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[GE Morton]

So let's say that we have a word, "rock," and we assign it to a particular "sort" of thing-in-the-world, rocks.

Now, there's some disaster that kills off all life on Earth. That way we can be sure there are no minds to appeal to.

You want to say that despite the disaster, the word "rock" still has a relationship to the thing-in-the-world, rocks. I'm asking you to describe, in detail, how that relationship obtains after the disaster.

You've asked that question before, via the "spaceship" scenario, and it was answered before. Yes, there is a relationship between the word and the thing denoted. It obtains because it was established at one point; the marks were put on paper for some reason. That there is now no one who knows what that relationship is, is irrelevant.

Again, you conflate knowing something with the thing known.

BTW, we don't have to invent disaster scenarios to explore this issue. Linear A is an ancient Minoan writing system that has never been deciphered. But there is no doubt those characters and symbols mean something. Several other undecipherable ancient scripts are known as well.

[Peter Holmes]

Just some observations on this sideline about meaning.

1 What we call meaning isn't a thing of any kind whatsoever. So the question 'what is meaning?' is always already half-way down the rabbit hole.

Of course it is. "Thing" is the universal noun. Everything --- anything one may speak of --- is a thing. The use of "thing" is not restricted to concrete objects with spatio-temporal locations. "Love is a many splendored thing" (song), "A mind is a terrible thing to waste," "Things that go bump in the night," etc., etc. Dogs are things, love is a thing, ideas are things, meanings are things.

Please. To say abstract nouns are names of things that exist is to equivocate on the words 'thing' and 'exist'. What are abstract things and where do they exist? You're merely repeating the metaphysical mistake that I'm pointing out.

2 The meaning of something is the explanation we give when asked to explain its meaning. And there are many different kinds or explanation.

We can only explain meanings verbally to someone who is already fluent in the language of the explanation. To teach meanings to pre-verbal people, such as young children, we point to . . . things (usually concrete things). Those are the meanings of the terms we're trying to teach.

Not so. We're teaching the ways we use those words. A dog isn't a meaning. That's to confuse the way we use a word with the thing we name with the word - an elementary mistake the later Wittgenstein took pains to expose.

3 We use the word 'dog' to talk about the things we call dogs. The meaning of the word 'dog' is not a dog, because a dog is a real thing - a feature of reality - not the meaning of a word.

Meanings are also "features of reality." A meaning is as "real" as a dog. "Reality" is not limited to concrete physical objects. The latter are merely one ontological class of "real" things.

Nonsense. What and where is a meaning? Explanations - typically verbal ones - are real things, of course.

4 There's no correspondence, or relationship of any kind, between a name and what it names. A name no more corresponds with what it names than an arrow corresponds with its target.

Well, now you've fallen down TP's rabbit hole. If there is "no relationship of any kind" between a noun and the thing(s) it names, then communication of information via speech is impossible.

Nope. 'Correspondence' means a close relationship, smilarity or equivalence - and there's none between the word 'dog' and what we call a dog. Correspondence theories of meaning and truth are fundamentally mistaken - manifestations of the myth of propositions at work: S knows that p iff p is true. Again, the later Wittgenstein painstakingly prised apart the way things are and what we say about them, showing that there's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices.

[GE Morton]

Of course it is. "Thing" is the universal noun. Everything --- anything one may speak of --- is a thing. The use of "thing" is not restricted to concrete objects with spatio-temporal locations. "Love is a many splendored thing" (song), "A mind is a terrible thing to waste," "Things that go bump in the night," etc., etc. Dogs are things, love is a thing, ideas are things, meanings are things.

Please. To say abstract nouns are names of things that exist is to equivocate on the words 'thing' and 'exist'. What are abstract things and where do they exist? You're merely repeating the metaphysical mistake that I'm pointing out.

What? Love doesn't exist? Ideas don't exist? Meanings don't exist?

There is no mistake, though it may seem so if you've adopted some myopic metaphysics that absurdly presumes to restrict "existence" to concrete objects, thereby blinding yourself to huge arenas of of human thought and behavior.

We can only explain meanings verbally to someone who is already fluent in the language of the explanation. To teach meanings to pre-verbal people, such as young children, we point to . . . things (usually concrete things). Those are the meanings of the terms we're trying to teach.

