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[Terrapin Station]

Moral claims are opinions in the sense of how someone feels about something, or their "personal evaluation" of something .

They very often are. And hence are subjective. But moral philosophers are not interested in moral views that merely express personal feelings (though some psychologists may be).

The following, for example, is merely a personal feeling or disposition: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."

[Sculptor1]

To be clear.
I don't give a rat's **** about your hypocrisy.

Where was "my hypocrisy"?

Duh!

You said "To me, ALL animals, including ALL human beings, are the same and need as much love, care, and protection as they can get."

This is at best childish hyperbole, at worst a stupid lie. One thing is for sure it is false.

[GE Morton]

They very often are. And hence are subjective. But moral philosophers are not interested in moral views that merely express personal feelings (though some psychologists may be).

The following, for example, is merely a personal feeling or disposition: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."

No, it is not. It is an advisory as to a property a moral maxim must have if it is to be rationally defensible, namely, universality. It is either true or false, and whether it is true or false has nothing to do with Kant's or anyone else's feelings.

[GE Morton]

I assume the "it" there refers to a sensory impression. Yes, it represents a neural data stream.

A subjective sensory experience, yes. What would be the grounds for saying that it's not a neural data stream but only represents one?

Well, because a neural data stream consists of a sequence of electrical pulses traveling along a nerve pathway. But you do not experience a series of electrical pulses, or even nerve pathways. What you experience is a patch of color.

Of course I would. They allow me to predict future phenomena. That is the only justification necessary and the only one available. It gives me very good reason to stick with those postulates.

What ontological stance wouldn't allow you to predict future phenomena?

Any stance that postulates entities that violate Occam's principle and serve no explanatory purpose.

[Belindi]

Is absolutely objective the same as absolutely true?

Both of those phrases presuppose some transcendental criterion of truth or knowledge, and thus are nonsensical.

While Creation's reply to my question was helpful, I am inclined to go with yours. The word "absolute" is coherent only by means of metaphors or analogies.

[Sy Borg]

Come on GEM, enough is enough. Where are some concrete examples of this "objective morality" to show that it is possible?

Just give us five examples of morals that are objective. It's such a small thing to ask in the light of the last sixty pages.

Why do you keep refusing? All I am asking for is some tiny evidence for the assertion, just five measly examples.

Here's a list of morals that are accepted in all societies:

love your family
help your group
return favours
be brave
defer to authority
be fair
respect others’ property

https://evolution-institute.org/the-sev ... the-world/

Yet there are hardly "objective", just typical of human societies. What if your family or group is abusive? What about situations where discretion is the better part of valour? Should we defer to an authority that is corrupt and lies constantly? Can fairness in complex cases ever be seen as objective by the standards demanded by philosophy?

[Terrapin Station]

Well, because a neural data stream consists of a sequence of electrical pulses traveling along a nerve pathway. But you do not experience a series of electrical pulses, or even nerve pathways.

Why wouldn't the properties be "experiencing a patch of color" from the spatiotemporal reference point of being the neural data stream (as a subset of brain states)?

Any stance that postulates entities that violate Occam's principle and serve no explanatory purpose.

First off, that wouldn't be the same as something that doesn't allow successful predictions. You'd just be saying that it's not necessary for successful predictions.

Aside from that, you're not actually specifying a stance.

[creation]

None that I know of.



The knowing expressed by human beings.

Why would we parse it as "knowing" rather than feelings or dispositions if the answer to the first question is "none that I know of"?

Because only through 'knowing' is objectivity discovered and found.

Obviously, the 'knowing' of some thing, is itself irrefutable by anyone, whereas just as obvious is that the 'thinking' of some thing, could be wrong in and of itself.

I already showed how 'feelings' are just subjective only and can lead one easily astray.

[creation]

Where was "my hypocrisy"?

Duh!

You said "To me, ALL animals, including ALL human beings, are the same and need as much love, care, and protection as they can get."

This is at best childish hyperbole, at worst a stupid lie. One thing is for sure it is false.

Okay. If you believe some animals and some human beings do not need as much, love, care, and protection as others, and/or these things do not need as much love, care, and protection as they can get, then that is fine by me. This just shows more about 'you' and 'I'.

[GE Morton]

Come on GEM, enough is enough. Where are some concrete examples of this "objective morality" to show that it is possible?

Greta, the title and question of this thread is, "What could make morality objective?" Before you can usefully present examples of objective moral principles or rules, you need to answer the above question, and to do that you need to clarify what "morality" is, what is its aim, and what "objectivity" is. Otherwise, any examples presented could be dismissed as "subjective," due to divergent understandings of those terms.

The question of the thread is a meta-ethical one. Specific moralities can only be evaluated after those meta-ethical issues are resolved.

[GE Morton]

Well, because a neural data stream consists of a sequence of electrical pulses traveling along a nerve pathway. But you do not experience a series of electrical pulses, or even nerve pathways.

