Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

On my view, by the way, there isn't anything that's not a process or event. Hence my question about whether there are real abstracts in your ontology. (And then we can try to figure out what the heck real abstracts in your ontology amount to exactly (well, where we try to pretend that it's not you simply reifying concepts).)

[Terrapin Station]

TP ---

To amplify: Words that denote something have meanings. The things denoted are the meanings.

Let's try this: what is a word in the absence of people? It's marks written on something or a sound recording, right?

[GE Morton]

Let's try this: It's the year 3157 CE and no people exist any longer. Do you believe that it's a fact that the word "dog" printed in a book has a meaning where it refers to a creature that still exists?

The English word "dog" has, and will have, a meaning whether any English speakers exist or any dogs exist (the word "dinosaur" has a meaning even though no dinosaurs now exist). If a word was assigned a meaning when coined, and used within a speech community with that meaning, then it will always have it.

Presumably you'd say that the meaning is a "pseudo-property" of something at 3157 CE, correct? What, exactly is it a "pseudo-property" of?

Explained before. A pseudo-property is a property imputed to things if some external fact about them is true. It is distinguished from a sensible property --- one confirmable by examining the thing. Confirming pseudo-properties requires examining something other than the subject, beyond the subject.

You can't look at at an unfamiliar word and determine whether it has a meaning, any more than you can examine Bruno and determine whether he has an uncle. You need some evidence beyond the subject. In the case of Bruno you need to determine whether one of his parents has a living male sibling. In the case of the word, you need to see whether it is (or was) used in a speech community to denote something. If those facts are true, respectively, then the subjects have those pseudo-properties.

[Terrapin Station]

I hate to keep making posts . . . but that's one of the problems with not being able to edit.

Another thing we'd need to go over is this: when there are no people, are there both properties and (imputed) pseudo-properties? Where do the (imputed) pseudo-properties obtain, exactly?

[Terrapin Station]

Confirming pseudo-properties requires examining something other than the subject, beyond the subject. You can't look at at an unfamiliar word and determine whether it has a meaning, any more than you can examine Bruno and determine whether he has an uncle. You need some evidence beyond the subject. In the case of Bruno you need to determine whether one of his parents has a living male sibling. In the case of the word, you need to see whether it is (or was) used in a speech community to denote something. If those facts are true, respectively, then the subjects have those pseudo-properties.

First off, when there are no people, are when our answer can't refer to anything mental, we can't do any examining or confirming or any evidence-gathering, etc. as such, right?

Secondly, the facts that you have in mind would be that people used the words in such and such way, but that's a fact about how people THOUGHT about the word. But (a) that is a fact about minds, not meaning that obtains without minds, and (b) it's not a fact that just because someone thought about or used something in some way that that is the meaning of the word in question in any other context.

In other words, you presumably agree that I think that Wittgenstein sucked as a philosopher (I just said as much--that I thought that--in a post above). So there's a fact that that is (and once I'm gone, was) something I thought. Well, the mere fact that I think about Wittgenstein that way doesn't imply that Wittgenstein sucks mind-independently. It's a fact that I thought that, but it's not actually a fact about Wittgenstein.

Likewise, there are facts that so and so thought about the text marks "dog" in such and such way, so that it has some meaning to so and so, but that doesn't amount to a fact that "dog" has that meaning mind-independently, as a fact merely about the marks on paper (or wherever it might occur).

[GE Morton]

First off, when there are no people, are when our answer can't refer to anything mental, we can't do any examining or confirming or any evidence-gathering, etc. as such, right?

Yes we can, when the uninhabited universe is hypothetical and we are exploring that hypothesis. If the uninhabited universe was inhabited at one time, and those inhabitants assigned a meaning to the word "dog," then that is a permanent, unalterable historical fact. That group of letters still has that meaning, whether anyone is around to read it or not.

Secondly, the facts that you have in mind would be that people used the words in such and such way, but that's a fact about how people THOUGHT about the word.

That is false on its face. How people use a word neither assumes nor implies anything about what they think about it. Their behavior alone constitutes their uses of it, and that behavior is empirically determinable. We may make conjectures about what is in their heads when they hear or speak the word, but those are speculative and are irrelevant to the observed uses they make of the words they speak or hear --- the responses they utter or the actions they take.

In other words, you presumably agree that I think that Wittgenstein sucked as a philosopher (I just said as much--that I thought that--in a post above). So there's a fact that that is (and once I'm gone, was) something I thought. Well, the mere fact that I think about Wittgenstein that way doesn't imply that Wittgenstein sucks mind-independently. It's a fact that I thought that, but it's not actually a fact about Wittgenstein.

I certainly don't agree with your characterization of Wittgenstein. And the property you ascribe to him signifies nothing about him, only your disapproval of his work.

[Peter Holmes]

I apologise for failing to respond to what you said.

But what you say here is incoherent blather, and I don't think you know what you're talking about. You ignore my point about equivocating on 'thing' and 'exist' with regard to abstract things and events. And you seem to content to rehash metaphysical nonsense about the mind and mental things.

And that's fine. Let's leave it there.

I already explained my take on abstracts to you. I wrote this:

"I'm also a nominalist in the senses that I think there are only unique particulars, and there are no real (extramental) abstracts. Abstraction is a mental phenomenon, and as such, it's a mental particular that like everything else, amounts to ((dynamic) relations of) matter."

Again, I apologise for not taking up this point when you made it - particularly as I think it's important in our discussion. Mea culpa.

