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[Terrapin Station]

Of course "meaning" denotes a relationship, between a word and a thing.

The thing-in-the-world assigned to the word is its meaning.

These are incompatible.

The thing-in-the-world isn't the same thing as a relationship between a word and a thing, is it?

The thing in the world is a dog.

A relationship between the word "dog" and the thing in the world, dog, is different.

So you're proposing two different things with respect to what meaning is. Which one is it?

[Peter Holmes]

Just some observations on this sideline about meaning.

1 What we call meaning isn't a thing of any kind whatsoever. So the question 'what is meaning?' is always already half-way down the rabbit hole.

2 The meaning of something is the explanation we give when asked to explain its meaning. And there are many different kinds or explanation.

3 We use the word 'dog' to talk about the things we call dogs. The meaning of the word 'dog' is not a dog, because a dog is a real thing - a feature of reality - not the meaning of a word.

4 There's no correspondence, or relationship of any kind, between a name and what it names. A name no more corresponds with what it names than an arrow corresponds with its target.

[Terrapin Station]

Well, or at least they're different unless you'd say that another way to write "The thing-in-the-world assigned to the word is its meaning" would be, "Meaning is the relationship between a word and the thing-in-the-world assigned to the word." Then I'd agree that they're the same.

But what you're not answering then is how that works sans minds.

So let's say that we have a word, "rock," and we assign it to a particular "sort" of thing-in-the-world, rocks.

Now, there's some disaster that kills off all life on Earth. That way we can be sure there are no minds to appeal to.

You want to say that despite the disaster, the word "rock" still has a relationship to the thing-in-the-world, rocks. I'm asking you to describe, in detail, how that relationship obtains after the disaster.

Let's say we have the word "rock" in a book. So, now what happens for there to be a relationship between the marks in the book and rocks?

[Terrapin Station]

Just some observations on this sideline about meaning.

1 What we call meaning isn't a thing of any kind whatsoever. So the question 'what is meaning?' is always already half-way down the rabbit hole.

2 The meaning of something is the explanation we give when asked to explain its meaning. And there are many different kinds or explanation.

3 We use the word 'dog' to talk about the things we call dogs. The meaning of the word 'dog' is not a dog, because a dog is a real thing - a feature of reality - not the meaning of a word.

4 There's no correspondence, or relationship of any kind, between a name and what it names. A name no more corresponds with what it names than an arrow corresponds with its target.

So I don't agree with (1). I don't believe anything exists that isn't a "thing" (although maybe you're using some very specific, technical sense of "thing"--in that case you'd have to define the sense you're using). So on my view, if meaning isn't a "thing," there is no meaning, period.

I don't agree with (2), because I don't agree that it makes sense to say that meaning would be identical to some set of sounds or some set of marks on paper, etc. Sounds, marks on paper, etc. can't refer in themselves.

Re (3), you're dismissing denotation or extensional meaning. I don't have any problem with denotation or extensional meaning. I agree with GE Morton that "the denotation of 'dog' is a dog (or dogs collectively)." (I just disagree with him that denotational or extensional meaning can obtain extramentally, because only minds can perform the associations necessary for reference.)

And re (4), the relation is a mental relation. There is that. There's just no way to have the relation obtain extramentally, which is my whole issue here. If one is going to claim that the relation can obtain extramentally, then one is going to be required to explain/demonstrate exactly how the relation would obtain extramentally, in detail. (Not just by reciting a slogan like "'P' iff P" or "'P' is true in L iff P" etc.)--it would be necessary to demonstrate or explain HOW "P" is true in L iff P, extramentally.

[Sculptor1]

Just some observations on this sideline about meaning.

1 What we call meaning isn't a thing of any kind whatsoever. So the question 'what is meaning?' is always already half-way down the rabbit hole.

2 The meaning of something is the explanation we give when asked to explain its meaning. And there are many different kinds or explanation.

3 We use the word 'dog' to talk about the things we call dogs. The meaning of the word 'dog' is not a dog, because a dog is a real thing - a feature of reality - not the meaning of a word.

4 There's no correspondence, or relationship of any kind, between a name and what it names. A name no more corresponds with what it names than an arrow corresponds with its target.

So I don't agree with (1). I don't believe anything exists that isn't a "thing" (although maybe you're using some very specific, technical sense of "thing"--in that case you'd have to define the sense you're using). So on my view, if meaning isn't a "thing," there is no meaning, period.

