Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Sy Borg]

I highlight the statement in bold because it is so obviously wrong. There may be near-universal agreement amongst southern American evangelist Christian moral philosophers, or between New York secular atheist moral philosophers, but the disagreements are profound. And that's just the US.

You're claiming that the statement you highlighted describes only the views of Christian moral philosophers and atheist moral philosophers? In the West, who is left? Jewish moral philosophers?

Perhaps you can cite some moral philosophers who do not consider how people treat one another to be the main concern of moral philosophy.

That was a weird reframe. Stick to the point.

These various groups adhere to different morals. It is that simple. And they disagree on what constitutes good treatment.

And that's just two groups. Note that theists famously disgree with other theists about just about everything, and atheists are certainly not of one mind either. You will NEVER find an objective moral philosophy unless you can find a way of removing about 7,767,700,000 people - and even then you can be sure that the meagre remainder would disagree about who should have the biggest share of scavenged carcasses!

[Terrapin Station]

Oh, you're right. No preferences are objective. That Alfie does prefer X to Y, however, is objective, and that he will be better off by attaining X than Y is also objective.

lol --"better" IS a preference. X is only better than y if S ("better" is always to someone) prefers x to y, or at least prefers some upshot of x to some upshot of y. So, no, there is no objective "better" for anything.

It does if the goal of the "shoulds" and "oughts" in question is promoting human well-being.

There isn't anything that's objectively human well-being. Someone could think that humans are better off diseased, dead, etc.--and certainly some people do think such things.

If it isn't, if your goal is perhaps punishing or depriving or tormenting him, then he should not be allowed to realize his desires.

This is amounting to you wanting to think that your personal preferences are objective. How novel.

What you should or should not do depends on the goal you have in mind.

No objectively. There's no extramental fact that is or amounts to "one should (try to) achieve one's goals."

Whatever that may be, whether one ought or ought not do X is objective --- X either will or will not advance you toward that goal.

Again, no, because there's no extramental fact that is or amounts to "one should (try to) achieve one's goals." You'd have to try to argue how that obtains extramentally.

That's a subjective fact in my terminology. It's a fact about Alfie's mind.

No. It is a conclusion drawn from his observable behavior. If I see Alfie ordering a chocolate ice cream cone at Baskin-Robbins, I'll conclude he prefers chocolate to vanilla or Rocky Road, at least on that occasion. I need know nothing about what's going on in his head.
[/quote]
Preferences are mental states. Behavior is never identical to a mental state. So it's a fact about Aflie's mind, regardless of what methodology you might use to guesstimate what's going on in Alfie's mind.

Sorry, but it is.

"Is to" isn't actually a philosophical argument.

If Alfie considers himself better off with a chocolate ice cream cone than a vanilla one, then he is better off.

No objectively, lol. It's an objective fact in that case that he says he considers himself better off (and it can very well be a subjective fact that he considers himself better off). It's not an objective fact that he IS better off, without the "He says he considers himself" attached. "He is/is not better off is an objective fact" is a category error.

His well-being depends only upon satisfaction of his interests and desires,

Again, there's nothing that objectively counts as well being. Otherwise show me the extramental facts that amount to that.

and that he considers himself better off with chocolate is evident from his behavior. Anyone else's opinion of whether he is better off are irrelevant.

"Anyone else's opinion is irrelevant" is merely a subjective opinion. That's not an objective fact either.

All you're doing is the old shtick of psychologically projecting your preferences onto the world at large and thinking they're objective for that.

That's the same thing you do with meanings, etc.

[GE Morton]

It's not confusing to me. I think you are better off if you are happier, and that gaining material things or meeting external goals is a very shallow pursuit that brings little lasting happiness.

That may well be true for you, but it is obviously not true for everyone. What yields happiness is subjective, idiosyncratic, and unpredictable from person to person.

The world, and even a bastion of philosophy like this, is filled with people who apply logic in pursuit of these goals, yet take no time to become emotionally educated, or to consider if the goals fulfill them or not.

