Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Sculptor1]

So you agree that moral goals - and therefore moral assertions - are subjective, rather than objective.

Yes, goals are subjective. But moral assertions can be objective, given a goal. I've given what I take to the goal of moral philosophy, as understood by most philosophers historically. Like all goals it is subjective. There is no basis for fruitful discussion of morality with anyone who does not share that goal, just as there is no basis for fruitful discussions about physics among persons who don't share the goal of understanding the natural world.

You have just put a hole in your own foot so large I could drive a bus through it.

[Terrapin Station]

I've given my definition of "objective" several times. As with "subjective," it denotes a property of propositions (as do "true" and "false"). An objective proposition is one whose truth conditions are public (that is what makes an objective proposition "independent of opinion").

. . . as you ignore that the truth conditions can't actually be public. I explained all of that to you already.

[Terrapin Station]

Yes, goals are subjective. But moral assertions can be objective, given a goal.

"If one has x as a goal, one should (work to) achieve x" isn't an objective fact.

[Peter Holmes]

So you agree that moral goals - and therefore moral assertions - are subjective, rather than objective.

Yes, goals are subjective. But moral assertions can be objective, given a goal. I've given what I take to the goal of moral philosophy, as understood by most philosophers historically. Like all goals it is subjective. There is no basis for fruitful discussion of morality with anyone who does not share that goal, just as there is no basis for fruitful discussions about physics among persons who don't share the goal of understanding the natural world.

You must know this is nonsense. Can you suggest a goal which makes any moral assertion objective? I'm intrigued.

Suppose the goal is the well-being of sentient creatures, derived from the subjective assertion 'it is morally right to promote the well-being, etc'.

Can you you suggest a moral assertion that follows objectively (independent from opinion) from that goal and subjective assertion?

[GE Morton]

I've given my definition of "objective" several times. As with "subjective," it denotes a property of propositions (as do "true" and "false"). An objective proposition is one whose truth conditions are public (that is what makes an objective proposition "independent of opinion").

. . . as you ignore that the truth conditions can't actually be public. I explained all of that to you already.

Oh, you've said so, but bare assertions don't constitute "explanations." The truth condition for a proposition P is that state of affairs which, if it exists, makes P true (DEF). That is the DEFINITION of "truth condition." If the state of affairs in question is public, then so is the truth condition, by definition. If that state of affairs exists, then P has the imputed property of being "true."

You're free, of course, to define "true" and "truth condition" in some other way, but those definitions would be idiosyncratic and spurious.

[Terrapin Station]

Oh, you've said so, but bare assertions don't constitute "explanations."

And of course I said a lot more than a "bare assertion."

Meanwhile, you clowningly give us a definition:

The truth condition for a proposition P is that state of affairs which, if it exists, makes P true (DEF). That is the DEFINITION of "truth condition."

As if a definition makes something the case.

We could give an alternate definition:

The truth condition for a proposition P is the subjective judgment about a state of affairs that makes P true(DEF).

Is that sufficient for you to change your mind? We use a different definition and so what the definition says is the case on your view?



Or in other words, you can't possibly be serious.

[Sy Borg]

There can be no universal goals when different parties have different interests.

Sure there can. People have many goals, and though most of them will differ from person to person, there may still be one shared by all (not likely in a large group, but possible).

But that is a minor logical point. For moral theories and systems, as the subject matter of interest to moral philosophers, there indeed must be agreement as to what the aim, the goal, of moral philosophy is --- what it seeks to accomplish, just as, by comparison, a theory of gravity seeks to explain, and enable us to predict, the trajectories of moving bodies, the orbits of the planets, the tides, etc. A physicist who did not share that goal would not be much interested in theories of gravity.

There is and has been, I think, a near-universal consensus among moral philosophers that the broad aim of the discipline is to improve human welfare, human well-being, particularly as that is affected by interactions between moral agents. That is, moral philosophy has been concerned with how people treat one another; with developing principles and rules governing those interactions, with the aim of improving well-being for all. Moreover, being philosophers (as opposed to shamans, soothsayers, sophists, "holy men," autocrats, etc.) there is a consensus that those principles and rules should be universal --- applicable to all moral agents in a social setting --- and be rationally defensible.

So, yes, someone who did not share that goal or that methodology might have a very different idea as to what what "morality" is and what it entails. Not many moral philosophers, however, would be much interested in that person's views.

Again, you confuse objectivity and subjectivity.

