Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[creation]

No.

QED you have contradicted yourself.

Have I?

Are you absolutely 100%, without any doubt at all, SURE of this?

If you are, then you must have access to what is absolutely Right and True.

You are a time waster.

If you say and believe so, then that is what I must be, to you.

[creation]

QED you have contradicted yourself.
You are a time waster.

His move will be to say that you didn't understand him, and then to patronize you by saying that you weren't really interested in understanding him, or you would have asked clarifying questions.

Now that you appear to already KNOW what is NEEDED to be able to gain a True understanding of any and ALL others, and then ultimately learn about and understand Thy Self, I hopefully now do not have to say anymore regarding this to you.

[creation]

We ALL KNOW what is needed for our continued survival is one thing. This is one thing, which guides us to do what is morally right in Life.

From where are you getting "what is necessary for (prolonged) survival is what is morally right"?

Because taking away from 'what is necessary for survival' is obviously doing what is morally wrong.

Did you not already work this out from what I have previously written?

Unless you're simply defining "morally right" as that?

As 'what'?

[Sculptor1]

QED you have contradicted yourself.

Have I?

Are you absolutely 100%, without any doubt at all, SURE of this?

If you are, then you must have access to what is absolutely Right and True.

You are a time waster.

If you say and believe so, then that is what I must be, to you.

Is that the best you can do?

[Terrapin Station]

Because taking away from 'what is necessary for survival' is obviously doing what is morally wrong.

Obvious how? Because that's how you feel/what your intuition is?

[Peter Holmes]

GE Morton claims that, if there are public truth conditions for the assertion 'X is beautiful', then the assertion is objective.

But the only possible truth condition for the assertion 'X is beautiful' is its consistency with an opinion as to what constitutes beauty.

And an assertion expressing an opinion as to what constitutes beauty is subjective.

So the claim that the assertion 'X is beautiful' is or can be objective - that it does or can have public truth conditions - is specious.

And the same applies to the assertion 'X is morally wrong'.

Nothing has "public truth conditions."

He's confusing objective (in the sense of extramental) things/processes that factor into truth judgments with the truth judgments themselves.

Well, you and I disagree as to the nature of the subjective-objective distinction - what it refers or applies to. As I understand it, you think the distinction is between the mental and the extramental.

If so, can I ask - and sorry if you've explained this earlier in the marathon - do you subscribe to any theory of truth, correspondence or otherwise? (No worries if you'd rather not embark on this. I'm just wondering what you think a mental truth judgement is a judgement about.)

[Terrapin Station]

Nothing has "public truth conditions."

He's confusing objective (in the sense of extramental) things/processes that factor into truth judgments with the truth judgments themselves.

Well, you and I disagree as to the nature of the subjective-objective distinction - what it refers or applies to. As I understand it, you think the distinction is between the mental and the extramental.

If so, can I ask - and sorry if you've explained this earlier in the marathon - do you subscribe to any theory of truth, correspondence or otherwise? (No worries if you'd rather not embark on this. I'm just wondering what you think a mental truth judgement is a judgement about.)

I have my own truth theory, which is sort of a meta-theory:

"P" is true for S iff S judges "P" to have relation R to either S’s phenomenal experience, and/or S’s stock of previously adjudged true propositions, depending on the relation R. Relation R is whatever truth theory relation S feels is the appropriate one(s)—correspondence, coherence, consensus, pragmatic, etc.

What I personally use for R in most cases is correspondence.

[Peter Holmes]

Thanks, TS. I need to mull that over. One question: do you agree that what we call truth and falsehood are 'attributes' of assertions only? - So that what you call 'phenomenal experience' and the 'extramental' have and can have no truth-value?

[Terrapin Station]

Thanks, TS. I need to mull that over. One question: do you agree that what we call truth and falsehood are 'attributes' of assertions only? - So that what you call 'phenomenal experience' and the 'extramental' have and can have no truth-value?

Truth-value is a property of propositions that only obtains via a judgment made about propositions.

Remember that propositions are the meanings of declarative sentences. So we're already talking about an action that one is performing (even if it doesn't require intentional effort). Truth value is an additional sort of action (a judgment about a relation) on top of the action of thinking associatively about declarative sentences (or in other words, on top of meaning). So it's an active property of "a way of thinking" basically.

[GE Morton]

There is a third option. The absolute may or may not exist and in any case cannot affect us here in our relative space time. However consideration of what we would like to be absolute values , and even praying for those to be manifested on Earth, is a main human trait which became more powerful after the scientific enlightenment when light was being shone on human nature. Ontology is part of the human search for reality or truth. The human search for truth is faith- based, and faith is indispensible to maintenance of life.

You seem to be saying there that it is a "main human trait" to search for something that "may or may not exist and in any case cannot affect us . . ."

Is that not a fool's errand?

