Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

GE Morton, it seems like you want to keep going back to simply endorsing common ways of talking about this stuff, as if that's good enough for ontology.

In my view it's not at all good enough for ontology.

I'm after what is actually going on, in terms of physical details (or if someone would want to assert there are also nonphysical details, they'd need to try to support that, starting with trying to support the very idea that a "nonphysical" existent is coherent). And I do mean details--details of exactly how such and such is supposed to work, where exactly it's supposed to occur (remembering that locations can be complex and discontinuous), what exactly it's supposed to be a property of, etc.

[Terrapin Station]

I don't agree that (all) facts are mental. I'm using "fact" as "state of affairs" (with an understanding that states of affairs are actually dynamic, by the way). Or in other words, I'm using "fact" as a term for "just existing." I'm NOT using "fact" as a term for something like "true proposition."

And all propositions are mental.
A fact is a statement. It is NOT the thing in itself. It might be about a thing, or a state of affairs but the facts are not out there. They are mental states- literal statements ABOUT the world.

I agree that propositions are mental.

As I explained, I do not at all use "fact" to refer to propositions (or statements). Facts ARE things in themselves on my usage--facts are identical to states of affairs. "Fact" is not "true proposition" on my usage. I think that trying to use "fact" to refer to "true proposition" has serious problems.

[Peter Holmes]

Since what we call 'meaning' isn't a thing of any kind whatsoever, it isn't a thing that exists inside or outside minds or brains.

This isn't a view that I at all agree with. I'm a physicalist. I believe that everything extant is matter in the "chunks of stuff" sense, where matter is in dynamic spatio-temporal relations to other matter. There is nothing else on my view. Properties are inseparable from ((dynamic) relations of) matter. Properties are simply what ((dynamic) relations of) matter are "like," the characteristics they have.

I'm also a nominalist in the senses that I think there are only unique particulars, and there are no real (extramental) abstracts. Abstraction is a mental phenomenon, and as such, it's a mental particular that like everything else, amounts to ((dynamic) relations of) matter.

As I explained to you earlier but you never really responded to (well, or at least I didn't see it--I've missed plenty of responses on this board because of the notification system and the way that I check posts), I don't agree with any sort of eliminativist position. "Mind" is what certain brain states are like from the spatio-temporal reference point of being the brain in question. Every single extant has different properties from different spatio-temporal reference points, because properties are identical to ((dynamic) relations of) matter, and every spatio-temporal reference point has unique relations by virtue of being a unique spatio-temporal reference point.

Curious. I'm also a physicalist. And for that reason I think both platonists and nominalists mistake what we say about things for the way things are. And talk of minds and mental things and events demonstrates that. Given your position, what do you think what we call 'meaning' is?

[Terrapin Station]

Curious. I'm also a physicalist. And for that reason I think both platonists and nominalists mistake what we say about things for the way things are. And talk of minds and mental things and events demonstrates that. Given your position, what do you think what we call 'meaning' is?

Meaning is an association that we make, necessarily via a mental act (because nothing else seems to have the properties to make an association). It's similar to, but not exactly the same as intentionality or "aboutness" in this.

It's important to remember that meaning isn't the same thing as what's being associated. It's the associative act itself. If you don't have that, you can't "get at" or "arrive at" meaning--meaning can't obtain without the associative act. What's being associated can't "do anything by itself" when it comes to meaning.

[Terrapin Station]

Curious. I'm also a physicalist. And for that reason I think both platonists and nominalists mistake what we say about things for the way things are. And talk of minds and mental things and events demonstrates that. Given your position, what do you think what we call 'meaning' is?

Your comment about nominalism seems strange to me, by the way, because most people see it as very counterintuitive. People have a difficult time parsing the idea that no numerically distinct things are literally the same.

[Terrapin Station]

What an extraordinary metaphysical delusion it is to think abstract nouns are the names of things of some kind that somehow exist somewhere, and that we can describe.

Also, how do you reconcile this with physicalism? Just what sort of physical things do you believe abstracts are?

[GE Morton]

Just a suggestion. Since what we call 'meaning' isn't a thing of any kind whatsoever, it isn't a thing that exists inside or outside minds or brains.

Oh, no. You're construing "thing" much too narrowly. "Thing" is the universal noun, and can refer to, literally, anything that can be denoted with a word. Ideas, feelings, thoughts, dreams, beliefs, numbers and mathematical sets, categories, theories, etc., etc. --- and meanings --- are all things as much as trees, cats, stars.

What an extraordinary metaphysical delusion it is to think abstract nouns are the names of things of some kind that somehow exist somewhere, and that we can describe.

Even non-existent things are "things." It's true that whatever exists exists somewhere. But "somewhere" is not necessarily a physical location with spatio-temporal coordinates. It is any useful, informative frame of reference; a context. E.g., "Spring is in the air," "I had this idea in mind . . .," "The devil is in the details," Etc.

Meanings have locations too --- they're found in speech communities, and are revealed by the behavior of speakers of language L when presented with a word or phrase or sentence in L.

[GE Morton]

You're claiming that propositions ARE true or false independent of anyone's mind. Now, what you need to do to support that claim is to present an example explaining how a proposition can be true of false independent of anyone's mind. You failed on your first attempt, because you brought in a human observer.

I'm mystified. I just answered that question in the previous exchange. Apparently it went over your head. A proposition P in language L is true IFF s. "s" is the truth condition(s) for P. s denotes some state of affairs in the world. It must be spelled out in a meta-language, L1, in order to avoid the Liar's paradox and similar conundrums. That is the definition of "truth-in-L". s (usually) makes no mention of anything in anyone's mind; what may or may not be in anyone's mind is extraneous to that definition, and is irrelevant.