Not so. We're teaching the ways we use those words. A dog isn't a meaning. That's to confuse the way we use a word with the thing we name with the word - an elementary mistake the later Wittgenstein took pains to expose.

Pointing to a dog and saying, "This is the meaning of 'dog', IS the way we use that word. Hand a child a cookie and say, "Cookie." He looks at it, repeats, "cookie." He's just learned that the meaning of "cookie" is the thing in his hand.

The way we use nouns is to denote things (of any ontological class). The meaning of a noun is the class of things denoted by it. We teach those meanings, initially, by presenting one of the things denoted (for concrete things to which one can point).

Meanings are also "features of reality." A meaning is as "real" as a dog. "Reality" is not limited to concrete physical objects. The latter are merely one ontological class of "real" things.

Nonsense. What and where is a meaning? Explanations - typically verbal ones - are real things, of course.

Well, that is mysterious. Explanations are real things, but meanings are not? How can a sequence of words be an explanation if those words have no meanings, or the meanings are not real? You need to enlarge the scope your understanding of "reality," considerably. The human "universe of discourse" is much vaster than the physical universe.

Well, now you've fallen down TP's rabbit hole. If there is "no relationship of any kind" between a noun and the thing(s) it names, then communication of information via speech is impossible.

Nope. 'Correspondence' means a close relationship, smilarity or equivalence - and there's none between the word 'dog' and what we call a dog. Correspondence theories of meaning and truth are fundamentally mistaken - manifestations of the myth of propositions at work: S knows that p iff p is true. Again, the later Wittgenstein painstakingly prised apart the way things are and what we say about them, showing that there's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices.

Oh, I agree that the classical "correspondence theory of truth" is inadequate. But you said there is "no relationship of any kind" between words and things --- a relationship understood by all speakers in a speech community. But that, as I said, instantly renders all speech functionally meaningless. If I ask, "Please pass the salt," you will have no idea to what thing I'm referring or what act I'm asking you to perform.

[Sculptor1]

Please. To say abstract nouns are names of things that exist is to equivocate on the words 'thing' and 'exist'. What are abstract things and where do they exist? You're merely repeating the metaphysical mistake that I'm pointing out.

What? Love doesn't exist? Ideas don't exist? Meanings don't exist?

There is no mistake, though it may seem so if you've adopted some myopic metaphysics that absurdly presumes to restrict "existence" to concrete objects, thereby blinding yourself to huge arenas of of human thought and behavior.

Duh.
They do not exist objectively.
DUH

[Peter Holmes]

Please. To say abstract nouns are names of things that exist is to equivocate on the words 'thing' and 'exist'. What are abstract things and where do they exist? You're merely repeating the metaphysical mistake that I'm pointing out.

What? Love doesn't exist? Ideas don't exist? Meanings don't exist?

There is no mistake, though it may seem so if you've adopted some myopic metaphysics that absurdly presumes to restrict "existence" to concrete objects, thereby blinding yourself to huge arenas of of human thought and behavior.

Sorry. Are you a Platonist? If so, what evidence do you have for the existence and nature of abstract things? And can you explain the meanings of the words 'thing' and 'exist' in relation to those abstract things? If you have no explanation, then you're equivocating.

Not so. We're teaching the ways we use those words. A dog isn't a meaning. That's to confuse the way we use a word with the thing we name with the word - an elementary mistake the later Wittgenstein took pains to expose.

Pointing to a dog and saying, "This is the meaning of 'dog', IS the way we use that word. Hand a child a cookie and say, "Cookie." He looks at it, repeats, "cookie." He's just learned that the meaning of "cookie" is the thing in his hand.

Not so - he's learnt the ways we use those words. Do you think dogs and cookies are meanings of words? How strange.

The way we use nouns is to denote things (of any ontological class). The meaning of a noun is the class of things denoted by it. We teach those meanings, initially, by presenting one of the things denoted (for concrete things to which one can point).

Yes, we use ostensive explanations for the ways we use some words. So how do we explain the ways we use abstract nouns? And merely saying there's an ontological class of abstract things doesn't demonstrate that such a class exists. It's just doing what metaphysicians, such as Platonists, have always done. Where's the evidence? That we talk about such things as love, ideas and meanings? That we know how to use those words?

Nonsense. What and where is a meaning? Explanations - typically verbal ones - are real things, of course.

