Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

The definitions state the accepted, understood meanings.

Definitions are the text or sound strings that we correlate with meanings. Meanings consist of the mental act of making associations where something like a text string implies or suggests an association with something else. That association doesn't occur anywhere but in minds. So no, it doesn't make ontological sense to say that definitions are meanings.

If someone attaches some different meaning to a common word he will have a hard time communicating.

We haven't the faintest idea what meaning anyone else is associating with terms, sounds, gestures, etc. That doesn't matter. We go by observables instead.

People can give very idiosyncratic definitions of terms. That's no barrier to communicating as long as they have the capability of understanding and remembering that someone else is using a term in a different way. For example, I can understand and remember the ways that you use terms differently than I do. So no communication problem on my end.

That amounts to learning a new language. But if someone is creating a new language by assigning new meanings to words with existing, universally understood meanings I'd assume he has some sophistic purpose in mind, and wouldn't bother.

Basically, "I'm not really interested enough in other people to bother with such things" and/or "I'm too lazy/intellectually sluggish to bother with such things."

Of course, the history of philosophy is littered with people who used words in highly idiosyncratic ways, so this would suggest that you've not been very interested in learning the history of philosophy in any depth.

[GE Morton]

That is absurd. A goal is something one desires to pursue. If pursuing X it is not better than not pursuing it, then X is no longer a goal. Similarly, if one desires X, then securing X is better than not securing it. If it isn't, then one no longer desires X.

What you're talking about here is the way that an individual can feel about pursuing things, about whether they should pursue things when they have a goal, etc.

You're not getting it. One may wonder whether he should pursue a particular X to secure Y (because he is unsure whether X will get him any closer to Y), but if he is wondering whether he should pursue Y then he is wondering whether he should abandon that as a goal. As long as it remains his goal, then he will be better off by pursuing it. Being "better off" just means that more of one's goals and desires are fulfilled.

"A way that an individual feels" isn't "an objective fact."

True. But that Alfie considers Y to be a worthy goal is an objective fact, and that he will be better off having secured it is also an objective fact. His feelings are subjective; that he has them is objective.

[GE Morton]

The definitions state the accepted, understood meanings.

Definitions are the text or sound strings that we correlate with meanings. Meanings consist of the mental act of making associations where something like a text string implies or suggests an association with something else. That association doesn't occur anywhere but in minds. So no, it doesn't make ontological sense to say that definitions are meanings.

I didn't say, "Definitions are meanings." I said, "Defintitions state meanings. Just as "Paris is the capital of France" states that Paris is the capital of France. Where the association between a word and its meaning occurs is irrelevant to what that meaning is. Definitions state those meanings, and one can point to the things that are the meanings (of most concrete nouns and verbs).

We haven't the faintest idea what meaning anyone else is associating with terms, sounds, gestures, etc. That doesn't matter. We go by observables instead.

Of course we know that. If Alfie points to a dog when presented with the word "dog," then we know he associates that word with that object. We know nothing about what is in his head, and don't care.

This is going in circles, TP. Your conception of meanings results in a reductio ad absurdum, which you can't seem to grasp.

[GE Morton]

PS: And, yes, it is an objective fact. It is a logical truth, and all logical truths are objective.

Logic is a way that individuals think about implicational relations. It's not something found in the world outside of thinking.

So no, that's not objective.

Heh. Well, no propositions, no communication, no arguments, no science or philosophy is found "outside the world of thinking." If that is what "objective" requires for you, then nothing is objective, and you've rendered the term useless. You have a facility for absurdities of that sort.

[Peter Holmes]

,

Thanks. I must apologise for misunderstanding your argument. Your fire and gosoline example explains what you mean by 'ought':

If one wishes to put out a fire, one ought not pour gasoline on it.

This is a factual assertion, not an obligation, nor a value-judgement - least of all a moral claim. The word 'ought' here has none of the significance I'd been assuming. In effect, it means 'must'.

