Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

Just to tidy up and clarify my previous post.

It has been argued that claims about moral rightness and wrongness are about consistency with goals derived from axioms requiring no justification.

Axiom: Homosexuals are vermin.
Goal: Rid ourselves of vermin.
Advisory assertion: If we want to rid ourselves of vermin, then we [should/ought to/need to/must] rid ourselves of homosexuals.

This assertion is objective, because it has public truth conditions. And because it's about morality, then supposedly it's a 'moral assertion'.

Sarcasm notwithstanding, you're getting closer to understanding the argument here. But your straw-man argument above makes several mistakes.

"Homosexuals are vermin" cannot be an axiom in a moral theory, for 2 reasons. First, the axiom must express the aim or goal of the theory. Your "axiom" does not; it is merely a disparaging epithet. Secondly, axioms must be self-evident: widely, if not universally, understood and accepted as true (as you said, "requiring no justification"). Your "axiom" doesn't even have a truth value.

To clarify: "Moral" rules and principles are rules and principles governing interactions between agents in a social setting, having the aim of maximizing welfare for all agents (by reducing injuries and losses resulting from destructive interactions between agents, and fostering interactions which increase welfare for one or more agents).

The aim of a moral theory is to identify and develop those principles and rules in a systematic way (i.e., via methods that are rationally defensible).

Our thinking the axiom is morally wrong and repulsive (as I do) has no bearing on the nominal objectivity of the advisory assertion.

You're right, and that can be generalized: Agreement or disagreement with a goal has no bearing on the objectivity of any advisories proffered in support of that goal.

Our choice of a moral axiom, how ever we justify it, is subjective - a matter of opinion. And that single fact demolishes the argument for moral objectivity, ab initio.

Well, if we are able to justify it it cannot be subjective (I cannot "justify" my preference for chocolate over vanilla ice cream). And you just contradicted yourself. If Y is a moral goal, then by your own admission, advisories which demonstrably advance that goal are both moral and objective. Hence we have "moral objectivity."

You're confusing failing to share a goal with a lack of objectivity of proposed means to that goal.

You could re-state your argument above thus:

1. AXIOM: To develop rules and principles governing interactions between agents in a social setting, with the aim of ridding the world of homosexuals.
2. We ought yo kill any homosexual we encounter.
3. Etc.

But of course, the aim stated is hardly universally or widely shared, is not self-evident. Indeed, I'd argue that any rules or principles governing interactions between agents that did not have the aim I gave above would not be "moral" rules; that that aim is part of the definition of "moral." But the rules that ensue from your theory will (or can be) objective.

[GE Morton]

Well, the proposition in question --- "Paris is the capital of France" --- says nothing about Paris's location

?? It certainly says something about Paris' location re how I interpret it.

Egads, will you cease with the "interpretation" irrelevancies? The proposition asserts a specific fact; it has specific truth conditions. No "interpreting" is necessary, unless you count knowing the meanings of the words involved "interpreting."

France, among other things, picks out a location. Given what capitals are, they're always located in what they're a capital of (they wouldn't necessarily be, but this is contingently the case). So the sentence tells me that rather than being in Laos, say, or Greenland, say, which are different locations, Paris is in France.

Yes, one may draw that inference, inductively, from the proposition. But it is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the proposition.

[GE Morton]

Regarding GEMorton's example "Paris is the capital of France" whether or not the speaker intends the claim as a sort of geographical location in time and space, or whatever other motive she has for voicing the claim, her language behaviour is social.Or socio-cultural.

Of course it is. That is a given, a universal. But that fact does not render propositions subjective.

Kuhn has shown science is a social activity. Pure objectivity is impossible and must remain an ideal to aspire to but never to be realised in this world.

I have no idea what "pure objectivity" might consist of, or require. That is a idealistic concept that seems to presume some sort of transcendental realm of existence or an omniscient observer or a sub specie aeternitatis perspective --- none of which concepts have any explanatory utility. They are vacuous notions.

It is propositions, not persons, which are objective or subjective; a proposition is objective if its truth conditions are public. A person can be said to be objective or subjective to the extent the propositions he utters are objective or subjective.

The best we can do in the direction of objectivity is relative true knowledge and relatively true judgements.Those are founded on the true nature of events as if there be such as state as over arching order in the universe.This over arching order is what I call Nature. Some call it God, I call it Nature.

Any proposition you utter presuming to describe the "true knowledge" and the "true nature of events" will be either objective or subjective, depending upon whether its truth conditions are public or private.

Since we are inescapably subjective we suffer from a feeling of existential angst having no authority but our own.

Speak for yourself!

Any man who lacks an element of neuroticism in his psyche cannot live for long.It is neuroticism that makes GEMorton and any authentic person here able to think responsibly.

Egads, Belindi!

[creation]

The answer to the question is: Agreement and acceptance by all.

In what way does that make anything objective?

