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[Peter Holmes]

The most ridiculous thing about this is that General Electric Morton claimed that we can have objective morality via there being things that are objectively required to meet some goal, but then he turns around and says that some goals wouldn't be moral, making obvious that the "moral" part of "objective morality" isn't objective at all in his view.

The way I want to put it is this.

What moral objectivists seem unable to grasp is that we're talking about wanting and choosing moral principles, goals and rules. If wanting and choosing come into it, then we're dealing with subjectivity. And which moral principles, goals and rules makes no difference. They can be what we call as rational and evidence-based as it's possible for them to be. Makes no difference.

It may be a fact that we want a moral goal, but that doesn't make the moral goal a fact.

[Belindi]

Steve wrote:

I think the only way to think of morality as objective (assuming we're not proposing the existence of a God) is to root the prescriptions in description. That is, to make observations about the evolved nature of human beings and extrapolate from those to observations of human behaviour and human desires.

That's right as far as I'm concerned: I don't believe God is a supernatural person who has ordained events. I do believe nature has 'ordained' events. Please note my startle marks.

Your second sentence describes what I am doing when I claim morality has an objective base. Nature and nature's order which despite not being as predictable as I'd like is what inductive reasoning is based on. I think of a moral aspect or attribute of an event as no more mysterious than an aesthetic aspect of an event. Many other animals have moral sense the difference being they don't codify it.

[Peter Holmes]

GE Morton

I believe you think the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong' is a fact - a true factual assertion. (If you don't, please ignore this.)

But if so, what are the public truth conditions for the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong'? What makes it an objective assertion?

Do you think the moral wrongness of slavery is a feature of reality the existence of which makes the assertion true?

If derivation from an axiom is all that makes 'slavery is morally wrong' a fact, please state which axiom is involved.

[GE Morton]

I think TS has found the real issue.

Moral objectivists claim that the assertion 'If we want goal Y, then we should do X' can be objective - which GEM defines as 'having public truth conditions' - if goal Y is what they call a moral goal. And this is by analogy with other assertions where Y is non-moral. To adapt TS's example -

If we want to get to the roof, then we [must/should/can/could] use a ladder.

Here, only 'can' and 'could' make the assertion true, because we can or could use a cherry-picker instead of a ladder. The choice of modal is critical for the truth-value of the assertion. With 'can' and 'could', the assertion is objective and has a truth-value. Modals 'must' and 'should' would have different functions here. And, given no other information, their use would render this assertion subjective, because it would then express an opinion, rather than a fact.

Yikes, many comments to address . . .

"And, given no other information, their [must, should] use would render this assertion subjective, because it would then express an opinion, rather than a fact."

Not so. The instrumental "should" or "ought" can also yield factual statements. "If you seek goal Y you should do X" means that X is necessary, or is useful, for attaining Y. Both of those assert empirically verifiable facts. Usually, "you should . . ." implies something a bit stronger than "useful" --- it suggests that X is a particularly effective method, perhaps the best method, for achieving Y. That can also be empirically verifiable.

Also, as mentioned previously, opinions and facts are not disjoint. An opinion can express a fact, making it a "true opinion."

So goal Y in this kind of conditional premise can't be objective. Objectivity can come only from the claim made in the consequent.

We've covered this, and I agree.

BTW, goals per se are neither right or wrong, good or bad, in any sense of those terms. They can only be pronounced right or wrong when, and because, they advance or conflict with some other goal adopted a priori. (Every theory, remember, including moral theories, must begin from some axioms accepted as true a priori.

[GE Morton]

GE Morton

I believe you think the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong' is a fact - a true factual assertion. (If you don't, please ignore this.)

But if so, what are the public truth conditions for the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong'? What makes it an objective assertion?

What makes it objective is the objective, logical fact that it is inconsistent with the a priori goal, "Devise principles and rules governing interactions between agents in a moral field aimed at maximizing the well-being of all agents."

Since enslaving someone conflicts with that aim, and that aim is a moral* one, slavery is morally wrong. It would not necessarily be morally wrong given some different goal.

Do you think the moral wrongness of slavery is a feature of reality the existence of which makes the assertion true?

No. "Wrongness" or "rightness" are not "features of reality," at least, as I think you understand "reality." They are simply terms applied to some act or choice to indicate that it does or does not conform to some standard. Whether it does or does not conform is usually objective.

