Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

For one thing, you're misrepresenting, or perhaps just misinterpreting, representationalism. The latter is the theory that conscious experience "represents" things-in-the-world (in contrast to "reveals" things-in-the-world). That is a controversial philosophical thesis. That a subjective sensory experience, such as perceiving a color, represents a neural data stream is not controversial at all.

So it's not a neural data stream but it represents one?

That is false. Representationalism does not imply solipsism. I may postulate the existence of other people and observe their behavior, even if I consider what I observe to be representations of something-in-the-world.

Of course you may, but under representationalism, you have no reason to even believe that you can observe anyone else or their behavior--which is what I said. What I said doesn't claim that you can't postulate realist assumptions, so noting that you can isn't any kind of objection to what I said. Rather you'd have no good justification for any realist assumptions.

[Peter Holmes]

You asked how an assertion is what we call factual and objective. And I've explained how. And reality is what we call reality, just as truth and objectivity are what we call truth and objectivity. Sorry if I haven't answered your clarifying questions. It could be that you're asking questions that misfire. Ever thought of that possibility?

[Terrapin Station]

When, and if, a human being is looking at things not just from their own perspective, nor from just some other's perspective, but looks from the perspective of EVERY thing, as One, then it is that One object, thee Universe, Itself, which is the 'object' that is able to SEE what is right and what is wrong in Life, in regards to moral issues or human beings' behavior.

What would be any evidence of morality--that is, moral views--occurring anywhere in the world other than persons' dispositions about behavior? What is any evidence of morality occurring in "the universe itself"?

[Belindi]

Is absolutely objective the same as absolutely true?

[creation]

When, and if, a human being is looking at things not just from their own perspective, nor from just some other's perspective, but looks from the perspective of EVERY thing, as One, then it is that One object, thee Universe, Itself, which is the 'object' that is able to SEE what is right and what is wrong in Life, in regards to moral issues or human beings' behavior.

What would be any evidence of morality--that is, moral views--occurring anywhere in the world other than persons' dispositions about behavior?

None that I know of.

What is any evidence of morality occurring in "the universe itself"?

The knowing expressed by human beings.

[creation]

Is absolutely objective the same as absolutely true?

To see things objectively is to look from everything's perspective. Once this is being done, then that is how what is absolutely true can be seen.

'Absolutely objective' is not the same as 'absolutely true'.

The former is a way of seeing, whereas the later is what is seen, and understood.

[creation]

You asked how an assertion is what we call factual and objective. And I've explained how.

Do you really believe that the answer to a 'How?' question could be properly and correctly answered with words such as; "this is what we do, because it's all we can do"?

If yes, then, if that is all you can produce, then there is nothing else I could do.

And reality is what we call reality, just as truth and objectivity are what we call truth and objectivity.

So, your idea of defining what a word means is by just adding the exact same word in the definition, and then that explains it sufficiently.

I think you will discover it does not suffice.

Sorry if I haven't answered your clarifying questions. It could be that you're asking questions that misfire. Ever thought of that possibility?

No, I had never thought of now till just now. And, now that I have thought about it, it appears, at first glance, to be an absolute absurdity.

I know you have failed completely in answering my previous clarifying questions, but are you at all able to answer this one; How could questions, themselves, "misfire" exactly?

[Terrapin Station]

What would be any evidence of morality--that is, moral views--occurring anywhere in the world other than persons' dispositions about behavior?

None that I know of.

What is any evidence of morality occurring in "the universe itself"?

The knowing expressed by human beings.

Why would we parse it as "knowing" rather than feelings or dispositions if the answer to the first question is "none that I know of"?

[Peter Holmes]

You asked how an assertion is what we call factual and objective. And I've explained how.

Do you really believe that the answer to a 'How?' question could be properly and correctly answered with words such as; "this is what we do, because it's all we can do"?

If yes, then, if that is all you can produce, then there is nothing else I could do.

And reality is what we call reality, just as truth and objectivity are what we call truth and objectivity.

So, your idea of defining what a word means is by just adding the exact same word in the definition, and then that explains it sufficiently.

I think you will discover it does not suffice.

Sorry if I haven't answered your clarifying questions. It could be that you're asking questions that misfire. Ever thought of that possibility?

No, I had never thought of now till just now. And, now that I have thought about it, it appears, at first glance, to be an absolute absurdity.

I know you have failed completely in answering my previous clarifying questions, but are you at all able to answer this one; How could questions, themselves, "misfire" exactly?

Here's how questions such as yours misfire.

If the earth is what we call an oblate spheroid, then the assertion 'the earth is an oblate spheroid' is what we call true, given the way we use the signs in the assertion, in context. It is an objective assertion, because it asserts something about what we call reality that exists independent from anyone's opinion.