Not necessarily "must" (though in the fire example it does mean "must"). The instrumental sense of "ought" just means that doing X is an effective, or perhaps necessary, means of attaining Y. So, "You ought to do X" just means "Doing X will get you closer to Y." "You ought not do X" means, "Doing X will hamper or prevent your attainment of Y." All of those claims can be objective.

And of course I agree those are "factual assertions, not obligations or value-judgments." But they are moral claims, if the goal is a moral one.

Okay. Your claim is: a factual assertion whose purpose is to achieve a moral goal (which is subjective) is a moral assertion - so that 'Doing X will get you closer to Y' can be a moral assertion. But this is sophistry.

A moral assertion expresses a judgement about the moral rightness or wrongness of an action, and is therefore subjective. Examples might be:
'Y is morally good,' and 'It's morally right to do X in order to get closer to Y'. These are not factual assertions.

The factual assertion that doing X will get you closer to Y, which is objective and so true or false, has no moral implication - no expression of value whatsoever. To call it a moral assertion is false.

There is nothing epistemologically "special," and certainly nothing esoteric, about "moral" propositions, moral principles or rules. I take "morality" to be, simply, the inquiry into finding workable, effective principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, with the aim of maximizing the welfare of all. Principles and rules having that aim are "moral" principles and rules.

But that we should or ought to to do these things and have this goal - those are the moral issues - the matters of judgement. And moral and ethical debate is usually about them - not so much the practical, factual matters you think constitute moral theory and enquiry. What you're talking about is public or social policy - or legislation and law.

The exercise is analogous to devising a workable, effective set of principles and rules governing a highway system, with the aim of assuring that all drivers reach their destinations quickly and safely. Those principles and rules are "traffic rules." There is nothing mystical, or even mysterious, about either, and in both cases whether the principles do or do not advance their goals is an empirical question with objective answers.

I don't know why you think anyone believes morality is esoteric, mystical or mysterious. What straw man do you have in mind?

And, pari passu with 'if one wishes to preserve and advance the welfare of all agents, one ought not to kill people'. (Murder is unlawful killing, which introduces issues that beg the question.)

More broadly, "murder" means "unjustified killing." One may still commit murder even if there are no laws. A moral theory will need to spell out when killing is and is not justified.

And those will be matters of judgement, belief or opinion, and so subjective. Morality is not objective.

[Terrapin Station]

You're not getting it. One may wonder whether he should pursue a particular X to secure Y (because he is unsure whether X will get him any closer to Y), but if he is wondering whether he should pursue Y then he is wondering whether he should abandon that as a goal. As long as it remains his goal, then he will be better off by pursuing it. Being "better off" just means that more of one's goals and desires are fulfilled.

Nope. You're not getting it. It's not preferable in any objective way, so that it supports a normative, to have one's goals and desires fulfilled rather than to not have them fulfilled. An individual may very well prefer to have their goals and desires fulfilled, but that doesn't make it an objective fact that they should have them fulfilled.

We can say that it's an objective fact that x will fulfill goal y, but that doesn't lend itself to saying that it's an objective fact that one should do x.

True. But that Alfie considers Y to be a worthy goal is an objective fact,

That's a subjective fact in my terminology. It's a fact about Alfie's mind.

and that he will be better off having secured it is also an objective fact. His feelings are subjective; that he has them is objective.

He would only be better off in someone's opinion. It can't be an objective fact (that is, it can't obtain extramentally) that anyone is "better off" or that anything is better than anything else.

[Belindi]

GEMorton wrote:

Love is the default, and mercy, pity, and peace are love-based reactions to circumstances.

When I say "love is the default" I mean the more loving individuals have the choice to be fearful and have the choice to be loving. Those who choose fear are unfree as they lack that choice but must react from fear.

"Choose fear?" If they have a choice, then they are free, are they not? But it sounds like you're saying that some people have free will, others don't. A tough position to defend, I suspect.

Reacting to an emotion is unfree. Love is more free because love must include taking courage, care, and trouble to acquire knowledge and best judgement .
It's not that some have Free Will while other don't, but that some are more free than others because those who are more free are can love i.e. they can take courage, care and trouble to control their fear reactions and act from reason.