If derivation from an axiom is all that makes 'slavery is morally wrong' a fact, please state which axiom is involved.

Given above.

* I take a "moral" goal to be one concerned with how people treat one another, and with devising principles and rules governing those interactions.

[Peter Holmes]

I think TS has found the real issue.

Moral objectivists claim that the assertion 'If we want goal Y, then we should do X' can be objective - which GEM defines as 'having public truth conditions' - if goal Y is what they call a moral goal. And this is by analogy with other assertions where Y is non-moral. To adapt TS's example -

If we want to get to the roof, then we [must/should/can/could] use a ladder.

Here, only 'can' and 'could' make the assertion true, because we can or could use a cherry-picker instead of a ladder. The choice of modal is critical for the truth-value of the assertion. With 'can' and 'could', the assertion is objective and has a truth-value. Modals 'must' and 'should' would have different functions here. And, given no other information, their use would render this assertion subjective, because it would then express an opinion, rather than a fact.

Yikes, many comments to address . . .

"And, given no other information, their [must, should] use would render this assertion subjective, because it would then express an opinion, rather than a fact."

Not so. The instrumental "should" or "ought" can also yield factual statements. "If you seek goal Y you should do X" means that X is necessary, or is useful, for attaining Y. Both of those assert empirically verifiable facts. Usually, "you should . . ." implies something a bit stronger than "useful" --- it suggests that X is a particularly effective method, perhaps the best method, for achieving Y. That can also be empirically verifiable.

What are the public truth conditions for the assertion: if we want to get to the roof, we should use a ladder? We certainly can or could use a ladder, or a cherry-picker. So why should we use a ladder?

Also, as mentioned previously, opinions and facts are not disjoint. An opinion can express a fact, making it a "true opinion."

If you mean 'in my opinion, the earth is an oblate spheroid' expresses a fact, then that's trivial. And it's the embedded assertion that has truth value. To say an opinion has truth value is a colloquialism. We need to be precise here.

So goal Y in this kind of conditional premise can't be objective. Objectivity can come only from the claim made in the consequent.

We've covered this, and I agree.

BTW, goals per se are neither right or wrong, good or bad, in any sense of those terms. They can only be pronounced right or wrong when, and because, they advance or conflict with some other goal adopted a priori. (Every theory, remember, including moral theories, must begin from some axioms accepted as true a priori.

Imprecise again. To say a goal is morally right or wrong is to express an opinion. What you mean is that goal can't be true or false, because it isn't an assertion.

A goal that advances another goal (an axiom) doesn't, for that reason, change its nature. It doesn't become true or objective, for example. And that it advances a moral axiom doesn't change the fact that its moral rightness or wrongness remains a matter of opinion - as is the moral rightness or wrongness of the axiom. There's no injection of objectivity here, how ever you try to conjure it up.

[Peter Holmes]

GEM

If the assertion 'if we want goal Y, we should do X' is equivalent to 'if we want goal Y, we can/could do X', then truth-value and objectivity are evident. And if that's all you mean by the 'instrumental' use of 'should', that would clear up one confusion.

[Terrapin Station]

What makes it objective is the objective, logical fact that it is inconsistent with the a priori goal, "Devise principles and rules governing interactions between agents in a moral field aimed at maximizing the well-being of all agents."

There are many problems with that, but I'll point this out first:

Slavery is not inconsistent with the a priori goal "Devise principles and rules governing interactions between agents in a moral field aimed at only maximizing the well-being of agents who are slaveowners."

[Peter Holmes]

GE Morton

I believe you think the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong' is a fact - a true factual assertion. (If you don't, please ignore this.)

But if so, what are the public truth conditions for the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong'? What makes it an objective assertion?

What makes it objective is the objective, logical fact that it is inconsistent with the a priori goal, "Devise principles and rules governing interactions between agents in a moral field aimed at maximizing the well-being of all agents."

Since enslaving someone conflicts with that aim, and that aim is a moral* one, slavery is morally wrong. It would not necessarily be morally wrong given some different goal.

Do you think the moral wrongness of slavery is a feature of reality the existence of which makes the assertion true?

No. "Wrongness" or "rightness" are not "features of reality," at least, as I think you understand "reality." They are simply terms applied to some act or choice to indicate that it does or does not conform to some standard. Whether it does or does not conform is usually objective.

