speaker has in its truth.

I agree, which is why, if your claim - that every proposition expresses an opinion - is true, it is so trivially and irrelevantly. What matters is the truth-value of an assertion. And your mistake is in thinking that every assertion has a truth-value, so that 'slavery is morally wrong' is either true or false.

Now, what is it in reality the existence of which would make that assertion true, and the absence of which would make it false? If all you can suggest is the consistency of the assertion with some principle or goal or rule adopted by some people, that does nothing to establish the objectivity of the assertion that slavery is morally wrong - the truth of the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong'.

Also implicit in every goal --- something we seek, that we want --- is that we also want whatever is necessary or most effective in attaining that goal. If Alfie declares that he seeks goal Y, and X is the best, or only, means of attaining Y, and Alfie elects not to do X, he contradicts himself --- he does not actually seek Y.

As I said above, this claim is simply false. To want and say we want an outcome, and to know that an action leads to that outcome, and yet not to perform that action - is not a contradiction. It may be inconsistent, or even hypocritical in some situations, but it's not contradictory. A contradiction is making two opposed claims: 'I want and don't want that outcome' is a contradiction.

There is, to be sure, always room for opinions as to whether X is or is not the best means of attaining Y, or whether it is a better means than Z. But those questions can usually be answered empirically. Those answers will be objective.

Back to your misfiring answer to the OP - missing the point, as ever.

[Sculptor1]

There is, to be sure, always room for opinions as to whether X is or is not the best means of attaining Y, or whether it is a better means than Z. But those questions can usually be answered empirically. Those answers will be objective.

I call rubbish on that.
They will be based on opinions as to the criteria for "best".

The quickest way to over come the Corona Virus is for everyone to meet in a pub and get hammered to maximise the spread of the virus so that all susceptible will die off giving the world herd immunity.
If "quick" is best, then I assume you think this would make this solution the objective one?

[GE Morton]

All three of those formulations are truth-value equivalent. What is explicitly missing in your second two is the "we want goal Y." But that we want goal Y is implicit in the concept of a goal --- a goal is something we seek, that we want. Hence, that we want goal Y is implicit in your two formulations.

Not so. 'This action leads to this outcome' in no way implies that anyone wants this outcome.

You're right that "This action leads to this outcome" does not imply that anyone wants that outcome. But we are not speaking of generic outcomes, or events. We're speaking of goals. I'd assumed the outcomes to which you were referring were goals; otherwise the proposition would have been irrelevant to the thread.

The 'if we want ...' is critical. And the claim that 'goal Y' implies 'wanting goal Y' is false.

Really? What do you think a goal is, other than something someone desires and seeks? Saying that Alfie's goal is Y, but he doesn't want Y, is self-contradictory.

And the "ought" in the first formulation is the instrumental "ought": it simply means that X is necessary, or effective, for attaining Y. Or perhaps that X is the best available method, in the circumstances, for attaining Y. All of those claims can be objective.

So what? It's wanting Y that matters. That action X leads to outcome Y may well be true, so that the assertion that it does is objective. But that isn't what my OP was about. I'm asking what could make 'slavery is morally wrong' objective. Nothing you've said addresses that question.

Peter, I've already agreed that not everyone will embrace the goal I proposed. I've argued that those who don't are amoral, and have no desire or interest in a morality. But that fact doesn't render the theorems of a moral theory --- moral principles and rules --- subjective. They are objective
if whether they advance the declared goal is empirically determinable. To say that slavery is wrong is to say that it frustrates that goal. Whether it does or not is objective. That not everyone embraces that goal is immaterial.

And your mistake is in thinking that every assertion has a truth-value, so that 'slavery is morally wrong' is either true or false.

Oh, I've never claimed that every proposition has a truth value. "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" (Chomsky) has no truth value. Every cognitive proposition does, however (by definition). "Slavery is morally wrong" is a cognitive proposition. It is true if slavery is incompatible with a moral goal, and is only meaningful with reference to some moral goal or standard. All instrumental, advisory propositions are meaningful, and have truth values, only with reference to some goal or standard.

Also implicit in every goal --- something we seek, that we want --- is that we also want whatever is necessary or most effective in attaining that goal. If Alfie declares that he seeks goal Y, and X is the best, or only, means of attaining Y, and Alfie elects not to do X, he contradicts himself --- he does not actually seek Y.

As I said above, this claim is simply false. To want and say we want an outcome, and to know that an action leads to that outcome, and yet not to perform that action - is not a contradiction.

Yes, it is. We can infer a proposition from an action, or an inaction. If Alfie says "My goal is Y," and declines to do X, when X is necessary for Y, then we can infer "I don't want to do X." Which contradicts that Y is a goal of his.

Of course, someone may decline to perform some action X necessary for Y because it conflicts with some other goal of his, Z. Or conflicts with it at a given time, but may not later. But if he never is never willing to do X, then he has abandoned the goal Y. One cannot consistently claim "I want Y, but don't want X," when X is necessary for Y.

In the real world, of course, these decisions can get quite complicated and difficult, because many actions can have consequences affecting more than one goal. They can be difficult, but there will usually be a right --- optimum --- answer, and it will be objective.

[GE Morton]

What people mean by 'morality' or 'moral' can mean one of two things according to the context of the conversation.A cultures-specific morality is indeed sometimes accepted as synonymous with moral code. I have differentiated between moral code and morality in order to differentiate between culture-specific morality i.e. moral code on the one hand and the concept of non-specific morality on the other.

Belinidi, I have no idea what a non-specific morality might be, how it might be defined or recognized. I take the general definition of "morality" to be, "A set of rules and principles governing interactions between agents in a moral field (a social setting)." Is that what you mean by a non-specific morality?