[chewybrian]

You're not getting it. One may wonder whether he should pursue a particular X to secure Y (because he is unsure whether X will get him any closer to Y), but if he is wondering whether he should pursue Y then he is wondering whether he should abandon that as a goal. As long as it remains his goal, then he will be better off by pursuing it. Being "better off" just means that more of one's goals and desires are fulfilled.

Then why do so many lottery winners crash and burn? Aren't they able to reach many more of their goals and fulfill more of their desires? But, most people don't really even know what they want, as much as what they DON"T want. They had a scapegoat when the man was holding them down, and they knew that everything would be great if they could just break out of that rent trap and quit living paycheck to paycheck. But, they had no real idea of how to be happy, just an excuse of why they were not happy. Then, they realize, when given the chance, that they don't even know what, if anything, would make them happy. They have to take the blame for their unhappiness, which makes them even more unhappy.

They were free when they thought they were not, and they are still free after the big win, but they are not equipped to handle the freedom. I doubt many people would be happier by having their goals fulfilled, unless they really had their act together before the fulfillment. If your goals were to be a good person, help others and such, then maybe...

[GE Morton]

Okay. Your claim is: a factual assertion whose purpose is to achieve a moral goal (which is subjective) is a moral assertion - so that 'Doing X will get you closer to Y' can be a moral assertion. But this is sophistry.

Oh? In what way? Sophistry is an invalid argument, usually a subtle one, that aims to deceive. Yes, a principle or rule formulated to further some purpose takes on the name of that purpose. This quite conventional --- laws aimed to improve traffic flow and safety are "traffic laws." Rules adopted to govern the game of baseball are "baseball rules." Etc. Rules aimed at accomplishing some moral goal are "moral rules." Where do you see deception in that?

A moral assertion expresses a judgement about the moral rightness or wrongness of an action, and is therefore subjective. Examples might be:
'Y is morally good,' and 'It's morally right to do X in order to get closer to Y'. These are not factual assertions.

Well, first, "morally good" is a confusion. "Good" and "bad" may express approval or disapproval of an action (and are thus subjective), but they don't determine, or express, the rightness of wrongness of an action, which is objective. An act is morally right if it is consistent with a moral goal; a rule is morally right if it advances a moral goal. Whether they are or not is is objective.

Judgments, BTW are not true or false, objective or subjective. Judgments are "mental" acts, or events --- the act of interpreting and evaluating some state of affairs, or perhaps some argument or statement. It is the proposition expressed in a judgment that is subjective or objective. If I say, "It is my judgment that Trump is a liar," I'm saying two things: that I've evaluated his statements and concluded he is a liar, and that he is a liar. The former is a report on an action of mine; it is subjective, though it may be true, but the latter is objective.

All evaluations of states of affairs involve judgments. A moral judgment is a judgment that some act violates or complies with some moral rule. But that someone judges an act (morally) right or wrong doesn't entail that it is right or wrong. It is only right or wrong if it furthers or thwarts a moral goal, and whether it does or not is objective.

The factual assertion that doing X will get you closer to Y, which is objective and so true or false, has no moral implication - no expression of value whatsoever. To call it a moral assertion is false.

Well, Peter, X and Y there are variables, place-holders. Whether Y has moral implications depends upon what substantive is substituted for Y. If Y is a moral goal, then it, and X, have moral implications.

There is nothing epistemologically "special," and certainly nothing esoteric, about "moral" propositions, moral principles or rules. I take "morality" to be, simply, the inquiry into finding workable, effective principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, with the aim of maximizing the welfare of all. Principles and rules having that aim are "moral" principles and rules.

But that we should or ought to to do these things and have this goal - those are the moral issues - the matters of judgement. And moral and ethical debate is usually about them - not so much the practical, factual matters you think constitute moral theory and enquiry. What you're talking about is public or social policy - or legislation and law.

