Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Belindi]

We need to think of ethics and aesthetics without mystifying or glorifying them.
A moral or aesthetic proposition is like any other proposition, except that there is no objective measuring device for aesthetic or moral propositions. This lack has been addressed recently when a doctor says to a patient "From one to ten how would you describe the severity of the pain?" That is not a physical measuring device and levels of pain can also be measured objectively by signs of fainting or sudden very low blood pressure, pallor and so forth.

Similarly signs of happiness can be objectively measured by behaviours including for instance levels of dopamine.

Aesthetic propositions and moral propositions have in common that they measure the relative strength of a learning opportunity. A "good" work of art embodies a cognitive opportunity. A pain and a pleasure embody an opportunity to learn from conditioned response. A living organism that cannot learn is invariably an organism that has no facility for remembering ; this is a lawlike connection.

[Kaz_1983]

It depends on how you define morality.

[Belindi]

A moral proposition is a proposition about what ought to be the case. Sometimes the 'ought ' word is omitted and the moral proposition is like "These good people took the stray cat to the cat rescue". I.e. a claim about what it might be to be good people.

Or a moral proposition might be e.g. " The authorities in China should not permit wild animals to be farmed for food".

I did think about how the original poster had been defining morality, and I guessed the message was about whether good or bad was always a subjective opinion or feeling, or if there could be any possibility there was an objective, mind-independent, basis for what is good and what is bad.

[Peter Holmes]

GEM

I've been re-reading the discussion, and one thing you said more than once needs correction.

Your criterion for what you incorrectly call the objectivity of a moral theory is the consistency of its moral assertions. But that means any moral theory can be objective. So your claim that 'vernacular' moral theories are subjective - unlike your supposedly 'sound' theory - is flatly false, by your own definition - and merely an expression of your prejudice passed off as a fact. Moral objectivism in a nutshell, come to think about it.

[Terrapin Station]

Slavery is not inconsistent with the a priori goal "Devise principles and rules governing interactions between agents in a moral field aimed at only maximizing the well-being of agents who are slaveowners."

Oh, you're quite right. Is that the goal you prefer?

No, but neither is the other goal. "Maximizing well-being" is far too vague on my view, and it's going to result in countless conflicts, because what one person considers necessary for their well-being is often directly opposed to what another person considers necessary for their well-being.

[Peter Holmes]

A moral proposition is a proposition about what ought to be the case. Sometimes the 'ought ' word is omitted and the moral proposition is like "These good people took the stray cat to the cat rescue". I.e. a claim about what it might be to be good people.

Or a moral proposition might be e.g. " The authorities in China should not permit wild animals to be farmed for food".

I did think about how the original poster had been defining morality, and I guessed the message was about whether good or bad was always a subjective opinion or feeling, or if there could be any possibility there was an objective, mind-independent, basis for what is good and what is bad.

Fair point, Belindi. And we've been using somewhat varying definitions of objectivity sometimes. Three examples are 'mind-independence', 'having public truth conditions' and 'independence from opinion'. The last is my preference, and I think what matters is the function of an assertion: to make a factual claim about reality (objective); or to express an opinion or value-judgement of some kind (subjective).

[GE Morton]

Objective morality is the same as morality that is necessarily so. 'Objective' means 'necessary'.

Well, that would be an eclectic definition of "objective."

"Objective" and "subjective" are properties of propositions, like "true" and "false." A proposition is objective if its truth conditions are public; subjective if they are private.

Moral propositions, e.g., "One ought to do (or ought not do) X" are objective if their truth conditions are public, verifiable by any suitably situated observer. "Ought" statements, whether in moral propositions or elsewhere, are instrumental, they relate to some goal, acknowledged or implied. "You ought to do X" means, "X is an effective or necessary means of accomplishing Y," with Y being the goal. Whether a given X is or is not effective or necessary for accomplishing a given Y is usually objective.

[GE Morton]

GEM

Whether we're talking about moral theories, principles, axioms, goals , codes or rules, the only things that can be objective or subjective are assertions. And assertions that express moral opinions - it is right to maximise the well-being of all agents - slavery is wrong - are subjective.

Adopting any moral theory, principle, axiom, goal, code or rule - sound or otherwise - is a choice, and is therefore subjective.

We've covered this, and I agree with respect to axioms and goals. Axioms are deemed true a priori. If a goal is set forth as the axiom of a theory, then it is accepted a priori. One may accept or reject the axioms of any theory. One may reject the axioms of Euclid's geometry. But then you'll face the task of finding other means of solving the thousands of daily problems that geometry allows us to solve.

