Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

PS:

Under representationalism, the theories are no such thing as "representations of a neural data stream." They're just a story you're making up.

Er, I didn't claim that "theories are representations of a neural data stream." I said that experienced phenomena (colors, odors, flavors, etc.) are. Another misquote, to produce another straw man.

I wrote that sloppily because I was writing it fast, but the point remains. The supposed "representations of a neural data stream" are just a story you're making up on your view. The "predictions" are of something your brain is producing, which would imply that there's no reason to believe that the predictions aren't that at all, but the creation of a story that you fill out in more detail as you go along.

[Terrapin Station]

It's nonsensical, by the way, that you're both forwarding representationalism and behaviorism. If representationalism is right, you have no reason to even believe that you can observe anyone else or their behavior.

[Sy Borg]

Still waiting for concrete examples.

Without them, the thread is meaningless. Going around in circles, page after page.

[Peter Holmes]

What we call objectivity is independence from opinion. And that means independence from any and everyone's opinion. So 'agreement with and by everyone' doesn't and can't constitute what we call objectivity.

It's possible to deny that what we call objectivity exists or is possible. But then there's no reason to talk about what we call objectivity. And then, the claim that morality is objective is incoherent anyway.

Certainly agree with that latter point.

But "independence from opinion" is not a workable definition either, because opinions may also be objective. I.e., "It is my opinion that Paris is the capital of France."

Anything one believes is true is an opinion of his. "Paris is the capital of France" is true and objective, because it has public truth conditions. That Alfie believes it is true does not change that fact.

Your definition leads to the same result you criticize above: Every proposition can be framed as an opinion. Hence none of them can be objective, and the term is rendered useless.

The assertions 'Paris is the capital of France' and 'It is my opinion that Paris is the capital of France' are completely different, and have completely different truth-values. The truth-value of the second has nothing to do with Paris. And that the first is the expression of an opinion - because so are all assertions of any kind - is trivially true and inconsequential.

What we're arguing about is the difference between, for example, 'Paris is the capital of France' and 'Paris is beautiful'. The functional difference between them is what makes one objective and the other subjective.

[GE Morton]

I wrote that sloppily because I was writing it fast, but the point remains.

Lame excuse for a misquote.

The supposed "representations of a neural data stream" are just a story you're making up on your view.

Well it is a story, but not one I'm making up. It is the "standard" view among cognitive scientists. It is also readily confirmable experimentally --- electrically stimulate a particular nerve, and an electrical signal is transmitted though a sequence of connected nerves, to some pre-processing centers in the brain, and finally to some sensory region of the cortex. You then see a flash of color, feel a pain, hear a sound, etc. Those are your brain's means of representing that neural data to itself.

The "predictions" are of something your brain is producing, which would imply that there's no reason to believe that the predictions aren't that at all, but the creation of a story that you fill out in more detail as you go along.

That makes no sense. If you anticipate a certain phenomenon at time T, and that phenomenon later occurs at time T1, then the prediction was there.

[Terrapin Station]

Well it is a story, but not one I'm making up. It is the "standard" view among cognitive scientists.

Per your view, there's no way to know that there are any cognitive scientists.

[GE Morton]

It's nonsensical, by the way, that you're both forwarding representationalism and behaviorism.

For one thing, you're misrepresenting, or perhaps just misinterpreting, representationalism. The latter is the theory that conscious experience "represents" things-in-the-world (in contrast to "reveals" things-in-the-world). That is a controversial philosophical thesis. That a subjective sensory experience, such as perceiving a color, represents a neural data stream is not controversial at all.

If representationalism is right, you have no reason to even believe that you can observe anyone else or their behavior.

That is false. Representationalism does not imply solipsism. I may postulate the existence of other people and observe their behavior, even if I consider what I observe to be representations of something-in-the-world.

[GE Morton]

The assertions 'Paris is the capital of France' and 'It is my opinion that Paris is the capital of France' are completely different, and have completely different truth-values.

Yes, they do. The latter ("It is my opinion that . . .") is true if the speaker believes that Paris is the capital of France. But what he believes, that Paris is the capital of France, is also true or false. When one says, "It is my opinion that . . .", he is saying WHAT he believes, not that he believes it. That Paris is the capital of France is his opinion. And in that case his opinion is objective.