In order for me to answer this question so that you could understand my answer I will need to know how you define the word 'objective' here?

What work does "objectivity" do if what we mean by "objective" is "everyone agrees"?

What work does "subjectivity" do if what we mean by "subjective" is "individually one agrees"?

[Peter Holmes]

Just to tidy up and clarify my previous post.

It has been argued that claims about moral rightness and wrongness are about consistency with goals derived from axioms requiring no justification.

Axiom: Homosexuals are vermin.
Goal: Rid ourselves of vermin.
Advisory assertion: If we want to rid ourselves of vermin, then we [should/ought to/need to/must] rid ourselves of homosexuals.

This assertion is objective, because it has public truth conditions. And because it's about morality, then supposedly it's a 'moral assertion'.

Sarcasm notwithstanding, you're getting closer to understanding the argument here. But your straw-man argument above makes several mistakes.

"Homosexuals are vermin" cannot be an axiom in a moral theory, for 2 reasons. First, the axiom must express the aim or goal of the theory. Your "axiom" does not; it is merely a disparaging epithet. Secondly, axioms must be self-evident: widely, if not universally, understood and accepted as true (as you said, "requiring no justification"). Your "axiom" doesn't even have a truth value.

To clarify: "Moral" rules and principles are rules and principles governing interactions between agents in a social setting, having the aim of maximizing welfare for all agents (by reducing injuries and losses resulting from destructive interactions between agents, and fostering interactions which increase welfare for one or more agents).

The aim of a moral theory is to identify and develop those principles and rules in a systematic way (i.e., via methods that are rationally defensible).

Our thinking the axiom is morally wrong and repulsive (as I do) has no bearing on the nominal objectivity of the advisory assertion.

You're right, and that can be generalized: Agreement or disagreement with a goal has no bearing on the objectivity of any advisories proffered in support of that goal.

Our choice of a moral axiom, how ever we justify it, is subjective - a matter of opinion. And that single fact demolishes the argument for moral objectivity, ab initio.

Well, if we are able to justify it it cannot be subjective (I cannot "justify" my preference for chocolate over vanilla ice cream). And you just contradicted yourself. If Y is a moral goal, then by your own admission, advisories which demonstrably advance that goal are both moral and objective. Hence we have "moral objectivity."

You're confusing failing to share a goal with a lack of objectivity of proposed means to that goal.

You could re-state your argument above thus:

1. AXIOM: To develop rules and principles governing interactions between agents in a social setting, with the aim of ridding the world of homosexuals.
2. We ought yo kill any homosexual we encounter.
3. Etc.

But of course, the aim stated is hardly universally or widely shared, is not self-evident. Indeed, I'd argue that any rules or principles governing interactions between agents that did not have the aim I gave above would not be "moral" rules; that that aim is part of the definition of "moral." But the rules that ensue from your theory will (or can be) objective.

I conclude it's pointless to refute your argument, because you just ignore or evade the refutation. Thanks for the craic.

[Belindi]

Existential angst is wholesome as without it there would be no need to ask questions about morality and ethics.

[Sy Borg]

The answer to the question is: Agreement and acceptance by all.

In what way does that make anything objective? What work does "objectivity" do if what we mean by "objective" is "everyone agrees"?

It disappears into a cloud of whimsy because the chances of everyone agreeing on any issue are zero.

I'm not much keen about morality only being about humans either. Welfare of other species should be part of any moral equation too, but too often is treated as trivia. This is at least partly why humanity is in such a godawful mess today, due to the unacknowledged "services" provided by ecosystems, and our mistreatment of food animals is also coming back to haunt us again ... SARS, avian flu, Covid-19.

[Terrapin Station]

Egads, will you cease with the "interpretation" irrelevancies?

Interpretation is how language necessarily works.

The proposition asserts a specific fact;

The proposition is the meaning of the sentence. Meaning is per individual, it exists in individual's heads as something their brains are doing. And specifically it's the associative act an individual makes re, for example, associating "text marks" (a la pixels on a screen for example) with concepts they have in mind, or with memories, or with something they're looking at, etc.

Propositions assert things to individuals, and what they assert is determined by how an individual thinks about the proposition. Hence why interpretation is a necessary part of the equation.

it has specific truth conditions.

The truth conditions are (a) whatever the individual takes the proposition to be asserting, per the individual's subjective application of meaning, (b) whatever the individual takes to be the requirements for the proposition to match something else, and (c) the individual's judgment as to whether the proposition matches re (a) and (b)--the "matching" relation in question is also something that our brains do, and that can differ (aside from nominalistic differing, which is necessarily the case) per individual.

No "interpreting" is necessary, unless you count knowing the meanings of the words involved "interpreting."

We assign meanings. The text marks don't have meanings "on their own." Because of what meaning is, it can only occur in an individual's mind. There's no way to make the associative act obtain externally. It's not the sort of thing that falls under the property purviews of any other "substance" aside from brains.