The codes, rules, and principles that may be derived from a set of axioms, however, are objective --- they either do or do not advance the goal, either are or are not consistent with the axiom.

You can't seem to grasp that an "ought" statement can be objective whether or not the goal is objective. It can be, because the "ought" statement references the goal; it is a conditional --- "If you wish to do X, you must (or should) do Y." Propositions of that form can be true and objective.

"Objective" doesn't mean, "Agreed to by everyone," or, "true of 'external reality'," or, "From God's point of view," or anything with any metaphysical/ontological implications.

The real issue here is, "What is the aim, goal, of moral theories, moral codes, moral rules?" If you profess to interested in "morality" you have to answer that question somehow.

[GE Morton]

"Maximizing well-being" is far too vague on my view, and it's going to result in countless conflicts, because what one person considers necessary for their well-being is often directly opposed to what another person considers necessary for their well-being.

Well, your response contains the solution. What contributes to well-being indeed differs from agent to agent. Hence "Maxmimizing well-being for all" entails maximizing it for each person, as he defines it. So you need moral rules that yield that result.

[Terrapin Station]

"Maximizing well-being" is far too vague on my view, and it's going to result in countless conflicts, because what one person considers necessary for their well-being is often directly opposed to what another person considers necessary for their well-being.

Well, your response contains the solution. What contributes to well-being indeed differs from agent to agent. Hence "Maxmimizing well-being for all" entails maximizing it for each person, as he defines it. So you need moral rules that yield that result.

So for example person A experiences distress if people are smoking in enclosed public spaces they frequent. Person B experiences distress if person B isn't allowed to smoke in public spaces they frequent.

That's just a simple example, but there are a lot of situations like that where people want diametrically opposed things and where compromise either way diminishes the well being of someone.

[GE Morton]

So for example person A experiences distress if people are smoking in enclosed public spaces they frequent. Person B experiences distress if person B isn't allowed to smoke in public spaces they frequent.

Whether smoking should be allowed in any particular place is a decision for the owner of that place. If he decides smoking is allowed, then persons distressed by smoke can avoid that place. If he decides it is not allowed, smokers can avoid distress by avoiding that place.

That's just a simple example, but there are a lot of situations like that where people want diametrically opposed things and where compromise either way diminishes the well being of someone.

Er, no. Neither solution above diminishes anyone's well-being. Persons who choose to avoid that place are no worse off than than they would be if that place did not exist. A failure of someone else to improve one's well-being does not constitute a reduction in one's well-being.

[GE Morton]

PS: The owner's decision in that case is morally neutral.

[Terrapin Station]

Whether smoking should be allowed in any particular place is a decision for the owner of that place. If he decides smoking is allowed, then persons distressed by smoke can avoid that place. If he decides it is not allowed, smokers can avoid distress by avoiding that place.

Sure, that's what we do. That doesn't have anything to do with maximizing the folks-in-question's well-being, though.

Er, no. Neither solution above diminishes anyone's well-being. Persons who choose to avoid that place are no worse off than than they would be if that place did not exist.

If they're in distress about it it certainly does affect their well-being (well, as long as they don't desire to be in distress and most people do not).

[GE Morton]

Sure, that's what we do. That doesn't have anything to do with maximizing the folks-in-question's well-being, though.

Yes, it does. Since the goal is to maximize well-being for all, then maximizing it for any person is limited to means that don't diminish it for someone else. I.e., you can't improve your well-being by reducing someone else's.

If they're in distress about it it certainly does affect their well-being (well, as long as they don't desire to be in distress and most people do not).

No. We don't count subjective emotional states or responses as elements of or contributors to well-being with moral import, since those are unverifiable by third parties and are beyond anyone's control. I may be distressed because Annabelle won't marry me, but that imposes no obligation on her to say, "I do."

I can know that, say, owning a Porsche contributes to your well-being because I can observe that you invested time and effort in pursuit of that goal. I can have no idea of how much happiness that car brings you, and don't need to know that to know that I ought not steal your Porsche.

[Terrapin Station]

Yes, it does. Since the goal is to maximize well-being for all, then maximizing it for any person is limited to means that don't diminish it for someone else. I.e., you can't improve your well-being by reducing someone else's.

Which is the whole gist of pointing out that when x is distressing to S and not-x is distressing to R, we have a problem for "maximizing well-being."

It's ridiculous that I'd have to explain this again after I just explained it.