So this is weird.
How can anything have a meaning on its own?

[Sculptor1]

So I don't agree with (1). I don't believe anything exists that isn't a "thing" (although maybe you're using some very specific, technical sense of "thing"--in that case you'd have to define the sense you're using). So on my view, if meaning isn't a "thing," there is no meaning, period.

You are saying the meaning exists on its own.

Take an apple.

What does an apple mean?

[Terrapin Station]

So I don't agree with (1). I don't believe anything exists that isn't a "thing" (although maybe you're using some very specific, technical sense of "thing"--in that case you'd have to define the sense you're using). So on my view, if meaning isn't a "thing," there is no meaning, period.

So this is weird.
How can anything have a meaning on its own?

The thing that is meaning is a mental state. (In other words, a brain state.)

I agree with you that aside from that, the notion of meaning doesn't make sense.

[Peter Holmes]

Just some observations on this sideline about meaning.

1 What we call meaning isn't a thing of any kind whatsoever. So the question 'what is meaning?' is always already half-way down the rabbit hole.

2 The meaning of something is the explanation we give when asked to explain its meaning. And there are many different kinds or explanation.

3 We use the word 'dog' to talk about the things we call dogs. The meaning of the word 'dog' is not a dog, because a dog is a real thing - a feature of reality - not the meaning of a word.

4 There's no correspondence, or relationship of any kind, between a name and what it names. A name no more corresponds with what it names than an arrow corresponds with its target.

So I don't agree with (1). I don't believe anything exists that isn't a "thing" (although maybe you're using some very specific, technical sense of "thing"--in that case you'd have to define the sense you're using). So on my view, if meaning isn't a "thing," there is no meaning, period.

Do you think the abstract noun meaning is the name of a thing of some kind. Do you think that thing exists in the way that real things exist - or are you equivocating on the word exist? And if you think meaning exists, what is it and where does it exist? In what we call the mind? And what and where does the thing we name with the abstract noun mind exist? That this nonsense of the mental and the extramental still passes muster amazes me.

I don't agree with (2), because I don't agree that it makes sense to say that meaning would be identical to some set of sounds or some set of marks on paper, etc. Sounds, marks on paper, etc. can't refer in themselves.

When we abandon reifying talk about fictional abstract things, such as meaning, we can free ourselves from the delusion that such things are identical to or different from anything.

Re (3), you're dismissing denotation or extensional meaning. I don't have any problem with denotation or extensional meaning. I agree with GE Morton that "the denotation of 'dog' is a dog (or dogs collectively)." (I just disagree with him that denotational or extensional meaning can obtain extramentally, because only minds can perform the associations necessary for reference.)

Denotational and extensional meaning are subsets of the non-existent thing we call meaning. See above.

And re (4), the relation is a mental relation. There is that. There's just no way to have the relation obtain extramentally, which is my whole issue here. If one is going to claim that the relation can obtain extramentally, then one is going to be required to explain/demonstrate exactly how the relation would obtain extramentally, in detail. (Not just by reciting a slogan like "'P' iff P" or "'P' is true in L iff P" etc.)--it would be necessary to demonstrate or explain HOW "P" is true in L iff P, extramentally.

You're stuck with the metaphysical delusion that there's an abstract place - the mind - in which abstract things exist and abstract events occur.

[Peter Holmes]

So this is weird.
How can anything have a meaning on its own?

The thing that is meaning is a mental state. (In other words, a brain state.)

I agree with you that aside from that, the notion of meaning doesn't make sense.

We use the word 'meaning' and its cognates perfectly clearly all the time, in many different contexts.

If by 'mental state' you mean 'brain state', then don't bother with mental states and the distinction between the mental and the extramental.

But then, why is meaning a brain state? More metphysical delusion.

[Terrapin Station]

Do you think the abstract noun meaning is the name of a thing of some kind.

Yes. (Isn't that what I just said?)

Do you think that thing exists in the way that real things exist

Meaning is a mental (brain) state.

Re "real" and "exist," I don't know if you're using "real" in the traditional philosophical sense (so that it refers to extramental things), and "exist" has often been used similarity. You'd have to clarify that.

And if you think meaning exists, what is it and where does it exist?

Again, it's a mental, or a brain state. Brains are in heads, of course.