Am I right to think that, as a nominalist, you deny the existence of Platonic universals? Is what you call an abstract thing, such as meaning, another name for what the schoolmen called a universal? As I understand it, the nominalists thought universals are no more than 'flatus vocis' - merely names, words or sounds. If that's right, to that extent I'm also a nominalist. And names, words and sounds are real things - I'm also a physicalist, as I gather you are. I think we're both non-dualists - though you may reject that label.

But I think the problem with the Platonist-nominalist dispute was (is) that both camps mistake abstract nouns for things which, because they are things, may or may not exist: Platonists assert their existence (somehow, somewhere), and nominalists deny it. It seems to me that thoroughgoing nominalism must involve rejecting that dispute as incoherent. If a name, word or sound has no referent, then it makes no sense to assert or deny the existence of that referent. Why deny the existence of something that can't exist?

Now, what I don't understand is your position with regard to supposed abstract things or abstractions. You seem to think they do exist, but only 'in the mind'. Does that mean you think the universal (Platonic form) dog exists in the mind? And if not, why do you think the supposed abstract thing meaning exists in the mind? As a nominalist, why do you think abstractions exist anywhere? And as a physicalist, why talk about things existing in the mind anyway? Isn't that Platonism by another name? (Sorry - so many questions!)

And twice I asked you just what sort of things you believe abstracts are. The first time I asked you, you had written this:

"What an extraordinary metaphysical delusion it is to think abstract nouns are the names of things of some kind that somehow exist somewhere, and that we can describe."

To which I responded: "how do you reconcile this with physicalism? Just what sort of physical things do you believe abstracts are?"

As a physicalst and out-and-out nominalist, I think my position is the only rational one. There are only physical things, such as electrochemical processes in our brains, and signs, including abstract nouns. So it's a mistake to think abstract things and events exist - anywhere.

You never responded to any of that. This is why I don't like doing long posts back and forth or posting too much too soon.

Once again, I apologise. I hope the goes some way to making amends.

[Peter Holmes]

I hope the above goes some way to making amends.

[Belindi]

GEMorton wrote;

Yes we can, when the uninhabited universe is hypothetical and we are exploring that hypothesis. If the uninhabited universe was inhabited at one time, and those inhabitants assigned a meaning to the word "dog," then that is a permanent, unalterable historical fact. That group of letters still has that meaning, whether anyone is around to read it or not.

History i.e. the story of man's past is a man- made story, or a set of man-made stories. Thought experiment: if there were an omniscient being then he would know the story of man's past and infinitely more.This being would know every thought and every aspect of temporal existence , plus every natural law if there are such as natural laws. This OB would know what men attribute to the concept 'dog' together with valencies of these attributes and the concept as a whole.

Such omniscience is possible however we cannot know whether or not. One's ontological stance is a matter of opinion or religious faith.

Nonetheless our generation believes nature is the most important frame of belief. Muslims and Christians cleverly attribute nature to the Being's word and will. Pantheists believe nature is cause of itself. Be those as they may, inescapable nature is a sound pragmatic basis for moral codes and the concept of morality.

[Terrapin Station]

That is false on its face. How people use a word neither assumes nor implies anything about what they think about it.

Woo on your view, people might use words in some way without it having anything to do with anything that they're thinking?

[Terrapin Station]

I'll get back to the questions (some of which you should know the answer to already because I keep giving my view on stuff you're asking) in a post after this, but I'm curious about this:

As a physicalst and out-and-out nominalist, I think my position is the only rational one. There are only physical things, such as electrochemical processes in our brains, and signs, including abstract nouns. So it's a mistake to think abstract things and events exist - anywhere.

You just said both that there are abstract nouns and that it's a mistake to think abstract things exist anywhere. So how would there be abstract nouns? What sorts of things are signs and abstract nouns on your view?

[Terrapin Station]

Not sure how I wound up posting the word "woo" above. LOL.

[Peter Holmes]

I'll get back to the questions (some of which you should know the answer to already because I keep giving my view on stuff you're asking) in a post after this, but I'm curious about this:

As a physicalst and out-and-out nominalist, I think my position is the only rational one. There are only physical things, such as electrochemical processes in our brains, and signs, including abstract nouns. So it's a mistake to think abstract things and events exist - anywhere.

For some reason, your question wasn't copied here. I'll try again.

[Peter Holmes]

I'll get back to the questions (some of which you should know the answer to already because I keep giving my view on stuff you're asking) in a post after this, but I'm curious about this:

As a physicalst and out-and-out nominalist, I think my position is the only rational one. There are only physical things, such as electrochemical processes in our brains, and signs, including abstract nouns. So it's a mistake to think abstract things and events exist - anywhere.

No - it's done it again. I'll answer the question anyway.

The expression 'abstract noun' is a grammatical misattribution, because words such as nouns are real things, so the modifier 'abstract' doesn't refer to 'noun'. It actually refers to the unspecified abstract thing that the noun supposedly names. So abstract reification - Platonism - is built into the phrase 'abstract noun'. Does that sort out the confusion?

[Terrapin Station]

The expression 'abstract noun' is a grammatical misattribution, because words such as nouns are real things, so the modifier 'abstract' doesn't refer to 'noun'. It actually refers to the unspecified abstract thing that the noun supposedly names. So abstract reification - Platonism - is built into the phrase 'abstract noun'. Does that sort out the confusion?

If you think that there's something abstract that we're reifying, then you'd think there's something abstract. We can't reify something that doesn't occur as a concept/idea/fantasy/etc.

Aside from this, you're not saying what you think signs and abstract nouns are, exactly. Where do they exist?