If you bring in people observing things, making determinations, etc. you're going to get a buzzer, because that's introducing minds into the equation. You need to explain how a proposition is true or false INDEPENDENT of anyone's mind.

I just did. The truth of P is independent of anyone's mind; it is not part of the definition of truth-in-L. Knowing or determining whether P is true requires a mind, but the truth of P does not. P is true (or not) depending only upon whether s exists or not. That's a distinction you seem unable to grasp.

[GE Morton]

It's important to remember that meaning isn't the same thing as what's being associated.

Yes, it is. The meaning of "dog" is ----> [dachsund, collie, spaniel, etc.]. That is, if you want "meaning" to be able to explain language learning and speech communication. Meanings are not in people's heads. Knowledge of meanings is in people's heads. Knowledge of geology is in people's heads. The geology is not.

[Sculptor1]

And all propositions are mental.
A fact is a statement. It is NOT the thing in itself. It might be about a thing, or a state of affairs but the facts are not out there. They are mental states- literal statements ABOUT the world.

I agree that propositions are mental.

As I explained, I do not at all use "fact" to refer to propositions (or statements). Facts ARE things in themselves on my usage--facts are identical to states of affairs. "Fact" is not "true proposition" on my usage. I think that trying to use "fact" to refer to "true proposition" has serious problems.

Facts are propositions about the relationships between things in the world and ideas we share about them.
A fact is a thing know to be so. Knowing is a mental state.

[Sculptor1]

It's important to remember that meaning isn't the same thing as what's being associated.

Yes, it is. The meaning of "dog" is ----> [dachsund, collie, spaniel, etc.]. That is, if you want "meaning" to be able to explain language learning and speech communication. Meanings are not in people's heads. Knowledge of meanings is in people's heads. Knowledge of geology is in people's heads. The geology is not.

Geology is the logos of the earth. Geology is mental. This is a study. Study is a mental state.
The perception of the earth is mental. The idea that there is even such a thing as the earth is mental.
Whilst I agree that there is an external reality, everything we can possibly know about it is mental; every thing we think about it, everything we feel about it, all perceptions of it exist within us as mental constructions.
You are simply wrong-headed to say that geology in not in people's heads. Geology and every thing there is about it, concerned with it, all the conditions that it exists in has a history that can be dated. Before humanity there was nothing like geology.
Whilst I agree that what we call the earth existed before humanity and that there is something that is not humanity that is tangible; all tangibility and all we can possibly know can only be mentally constructed.
Until you really get this you shall continue with your self delusion that something could make morality objective; the most absurd and dangerous idea since Hitler.

[Terrapin Station]

I'm mystified. I just answered that question in the previous exchange. Apparently it went over your head. A proposition P in language L is true IFF s. "s" is the truth condition(s) for P. s denotes some state of affairs in the world. It must be spelled out in a meta-language, L1, in order to avoid the Liar's paradox and similar conundrums. That is the definition of "truth-in-L". s (usually) makes no mention of anything in anyone's mind; what may or may not be in anyone's mind is extraneous to that definition, and is irrelevant.

You being mystified here is a serious problem.

Apparently you didn't understand this comment of mine: "I'm after what is actually going on, in terms of physical details (or if someone would want to assert there are also nonphysical details, they'd need to try to support that, starting with trying to support the very idea that a "nonphysical" existent is coherent). And I do mean details--details of exactly how such and such is supposed to work, where exactly it's supposed to occur (remembering that locations can be complex and discontinuous), what exactly it's supposed to be a property of, etc."

And you're completely overlooking this:

"Okay, so let's say we have ink marks on paper or pixel marks on a screen that look like this: "Paris is the capital of France" (using that one since you liked it earlier--if you want to change it that's fine).

"Is the next step that you want to claim that those ink marks assert something independent of anyone's mind? How do they do that? Describe exactly how that works--and again, it has to be an explanation that's independent of anyone's mind."

The challenge is to DETAIL how P in L is true iff s. Just how does that work, in terms of what physically obtains, where it obtains, etc.? Or again, if you want to claim that it's not a physical matter, you need to support how anything nonphysical obtains (and is a coherent thing to claim in general), plus how exactly it works non-physically.

I'm not looking for the standard slogan. That doesn't tell us anything about what's going on ontologically.

[Terrapin Station]

It's important to remember that meaning isn't the same thing as what's being associated.

Yes, it is. The meaning of "dog" is ----> [dachsund, collie, spaniel, etc.]. That is, if you want "meaning" to be able to explain language learning and speech communication. Meanings are not in people's heads. Knowledge of meanings is in people's heads. Knowledge of geology is in people's heads. The geology is not.

You can't just completely ignore this: "If you don't have that, you can't 'get at' or 'arrive at' meaning--meaning can't obtain without the associative act. What's being associated can't "do anything by itself" when it comes to meaning," as it's simply ignoring the objection in that case. You're required to meet the objection and have an answer for how it works on your account.

[Terrapin Station]

I agree that propositions are mental.

As I explained, I do not at all use "fact" to refer to propositions (or statements). Facts ARE things in themselves on my usage--facts are identical to states of affairs. "Fact" is not "true proposition" on my usage. I think that trying to use "fact" to refer to "true proposition" has serious problems.

Facts are propositions about the relationships between things in the world and ideas we share about them.
A fact is a thing know to be so. Knowing is a mental state.

I understand that you're using the term that way. Do you understand that I'm not using the term that way?

[Sculptor1]

Facts are propositions about the relationships between things in the world and ideas we share about them.
A fact is a thing know to be so. Knowing is a mental state.

I understand that you're using the term that way. Do you understand that I'm not using the term that way?

Yes I understand that perfectly.
This changes nothing.