Why wouldn't the properties be "experiencing a patch of color" from the spatiotemporal reference point of being the neural data stream (as a subset of brain states)?

What on Earth are you talking about? That question is gibberish.

[Sy Borg]

Come on GEM, enough is enough. Where are some concrete examples of this "objective morality" to show that it is possible?

Greta, the title and question of this thread is, "What could make morality objective?" Before you can usefully present examples of objective moral principles or rules, you need to answer the above question, and to do that you need to clarify what "morality" is, what is its aim, and what "objectivity" is. Otherwise, any examples presented could be dismissed as "subjective," due to divergent understandings of those terms.

The question of the thread is a meta-ethical one. Specific moralities can only be evaluated after those meta-ethical issues are resolved.

It's not meta-ethical, it's waffling balderdash that has managed to achieve nothing over many pages.

What makes anything objective? Concrete evidence - 99.9999% in some areas of science. Testing, observation, questioning, re-testing. That's as good as we can manage. Even then, whether we are dealing with objective reality or just an evolutionarily useful filtering of it, cannot be definitively ascertained. But you have already said that the ontic approach is too meta for this thread. There appears to be a very precise GE Morton-shaped degree of meta required.

In the real world, the vagaries and relativities of morality mean that nothing whatever can render morality objective, and most so-called moralities blithely trample over other species without consideration or empathy.

Morality is not supposed to be objective. Morality is simply a means of pulling societies together sufficiently to compete successfully, to impose order so as to reduce chaos. Different moralities suit different geographies, economies, cultures and epochs.

[creation]

Do you really believe that the answer to a 'How?' question could be properly and correctly answered with words such as; "this is what we do, because it's all we can do"?

If yes, then, if that is all you can produce, then there is nothing else I could do.



So, your idea of defining what a word means is by just adding the exact same word in the definition, and then that explains it sufficiently.

I think you will discover it does not suffice.



No, I had never thought of now till just now. And, now that I have thought about it, it appears, at first glance, to be an absolute absurdity.

I know you have failed completely in answering my previous clarifying questions, but are you at all able to answer this one; How could questions, themselves, "misfire" exactly?

Here's how questions such as yours misfire.

If the earth is what we call an oblate spheroid, then the assertion 'the earth is an oblate spheroid' is what we call true, given the way we use the signs in the assertion, in context. It is an objective assertion, because it asserts something about what we call reality that exists independent from anyone's opinion.

Misfiring metaphysical questions: But...what are truth and objectivity?

Patient but bored answer: Well, here's how we use these words in these different contexts.

Persistently stupid metaphysical questions: Okay, but what are these things called truth and objectivity? How do you know they are what you say they are?

And on and on, furkling ever deeper down the rabbit hole.

I have no idea what you are trying to say here.

To me, what makes something true is agreement.

If you answered my questions honestly, then this obvious fact would have become obvious to you as well.

[creation]

Is absolutely objective the same as absolutely true?

Both of those phrases presuppose some transcendental criterion of truth or knowledge, and thus are nonsensical.

If both of these are supposedly "nonsensical", then this is just your own opinion anyway, which obviously may not reflect what is actually true and right anyway at all.

[GE Morton]

Greta, the title and question of this thread is, "What could make morality objective?" Before you can usefully present examples of objective moral principles or rules, you need to answer the above question, and to do that you need to clarify what "morality" is, what is its aim, and what "objectivity" is. Otherwise, any examples presented could be dismissed as "subjective," due to divergent understandings of those terms.

The question of the thread is a meta-ethical one. Specific moralities can only be evaluated after those meta-ethical issues are resolved.

It's not meta-ethical, it's waffling balderdash that has managed to achieve nothing over many pages.

What makes anything objective? Concrete evidence - 99.9999% in some areas of science. Testing, observation, questioning, re-testing. That's as good as we can manage.

Well, you've just confirmed my statement above, concerning divergent understandings of those terms. No --- testing, re-testing, etc., is not what makes a proposition objective, though it may make it more certain. What makes it objective is that is testable, i.e., it has public truth conditions. Objectivity does not mean certainty.

Even then, whether we are dealing with objective reality or just an evolutionarily useful filtering of it, cannot be definitively ascertained.

"Objective reality" is whatever is asserted by a true, objective proposition.

But you have already said that the ontic approach is too meta for this thread.

Greta, I never said any such thing. What I said was that ontology is mostly nonsense. Stop putting words in my mouth, please.

In the real world, the vagaries and relativities of morality mean that nothing whatever can render morality objective, and most so-called moralities blithely trample over other species without consideration or empathy.

The vagaries and relativities of vernacular moralities have no bearing on the question of whether an objective morality is possible.

Morality is not supposed to be objective.

"Not supposed to be?" Again, you confirm my claim above. Apparently you equate morality with folkways. Most moral philosophers have seen it as a subject amenable to rational analysis and elucidation of universal truths.