If derivation from an axiom is all that makes 'slavery is morally wrong' a fact, please state which axiom is involved.

Given above.

* I take a "moral" goal to be one concerned with how people treat one another, and with devising principles and rules governing those interactions.

So you agree that the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong' has no public truth condition(s) in the way that, say, the assertion 'the earth is an oblate spheroid' does. And that's because the moral wrongness of slavery isn't a feature of reality, unlike the shape of the earth.

And you agree that 'moral rightness' and 'moral wrongness' are simply terms, with the cognates 'morally right' and 'morally wrong' that we can use to modify terms attributively - the morally right decision - or predicatively - slavery is morally wrong - to express a judgement, belief or opinion.

And the reason for applying those modifiers to something - such as an act or choice - is its consistency with an axiom or goal, which isn't objective, the choice of which also isn't objective - because only assertions can be objective. And that the act or choice is indeed consistent with the axiom or goal can be a matter of opinion, which also isn't objective.

So much for moral objectivity.

[GE Morton]

What are the public truth conditions for the assertion: if we want to get to the roof, we should use a ladder? We certainly can or could use a ladder, or a cherry-picker. So why should we use a ladder?

Someone who makes that statement is saying that using a ladder is an effective, or perhaps the "best," tool for reaching the roof. Why it is "best" depends on the context; it means the ladder is the easiest, cheapest, safest, quickest (etc.) available tool for that job. That claim is either true or false, and empirically determinable (it either is or is not the cheapest, safest, etc.). Note that there is an assumption underlying all such advisories: that whatever goal one wishes to pursue, he also wishes to attain it at the least cost (in time, effort, money, risk, etc.).

Also, as mentioned previously, opinions and facts are not disjoint. An opinion can express a fact, making it a "true opinion."

If you mean 'in my opinion, the earth is an oblate spheroid' expresses a fact, then that's trivial. And it's the embedded assertion that has truth value. To say an opinion has truth value is a colloquialism. We need to be precise here.

Yes, we do. When we preface proposition with, "It is my opinion that . . . ," we are making a second claim in addition to the proposition that follows. We are saying that we lack conclusive evidence to support that claim; admitting that there is a possibility that it is false. Moreover, opinions don't have to be self-styled in order to be so called. Consider:

ALFIE: "The earth is an oblate spheroid."

BRUNO: "That is your opinion."

Here is it Bruno who is saying the evidence is insufficient to support Alfie's claim.

Whether a proposition is called a "fact" or an "opinion" is a matter of whether someone, the speaker or a hearer, considers the evidence for a claim sufficient to confirm it. In any case, Alfie's claim above is either true or false, regardless of whether it is called a "fact" or an "opinion." And it remains true or false even if Alfie himself considers the evidence for it insufficient.

Of course, when someone else styles another's statement as "your opinion," he may just be saying he disagrees with it. But a third-party's characterization of it doesn't effect its truth value.

BTW, goals per se are neither right or wrong, good or bad, in any sense of those terms. They can only be pronounced right or wrong when, and because, they advance or conflict with some other goal adopted a priori. (Every theory, remember, including moral theories, must begin from some axioms accepted as true a priori.

Imprecise again. To say a goal is morally right or wrong is to express an opinion. What you mean is that goal can't be true or false, because it isn't an assertion.

I've never claimed that any goal is "morally right." Since the goal statement of a moral theory is an axiom from which what is and is not moral is to be derived, that would be question-begging. And of course the goal statement is a proposition. It states that "I (we) adopt Y as the aim, goal, of the following theory." That proposition is true if the architects of the ensuing theory produce theorems derived from and consistent with that goal.

And that it advances a moral axiom doesn't change the fact that its moral rightness or wrongness remains a matter of opinion - as is the moral rightness or wrongness of the axiom. There's no injection of objectivity here, how ever you try to conjure it up.

As I said, a moral axiom cannot be said to be "morally right or wrong" without circularity. If it is adopted it is for pragmatic reasons.

[GE Morton]

So you agree that the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong' has no public truth condition(s) in the way that, say, the assertion 'the earth is an oblate spheroid' does.

Yes, I do agree (not "in the way that"). But public truth conditions include logical deductions, as well as empirical observations. "There is no largest prime" has public truth conditions (there is a valid proof for it which anyone can confirm).