As I explained before, when someone says, "It is my opinion that P," he is saying two things: P, and that he lacks conclusive evidence for P; he concedes that P may be false. Similarly, if Alfie asserts P, and Bruno replies, "That is your opinion," Bruno is saying that Alfie lacks sufficient evidence for P. Don't confuse Alfie's opinion, P, with the proposition that Alfie has an opinion.

The truth-value of the second has nothing to do with Paris. And that the first is the expression of an opinion - because so are all assertions of any kind - is trivially true and inconsequential.

Yes, it is trivially true --- but true nonetheless. And that makes it very consequential for your definition of "objective."

What we're arguing about is the difference between, for example, 'Paris is the capital of France' and 'Paris is beautiful'. The functional difference between them is what makes one objective and the other subjective.

Oh, I agree. And that functional difference is that the former has public truth conditions, the latter has only private ones --- not that one is an opinion and the other is not. They both are.

[Peter Holmes]

The assertions 'Paris is the capital of France' and 'It is my opinion that Paris is the capital of France' are completely different, and have completely different truth-values.

Yes, they do. The latter ("It is my opinion that . . .") is true if the speaker believes that Paris is the capital of France. But what he believes, that Paris is the capital of France, is also true or false. When one says, "It is my opinion that . . .", he is saying WHAT he believes, not that he believes it. That Paris is the capital of France is his opinion. And in that case his opinion is objective.

As I explained before, when someone says, "It is my opinion that P," he is saying two things: P, and that he lacks conclusive evidence for P; he concedes that P may be false. Similarly, if Alfie asserts P, and Bruno replies, "That is your opinion," Bruno is saying that Alfie lacks sufficient evidence for P. Don't confuse Alfie's opinion, P, with the proposition that Alfie has an opinion.

The truth-value of the second has nothing to do with Paris. And that the first is the expression of an opinion - because so are all assertions of any kind - is trivially true and inconsequential.

Yes, it is trivially true --- but true nonetheless. And that makes it very consequential for your definition of "objective."

What we're arguing about is the difference between, for example, 'Paris is the capital of France' and 'Paris is beautiful'. The functional difference between them is what makes one objective and the other subjective.

Oh, I agree. And that functional difference is that the former has public truth conditions, the latter has only private ones --- not that one is an opinion and the other is not. They both are.

I think your explanation is incorrect. We're talking about the nature and function of assertions, which, of course, aren't themselves opinions. Here are the examples.

#1 Paris is the capital of France.
#2 In my opinion, Paris is the capital of France.
#3 Paris is beautiful.

You say that all of these express opinions - because all assertions of any kind express opinions.

But the function of #1 is not to express the opinion that Paris is the capital of France. Its function is to make a factual claim with a truth-value. And because its truth-value is independent from opinion, the assertion is objective. Your appeal to 'public truth conditions' - though it's a correspondence-theory mistake - also assumes independence from opinion.

#2 may express hesitation or uncertainty as to the truth of the embedded factual assertion. But it doesn't express the opinion that, in 'my' opinion, Paris is the capital of France. That's an absurd analysis of the function of #2.

But #3 does genuinely express an opinion, judgement or belief - aesthetic, in this case. Its function is not to make a factual claim with a truth-value independent from opinion. And the function of the moral assertion 'slavery is wrong' is identical: to express an opinion.

The nature and function of factual assertions, and the fundamental difference between them and expressions of opinion, is right at the heart of the argument against moral objectivity.

[creation]

No.

Sure. So what's the "object" re objective moral claims in your view?

To look at and/or see things, for what they REALLY ARE, then this can be known as 'objectivity', and can only be done 'objectively'. To obtain an 'objective view' of things is to see things are they REALLY ARE. The ONLY WAY this can be Truly done is to see things from the perspective of absolutely every thing/one.

For example, if from the perspective of absolutely every thing there is agreement by ALL on some issue/thing, then that is how 'objectivity' is reached or obtained.

What the 'object', re 'objective moral view', is thee view that is SEEN by absolutely every thing, and obviously which absolutely every one/thing agrees with (and/or accepts).

When, and if, a human being is looking at things not just from their own perspective, nor from just some other's perspective, but looks from the perspective of EVERY thing, as One, then it is that One object, thee Universe, Itself, which is the 'object' that is able to SEE what is right and what is wrong in Life, in regards to moral issues or human beings' behavior.

But, as I have alluded to previously, this is still a long way from being fully understood, that is; to most people in the days of when this is being written.

