Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

It's foolish to not search for patterns in the environment, patterns of events that help us to stay alive. It may be the case that there are laws of nature which are independent of conscious awareness. Nomic connections such as we do know and can easily name may proliferate whether we know about them or not until there is one big absolute truth. It's rather a pity we can't know this however it is a good thought that the universe is orderly.

Well, I agree that it would be foolish, if not impossible, not to search for patterns in the environment. And that it is useful, if not necessary, to assume the universe is orderly. But that those patterns may, or must, lead to "one big absolute truth" is not apparent to me. I have no idea what that phrase could possibly mean, other than something transcendental, which (as far as I can see) is an entirely useless concept.

Ontology is the study of all theories of existence, and is not limited to supernatural theories.

You're right. I said that most ontological theories are nonsense. But anyone who inquires as to what exists, or speculates as what what might exist, per force engages in ontology.

[Peter Holmes]

GE Morton claims that, if there are public truth conditions for the assertion 'X is beautiful', then the assertion is objective.

But the only possible truth condition for the assertion 'X is beautiful' is its consistency with an opinion as to what constitutes beauty.

Yes. With some internal criteria for beauty. It is somewhat un-colloquial, if not inaccurate, to call those criteria an "opinion." An opinion is a belief, typically one considered to be inadequately supported by evidence. Those internal criteria are not beliefs, strictly speaking. They are often subconscious and ineffable.

For my argument, 'judgement', 'belief' and 'opinion' are synonymous in this context. I'll use 'belief', if you prefer. But anyway, talk of 'internal criteria' is obfuscatory. We're discussing the objectivity or subjectivity of assertions. And I assume you agree there are no public truth conditions for subconscious and ineffable criteria - whatever they may be.

So, to substitute: The only possible truth condition for the assertion 'X is morally wrong' is its consistency with a belief as to what constitutes moral wrongness.

And an assertion expressing an opinion as to what constitutes beauty is subjective.

Yes.

So, to substitute: An assertion expressing a belief as to what constitutes moral wrongness is subjective.

So the claim that the assertion 'X is beautiful' is or can be objective - that it does or can have public truth conditions - is specious.

It can be objective if there is some public criterion of beauty accepted by all parties to the discussion. I don't know of any such public criteria, but it is conceivable some such might be adopted at some point (perhaps by a panel of judges at an art show).

No. This is where your argument goes astray. To recapitulate what you've agreed to above:

The only possible truth condition for the assertion 'X is morally wrong' is its consistency with a subjective assertion expressing a belief as to what constitutes moral wrongness.

That all parties to the discussion accept or endorse that subjective assertion doesn't mean the assertion is objective. (The only fact of the matter is that all parties accept or endorse the assertion.) To put it another way:

From the objective assertion 'all parties believe X is morally wrong' - which may be true - it doesn't follow that the assertion 'X is morally wrong' is also objective. All that follows is that doing X is inconsistent with the shared belief that X is morally wrong.

So, to substitute: the claim that the assertion 'X is morally wrong' is or can be objective - that it does or can have public truth conditions - is specious.

And the same applies to the assertion 'X is morally wrong'.

Yes it does. If a particular moral goal is postulated, then whether whether a proffered moral rule or judgment advances it is objective.

But that doesn't make the moral rule or judgement itself objective. You've been making this mistake all along.

[Terrapin Station]

Truth is not agent-relative or agent-dependent.

Yes it is. What's incoherent is trying to parse it as not agent-relative/agent-dependent. At best in that case you'd simply be confused regarding what's really going on with truth attributions.

[Terrapin Station]

Er, no. While it is (trivially) true that determining whether a proposition is true or false requires a judgment, the truth or falsity of the proposition does not require, or depend upon, that judgment.

Nope. This is just one more thing that you're wrong about. The only way to arrive at a truth value is by making a judgment about the relation of a proposition to something else.

What action would that be? Are you speaking of uttering the sentence?

No. Speaking or uttering a sentence is just making sounds. Sounds don't contain meaning.

The action is making a mental association. Only minds can perform that action.

[GE Morton]

For my argument, 'judgement', 'belief' and 'opinion' are synonymous in this context. I'll use 'belief', if you prefer. But anyway, talk of 'internal criteria' is obfuscatory. We're discussing the objectivity or subjectivity of assertions. And I assume you agree there are no public truth conditions for subconscious and ineffable criteria - whatever they may be.

