Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

Well, you're right that behavior is not the same thing as "mentality." But if you want propositions concerning preferences to be cognitive --- to have determinable truth values --- then you'll use the term to refer to observable behaviors.

You take the behavior as indirect evidence of the mental state. Why doesn't that work?

Are you saying that you don't accept any indirect evidence of anything as support for claims?

[Peter Holmes]

I think the following demonstrates the absurdity of moral objectivism.

P1: If we want goal Y, then we must do X.
P2: We want goal Y.
C: Therefore we must do X.

For the sake of this argument, the nature of goal Y is irrelevant. We can insert any goal we like, moral or otherwise.

P1 and P2 may be true, in which case the argument is not only valid, but also sound.

But wanting goal Y is a matter of preference, and is therefore subjective.

The claim that we must want goal Y is a matter of opinion, and is therefore subjective.

I think there's no way around this for moral objectivists. But I may be wrong. Can anyone see a way?

[Terrapin Station]

The big problem with it, again, is that it doesn't follow that you must or that it's better to try to achieve a goal than otherwise.

Sure, many people think that, and you can even use it to define "goal" if you want, but nevertheless, it's not an objective fact that we must or should do this, or that that's how we should define goal. And plenty of people have what they'd call goals that they don't feel it's better to try to achieve. The fact that someone might refuse to call that a goal doesn't amount to it being an objective fact that it's not a goal, etc.

[Peter Holmes]

The big problem with it, again, is that it doesn't follow that you must or that it's better to try to achieve a goal than otherwise.

Sure, many people think that, and you can even use it to define "goal" if you want, but nevertheless, it's not an objective fact that we must or should do this, or that that's how we should define goal. And plenty of people have what they'd call goals that they don't feel it's better to try to achieve. The fact that someone might refuse to call that a goal doesn't amount to it being an objective fact that it's not a goal, etc.

Agreed. You're right that P1 doesn't follow. My point is that, even if it did, so that the argument is valid and sound, that still doesn't establish moral objectivity. It's 'wanting' the goal, whatever it is, that undermines the case for objectivity. But point taken.

[Peter Holmes]

Terrapin Station

As I'm sure you see, I'm trying to head off GEM's argument that modal 'must', 'should' or 'ought to' in the P1 consequent is merely instrumental, rather than moral.

Can you suggest a way of phrasing P1 to do that? Or would a note explaining the lack of entailment do - having said that this is how objectivists must or usually do formulate their argument?

[GE Morton]

If you're using 'right or wrong' non-morally, as 'factually correct/incorrect' seems to indicate, then presumably you mean 'true or false'. So you are really saying: 'opinions are true or false - so moral opinions are true or false'.

Yes.

But only factual assertions have truth-value. And only assertions can be objective - with public truth conditions.

Yes.

To say 'this act is morally wrong' is true or false - that this assertion of an opinion has public truth conditions and is therefore objective - merely begs the question. You're not showing that it does, you're flatly asserting that it does.

I'm not sure what question you think is being begged.

Your assumption seems to be that opinions, judgments, beliefs are not factual assertions (propositions). But they are. Calling them opinions, judgments, beliefs merely means the speaker acknowledges that he lacks conclusive evidence for the proposition, or someone else believes he doesn't. But he is still asserting a proposition, which is either true or false. E.g.:

"It is my opinion (belief, judgment) that slavery is wrong."

The embedded proposition is, "Slavery is wrong." That proposition is true or false. It is true if slavery conflicts with the axiom and postulates of the theory; it is false if slavery does not conflict with those postulates. Whether it conflicts or does not is a factual or logical matter, and is objective.

With any other subject matter this "right/wrong" would be understood as the instrumental, or factual, sense of those terms. E.g.,

"It is my opinion that we turned the wrong way at that last intersection."

The embedded proposition is, "We turned the wrong way at that last intersection." That proposition is true or false. It is true if the left turn leads away from our destination; it is false it leads toward the destination.

If the proposition embedded in the expression, judgment, belief is true (or false) then the opinion, judgment, belief is true (or false).