I am not expecting people to fully understand this, yet. I am also not yet ready to explain this is full detail, yet. Unless of course there is someone who is Truly interested in this, and then I can and will explain absolutely EVERY thing in FULL.

[creation]

Still waiting for concrete examples.

Without them, the thread is meaningless. Going around in circles, page after page.

I am not sure what "concrete examples" you are still waiting for. But, if you are still waiting for concrete examples of; What could make morality objective? Then, you will either have to express how you define the word 'morality' and the word 'objective' in relation to them being together here, or, I could just repeat what I wrote previously of just one of many examples of what could be 'morally objective', from my point of view on this.

If, however, you are still waiting for "concrete examples" of something else entirely, then just disregard what I will repeat now;

To me, 'morality' is just in reference to what is right and what is wrong in Life just in regards to human beings behavior.

Whereas, what is actually True and False is decided upon 'that' what everyone agrees with, what is actually Right and Wrong in Life is decided upon 'that' what everyone agrees with and with what is necessary for living.

So, an example of what is right in Life that everyone agrees on at present is: If human beings do not need meat to eat, then everyone agrees that human beings do not need to eat meat to live. Therefore, if human beings do not need to eat meat to live, then human beings killing animals just for meat to eat is obviously the wrong thing to do in Life. Or, in other words 'immoral'.

Everyone agrees with this at present. Although a lot, if not most, adult human beings will 'try to' disagree with this, and some will fight vigorously that it is right to kill and eat animals when they do not need to.

That adult human beings will fight vigorously that it is alright to kill and eat animals when they do not need to will be proven by the reaction this gets.

Also, obviously some people will say they "disagree" with this, but this is only because they are not being Truly OPEN and Honest.

So, What could make morality objective, to me, is agreement with and by everyone.

A concrete example of discovering what is right in Life is that eating of meat when not necessary is wrong, and therefore one concrete example of a moral objective is that what is right in Life is not doing those things that are not necessary and harm or hurt others. If you do not want something done to you, then that is a sign that doing that would be what is wrong in Life. But, only from being able to look at and see this (and all things) from the perspective of everyone, to find out what could actually be in agreement with and by everyone, is then how one KNOWS, for sure, what is right and what is wrong in Life.

[creation]

Yes, they do. The latter ("It is my opinion that . . .") is true if the speaker believes that Paris is the capital of France. But what he believes, that Paris is the capital of France, is also true or false. When one says, "It is my opinion that . . .", he is saying WHAT he believes, not that he believes it. That Paris is the capital of France is his opinion. And in that case his opinion is objective.

As I explained before, when someone says, "It is my opinion that P," he is saying two things: P, and that he lacks conclusive evidence for P; he concedes that P may be false. Similarly, if Alfie asserts P, and Bruno replies, "That is your opinion," Bruno is saying that Alfie lacks sufficient evidence for P. Don't confuse Alfie's opinion, P, with the proposition that Alfie has an opinion.



Yes, it is trivially true --- but true nonetheless. And that makes it very consequential for your definition of "objective."



Oh, I agree. And that functional difference is that the former has public truth conditions, the latter has only private ones --- not that one is an opinion and the other is not. They both are.

I think your explanation is incorrect. We're talking about the nature and function of assertions, which, of course, aren't themselves opinions. Here are the examples.

#1 Paris is the capital of France.
#2 In my opinion, Paris is the capital of France.
#3 Paris is beautiful.

You say that all of these express opinions - because all assertions of any kind express opinions.

But the function of #1 is not to express the opinion that Paris is the capital of France. Its function is to make a factual claim with a truth-value.

But HOW does it become a 'factual claim' with a truth-value? And, how does one know that it is a so called "factual claim with a truth-value".

If it is not 'agreement' that makes the statement; paris is the capital of france, a factual claim with a truth-value, then what makes it a factual claim with a truth-value?

How do statements get truth-value from exactly, if not agreement.

If it is not agreement that makes a claim true, then what does?

And because its truth-value is independent from opinion, the assertion is objective.

But how is opinion separated from objective?

What makes 'paris the capital of france'? And, what makes the assertion that 'paris is capital of france' objective?

How is my opinion 'children do not want to be punched in the face' separated from the assertion 'children do not want to be punched in the face'?

Is that assertion 'objective', or is this just my 'opinion'?

Is the truth-value independent from opinion, if not, then why is that subjective only, and not objective?

Where exactly does 'truth-value' come from? And, how is 'truth-value' actually created and made?