Well, that is mysterious. Explanations are real things, but meanings are not? How can a sequence of words be an explanation if those words have no meanings, or the meanings are not real? You need to enlarge the scope your understanding of "reality," considerably. The human "universe of discourse" is much vaster than the physical universe.

That's an article of metaphysical faith. And I think you're being obtuse. I'm saying that what a word means can be nothing other than the way(s) we use it. We use the word 'dog' to talk about the things we call dogs. There's no abstract thing - 'the meaning of the word 'dog' - that exists somehow, somewhere. What kind of absurd delusion is that?

Nope. 'Correspondence' means a close relationship, similarity or equivalence - and there's none between the word 'dog' and what we call a dog. Correspondence theories of meaning and truth are fundamentally mistaken - manifestations of the myth of propositions at work: S knows that p iff p is true. Again, the later Wittgenstein painstakingly prised apart the way things are and what we say about them, showing that there's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices.

Oh, I agree that the classical "correspondence theory of truth" is inadequate. But you said there is "no relationship of any kind" between words and things --- a relationship understood by all speakers in a speech community. But that, as I said, instantly renders all speech functionally meaningless. If I ask, "Please pass the salt," you will have no idea to what thing I'm referring or what act I'm asking you to perform.

Correspondence theories aren't merely inadequate. They're mistaken. To say 'the assertion 'snow is white' is true because snow is white' is to state a fatuous tautology - a purely linguistic exercise.

I appreciate that what I'm saying - and what Wittgenstein said - disturbs deeply held delusional beliefs. The emperor didn't like having his nakedness pointed out either.

[Terrapin Station]

I'm reminded of Wittgenstein's joke about opening up someone's head - nowadays we'd use a brain scan - and trying to find thoughts, feelings, intentions - you'd add meanings - and other so-called mental things and events - things such as concepts or ideas. Category error, or what?

As I wrote to you in a post a couple weeks ago that you never responded to, mentality is what a subset of brains are like from the spatio-temporal reference point of being the brain in question.

This isn't something unique about brains. Every single existent has different properties from different spatio-temporal reference points.

Given this, the fact that we don't experience every property of something from every spatio-temporal reference point shouldn't be at all surprising, it's a truism about every single existent.

I'm asking if you use the words 'thing' and 'exist', without equivocation, to talk about what you call mental things and events. Brain states - electrochemical processes - are real and exist, of course.

There's a long historical tradition in philosophy to use "real" in the sense of "extramental." So I was checking if you were using the term that way. With no context (or at least not much context), it's hard to tell. "Exists" is sometimes used that way to (so that only extramental things exist, but that's not as firm of a tradition as using "real" that way). At any rate, if I'm going to use terms in different ways, I try to make it clear via context.
It would be ridiculous to change all mental talk to something else. There's no need to.
It would especially not be a good idea to change talk if you start typing nonsense like the above. Meaning IS a thing that goes on in the mind. Mind is identical to brain states. Meaning is a thing that goes on in brain states you could say, but there's no need to. People shouldn't be morons and should simply realize that mind is identical to a subset of brain states.

I don't want to start going back and forth about 50 different things--I can't stand that, especially because I get annoyed when people ignore stuff (as you did with my earlier post to you (again, from a couple weeks ago) about mind/brain). So I'll leave it at this for now.

[Terrapin Station]

Wittgenstein sucks, by the way. He was a really crappy philosopher.

[Terrapin Station]

You've asked that question before, via the "spaceship" scenario, and it was answered before. Yes, there is a relationship between the word and the thing denoted. It obtains because it was established at one point; the marks were put on paper for some reason. That there is now no one who knows what that relationship is, is irrelevant.

Right. So are you going to finally detail how the relationship between the word and the thing obtains after there are no people left around?

You're claiming it obtains because it was established at one point. That's a start. Now you need to detail how this works. I can ask you "leading questions" to help you out, but how about trying to simply detail how it works first so that we don't keep wasting time with you responding critically to the leading questions?

[Terrapin Station]

The thing that is meaning is a mental state. (In other words, a brain state.)

I agree with you that aside from that, the notion of meaning doesn't make sense.

Good. I see. But it was not what you seemed to be saying.
If a thought is a thing, then an idea, a concept and a meaning is a thing.
I think it is worth remembering that such things are no bounded, by co-dependant on many other things concrete or mental or both.

But I would say ideas, concepts, meanings are things. They're concrete brain states. "Mental" things are concrete things--they're brain states.