Well, the question of whether we "ought" to adopt that goal is not a moral one, but a pragmatic one. Nor do I agree that ethical debate is "usually about them" (goals). It is usually about what principles and rules hold the most promise of attaining that goal. But I make no claim that we "should" or "ought" adopt that goal. I make no argument intended to persuade anyone to adopt it. I take it as obvious that, historically, the aim of anything we're willing to call a "moral code" has been to secure and advance human well-being. And I take it as self-evident that some principles and rules governing human interactions are necessary for that goal to be attained. Those principles and rules can, of course, result in laws and public policies. But the moral questions need to be answered before any such laws or policies are adopted. Laws and public policies are as capable, and as likely, to be immoral as moral.

So if you disagree with that goal, think it not worth pursuing, then you'll either have a very different conception of what morality is, or no interest in a moral code and no need for one.

More broadly, "murder" means "unjustified killing." One may still commit murder even if there are no laws. A moral theory will need to spell out when killing is and is not justified.

And those will be matters of judgement, belief or opinion, and so subjective. Morality is not objective.

Every matter is one of judgment and opinion. But some are also matters of fact. (See above).

[GE Morton]

GEMorton wrote:

"Choose fear?" If they have a choice, then they are free, are they not? But it sounds like you're saying that some people have free will, others don't. A tough position to defend, I suspect.

Reacting to an emotion is unfree. Love is more free because love must include taking courage, care, and trouble to acquire knowledge and best judgement .
It's not that some have Free Will while other don't, but that some are more free than others because those who are more free are can love i.e. they can take courage, care and trouble to control their fear reactions and act from reason.

Love is an emotion too, Belindi. Sometimes love can override fear, sometimes fear overrides love. No one is free from emotions, but everyone is free to act or not act on them.

[GE Morton]

Nope. You're not getting it. It's not preferable in any objective way . . .

Oh, you're right. No preferences are objective. That Alfie does prefer X to Y, however, is objective, and that he will be better off by attaining X than Y is also objective.

. . . so that it supports a normative, to have one's goals and desires fulfilled rather than to not have them fulfilled. An individual may very well prefer to have their goals and desires fulfilled, but that doesn't make it an objective fact that they should have them fulfilled.

It does if the goal of the "shoulds" and "oughts" in question is promoting human well-being. If it isn't, if your goal is perhaps punishing or depriving or tormenting him, then he should not be allowed to realize his desires. What you should or should not do depends on the goal you have in mind. Whatever that may be, whether one ought or ought not do X is objective --- X either will or will not advance you toward that goal.

True. But that Alfie considers Y to be a worthy goal is an objective fact,

That's a subjective fact in my terminology. It's a fact about Alfie's mind.

No. It is a conclusion drawn from his observable behavior. If I see Alfie ordering a chocolate ice cream cone at Baskin-Robbins, I'll conclude he prefers chocolate to vanilla or Rocky Road, at least on that occasion. I need know nothing about what's going on in his head.

He would only be better off in someone's opinion. It can't be an objective fact (that is, it can't obtain extramentally) that anyone is "better off" or that anything is better than anything else.

Sorry, but it is. If Alfie considers himself better off with a chocolate ice cream cone than a vanilla one, then he is better off. His well-being depends only upon satisfaction of his interests and desires, and that he considers himself better off with chocolate is evident from his behavior. Anyone else's opinion of whether he is better off are irrelevant.

[GE Morton]

You're not getting it. One may wonder whether he should pursue a particular X to secure Y (because he is unsure whether X will get him any closer to Y), but if he is wondering whether he should pursue Y then he is wondering whether he should abandon that as a goal. As long as it remains his goal, then he will be better off by pursuing it. Being "better off" just means that more of one's goals and desires are fulfilled.

Then why do so many lottery winners crash and burn? Aren't they able to reach many more of their goals and fulfill more of their desires? But, most people don't really even know what they want, as much as what they DON"T want. They had a scapegoat when the man was holding them down, and they knew that everything would be great if they could just break out of that rent trap and quit living paycheck to paycheck. But, they had no real idea of how to be happy, just an excuse of why they were not happy. Then, they realize, when given the chance, that they don't even know what, if anything, would make them happy. They have to take the blame for their unhappiness, which makes them even more unhappy.