Moral judgments made in the context of a sound, rational moral theory are not expressions of personal values, emotional states, conditioned responses, cultural norms, or anything of the kind. They are claims that a certain act or practice is consistent or inconsistent with the axioms and theorems of that theory. Those claims are either true or false and are objective; they have public truth conditions.

And that says it all. I think our discussion has run its course. For me, at least, it's been salutary. Thanks.

Giving up so quickly? But I also enjoyed the dialogue. It has been more challenging than most here.

[GE Morton]

Terrapin Station

As I'm sure you see, I'm trying to head off GEM's argument that modal 'must', 'should' or 'ought to' in the P1 consequent is merely instrumental, rather than moral.

It is not an "either/or" matter. An instrumental "ought" merely means that doing X is a necessary or useful for attaining some goal. A moral "ought" is an just an instrumental "ought" when the goal is a moral one.

[GE Morton]

The big problem with it, again, is that it doesn't follow that you must or that it's better to try to achieve a goal than otherwise.

Well, I make no claim that one must try to achieve any particular goal. But if someone decides he will be better off not pursuing some goal than pursuing it, then he has abandoned that goal. It is no longer a goal for him.

The fact that someone might refuse to call that a goal doesn't amount to it being an objective fact that it's not a goal, etc.

The only "objective fact" about the meaning of the word "goal" is how the word is used by English speakers. That is as follows:

"Definition of goal
1: the end toward which effort is directed : AIM"

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/goal

An end to which no effort is directed is not a goal.

[Peter Holmes]

Following TS's just criticism of my attempt to show that moral objectivism is a mistake, here's another go.

P1: If we want goal Y, then we must do X.
P2: We want goal Y.
C: Therefore we must do X.

For the sake of this argument, the nature of goal Y is irrelevant. We can insert any goal we like, moral or otherwise.

If P1 and P2 are true, the argument is not only valid, but also sound. And negating every clause in the argument maintains its soundness.

But P1 is false, because wanting goal Y need not entail any action X.

And anyway, wanting goal Y is a matter of preference, and is therefore subjective.

The claim that we must want goal Y is a matter of opinion, and is therefore subjective.

I think there's no way around this for moral objectivists. But I may be wrong. Can anyone see a way?

[Peter Holmes]

If you're using 'right or wrong' non-morally, as 'factually correct/incorrect' seems to indicate, then presumably you mean 'true or false'. So you are really saying: 'opinions are true or false - so moral opinions are true or false'.

Yes.

But only factual assertions have truth-value. And only assertions can be objective - with public truth conditions.

Yes.

To say 'this act is morally wrong' is true or false - that this assertion of an opinion has public truth conditions and is therefore objective - merely begs the question. You're not showing that it does, you're flatly asserting that it does.

I'm not sure what question you think is being begged.

Your assumption seems to be that opinions, judgments, beliefs are not factual assertions (propositions). But they are. Calling them opinions, judgments, beliefs merely means the speaker acknowledges that he lacks conclusive evidence for the proposition, or someone else believes he doesn't. But he is still asserting a proposition, which is either true or false. E.g.:

"It is my opinion (belief, judgment) that slavery is wrong."

The embedded proposition is, "Slavery is wrong." That proposition is true or false. It is true if slavery conflicts with the axiom and postulates of the theory; it is false if slavery does not conflict with those postulates. Whether it conflicts or does not is a factual or logical matter, and is objective.

With any other subject matter this "right/wrong" would be understood as the instrumental, or factual, sense of those terms. E.g.,

"It is my opinion that we turned the wrong way at that last intersection."

The embedded proposition is, "We turned the wrong way at that last intersection." That proposition is true or false. It is true if the left turn leads away from our destination; it is false it leads toward the destination.

If the proposition embedded in the expression, judgment, belief is true (or false) then the opinion, judgment, belief is true (or false).

Moral judgments made in the context of a sound, rational moral theory are not expressions of personal values, emotional states, conditioned responses, cultural norms, or anything of the kind. They are claims that a certain act or practice is consistent or inconsistent with the axioms and theorems of that theory. Those claims are either true or false and are objective; they have public truth conditions.

And that says it all. I think our discussion has run its course. For me, at least, it's been salutary. Thanks.

Giving up so quickly? But I also enjoyed the dialogue. It has been more challenging than most here.

Not giving up, just tired of your argument.