Well, logic is useful, if not essential, in the pursuit of any goal, whatever it may be. But it won't tell you whether attaining a given goal will deliver the happiness you may anticipate. Only attaining it will tell you that.

I confess I have no idea what "emotional education" might involve.

[chewybrian]

I confess I have no idea what "emotional education" might involve.

The easiest way I can describe it is to mention the dichotomy of cognition from Maslow. There are two ways to perceive the world (according to him). The first is 'deficiency cognition', meaning perceiving the world by means of what you want and do not have. In this mode, you are focused on your target, and experience is just a sort of byproduct of your effort to secure the thing you want--money, power, whatever. In that mode, you might see others as tools or obstacles to be overcome in your quest to get what you want.

The other mode is 'being cognition'. In this mode, you are striving to experience things fully and enjoy your life. Others are then seen as fellow travelers, or sources of insight or happiness. Your goal is to enjoy everything and everyone you encounter to the greatest extent possible, to learn and to grow. Accumulating stuff may be a byproduct of this goal, and you might even do better in the end, but the stuff is the means, not the end.

I guess what I am getting at is that we give people all kinds of information and tools to follow the deficiency mode, yet offer little to allow them to find tranquility or happiness. A little psychology or philosophy along with the other subjects in school might go a long way toward making people happier. I consider the being cognition mode a better way to live, and a good and happy life as a superior goal to getting rich.

[GE Morton]

Perhaps you can cite some moral philosophers who do not consider how people treat one another to be the main concern of moral philosophy.

These various groups adhere to different morals. It is that simple. And they disagree on what constitutes good treatment.

Yes, they do. But (if you'll recall) the issue here was whether central concern of morality, historically, has been how people treat one another (as I said in the quote above). Not whether different people have offered different answers to that question.

Note that theists famously disgree with other theists about just about everything, and atheists are certainly not of one mind either. You will NEVER find an objective moral philosophy unless you can find a way of removing about 7,767,700,000 people - and even then you can be sure that the meagre remainder would disagree about who should have the biggest share of scavenged carcasses!

Well, you seem to think an objective moral philosophy entails agreement among some group of people. It doesn't. "Objective" is a property of propositions. A proposition is objective if its truth conditions are public; who, or how many, may agree with it is irrelevant. The same criterion applies to moral propositions as to any other propositions.

[GE Morton]

Oh? In what way? Sophistry is an invalid argument, usually a subtle one, that aims to deceive. Yes, a principle or rule formulated to further some purpose takes on the name of that purpose. This quite conventional --- laws aimed to improve traffic flow and safety are "traffic laws." Rules adopted to govern the game of baseball are "baseball rules." Etc. Rules aimed at accomplishing some moral goal are "moral rules." Where do you see deception in that?

The deception is in your slippery use of terms. Rules are commands, which are not factual, and have no truth-value. To call a rule 'objective' is a simple misuse of the word 'objective', which, as you say, properly refers to assertions.

Rules are not necessarily commands. More often than not they're reports of regularities, guidelines based on known regularities, or suggestions of methods or procedures known to work (such as rules in mathematics for solving various types of equations). Moreover, I unpacked "moral rules" earlier --- the rule, "One ought not murder," means that murdering conflicts with the goal of advancing everyone's welfare. Every "moral rule" can be restated as a proposition of that form. If that proposition is objective, so is the rule. The "oughts" are instrumental "oughts" --- claims that doing X advances or impedes attainment of a given goal. Such claims all have truth values and are (usually) objective.

There is no "slippery use of terms." The above use of "rule" is commonplace. Your objection is fussy and contrived, based on an irrelevant meaning of "rule."

[GE Morton]

Peter Holmes wrote:

Love is an emotion too, Belindi. Sometimes love can override fear, sometimes fear overrides love. No one is free from emotions, but everyone is free to act or not act on them.

Love is not an emotion it's a set of motivations, intentions, and behaviours. Love is invariably present unless fear has banished it.

I'm sure Peter Homes will forgive you for attributing my comment to him.