That this nonsense of the mental and the extramental still passes muster amazes me.

That it's considered nonsense stumps me. It's a very obvious, simple distinction. It's basically like saying brains versus things that aren't brains. You don't think that's nonsense, do you?

When we abandon reifying talk about fictional abstract things, such as meaning, we can free ourselves from the delusion that such things are identical to or different from anything.

Just what do you take abstracts to be, by the way? (I had asked you this before, more or less, and I didn't see you answer.)

Denotational and extensional meaning are subsets of the non-existent thing we call meaning. See above.

Presumably you'd say that meaning is non-existent, but that there is meaning? What would meaning be other than existent then?

You're stuck with the metaphysical delusion that there's an abstract place - the mind - in which abstract things exist and abstract events occur.

Mind isn't abstract. Mind is identical to a subset of brain states. There's nothing abstract about that.

Mind can perform abstractions, but as such, those abstractions are concrete, particular things that minds (subsets of brain states) do.

There's no such thing as an "abstract place."

We use the word 'meaning' and its cognates perfectly clearly all the time, in many different contexts.

I'm not sure why you're introducing this.

If by 'mental state' you mean 'brain state', then don't bother with mental states and the distinction between the mental and the extramental.

No idea what you're saying here, exactly.

But then, why is meaning a brain state? More metphysical delusion.

That's like asking why eruptions are volcano states. It's simply something that volcanoes do, it's a property they have.

With meaning, there doesn't appear to be anything else that can do the task at hand. Nothing else seems to have the relevant properties. Brains do.

[Peter Holmes]

Do you think the abstract noun meaning is the name of a thing of some kind.

Yes. (Isn't that what I just said?)

Okay. And that's where, in my view, the problem starts. Your argument here has been about what and where that supposed thing is. If it's not a thing of any kind, then what and where that thing is - inside or outside brains - is no longer an issue.

Do you think that thing exists in the way that real things exist

Meaning is a mental (brain) state.

I'm reminded of Wittgenstein's joke about opening up someone's head - nowadays we'd use a brain scan - and trying to find thoughts, feelings, intentions - you'd add meanings - and other so-called mental things and events - things such as concepts or ideas. Category error, or what?

Re "real" and "exist," I don't know if you're using "real" in the traditional philosophical sense (so that it refers to extramental things), and "exist" has often been used similarity. You'd have to clarify that.

I'm asking if you use the words 'thing' and 'exist', without equivocation, to talk about what you call mental things and events. Brain states - electrochemical processes - are real and exist, of course.

And if you think meaning exists, what is it and where does it exist?

Again, it's a mental, or a brain state. Brains are in heads, of course.

The word 'mental' comes from 'mind'. If you think that what we call the mind is nothing more than, say, a dynamic brain state, it's multiplying entities and terms unnecessarily - and confusingly - to talk about mental states. And it's fooled you (us) into saying meaning is a thing that exists or goes on 'in the mind'.

That this nonsense of the mental and the extramental still passes muster amazes me.

That it's considered nonsense stumps me. It's a very obvious, simple distinction. It's basically like saying brains versus things that aren't brains. You don't think that's nonsense, do you?

Of course not. Both brains and things that aren't brains are real things. But what and where are minds and mental states - such as thoughts and meanings? I'm just pointing out the delusion of thinking they're real things that exist, in some way, 'in' 'minds', in the way that brains exist in our skulls.

When we abandon reifying talk about fictional abstract things, such as meaning, we can free ourselves from the delusion that such things are identical to or different from anything.

Just what do you take abstracts to be, by the way? (I had asked you this before, more or less, and I didn't see you answer.)

My quarry is supposed abstract things - knowledge, truth, justice, identity, meaning, causation, being, and so on - the whole absurd catalogue of supposed things that metaphysical philosophers have been arguing about for centuries - as though abstract nouns are the names of things of some kind that somehow exist somewhere, and that we can describe. Your belief that meaning is such a thing demonstrates the delusion at work.

Denotational and extensional meaning are subsets of the non-existent thing we call meaning. See above.

Presumably you'd say that meaning is non-existent, but that there is meaning? What would meaning be other than existent then?

Meaning, like other invented abstract things, doesn't 'exist' in the way that brains and electrochemical processes exist. If your answer is that meaning does exist, and that it's a brain state, then that's a category error. Examine any brain state or electrochemical process, and there won't be a menaing in sight, or a thought, or a feeling, or an intention, and so on, and so on.

