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[Belindi]

GEMorton wrote:

Every man who denies ordinary human kindness and sympathy is essential to the natural human is either a cynic or a sociopath. Both of these are disabilities, the man who is a cynic or a sociopath is incomplete. It is difficult to say ordinary human kindness defines the human because many other animals also display what if they were men would be ordinary kindness.

That is surely false, Belindi. The very fact that cynics and sociopaths exist is conclusive evidence that kindness and sympathy are not essential to humans. Those traits are certainly elements of human nature, but so are malevolence, rapacity, hatred. Human nature is a mixed bag, from a moral point of view.

Malevolence, rapacity, and hatred are fear-based reactions to circumstances. Love is the default, and mercy, pity, and peace are love-based reactions to circumstances.

When I say "love is the default" I mean the more loving individuals have the choice to be fearful and have the choice to be loving. Those who choose fear are unfree as they lack that choice but must react from fear.

The loving people who choose mercy, pity, and peace are stronger and more complete therefore those who react to fear lack an essential quality, "essential" as without it nobody is completely human.

I trust you understand I am polarising humans as if they are indeed two sorts of people,and I do so to make my point clearer. Obviously in real life people vary in their choices throughout their lives. For instance love might become less when the subject is unwell or undergoing some trauma

[Peter Holmes]

Suppose the goal is the well-being of sentient creatures, derived from the subjective assertion 'it is morally right to promote the well-being, etc'.

Can you you suggest a moral assertion that follows objectively (independent from opinion) from that goal and subjective assertion?

Well, no. The aim of a moral theory, and of the theorems it generates, is not "morally right." That would be question-begging, since the point of that theory is to define what is moral and immoral. Advancing human welfare is just a goal, which one either agrees has been the chief aim of moral inquiry (among philosophers) historically, and is a goal worth pursuing, or does not. Someone who doesn't share that goal, or consider it to be the impetus for devising moral principles and rules, will end up with a very different moral theory (if it can be called that), or has no need of a moral theory at all.

But if that is the aim of the theory, then the principles and rules developed should advance that goal. Whether they do or not is objective. E.g., if the goal of theory is preserving and advancing the welfare of all agents, then the principle, "One ought not murder," is objective, since murdering someone clearly does not preserve or advance the victim's welfare; that act is in conflict with the goal. That is an empirical fact; the "ought" there is instrumental, just as it is in, "If one wishes to put out a fire, one ought not pour gasoline on it."

Thanks. I must apologise for misunderstanding your argument. Your fire and gosoline example explains what you mean by 'ought':

If one wishes to put out a fire, one ought not pour gasoline on it.

This is a factual assertion, not an obligation, nor a value-judgement - least of all a moral claim. The word 'ought' here has none of the significance I'd been assuming. In effect, it means 'must'.

And, pari passu with 'if one wishes to preserve and advance the welfare of all agents, one ought not to kill people'. (Murder is unlawful killing, which introduces issues that beg the question.)

You're not at all saying that morality is objective, because your claim isn't 'if one wishes to preserve, etc, killing people is morally wrong' - which obviously doesn't follow.

[Terrapin Station]

When it comes to the meanings of words, you're either a conformist or you're unintelligible.

Definitions, not meanings. (It's not possible to check whether you're "conforming to someone else's meaning.")

Your aphorism isn't the case, though. Someone can define a bunch of terms in a completely idiosyncratic way and still be intelligible. You just need to know how they're defining the terms, and you need to be able to learn and remember how they define the terms so that you can understand them.

[Terrapin Station]

But if that is the aim of the theory, then the principles and rules developed should advance that goal. Whether they do or not is objective. E.g., if the goal of theory is preserving and advancing the welfare of all agents, then the principle, "One ought not murder," is objective, since murdering someone clearly does not preserve or advance the victim's welfare; that act is in conflict with the goal. That is an empirical fact; the "ought" there is instrumental, just as it is in, "If one wishes to put out a fire, one ought not pour gasoline on it."

Again, this doesn't work, because there's no objective fact that it's better to advance goals than not. You can't arrive at an objective "ought" that way.

[Peter Holmes]

But if that is the aim of the theory, then the principles and rules developed should advance that goal. Whether they do or not is objective. E.g., if the goal of theory is preserving and advancing the welfare of all agents, then the principle, "One ought not murder," is objective, since murdering someone clearly does not preserve or advance the victim's welfare; that act is in conflict with the goal. That is an empirical fact; the "ought" there is instrumental, just as it is in, "If one wishes to put out a fire, one ought not pour gasoline on it."

Again, this doesn't work, because there's no objective fact that it's better to advance goals than not. You can't arrive at an objective "ought" that way.

Nicely and neatly put. Thanks.

[GE Morton]

Malevolence, rapacity, and hatred are fear-based reactions to circumstances.