When you say, "Ontology is part of the search for reality or truth," is the "reality" and "truth" sought some sort of transcendental truth or reality, i.e., "Truth" and "Reality" capitalized? Something "truer" or "more real" than the truth of verifiable propositions, or the reality of common experience?

I think that is what most ontological theories strive for, and why I said they are nonsense. If the faith you mention is faith that some such transcendental truth or reality must exist, or that there is some transcendental "meaning of life," then that faith is idle; it leads either to delusions or frustrations, and is hardly necessary for maintenance of life --- indeed, it is more likely to be inimical to it.

[GE Morton]

GE Morton, what is this meaningless babble?

Please do not respond to each sentence out of context.

It was not out of context. Your entire comment was included in the response. And, yes, I respond to each proposition, because each one has a truth value. You should do the same (and, of course, dispense with the ad hominems).

Please reply properly, with a *cohesive* argument against my argument - as a whole.

There was nothing resembling an argument in the post in question. There were only ad hominems ("waffling balderdash"), fabricated quotes ("You have already said that the ontic approach is too meta for this thread"), an erroneous understanding of the meaning of "objective," and dogmatic, presumptuous assertions ("morality is not supposed to be objective").

BTW, one does not respond to "arguments as a whole." You respond to them premise by premise.

[GE Morton]

GE Morton claims that, if there are public truth conditions for the assertion 'X is beautiful', then the assertion is objective.

But the only possible truth condition for the assertion 'X is beautiful' is its consistency with an opinion as to what constitutes beauty.

Yes. With some internal criteria for beauty. It is somewhat un-colloquial, if not inaccurate, to call those criteria an "opinion." An opinion is a belief, typically one considered to be inadequately supported by evidence. Those internal criteria are not beliefs, strictly speaking. They are often subconscious and ineffable.

And an assertion expressing an opinion as to what constitutes beauty is subjective.

Yes.

So the claim that the assertion 'X is beautiful' is or can be objective - that it does or can have public truth conditions - is specious.

It can be objective if there is some public criterion of beauty accepted by all parties to the discussion. I don't know of any such public criteria, but it is conceivable some such might be adopted at some point (perhaps by a panel of judges at an art show).

And the same applies to the assertion 'X is morally wrong'.

Yes it does. If a particular moral goal is postulated, then whether whether a proffered moral rule or judgment advances it is objective.

[GE Morton]

I have my own truth theory, which is sort of a meta-theory:

"P" is true for S iff S judges "P" to have relation R to either S’s phenomenal experience . . .[etc.].

The only time propositions of the form, "P is true for S" are coherent is in cases where S is the subject, or a member of the subject class, in P, e.g., "P: All crows are black." If S is a crow, then P is true for S.

Truth is not agent-relative or agent-dependent. Except in the above case there is no "true for . . ." Supposing otherwise is a misuse of that word.

[Belindi]

GEMorton wrote:

You seem to be saying there that it is a "main human trait" to search for something that "may or may not exist and in any case cannot affect us . . ."

Is that not a fool's errand?

It's foolish to not search for patterns in the environment, patterns of events that help us to stay alive. It may be the case that there are laws of nature which are independent of conscious awareness. Nomic connections such as we do know and can easily name may proliferate whether we know about them or not until there is one big absolute truth. It's rather a pity we can't know this however it is a good thought that the universe is orderly .

When you say, "Ontology is part of the search for reality or truth," is the "reality" and "truth" sought some sort of transcendental truth or reality, i.e., "Truth" and "Reality" capitalized? Something "truer" or "more real" than the truth of verifiable propositions, or the reality of common experience?

Some people do indeed believe in, or trust there is ,a form of being that transcends this relative world. I don't. I believe in nature, not supernatural being. Ontology lays out for our inspection the several theories of existence and thereby we can be assured we have made an informed choice.

I think that is what most ontological theories strive for, and why I said they are nonsense. If the faith you mention is faith that some such transcendental truth or reality must exist, or that there is some transcendental "meaning of life," then that faith is idle; it leads either to delusions or frustrations, and is hardly necessary for maintenance of life --- indeed, it is more likely to be inimical to it.

Ontology is the study of all theories of existence, and is not limited to supernatural theories.

[GE Morton]

Truth-value is a property of propositions that only obtains via a judgment made about propositions.

Er, no. While it is (trivially) true that determining whether a proposition is true or false requires a judgment, the truth or falsity of the proposition does not require, or depend upon, that judgment, just as that, while determining the speed of a moving car requires a speedometer, the speed of the car does not depend on the speedometer. It depends only on the distance traveled and the elapsed time.

Remember that propositions are the meanings of declarative sentences. So we're already talking about an action that one is performing (even if it doesn't require intentional effort).

What action would that be? Are you speaking of uttering the sentence?