I don't think many psychologists or neurologists would agree with you that love is not an emotion. Nor would Aristotle, Darwin, or most other investigators of emotions. It can, indeed, arouse motivations, intentions, behaviors, but so can any of the other emotions. Nor would they likely agree that love is invariably present in all people, and certainly not at all times. What is your evidence for that claim?

You seem to be trying to elevate that emotion into something transcendental, even "holy." But it is just one of the poorly understood neurochemical complexes that instigate or modify our behaviors.

[Sy Borg]

Well, you seem to think an objective moral philosophy entails agreement among some group of people. It doesn't. "Objective" is a property of propositions. A proposition is objective if its truth conditions are public; who, or how many, may agree with it is irrelevant. The same criterion applies to moral propositions as to any other propositions.

No. You are confusing morality with physical science.

Morality is entirely about agreement between people, generally the most powerful and influential, formally or informally. By contrast, objective physical experiments are unaffected by opinion.

Go on, point out a single case or experiment that proves morality is objective. Of course, that's a rhetorical challenge because you obviously cannot find such things. It would be akin to trying to prove that the taste of ice cream is objective.

[GE Morton]

Oh, you're right. No preferences are objective. That Alfie does prefer X to Y, however, is objective, and that he will be better off by attaining X than Y is also objective.

lol --"better" IS a preference. X is only better than y if S ("better" is always to someone) prefers x to y, or at least prefers some upshot of x to some upshot of y. So, no, there is no objective "better" for anything.

You've just affirmed, not refuted, my claim. You say, " X is only better than y if S ("better" is always to someone) prefers x to y . . ." But we've already stipulated that S prefers X to Y. Hence S is better off with X than with Y --- by your own analysis. And that he is better off is objective, since that he prefers X to Y is objective (we know that from his behavior). Or are you claiming that "S prefers X to Y" is NOT objective?

There isn't anything that's objectively human well-being. Someone could think that humans are better off diseased, dead, etc.--and certainly some people do think such things.

I've defined "human well-being" as "satisfaction of one's desires, fulfillment of one's goals, pursuit of one's interests." I.e., what Alfie counts as contributing to his well-being is what DOES contribute to it. What anyone else may consider to contribute to it is irrelevant. Alfie doesn't care what you might think contributes to his well-being, UNLESS he values your opinion on that matter. Which he likely doesn't. His efforts are directed to improving his well-being as he defines, not how anyone else may presume to define it. We can know what will improve his well-being by observing his behavior --- to what ends he devotes his time, efforts, other resources. Those facts are objective.

Enough.

[Belindi]

Regarding my remarks about the meaning of love GEMorton wrote:

You seem to be trying to elevate that emotion into something transcendental, even "holy." But it is just one of the poorly understood neurochemical complexes that instigate or modify our behaviors.

You seem to use 'love' in the sense of an abundance of liking or pleasure-giving, or even sexual arousal.
True, most people do so and those are everyday usages of 'love'.

Do you believe people who are stupid, angry, malevolent, jealous, willfully ignorant,greedy, and so forth are as whole as people who are none of these ?

On an anatomical level, it can be shown the source for the modulation of both pain and pleasure originates from neurons in the same locations, including the amygdala, the pallidum, and the nucleus accumbens. Not only have Leknes and Tracey, two leading neuroscientists in the study of pain and pleasure, concluded that pain and reward processing involve many of the same regions of the brain, but also that the functional relationship lies in that pain decreases pleasure and rewards increase analgesia, which is the relief from pain.

These basic poles of the pleasure/pain continuum would remain the only affects but for cognitive processes of the neurocortex which refine those basic affects according to our experiences , and beliefs about people and events.Thus anger, jealousy and so forth are cognitive refinements of relative lack of dopamine or opiods.

[Peter Holmes]

GE Morton

To clarify terminology: you say that, properly speaking, only assertions are objective or subjective.

If so, it follows that moral principles, goals and rules - and morality itself – are not (properly speaking) objective or subjective – because none of those is an assertion. No principles, goals or rules of any kind are objective or subjective.

Given that, my OP question, ‘What could make morality objective?’ makes a category error. Properly speaking, nothing could make morality either objective or subjective.