Are they? Or are they endemic propensities in some personalities? I don't think the answer to that is known, and at any rate, the question is one for psychologists, neurologists, or perhaps cognitive scientists, not philosophers.

Love is the default, and mercy, pity, and peace are love-based reactions to circumstances.

When I say "love is the default" I mean the more loving individuals have the choice to be fearful and have the choice to be loving. Those who choose fear are unfree as they lack that choice but must react from fear.

"Choose fear?" If they have a choice, then they are free, are they not? But it sounds like you're saying that some people have free will, others don't. A tough position to defend, I suspect.

The loving people who choose mercy, pity, and peace are stronger and more complete therefore those who react to fear lack an essential quality, "essential" as without it nobody is completely human.

Well, that is clearly a value judgment. While many humans possess those traits and desires, others don't, or if they do, they're often overridden by other traits and desires, such as envy, rapacity, lust, greed, etc. But while all of those desires and propensities can be found among humans, I know of no biologists or anthropologists who would consider any of them to be defining properties of homo sapiens.

[Peter Holmes]

A quick google is informative. I gather Bernard Williams' 'The Project of Pure Enquiry' is useful, though I haven't read it. Names I came across include Gassendi, Kierkegaard, Wiliams, Heidegger and Macmurray. They've all challenged the cogito. The main objection is that it assumes the 'I' that it purports to establish, so it begs the question.

Ah, yes. I was familiar with that objection, though I'd long forgotten the sources.

"Thinking" (and perceiving, imagining, dreaming, feeling, etc.) doesn't assume an "I," it implies one. Or, more precisely, it implies a subject. Those are all verbs --- action words --- and all action words imply an actor. The notion of an actorless action is incoherent. That objection is contrived and idle.

My objection is that there's no reason to think the malicious demon's tricks can't include deceiving me into thinking that I'm thinking.

There is no deception or thinking without someone who is deceived or who is thinks he is thinking. A subject is strictly implied by all of those terms.

I meant to pick this up earlier. The objection to 'I think therefore I am' - that it begs the question - is not contrived and idle. It's a fact that it assumes what it purports to demonstrate - the existence of an 'I'. And 'there is thinking, therefore I am' doesn't follow at all. The cogito is useless.

And anyway, thinking, perceiving, imagining, dreaming, feeling, etc, aren't verbs. They're gerunds, which are nouns, which obviously don't imply a subject. And finite 'think' is usually stative - not suggesting an action. And anyway, why not 'I dream, therefore I am'? 'I imagine, therefore I am'? - and so on. It seems to me any of them would supposedly have the same function as 'think' in the cogito. The question-begging assumption of an 'I' applies to all of them.

And anyway, to say a finite verb, such as 'think' or 'am' does imply a subject, is merely to state a grammatical fact about a well-formed clause- the very fact that deceived Descartes in the first place. We're bewitched by the devices of our language, for example into thinking the personal pronouns are names of metaphysical things: what are the things we call 'I' and 'you'?

Descartes inherited substance-dualism and theism, and set about trying to show that what he already believed exists actually does exist. The cogito was a case of theory-based evidence.

[GE Morton]

But if that is the aim of the theory, then the principles and rules developed should advance that goal. Whether they do or not is objective. E.g., if the goal of theory is preserving and advancing the welfare of all agents, then the principle, "One ought not murder," is objective, since murdering someone clearly does not preserve or advance the victim's welfare; that act is in conflict with the goal. That is an empirical fact; the "ought" there is instrumental, just as it is in, "If one wishes to put out a fire, one ought not pour gasoline on it."

Again, this doesn't work, because there's no objective fact that it's better to advance goals than not.

That is absurd. A goal is something one desires to pursue. If pursuing X it is not better than not pursuing it, then X is no longer a goal. Similarly, if one desires X, then securing X is better than not securing it. If it isn't, then one no longer desires X.

You come up with the goofiest claims, TP.

[GE Morton]

PS: And, yes, it is an objective fact. It is a logical truth, and all logical truths are objective.

[GE Morton]

,

Thanks. I must apologise for misunderstanding your argument. Your fire and gosoline example explains what you mean by 'ought':

If one wishes to put out a fire, one ought not pour gasoline on it.

This is a factual assertion, not an obligation, nor a value-judgement - least of all a moral claim. The word 'ought' here has none of the significance I'd been assuming. In effect, it means 'must'.

Not necessarily "must" (though in the fire example it does mean "must"). The instrumental sense of "ought" just means that doing X is an effective, or perhaps necessary, means of attaining Y. So, "You ought to do X" just means "Doing X will get you closer to Y." "You ought not do X" means, "Doing X will hamper or prevent your attainment of Y." All of those claims can be objective.

And of course I agree those are "factual assertions, not obligations or value-judgments." But they are moral claims, if the goal is a moral one.