Yes, one may draw that inference, inductively, from the proposition. But it is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of the proposition.

Not at all on my interpretation, because if it were to say "Paris is the capital of Laos," that would be false on my view because "we've got the wrong place."

[creation]

In what way does that make anything objective? What work does "objectivity" do if what we mean by "objective" is "everyone agrees"?

It disappears into a cloud of whimsy because the chances of everyone agreeing on any issue are zero.

LOL

Do human beings need air to live?

If anyone disagrees they do, then put them in a room, tell them we are going to remove the air, and show us how human beings do not need air to live. Then, ask them, Do you want to continue?

It is very possible to quickly learn and see the issues that everyone agrees on and with.

By the way, this is HOW objective morality is discovered, learned, and understood.

I'm not much keen about morality only being about humans either.

Who has even suggested morality is only being about humans?

If human being thought that morality was only about them, then this just shows the stupidity that human beings can have and are capable of.

Welfare of other species should be part of any moral equation too, but too often is treated as trivia.

Why is this being brought up after quoting what I have said.

Absolutely EVERY species is EQUAL in morality issues, well to me anyway.

This is at least partly why humanity is in such a godawful mess today, due to the unacknowledged "services" provided by ecosystems, and our mistreatment of food animals is also coming back to haunt us again ... SARS, avian flu, Covid-19.

You have, so far, really missed or misconstrued what I was saying and getting at.

[Terrapin Station]

By the way, this is HOW objective morality is discovered, learned, and understood.

So you're claiming that there actually are moral stances that everyone agrees on?

[GE Morton]

I'm not much keen about morality only being about humans either. Welfare of other species should be part of any moral equation too, but too often is treated as trivia.

Most contemporary moral philosophers do consider the welfare of (some) other species to be within the purview of moral philosophy, though they are usually deemed "moral subjects," or "moral patients," instead of "moral agents," and the duties of moral agents to them differs from those due other moral agents. They don't treat the issue as trivia.

[Sculptor1]

I'm not much keen about morality only being about humans either. Welfare of other species should be part of any moral equation too, but too often is treated as trivia.

Anyone who loves their dog knows what you mean.
It takes very little cruelty directed at dogs to get my outrage running.

https://uk.yahoo.com/news/therapy-dog-d ... 10596.html

Most mammals have the same emotional tendencies that cause humans to think about moral behaviour.
Were we lacking in those emotions I doubt we would have any interests in the welfare of others of any kind. In fact I doubt we would have any particular will to live or have purpose.

The purity of the subjectiveness is wrought large when you consider the wide ranging spectrum of which humans or animals are see to deserve moral consideration and to what degree. This varies so much historically, culturally and personally, that any case for objectivity is laughable.

[Terrapin Station]

Most contemporary moral philosophers do consider the welfare of (some) other species to be within the purview of moral philosophy

That seems like a very dubious claim. Do you have survey data to back it up?

[Terrapin Station]

Most contemporary moral philosophers do consider the welfare of (some) other species to be within the purview of moral philosophy

Ah--sorry, I misread you as saying DON'T, not "do"

[Sy Borg]

I'm not much keen about morality only being about humans either. Welfare of other species should be part of any moral equation too, but too often is treated as trivia.

Anyone who loves their dog knows what you mean.
It takes very little cruelty directed at dogs to get my outrage running.

https://uk.yahoo.com/news/therapy-dog-d ... 10596.html

Most mammals have the same emotional tendencies that cause humans to think about moral behaviour.
Were we lacking in those emotions I doubt we would have any interests in the welfare of others of any kind. In fact I doubt we would have any particular will to live or have purpose.

The purity of the subjectiveness is wrought large when you consider the wide ranging spectrum of which humans or animals are see to deserve moral consideration and to what degree. This varies so much historically, culturally and personally, that any case for objectivity is laughable.

Yes. Humans are self-obsessed. That is how so many humans can posit that a tiny piece of protoplasmic muck (aka a human embryo) is more important than any sentient, intelligent and bonded adult mammal of another species. Thus, those who speak of a "right to life" will typically speak of the sanctity of life while chomping down eat large portions of factory-farmed steak and/or pork every day.

Humans tend to see any moral system that is fair to humans as fair per se. Other sentient beings do not count, being largely treated as a moral null unless they are considered to be loveable, valuable or useful to humans.

Of course, many other social animals are similarly solipsist and ruthlessly bloody-minded, but none of those species claim to be far morally superior to all others.

I have watched toilet paper panic buying in a recent days in response to the smallest hint of a supply shock, with people walking out of shops with months of toilet rolls, ensuring that others will have none. It reminds me that human moral superiority is an illusion and delusion. We are exactly as selfish and immoral as wolves, bears and lions. Only a thin veneer of civilisation providing a sense of security stands between humans and total moral breakdown.