A moral assertion such as 'slavery is wrong' is as objective as the moral axiom from which it is derived - the asserted goal or principle. And adopting an axiom is a decision which no supposed fact entails. End of story.

[GE Morton]

But P1 is false, because wanting goal Y need not entail any action X.

That is false. If Y is a goal then it does entail action. See comment to TP above, and def. of "goal."

And anyway, wanting goal Y is a matter of preference, and is therefore subjective.

The claim that we must want goal Y is a matter of opinion, and is therefore subjective.

That is true. Someone who does not share the goal for moral philosophy I cited would not be bound by the rest of the theory. Egoists, elitists, moral anarchists, et al would not be bound by it. Their conception/understanding of "morality" would bear little resemblance to that concept has it has been generally understood in the history of philosophy. The theory will be useful only to those who do share that understanding. The theorems are objective given that goal; they do or do not advance it.

[Peter Holmes]

But P1 is false, because wanting goal Y need not entail any action X.

That is false. If Y is a goal then it does entail action. See comment to TP above, and def. of "goal."

That is false, and TP has explained why. There's no point continuing on this issue.

And anyway, wanting goal Y is a matter of preference, and is therefore subjective.

The claim that we must want goal Y is a matter of opinion, and is therefore subjective.

That is true. Someone who does not share the goal for moral philosophy I cited would not be bound by the rest of the theory. Egoists, elitists, moral anarchists, et al would not be bound by it. Their conception/understanding of "morality" would bear little resemblance to that concept has it has been generally understood in the history of philosophy. The theory will be useful only to those who do share that understanding. The theorems are objective given that goal; they do or do not advance it.

Good. Agreement. But moral philosophers merely study moral values and issues. Your claim that there is 'the goal for moral philosophy' is false. But if there were an agreed goal, the claim that we must want that goal would be a matter of opinion, as you say. Again, end of story.

[Terrapin Station]

The big problem with it, again, is that it doesn't follow that you must or that it's better to try to achieve a goal than otherwise.

Well, I make no claim that one must try to achieve any particular goal. But if someone decides he will be better off not pursuing some goal than pursuing it, then he has abandoned that goal. It is no longer a goal for him.

The problem with this is that it's actually possible for the person to still think about it as a goal, but to feel that it's better off not pursuing that goal.

You can decide to just call it something different, but nevertheless, people can think about things that way.

Re the definition, if you asked thousands of people to tell you how they're using a term like "goal" you're actually going to get all sorts of different answers. But sure, some answers will be more common than others. That has no implication for anything else, though.

[Terrapin Station]

"the end toward which effort is directed"

That's not how I'd define "goal," by the way. I don't know many people who would define it that way. It would be interesting to take a few thousand people, ask them to give a definition of "goal" (where we're careful about both not giving them any context for why we're asking for the definition, and where we can ensure that they won't just look it up), and see how many actually give a definition anything like "the end toward which effort is directed."

I'd define a goal as something like, "Something I'd like to achieve, although not something I'd necessarily pursue under conditions that I don't feel are ideal for it, and where action is always tempered against other considerations."

[GE Morton]

That is false. If Y is a goal then it does entail action. See comment to TP above, and def. of "goal."

That is false, and TP has explained why. There's no point continuing on this issue.

TP's "explanation" derives from a failure to understand what a goal is, and what it implies --- namely, that one makes some efforts to secure it. If Alfie makes no efforts to secure X, then X is not a goal for him. See the dictionary definition. Are you agreeing with TP that a goal is "something in someone's head"? If not, how would you determine whether X is a goal for Alfie, other than by observing his behavior?

Your claim that there is 'the goal for moral philosophy' is false. But if there were an agreed goal, the claim that we must want that goal would be a matter of opinion, as you say. Again, end of story.

I haven't claimed that anyone "must want" that or any other goal. The theory is intended for those who think it a worthy one, and the impetus of most moral codes historically. As I said, egoists ("The right thing to do is whatever benefits me"), elitists ("The right thing do do is whatever benefits my tribe/ethnic group/social circle"), mystics ("The right thing to do is whatever the gods command, as determined by us shamans") amoralists ("If it feels good, do it") will have no use for it.