There is nothing epistemologically "special," and certainly nothing esoteric, about "moral" propositions, moral principles or rules. I take "morality" to be, simply, the inquiry into finding workable, effective principles and rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting, with the aim of maximizing the welfare of all. Principles and rules having that aim are "moral" principles and rules. The exercise is analogous to devising a workable, effective set of principles and rules governing a highway system, with the aim of assuring that all drivers reach their destinations quickly and safely. Those principles and rules are "traffic rules." There is nothing mystical, or even mysterious, about either, and in both cases whether the principles do or do not advance their goals is an empirical question with objective answers.

And, pari passu with 'if one wishes to preserve and advance the welfare of all agents, one ought not to kill people'. (Murder is unlawful killing, which introduces issues that beg the question.)

More broadly, "murder" means "unjustified killing." One may still commit murder even if there are no laws. A moral theory will need to spell out when killing is and is not justified.

[GE Morton]

When it comes to the meanings of words, you're either a conformist or you're unintelligible.

Definitions, not meanings. (It's not possible to check whether you're "conforming to someone else's meaning.")

The definitions state the accepted, understood meanings. If someone attaches some different meaning to a common word he will have a hard time communicating.

Your aphorism isn't the case, though. Someone can define a bunch of terms in a completely idiosyncratic way and still be intelligible. You just need to know how they're defining the terms, and you need to be able to learn and remember how they define the terms so that you can understand them.

That amounts to learning a new language. But if someone is creating a new language by assigning new meanings to words with existing, universally understood meanings I'd assume he has some sophistic purpose in mind, and wouldn't bother.

[GE Morton]

Ah, yes. I was familiar with that objection, though I'd long forgotten the sources.

"Thinking" (and perceiving, imagining, dreaming, feeling, etc.) doesn't assume an "I," it implies one. Or, more precisely, it implies a subject. Those are all verbs --- action words --- and all action words imply an actor. The notion of an actorless action is incoherent. That objection is contrived and idle.

There is no deception or thinking without someone who is deceived or who is thinks he is thinking. A subject is strictly implied by all of those terms.

I meant to pick this up earlier. The objection to 'I think therefore I am' - that it begs the question - is not contrived and idle. It's a fact that it assumes what it purports to demonstrate - the existence of an 'I'. And 'there is thinking, therefore I am' doesn't follow at all. The cogito is useless.

Well, you're just repeating the claim, ignoring what I said: the "I" is not assumed; it is (strictly) implied.

And anyway, thinking, perceiving, imagining, dreaming, feeling, etc, aren't verbs. They're gerunds, which are nouns, which obviously don't imply a subject.

A gerund is "a form that is derived from a verb but that functions as a noun." Those terms I gave do not function as nouns in "I am thinking," I am dreaming," etc. They denote ongoing activities --- they are verbs, just as "I am walking," I am eating," etc. And there is no activity without an actor (an acting entity). If there is eating, then there is someone or something doing it.

And anyway, why not 'I dream, therefore I am'? 'I imagine, therefore I am'? - and so on. It seems to me any of them would supposedly have the same function as 'think' in the cogito. The question-begging assumption of an 'I' applies to all of them.

Indeed they do all function the same way; Descartes could have used any of them and made the same point. They are all activities and all imply an actor.

And anyway, to say a finite verb, such as 'think' or 'am' does imply a subject . . .

"Think" does not imply a subject (it could be command, directed to no one in particular). "Thinking" does; it is an activity.

We're bewitched by the devices of our language, for example into thinking the personal pronouns are names of metaphysical things: what are the things we call 'I' and 'you'?

There is nothing "metaphysical" about "I". It denotes a person, when used by the person denoted. In the cogito it denotes that the entity doing the thinking (which must exist, if there is thinking), is the entity reporting on it.

No metaphysical assumptions are made in the cogito, and no metaphysical conundrums raised.

Descartes inherited substance-dualism and theism, and set about trying to show that what he already believed exists actually does exist. The cogito was a case of theory-based evidence.

Descartes made many errors, but the cogito is not one of them.

[Terrapin Station]

Again, this doesn't work, because there's no objective fact that it's better to advance goals than not.

That is absurd. A goal is something one desires to pursue. If pursuing X it is not better than not pursuing it, then X is no longer a goal. Similarly, if one desires X, then securing X is better than not securing it. If it isn't, then one no longer desires X.

What you're talking about here is the way that an individual can feel about pursuing things, about whether they should pursue things when they have a goal, etc.

"A way that an individual feels" isn't "an objective fact."

[Terrapin Station]

In order for it to be an objective fact that "just in case S has a goal of g, then x should pursue things to make goal g obtain" it needs to be a fact found in the world outside of how S (or any other person) feels about it.

[Terrapin Station]

PS: And, yes, it is an objective fact. It is a logical truth, and all logical truths are objective.

Logic is a way that individuals think about implicational relations. It's not something found in the world outside of thinking.

So no, that's not objective.