Can an 'opinion' be dependent upon truth-value, or is this not possible?

Your appeal to 'public truth conditions' - though it's a correspondence-theory mistake - also assumes independence from opinion.

#2 may express hesitation or uncertainty as to the truth of the embedded factual assertion. But it doesn't express the opinion that, in 'my' opinion, Paris is the capital of France. That's an absurd analysis of the function of #2.

Why?

What makes you KNOW what thee actual Truth of things ARE?

In my opinion 'paris could be the capital of france, or it may not be'. What makes 'paris the capital of france' and unambiguous and irrefutable fact?

But #3 does genuinely express an opinion, judgement or belief - aesthetic, in this case. Its function is not to make a factual claim with a truth-value independent from opinion. And the function of the moral assertion 'slavery is wrong' is identical: to express an opinion. [/quote]

If some one said to me;
"Paris is beautiful", then I would ask them,Why?

Just like, if some one said to me;
"Slavery is wrong", then I would ask them, Why?

Now, to distinguish between whether they are opinions or whether that are a factual claim I would NOT assume that I already know what the truth is, like what you are doing here.

I would listen to what they have to say, and, if everyone could agree with what they say, then that would just be a fact. But, if others could disagree, then that would be just an opinion.

See, to make a factual claim, then one would have to formulate an argument that was sound and valid, and thus an unambiguous irrefutable fact, which obviously no one could disagree with it.

If an 'assertion' is agreed to be true with and by everyone, then that Truth is objective.

The nature and function of factual assertions, and the fundamental difference between them and expressions of opinion, is right at the heart of the argument against moral objectivity.

What 'argument' is there "against" 'moral objectivity'?

By the way, how does one distinguish between a 'factual' assertion and an 'opinioned' assertion?

[Peter Holmes]

Words, such as 'truth' and 'objectivity', can mean only what we use them to mean. Such abstract nouns aren't the names of abstract things that may or may not exist, or that may not be what we say they are. That's just metaphysical delusion. (The meaning of any name is not the thing it names.)

So we use the word 'truth' and its cognates to refer to assertions that describe features or reality, given the way we use the signs involved. And such descriptions are always contextual and purposive. The answer to your how? questions is: this is what we do, because it's all we can do.

[Belindi]

Peter Holmes wrote:

What we're arguing about is the difference between, for example, 'Paris is the capital of France' and 'Paris is beautiful'. The functional difference between them is what makes one objective and the other subjective.

That argument omits that , apart from discussions about utterances, the social situation makes the same utterance have a variety of meanings.

A: "If only the old medieval streets of Paris still existed."
B: " Paris is beautiful!"


A: "Paris is the capital of France."
B: "I still say Avignon is more beautiful."

If there is a measurement device in place, such as mathematics or logic, the utterance might be objective, but only by reason of the device. Otherwise there is no such thing as an objective utterance. True, many people aim for objectivity.

[creation]

Words, such as 'truth' and 'objectivity', can mean only what we use them to mean.

Words, such as absolutely any word in the Universe, can mean only what we use them to mean, obviously.

Such abstract nouns aren't the names of abstract things that may or may not exist, or that may not be what we say they are. That's just metaphysical delusion. (The meaning of any name is not the thing it names.)

Would there be a human being who says, "The meaning of any name is the thing it names"?

So we use the word 'truth' and its cognates to refer to assertions that describe features or reality, given the way we use the signs involved.

If you are trying to describe that there is features of 'reality', then how are you defining the word 'reality' here, and/or asserting what the word 'reality' means or refers to exactly.

And such descriptions are always contextual and purposive. The answer to your how? questions is: this is what we do, because it's all we can do.

So, your answer to; How does one distinguish between a 'factual' assertion and an 'opinioned' assertion? IS "this is what we do, because it is all we can do", which is fair enough. You are free to answer any question any way you like. But, what can be obviously noticed and seen is that your answer certainly and clearly does not answer my clarifying question. Saying that, "this is what we do", and saying, "because it is all we can do" obviously does not answer my question. But maybe you were answering some other "how" question, which I am unaware of? And, besides that, that is not all we can do. There is others things we can do.

Also, who and/or what is the 'we' exactly that you are referring to here?

By the way, the actual answer to my 'How?' question is NOT what you are proposing. That is just your opinion only, and not a factual claim with a truth-value. In fact your answer has absolutely nothing to do with my question. But, once again, you may be answering some other "How?" question.