I highlight the statement in bold because it is so obviously wrong. There may be near-universal agreement amongst southern American evangelist Christian moral philosophers, or between New York secular atheist moral philosophers, but the disagreements are profound. And that's just the US.

When subjective views are imposed on a populace, that is not objectivity, it is governance.

[Belindi]

Do you think there is such a given reality as human nature?

Yes. But it is not a very useful concept. Any property some person naturally possesses, and anything any person does, is embraced by "human nature," just as whatever a dog does is embraced by "canine nature."

But canine nature is usually taken to be a definable essence which pervades every dog whereas human nature is undefinable and has no detectable essence which pervades every human individual.

Human nature, however, is so complex and so various , so adulterated with religious and other ideologies that we can only make educated guesses at what it is. Therefore the concept of 'real' applied to human nature largely a matter of faith in human nature or alternatively cynicism regarding human nature.

All of those beliefs and ideologies are themselves part of human nature --- or, more precisely, products of the human capacity for ideation and invention. You can't defend or reject any given ideology or theory or belief, or praise or condemn any human act, on the grounds that it is in keeping with or contrary to human nature. (That is a version of the "naturalistic fallacy").

It's no fallacy despite that we don't know what the essence of the human is. If human nature was a definable essence we could know what the good human is; a human individual and a human culture could be measured against a criterion. This is not to say the individual would not be moulded by their culture they would be, but I do claim that if we knew the essential qualities that pervaded all human beings we would also know which cultures were true to the human essence.

You can only ascertain what is and is not "human nature" by observing humans and their behaviors. It is an empirical question. When you begin to add normative qualities to it you have an "ideal human nature," not real human nature. When you then cite this ideal human nature as grounds for normative precepts, you indulge in a circular argument.

It is an empirical question. I don't add normative qualities to it. I tentatively claim buried under ideologies and religions there is an essence of the human . Unless we can know what that essential definition is we can't make morality objective. You can only work with the raw material you are given.

We know the goodness in human nature when we see it and when we do it: or is that claim a subjective one?

Yes, it is subjective. All claims of the form, "X is good," are subjective (when "good" is used an evaluative; there are other uses).

Every man who denies ordinary human kindness and sympathy is essential to the natural human is either a cynic or a sociopath. Both of these are disabilities, the man who is a cynic or a sociopath is incomplete. It is difficult to say ordinary human kindness defines the human because many other animals also display what if they were men would be ordinary kindness.

[GE Morton]

We could give an alternate definition:

The truth condition for a proposition P is the subjective judgment about a state of affairs that makes P true(DEF).

Oh, yes. We could give a million alternate definitions. But they would not represent the meaning of "truth condition" or "true" as understood by most philosophers, or most people, for that matter, or given in most dictionaries.

"Definition of true (Entry 1 of 4)
1a(1): being in accordance with the actual state of affairs
true description"

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/true

We use a different definition and so what the definition says is the case on your view?

Yes. For imputed properties what we say is the case IS the case. That is because we have decided what fact(s) those properties shall denote. But not just any definition; only the definition commonly used, accepted, and understood in that speech community. We have decided that a proposition shall be deemed "true" if such-and-such is the case; that that is how we shall use that word. For "true," that such-and-such has nothing to do with anyone's subjective judgments.

You seem to be convinced there is some "deeper," more profound insight to be gained regarding what truth "really is." There isn't. That is just idle metaphysical flapdoodle.

[Terrapin Station]

Oh, yes. We could give a million alternate definitions. But they would not represent the meaning of "truth condition" or "true" as understood by most philosophers, or most people, for that matter, or given in most dictionaries.

And you have a conformism fetish? That might be the case, but it has no bearing on what's the case.

Yes. For imputed properties what we say is the case IS the case. That is because we have decided what fact(s) those properties shall denote. But not just any definition; only the definition commonly used, accepted, and understood in that speech community.

That would only go insofar as someone is using the definition in question. It goes nowhere beyond that.

We have decided that a proposition shall be deemed "true" if such-and-such is the case;

While completely ignoring that there's not actually any way for such and such to link up with any proposition aside from thinking about it in a particular way.

[GE Morton]

There is and has been, I think, a near-universal consensus among moral philosophers that the broad aim of the discipline is to improve human welfare, human well-being, particularly as that is affected by interactions between moral agents. That is, moral philosophy has been concerned with how people treat one another . . .

I highlight the statement in bold because it is so obviously wrong. There may be near-universal agreement amongst southern American evangelist Christian moral philosophers, or between New York secular atheist moral philosophers, but the disagreements are profound. And that's just the US.

