Terrapin Station wrote: ↑March 11th, 2020, 6:23 am
GE Morton wrote: ↑March 10th, 2020, 9:55 pm
We've been over this a dozen times. Your conception of meaning results in a reduction ad absurdum --- if meanings are "things in people's heads," and "what they assert is determined by how an individual thinks" then verbal transference of information is impossible, because we have no means of determining what is in anyone else's head.
Verbal transference of meaning of any other mental-only phenomena is impossible, yes.
You're again misquoting what I said. I said that information, not "meaning," is transferred. I assume you know what is meant by "information" (perhaps a rash assumption). There is no need to transfer meanings, since other speakers of your language will already know the meanings of the words you're using. If they don't know the meaning of some particular word they'll consult a dictionary.
Meaning is the associative act.
Er, no. "Meaning" is not a verb. It is not an "act" of any kind.
Learning a meaning is an associative act. The meaning is that which is learned. Learning a fact is not the fact, learning someone's name is not the name, learning a meaning is not the meaning. When you learn the (denotative) meaning of a word you learn which things-in-the-world that word denotes. Those things are the meanings of that word. What is in your head is
knowledge of those meanings.
So first off you're calling the wrong thing meaning. You're doing this because you appeal to common things to say about everything, but those common things to say reflect serious misconceptions--misconceptions that wind up suggesting untenable ontological scenarios.
Oh, my. You're claiming that the common understandings, uses, of common words involve "misconceptions, untenable ontological scenarios"? Are you suggesting we need a new language? HINT: EVERY ontology is a linguistic construct. The only basis for comparing one construct with another is their respective utilities in description and explanation for perceived phenomena. "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" (Quine). What exists is whatever we say exists, as long as that existent has some descriptive or explanatory value. And as I said earlier, virtually every ontology proffered by philosophers over the centuries is metaphysical nonsense, with no explanatory power or descriptive value whatsoever.
What "dog" means to someone is a matter of what's in their head; it's not a behavioral matter.
Sorry, TP, but it is. If Alfie points to a the dog photo when presented with the word "dog," then I know what meaning he attaches to that word. I need no more information. I need know nothing about what is in his head. If he points to the same photo I would point to for that word, then I know that he and I attach the same meaning to it. That behavior is all any of us, including you, knows or can know, about what meanings others attach to words.
You can't seem to grasp the
reductio ad absurdum to which your eccentric theory leads. Let me try to outline it one more time.
1. Unless speaker and hearer have a common understanding of the meanings of the words in a proposition, and know that they do, then no information can be exchanged verbally between them. They are speaking different languages.
2. If meanings are "things in people's heads," then a hearer can never know what meanings a speaker attaches to the words he utters, because he can never know what is in that speaker's head.
3. Hence no information can be exchanged verbally between speaker and hearer.
4. But information can be, and is constantly, exchanged between speakers of a common language. So a
reductio ad absurdum.
Since 1. is obviously true, 2. must be false.
QED.