But if we’re sticking to assertions only, then my question is: ‘What could make a moral assertion objective?’ (And I regret the assumption that my OP was asking that specific question. My bad.)

Given that, I’ve tried to clarify your argument as follows, using what I take to be your definition of the word objective.

P1 An objective assertion has public truth conditions. (Definition.)

P2 An assertion about morality is a moral assertion. (Definition.)

P3 An assertion about morality could have public truth conditions.

P4 A moral assertion could have public truth conditions. (From P2 and P3.)

C Therefore, a moral assertion could be objective.

Does this fairly represent your argument? If not, please could you re-formulate it so that it does?

[Peter Holmes]

GE Morton

I appreciate there are oher ways of formulating the argument, assuming an assertion about morality is a moral assertion. For example:

P1 If a moral assertion has public truth conditions, then it is objective.

P2 A moral assertion could have public truth conditions.

C Therefore, a moral assertion could be objective.

[GE Morton]

Do you believe people who are stupid, angry, malevolent, jealous, willfully ignorant,greedy, and so forth are as whole as people who are none of these ?

I can't make out your question there. You seem to be asking whether people who are X are not X.

??

On an anatomical level, it can be shown the source for the modulation of both pain and pleasure originates from neurons in the same locations, including the amygdala, the pallidum, and the nucleus accumbens. Not only have Leknes and Tracey, two leading neuroscientists in the study of pain and pleasure, concluded that pain and reward processing involve many of the same regions of the brain, but also that the functional relationship lies in that pain decreases pleasure and rewards increase analgesia, which is the relief from pain.

These basic poles of the pleasure/pain continuum would remain the only affects but for cognitive processes of the neurocortex which refine those basic affects according to our experiences , and beliefs about people and events.Thus anger, jealousy and so forth are cognitive refinements of relative lack of dopamine or opiods.

That is possible, but those "cognitive processes" are a black box. Experiences surely play into them, but so will various biochemical and neuro-structural factors. And I'm not sure what this has to do with love.

[GE Morton]

No. You are confusing morality with physical science.

I didn't say "morality" was objective. I said that a sound moral theory will be objective. Vernacular moralities --- the various moralities embraced by various people at various times and places --- are anything but objective. The aim is to replace those with one that is rationally defensible --- one that is coherent, internally consistent and consistent with known facts regarding human nature and the nature of human societies. That morality will be objective. Developing it is the job of moral philosophy.

Humans over the centuries also concocted many vernacular cosmologies ("turtles all the way down") just as irrational, even nonsensical, as most vernacular moralities. Moral philosophers need to do for morality what natural philosophers have done for cosmology.

[GE Morton]

GE Morton

To clarify terminology: you say that, properly speaking, only assertions are objective or subjective.

Well, this may be a quibble, but I claimed that propositions are objective or subjective; that those are properties of propositions. I use "assertion" to denote a specific utterance made by a specific person at a specific time and place. But two or more assertions made by different people at different times, even in different languages, may express the same proposition (assert the same state of affairs). "Snow is white" and "Der schnee ist weiss" are two different assertions of the same proposition.

If so, it follows that moral principles, goals and rules - and morality itself – are not (properly speaking) objective or subjective – because none of those is an assertion. No principles, goals or rules of any kind are objective or subjective.

Moral principles and rules do express propositions --- that doing X conflicts with, or furthers, a moral goal. Whether it does or not is (usually) objective. If one shares that goal, then one ought or ought not do X (because, by hypothesis, one seeks to attain that goal). "Morality" is a system of moral principles and rules. It is objective if all of its principles and rules are objective.

Given that, I’ve tried to clarify your argument as follows, using what I take to be your definition of the word objective.

P1 An objective assertion has public truth conditions. (Definition.)

P2 An assertion about morality is a moral assertion. (Definition.)

P3 An assertion about morality could have public truth conditions.

P4 A moral assertion could have public truth conditions. (From P2 and P3.)

C Therefore, a moral assertion could be objective.

Does this fairly represent your argument? If not, please could you re-formulate it so that it does?

Yes, keeping in mind the quibble about assertions and propositions.