Well, no. Those internal criteria are not propositions, and thus "subjective" and "objective" don't apply. They are latent, inexplicable, and ineffable (just as are the factors which underlie any other primary interest, desire, taste, preference). They are "just there." One's opinion, or belief, that X is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, beautiful or ugly, delicious or foul-tasting, results from weighing phenomena against those criteria, of which one is not consciously aware and cannot articulate. It is a subconscious, autonomic process. Why does Alfie prefer chocolate, and Bruno vanilla? Who knows? But there is --- presumably --- some reason.

So, to substitute: The only possible truth condition for the assertion 'X is morally wrong' is its consistency with a belief as to what constitutes moral wrongness.

I assume what what you're "substituting" there is "morally wrong" for "beautiful." Is that correct? But no, consistency with a belief is not a truth condition for a proposition asserting that belief. That is tautological, and circular. The truth condition for Alfie's belief that Paris is beautiful is that Paris satisfies some internal criteria of beauty that he harbors, not merely that he believes it. He believes it because it satisfies those criteria.

So, to substitute: An assertion expressing a belief as to what constitutes moral wrongness is subjective.

It can be --- often is --- but it need not be. If X is declared morally wrong because it conflicts with some postulated moral goal, as explained at length in previous posts, then that declaration can be objective.

No. This is where your argument goes astray. To recapitulate what you've agreed to above:

The only possible truth condition for the assertion 'X is morally wrong' is its consistency with a subjective assertion expressing a belief as to what constitutes moral wrongness.

Again, that is circular. The truth condition for a proposition cannot be the belief that the proposition is true. Nor did I "agree to" any such claim.

That all parties to the discussion accept or endorse that subjective assertion doesn't mean the assertion is objective. (The only fact of the matter is that all parties accept or endorse the assertion.) To put it another way:

From the objective assertion 'all parties believe X is morally wrong' - which may be true - it doesn't follow that the assertion 'X is morally wrong' is also objective. All that follows is that doing X is inconsistent with the shared belief that X is morally wrong.

That's true. But a goal is not a belief. If a group of mountain climbers declare, "Our goal is to reach the summit of K2," the truth condition for that proposition is that they take actions to further that goal. A particular action taken by a particular climber in the group may or may not further that goal, and whether it does or not will be objective. That action will be (instrumentally) "wrong." The beliefs of the climbers have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of that judgment.

But that doesn't make the moral rule or judgement itself objective. You've been making this mistake all along.

Of course it does. But what do you mean by, "the judgment itself"? You're not unwittingly assuming there is some, other, hidden, criterion of rightness or wrongness applicable here, are you? There isn't. The act is wrong depending upon whether it does or does not further the goal. The judgment is objective if it reflects that fact.

[GE Morton]

Truth is not agent-relative or agent-dependent.

Yes it is.

Ah. Inventing your own definition of another common word, eh? Here is Merriam-Webster's:

"Definition of true (Entry 1 of 4)
1a(1): being in accordance with the actual state of affairs"

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/true

No mention there of agents or judgments.

What's incoherent is trying to parse it as not agent-relative/agent-dependent. At best in that case you'd simply be confused regarding what's really going on with truth attributions.

What may be "really going on with truth attributions" has nothing to do with the meaning of "true." That may be a matter of interest to some psychologists, but it has no bearing on the meaning of the word.

[GE Morton]

Nope. This is just one more thing that you're wrong about. The only way to arrive at a truth value is by making a judgment about the relation of a proposition to something else.

That's quite true. But that truth value depends only upon whether that relation exists, not upon the fact that someone judges that it does. You seem not to grasp the distinction between the making of a judgment and what is judged.

The action is making a mental association. Only minds can perform that action.

True. But whether a particular association (say, between a word and a class of object) exists in a particular speech community is an objective, empirical question. The "mental action" required of members of that community is learning those associations.

[creation]

Because taking away from 'what is necessary for survival' is obviously doing what is morally wrong.

Obvious how?

Because every one agrees on this, and accepts this.

Because that's how you feel/what your intuition is?

No. Not at all.

Your assumption here was way off the mark.

I have already explained why using one's own 'feelings' and/or one's own thoughts is not the way to look at 'morality' properly and correctly.

[creation]

Yes it is.

Ah. Inventing your own definition of another common word, eh? Here is Merriam-Webster's:

"Definition of true (Entry 1 of 4)
1a(1): being in accordance with the actual state of affairs"

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/true

No mention there of agents or judgments.

