Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 23rd, 2020, 8:52 amEr, no, TP. I claimed that the meanings of words and sentences is mind-independent. The denotational meanings of words and propositions are the things or states-of-affairs they denote. I made no claim that learning those meanings is mind-independent. That Paris is the capital of France is a state-of-affairs-in-the-world, and is independent of anything in anyone's mind. Learning that Paris is the capital of France does, of course, require a sentient creature with a mind. Similarly, a dog is an animal, a thing-in-the-world. That the word "dog" denotes, refers to, that animal must be learned by a sentient creature with a mind.GE Morton wrote: ↑February 22nd, 2020, 8:33 pm Yes, you asked that before and I answered it before. You seem to be asking how learning (of a meaning, a fact, a skill, etc.) works --- how an association is formed between, e.g., a word and something else (a thing-in-the world, another word, a state-of-affairs, etc.). I answered that that is a question for neurophysiologists, not philosophers, though we know it happens in the brain. Is that what you're asking? If not, then I have no idea what you're asking.And I explained in response to that that you can't possibly be appealing to neurophysiology in this because your claim is that it works mind-independently.
Above you say, " . . . your claim is that it works . . ." What "works'? That term is (in this case) a verb, denoting some activity. The only activity I can see relevant to this issue is forming the association between a word and the thing it denotes. I.e., learning what "dog" means. But I made no claims about how forming that association "works," deferring the physiologists.
You seem unable, or unwilling, to acknowledge the difference between knowing something and what is known.