Misfiring metaphysical questions: But...what are truth and objectivity?

Patient but bored answer: Well, here's how we use these words in these different contexts.

Persistently stupid metaphysical questions: Okay, but what are these things called truth and objectivity? How do you know they are what you say they are?

And on and on, furkling ever deeper down the rabbit hole.

[GE Morton]

I think your explanation is incorrect. We're talking about the nature and function of assertions, which, of course, aren't themselves opinions. Here are the examples.

#1 Paris is the capital of France.
#2 In my opinion, Paris is the capital of France.
#3 Paris is beautiful.

You say that all of these express opinions - because all assertions of any kind express opinions.

Yes, they do, although prefacing #2 with, "It is my opinion that . . ." would be redundant.

But the function of #1 is not to express the opinion that Paris is the capital of France. Its function is to make a factual claim with a truth-value.

Yes, it is. But whenever that proposition is asserted it also expresses the opinion of the speaker. It is not the function of #1 to express an opinion, but it nevertheless expresses one. Whenever it is asserted, someone can truthfully say, "That is your opinion."

And because its truth-value is independent from opinion, the assertion is objective. Your appeal to 'public truth conditions' - though it's a correspondence-theory mistake - also assumes independence from opinion.

Yes, the truth values of all propositions are "independent of opinion," in the sense that no one's opinions affect their truth values (except for propositions asserting something about someone's opinion). "All propositions" there, BTW, includes subjective propositions. See below.

#2 may express hesitation or uncertainty as to the truth of the embedded factual assertion. But it doesn't express the opinion that, in 'my' opinion, Paris is the capital of France. That's an absurd analysis of the function of #2.

Not absurd, but redundant and awkward.

But #3 does genuinely express an opinion, judgement or belief - aesthetic, in this case. Its function is not to make a factual claim with a truth-value independent from opinion. And the function of the moral assertion 'slavery is wrong' is identical: to express an opinion.

Suppose we had a set of criteria of beauty accepted by all members of some speech community, such that anything X satisfying one (or some other number) of them would qualify them as "beautiful," and that determining whether X did or did not satisfy the criteria was empirical. Then "Paris is beautiful" would be objective; it would be a factual claim. Of course, there is no such set of agreed upon criteria --- no public truth conditions --- so the proposition, "Paris is beautiful" is subjective. But calling that proposition an "opinion," and "Paris is the capital of France" "factual" does not get to the real difference between them. The latter statement is also the opinion of the person asserting it. "Fact" and "opinion" are not contraries.

Furthermore, "Paris is beautiful" is a "factual" claim. It has a truth value --- it is true if the city somehow satisfies the speaker's criteria of beauty. But those criteria are not public, and hence the proposition is subjective. Suppose you have a headache and declare, "I have a headache." Does that proposition have no truth value? Of course it does. But since its truth conditions are private, it is subjective.

[GE Morton]

Is absolutely objective the same as absolutely true?

Both of those phrases presuppose some transcendental criterion of truth or knowledge, and thus are nonsensical.

[Terrapin Station]

I think your explanation is incorrect. We're talking about the nature and function of assertions, which, of course, aren't themselves opinions. Here are the examples.

#1 Paris is the capital of France.
#2 In my opinion, Paris is the capital of France.
#3 Paris is beautiful.

You say that all of these express opinions - because all assertions of any kind express opinions.

Yes, they do, although prefacing #2 with, "It is my opinion that . . ." would be redundant.

There are different senses of the term "opinion." Moral claims are opinions in the sense of how someone feels about something, or their "personal evaluation" of something .

[GE Morton]

So it's not a neural data stream but it represents one?

I assume the "it" there refers to a sensory impression. Yes, it represents a neural data stream.

Of course you may, but under representationalism, you have no reason to even believe that you can observe anyone else or their behavior--which is what I said. What I said doesn't claim that you can't postulate realist assumptions, so noting that you can isn't any kind of objection to what I said. Rather you'd have no good justification for any realist assumptions.

Of course I would. They allow me to predict future phenomena. That is the only justification necessary and the only one available. It gives me very good reason to stick with those postulates.

[GE Morton]

Moral claims are opinions in the sense of how someone feels about something, or their "personal evaluation" of something .

They very often are. And hence are subjective. But moral philosophers are not interested in moral views that merely express personal feelings (though some psychologists may be).

[Terrapin Station]

I assume the "it" there refers to a sensory impression. Yes, it represents a neural data stream.

A subjective sensory experience, yes. What would be the grounds for saying that it's not a neural data stream but only represents one?

Of course I would. They allow me to predict future phenomena. That is the only justification necessary and the only one available. It gives me very good reason to stick with those postulates.

What ontological stance wouldn't allow you to predict future phenomena?