How is the 'what the actual state of affairs' IS, actually known? How is one to KNOW, for sure, if some 'thing' is being in accordance with the actual state of affairs, when what the actual state of affairs, itself, IS exactly is also being disputed?

Also, is this, just one of many different definitions in one of many different dictionaries, thee one and only True definition?

In fact, how I am meant to KNOW, for sure, that that one different definition, in the one of many different defining dictionaries, is in accordance with what the actual state of affairs IS, itself?

What's incoherent is trying to parse it as not agent-relative/agent-dependent. At best in that case you'd simply be confused regarding what's really going on with truth attributions.

What may be "really going on with truth attributions" has nothing to do with the meaning of "true." That may be a matter of interest to some psychologists, but it has no bearing on the meaning of the word.

[creation]

It's foolish to not search for patterns in the environment, patterns of events that help us to stay alive. It may be the case that there are laws of nature which are independent of conscious awareness. Nomic connections such as we do know and can easily name may proliferate whether we know about them or not until there is one big absolute truth. It's rather a pity we can't know this however it is a good thought that the universe is orderly.

Well, I agree that it would be foolish, if not impossible, not to search for patterns in the environment. And that it is useful, if not necessary, to assume the universe is orderly. But that those patterns may, or must, lead to "one big absolute truth" is not apparent to me.

It is obvious that thee 'one big absolute Truth' is not apparent to you, yet.

You do believe that the 'one big absolute truth' does not even exist, correct?

I have no idea what that phrase could possibly mean, other than something transcendental, which (as far as I can see) is an entirely useless concept.

Why do you have no idea what the phrase 'one absolute truth other than to be something transcendental?

Also, what does 'transcendental' mean to you? And, 'transcendental' to who or what exactly?

See, to understand what thee 'one absolute truth' idea or concept actually IS, is very easy indeed. But if it is a "useless concept" or one that you believe does not even exist anyway, then there is no use in trying to explain it, to you.

Ontology is the study of all theories of existence, and is not limited to supernatural theories.

You're right. I said that most ontological theories are nonsense. But anyone who inquires as to what exists, or speculates as what what might exist, per force engages in ontology.

How does one actually "inquire" as to what exists.

Just being aware one can, almost instantly, KNOW what exists. No inquiry necessary.

[creation]

Truth is not agent-relative or agent-dependent.

If 'truth' is not relative nor dependent upon an agent, then how is 'truth' arrived at exactly?

To me, absolutely every thing is relative to the observer (or agent here). And, absolutely every thing is dependent upon the way the observer (or agent) is looking, at things.

What an observer then sees, was dependent upon, and/or relative to, the way they were looking.

The views one form are solely dependent upon the way an observer looks at and sees things. I am now curious as to what 'truth' is concluded from exactly, and, how 'truth' is arrived at exactly, to you?

[Sy Borg]

BTW, one does not respond to "arguments as a whole." You respond to them premise by premise.

Each treated literally, out of context.

Forget it. I'm interested in how things are, not to test my skill at playing meaningless word games.

[Belindi]

GEMorton, causality may be the link between what we consider to be events.

What we consider to be events (individuation)may be the truth only insofar as thinkers are concerned i.e.idealism.

Or events may be individuated independently of thinkers(materialism/physicalism).

Or both of the above may be the truth as neither of the above excludes the other.

If all events are interlinked together , think Indra's net if you like, then we have the great big absolute.

Imagine a multidimensional spider's web in the early morning covered with dew drops. And every dew drop contains the reflection of all the other dew drops. And, in each reflected dew drop, the reflections of all the other dew drops in that reflection. And so ad infinitum. That is the Buddhist conception of the universe in an image." –Alan Watts[

[GE Morton]

You do believe that the 'one big absolute truth' does not even exist, correct?

Not correct. I have no idea what "one big absolute truth" might be, and hence have no idea how to go about determining whether it exists (whatever it is). It is a meaningless phrase.

[GE Morton]

If 'truth' is not relative nor dependent upon an agent, then how is 'truth' arrived at exactly?

You seem to be suffering from the same confusion as TP. Whether a proposition is true is a separate question from the question of how someone determined that it is true.

E.g., "It is raining outside" is true IFF it is raining outside. "Alfie determined that it is raining outside by looking out a window" is true if Alfie looked out a window and saw that it was raining outside. How Alfie determined that it is raining outside has no bearing on whether it is raining outside.

Hope this helps.