You're claiming that the statement you highlighted describes only the views of Christian moral philosophers and atheist moral philosophers? In the West, who is left? Jewish moral philosophers?

Perhaps you can cite some moral philosophers who do not consider how people treat one another to be the main concern of moral philosophy.

[GE Morton]

And you have a conformism fetish? That might be the case, but it has no bearing on what's the case.

When it comes to the meanings of words, you're either a conformist or you're unintelligible.

Yes. For imputed properties what we say is the case IS the case. That is because we have decided what fact(s) those properties shall denote. But not just any definition; only the definition commonly used, accepted, and understood in that speech community.

That would only go insofar as someone is using the definition in question. It goes nowhere beyond that.

Yes. There is nothing, nowhere to go, beyond that. What meanings shall be attached to words are social conventions. If you wish to be understood you'll have to follow the conventions.

[GE Morton]

But canine nature is usually taken to be a definable essence which pervades every dog whereas human nature is undefinable and has no detectable essence which pervades every human individual.

I have no idea what "essences" are, Belindi --- how to define or recognize them, or how to evaluate propositions asserting them. All "essentialist" claims I've encountered are non-cognitive.

It's no fallacy despite that we don't know what the essence of the human is. If human nature was a definable essence we could know what the good human is; a human individual and a human culture could be measured against a criterion.

You're still committing the naturalistic fallacy. No natural property of a thing imparts "goodness" to it. Whether that thing or that property is "good" is a judgment passed upon it by some valuer, not a property of the thing, and is subjective. If the "essence" someone attributes to a thing is "good," then it is only because that person has attached his judgment of the thing to it as a property, or inserted "goodness" into his definition of that essence.

This is not to say the individual would not be moulded by their culture they would be, but I do claim that if we knew the essential qualities that pervaded all human beings we would also know which cultures were true to the human essence.

I don't know what "essences" are, but I do know what "essential properties" are. That term is usually used to denote those properties of a thing such that, if something X lacks it, it is no longer an X. Also called "defining properties." E.g., if something called a triangle lacks 3 sides it is not a triangle. Is that what you mean by "essences" --- defining properties?

I tentatively claim buried under ideologies and religions there is an essence of the human . Unless we can know what that essential definition is we can't make morality objective. You can only work with the raw material you are given.

Why would we NOT know what this essence is, if (as we agree) what constitutes human nature is empirical? Don't we have ample evidence for what that nature is? The empirical evidence is abundant, indeed, overwhelming. What are we overlooking?

Every man who denies ordinary human kindness and sympathy is essential to the natural human is either a cynic or a sociopath. Both of these are disabilities, the man who is a cynic or a sociopath is incomplete. It is difficult to say ordinary human kindness defines the human because many other animals also display what if they were men would be ordinary kindness.

That is surely false, Belindi. The very fact that cynics and sociopaths exist is conclusive evidence that kindness and sympathy are not essential to humans. Those traits are certainly elements of human nature, but so are malevolence, rapacity, hatred. Human nature is a mixed bag, from a moral point of view.

[GE Morton]

PS:

Unless we can know what that essential definition is we can't make morality objective.

Morality --- meaning propositions asserting moral precepts --- will be objective if their truth conditions are public. Their objectivity has nothing to do with any "essences."

[GE Morton]

Suppose the goal is the well-being of sentient creatures, derived from the subjective assertion 'it is morally right to promote the well-being, etc'.

Can you you suggest a moral assertion that follows objectively (independent from opinion) from that goal and subjective assertion?

Well, no. The aim of a moral theory, and of the theorems it generates, is not "morally right." That would be question-begging, since the point of that theory is to define what is moral and immoral. Advancing human welfare is just a goal, which one either agrees has been the chief aim of moral inquiry (among philosophers) historically, and is a goal worth pursuing, or does not. Someone who doesn't share that goal, or consider it to be the impetus for devising moral principles and rules, will end up with a very different moral theory (if it can be called that), or has no need of a moral theory at all.

But if that is the aim of the theory, then the principles and rules developed should advance that goal. Whether they do or not is objective. E.g., if the goal of theory is preserving and advancing the welfare of all agents, then the principle, "One ought not murder," is objective, since murdering someone clearly does not preserve or advance the victim's welfare; that act is in conflict with the goal. That is an empirical fact; the "ought" there is instrumental, just as it is in, "If one wishes to put out a fire, one ought not pour gasoline on it."