You're stuck with the metaphysical delusion that there's an abstract place - the mind - in which abstract things exist and abstract events occur.

Mind isn't abstract. Mind is identical to a subset of brain states. There's nothing abstract about that.

Mind can perform abstractions, but as such, those abstractions are concrete, particular things that minds (subsets of brain states) do.

There's no such thing as an "abstract place."

Couldn't agree more - just as there's no such thing as an abstract thing, such as meaning, in that non-existent abstract place we call 'the mind'.

We use the word 'meaning' and its cognates perfectly clearly all the time, in many different contexts.

I'm not sure why you're introducing this.

I was reacting to your claim that, if meanings aren't mental things that exist in minds, there are no such things. I was just pointing out the fact - as Wittgenstein did tirelessly - that, metaphysical confusion notwithstanding, we talk about meanings all the time, oblivious to philosophical contortions.

If by 'mental state' you mean 'brain state', then don't bother with mental states and the distinction between the mental and the extramental.

No idea what you're saying here, exactly.

Sorry. An analogy. If someone says 'God is the universe', it saves time and effort to forget about 'God' and just talk about the universe.

But then, why is meaning a brain state? More metphysical delusion.

That's like asking why eruptions are volcano states. It's simply something that volcanoes do, it's a property they have.

With meaning, there doesn't appear to be anything else that can do the task at hand. Nothing else seems to have the relevant properties. Brains do.

And here's the rub. Volcanoes and eruptions are real things, with an explicable, demonstrable causal connection - though it would be odd to say that volcanoes 'do' eruptions.

The analogy with brains and meanings is hopeless.

[GE Morton]

Just some observations on this sideline about meaning.

1 What we call meaning isn't a thing of any kind whatsoever. So the question 'what is meaning?' is always already half-way down the rabbit hole.

Of course it is. "Thing" is the universal noun. Everything --- anything one may speak of --- is a thing. The use of "thing" is not restricted to concrete objects with spatio-temporal locations. "Love is a many splendored thing" (song), "A mind is a terrible thing to waste," "Things that go bump in the night," etc., etc. Dogs are things, love is a thing, ideas are things, meanings are things.

2 The meaning of something is the explanation we give when asked to explain its meaning. And there are many different kinds or explanation.

We can only explain meanings verbally to someone who is already fluent in the language of the explanation. To teach meanings to pre-verbal people, such as young children, we point to . . . things (usually concrete things). Those are the meanings of the terms we're trying to teach.

3 We use the word 'dog' to talk about the things we call dogs. The meaning of the word 'dog' is not a dog, because a dog is a real thing - a feature of reality - not the meaning of a word.

Meanings are also "features of reality." A meaning is as "real" as a dog. "Reality" is not limited to concrete physical objects. The latter are merely one ontological class of "real" things.

4 There's no correspondence, or relationship of any kind, between a name and what it names. A name no more corresponds with what it names than an arrow corresponds with its target.

Well, now you've fallen down TP's rabbit hole. If there is "no relationship of any kind" between a noun and the thing(s) it names, then communication of information via speech is impossible.

[GE Morton]

Of course "meaning" denotes a relationship, between a word and a thing.

The thing-in-the-world assigned to the word is its meaning.

These are incompatible.

The thing-in-the-world isn't the same thing as a relationship between a word and a thing, is it?

A meaning is also a "thing in the world." E.g., a dog. A dog is a member of the mammalian species canis, and also the meaning of the word, "dog."

But perhaps I should have said, "Meaning connotes a relationship between a word and a thing." "Meaning" is a relational word, implying both a word and the thing the word denotes. Most relational words work that way. E.g., "Alfie is Bruno's uncle." "Uncle" implies a niece or nephew. But Bruno is the uncle.

[Sculptor1]

So this is weird.
How can anything have a meaning on its own?

The thing that is meaning is a mental state. (In other words, a brain state.)

I agree with you that aside from that, the notion of meaning doesn't make sense.

Good. I see. But it was not what you seemed to be saying.
If a thought is a thing, then an idea, a concept and a meaning is a thing.
I think it is worth remembering that such things are no bounded, by co-dependant on many other things concrete or mental or both.

[Sculptor1]

ERROR
For " ... such things are no bounded, by ..."
Read "... such things are not bounded, but ..."