They were free when they thought they were not, and they are still free after the big win, but they are not equipped to handle the freedom. I doubt many people would be happier by having their goals fulfilled, unless they really had their act together before the fulfillment. If your goals were to be a good person, help others and such, then maybe...

What you say is largely true, but you're confusing being happier with being better off. I'm quite sure those unhappy lottery winners would agree they are better off after the win. People can indeed be mistaken about how much satisfaction attaining a goal will actually yield. But unless it yields no satisfaction they are better off, and had they not pursued it they would not have learned how overrated it was.

[Peter Holmes]

Okay. Your claim is: a factual assertion whose purpose is to achieve a moral goal (which is subjective) is a moral assertion - so that 'Doing X will get you closer to Y' can be a moral assertion. But this is sophistry.

Oh? In what way? Sophistry is an invalid argument, usually a subtle one, that aims to deceive. Yes, a principle or rule formulated to further some purpose takes on the name of that purpose. This quite conventional --- laws aimed to improve traffic flow and safety are "traffic laws." Rules adopted to govern the game of baseball are "baseball rules." Etc. Rules aimed at accomplishing some moral goal are "moral rules." Where do you see deception in that?

The deception is in your slippery use of terms. Rules are commands, which are not factual, and have no truth-value. To call a rule 'objective' is a simple misuse of the word 'objective', which, as you say, properly refers to assertions. That a rule exists may be a fact, of course, but that doesn't make the rule objective. And it follows that rules aimed at establishing any goal, including a moral goal, are not objective. They're just rules. Call them 'moral rules' if you wish, but please don't pretend that their existence means that moral assertions are objective. That's sophistry.

I have more to say about the terminological tangle you're peddling, but I have no time at the moment.

[chewybrian]

Then why do so many lottery winners crash and burn? Aren't they able to reach many more of their goals and fulfill more of their desires? But, most people don't really even know what they want, as much as what they DON"T want. They had a scapegoat when the man was holding them down, and they knew that everything would be great if they could just break out of that rent trap and quit living paycheck to paycheck. But, they had no real idea of how to be happy, just an excuse of why they were not happy. Then, they realize, when given the chance, that they don't even know what, if anything, would make them happy. They have to take the blame for their unhappiness, which makes them even more unhappy.

They were free when they thought they were not, and they are still free after the big win, but they are not equipped to handle the freedom. I doubt many people would be happier by having their goals fulfilled, unless they really had their act together before the fulfillment. If your goals were to be a good person, help others and such, then maybe...

What you say is largely true, but you're confusing being happier with being better off. I'm quite sure those unhappy lottery winners would agree they are better off after the win. People can indeed be mistaken about how much satisfaction attaining a goal will actually yield. But unless it yields no satisfaction they are better off, and had they not pursued it they would not have learned how overrated it was.

It's not confusing to me. I think you are better off if you are happier, and that gaining material things or meeting external goals is a very shallow pursuit that brings little lasting happiness. The world, and even a bastion of philosophy like this, is filled with people who apply logic in pursuit of these goals, yet take no time to become emotionally educated, or to consider if the goals fulfill them or not. When they reach a goal and still feel empty, rather than reflecting on why they feel empty, they simply carry on to the next external goal that they assume will make them feel better.

[Belindi]

Peter Holmes wrote:

Love is an emotion too, Belindi. Sometimes love can override fear, sometimes fear overrides love. No one is free from emotions, but everyone is free to act or not act on them.

Love is not an emotion it's a set of motivations, intentions, and behaviours. Love is invariably present unless fear has banished it.The probability of motivation, intention, or behaviour becoming actual varies with individuals and cultures, and indeed sometimes the raw emotion of fear overcomes an individual and a culture. Nazism is a culture where fear of others has overcome a significant number of individuals in a society, and love is swamped by fear and its aftermath. Indeed some beliefs can and do raise fear to the extent the individual concerned is too fearful to be able to love.

Fear is emotion which is usually cognitive . By "cognitive" I refer to raw fear translated by some belief about what is to blame for the perceived threat ; then raw fear turns into malevolence, jealousy, spite, murder, callousness, greed, timidity, bullying, stupidity, etc.