I'm guessing you're using "codependent" to refer to influences, etc. but that's no different than talking about something like a table. A table requires a lot of different things that aren't the table, otherwise the table won't exist, but that doesn't change the fact that the table is a thing, a concrete object. The table isn't the same thing as the furniture maker who made it, or the lumberjack who provided the wood, etc.

[Peter Holmes]

I'm reminded of Wittgenstein's joke about opening up someone's head - nowadays we'd use a brain scan - and trying to find thoughts, feelings, intentions - you'd add meanings - and other so-called mental things and events - things such as concepts or ideas. Category error, or what?

As I wrote to you in a post a couple weeks ago that you never responded to, mentality is what a subset of brains are like from the spatio-temporal reference point of being the brain in question.

I apologise for failing to respond to what you said.

But what you say here is incoherent blather, and I don't think you know what you're talking about. You ignore my point about equivocating on 'thing' and 'exist' with regard to abstract things and events. And you seem to content to rehash metaphysical nonsense about the mind and mental things.

And that's fine. Let's leave it there.

[GE Morton]

You're claiming it obtains because it was established at one point. That's a start. Now you need to detail how this works. I can ask you "leading questions" to help you out, but how about trying to simply detail how it works first so that we don't keep wasting time with you responding critically to the leading questions?

Apparently you've forgotten my answer that last time you asked that question. Meaning is not a process or event; not something that "works." That question is incoherent; it involves a category mistake.

A noun has a meaning if it has been assigned to denote a thing, or class of things, by a group of speakers. It is pseudo-property imputed to a word if such an assignment has been made. The meaning it has is that thing or class of things. There is no "work" involved.

[Terrapin Station]

As I wrote to you in a post a couple weeks ago that you never responded to, mentality is what a subset of brains are like from the spatio-temporal reference point of being the brain in question.

I apologise for failing to respond to what you said.

But what you say here is incoherent blather, and I don't think you know what you're talking about. You ignore my point about equivocating on 'thing' and 'exist' with regard to abstract things and events. And you seem to content to rehash metaphysical nonsense about the mind and mental things.

And that's fine. Let's leave it there.

I already explained my take on abstracts to you. I wrote this:

"I'm also a nominalist in the senses that I think there are only unique particulars, and there are no real (extramental) abstracts. Abstraction is a mental phenomenon, and as such, it's a mental particular that like everything else, amounts to ((dynamic) relations of) matter."

And twice I asked you just what sort of things you believe abstracts are. The first time I asked you, you had written this:

"What an extraordinary metaphysical delusion it is to think abstract nouns are the names of things of some kind that somehow exist somewhere, and that we can describe."

To which I responded: "how do you reconcile this with physicalism? Just what sort of physical things do you believe abstracts are?"

You never responded to any of that. This is why I don't like doing long posts back and forth or posting too much too soon.

[Terrapin Station]

You're claiming it obtains because it was established at one point. That's a start. Now you need to detail how this works. I can ask you "leading questions" to help you out, but how about trying to simply detail how it works first so that we don't keep wasting time with you responding critically to the leading questions?

Apparently you've forgotten my answer that last time you asked that question. Meaning is not a process or event; not something that "works." That question is incoherent; it involves a category mistake.

A noun has a meaning if it has been assigned to denote a thing, or class of things, by a group of speakers. It is pseudo-property imputed to a word if such an assignment has been made. The meaning it has is that thing or class of things. There is no "work" involved.

Let's try this: It's the year 3157 CE and no people exist any longer. Do you believe that it's a fact that the word "dog" printed in a book has a meaning where it refers to a creature that still exists? Presumably you'd say that the meaning is a "pseudo-property" of something at 3157 CE, correct? What, exactly is it a "pseudo-property" of?

[Terrapin Station]

I probably should have asked you long ago, by the way, if you believe that there are real (in the sense of extramental) abstracts.

[GE Morton]

TP ---

To amplify: Words that denote something have meanings. The things denoted are the meanings. Just as with, "Alfie is Bruno's uncle." Bruno has an uncle, Alfie isthe uncle.

If the symbol groups in Linear A texts denoted things or states of affairs when they were written then they have meanings. We have good reason to think they did. That we don't know those meanings doesn't change that historical fact. The many linguists and ethnographers who have been trying for decades to decipher them have not been wasting their time.