And that's because the moral wrongness of slavery isn't a feature of reality, unlike the shape of the earth.

Well, I'm pretty sure we disagree as to what constitutes "reality" (i.e., how we should understand that term) But, yes, confirming the truth of a moral claim requires a different methodology than confirming an empirical one (though the former usually require some empirical information also).

And you agree that 'moral rightness' and 'moral wrongness' are simply terms, with the cognates 'morally right' and 'morally wrong' that we can use to modify terms attributively - the morally right decision - or predicatively - slavery is morally wrong - to express a judgement, belief or opinion.

Of course. But as I said, beliefs, opinions, judgments are themselves true or false. Calling a proposition a "belief," "opinion," "judgement" has no effect on its truth value.

And that the act or choice is indeed consistent with the axiom or goal can be a matter of opinion, which also isn't objective.

Everything one may say is a "matter of opinion." But logical consistency is readily demonstrable; whether two propositions are logically consistent has public truth conditions. Hence it is objective.

[GE Morton]

Slavery is not inconsistent with the a priori goal "Devise principles and rules governing interactions between agents in a moral field aimed at only maximizing the well-being of agents who are slaveowners."

Oh, you're quite right. Is that the goal you prefer?

[GE Morton]

There is no uniquely or distinctly "moral sense" of "should," or "ought."

Sure there is and I just explained it.

Morally, we're not talking about a condition that has to be met for achieving something, but there's a colloquial way of using "should" for that.

It's a precondition of going up to the roof with a ladder that we have a ladder. So it's not uncommon to say in that situation, "You should have a ladder to go up to the roof with a ladder."

But that's not the gist of a moral normative. There's nothing moral about the "should" there. It's simply an alternate way of noting a precondition for achieving something.

Well, first, you're misstating the claim, distorting it into a tautology. "If you want to climb to that roof, you should get a ladder," is not a tautology. It is an advisory, proposing an effective, efficient, or necessary tool for accomplishing the stated goal. The question of whether that tool is or is not effective, efficient, or necessary has an empirical, objective answer.

But you're right that the ladder question is not a moral question. That is because the goal. reaching the roof, is not a moral one. Moral "oughts" are simply instrumental "oughts" wherein the goal is a moral one. Calling them "moral" is merely to denote the subject matter. Calling an act or rule or principle "morally right" is just to say it is consistent with a moral goal.

Moral normatives are rather focused on "right conduct," in a value sense of being an admirable, virtuous way to behave, where there are available options where other options would be "wrong conduct."

Whether someone admires or deems "virtuous" some act has nothing to do with whether it is morally right or wrong. Those are subjective, idiosyncratic value judgments. Whether it is right or wrong depends upon whether it is consistent with an adopted moral goal.

[GE Morton]

Whether someone admires or deems "virtuous" some act has nothing to do with whether it is morally right or wrong. Those are subjective, idiosyncratic value judgments. Whether it is right or wrong depends upon whether it is consistent with an adopted moral goal.

That is, if you're interested in a rationally defensible moral system. If you're not, then you can rely on those subjective judgments and live with the irresolvable conflicts that ensue.

[Peter Holmes]

GEM

Whether we're talking about moral theories, principles, axioms, goals , codes or rules, the only things that can be objective or subjective are assertions. And assertions that express moral opinions - it is right to maximise the well-being of all agents - slavery is wrong - are subjective.

Adopting any moral theory, principle, axiom, goal, code or rule - sound or otherwise - is a choice, and is therefore subjective.

The consistency of one subjective moral assertion with another subjective moral assertion doesn't confer objectivity on either assertion. The claim that moral assertions are consistent may be a factual assertion, with public truth conditions, and therefore objective. But that doesn't make the assertions objective.

Q: Why is slavery wrong? A: Because we want to maximise the well-being of all agents. Q: Why do we want to maximise the well-being of all agents? A: Because it's right to do so. Q: Why is it right to do so? A: It just is. It's in our moral code.

Under a different moral code, slavery would be right, as would minimising the well-being of some agents.

That people have and follow a moral code can be facts - true factual assertions - with public truth conditions, and therefore objective. But that doesn't make morality - and more precisely, moral assertions - objective.

I reckon - again - that we understand each other's positions. So I'm stopping here - though I'll follow the conversation with interest. Thanks.