Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

So you ask 50 people, and at least a few of them say "It is not raining."

Is that no longer an objective proposition then?

The proposition is objective if its truth conditions are public. Whether or not it is raining is a publicly observable state of affairs, ascertainable by looking out a window or stepping outside. If some of your observers step out, come in dripping wet and deny it is raining they are delusional or lying.

[GE Morton]

"Objective proposition" is a bad term for that, though, for a number of reasons. First, usually the "adjective noun" form suggests that the adjective is telling us a property of the noun as an existent. For example, "red ball," "tall man," "reticulated python." In those cases, "red," "tall," and "reticulated" are properties that the noun they modify "possesses." But with "objective proposition," the proposition itself isn't an object or objective. The way you and others are attempting to use this term is akin to saying, "Red book" when the book itself is in no way red, but is rather a book about the color red. If you were to say, "That's a red book" to someone, you shouldn't be surprised when they say, "Red? What are you talking about. My copy of the book has no red. The cover is black with white lettering. The pages are white with black ink."

Or once again, this is an example of use/mention confusion.

No, it isn't. For "objective proposition" the adjective does not denote a natural or perceptible property. It is an imputed property; a pseudo-property imputed to things to mark some external fact about them. The language is rife with such properties, e.g., "Alfie is a married man," "Bruno is a doctor," "Chauncey is the lead actor in Othello", the "Dead Sea Scrolls," etc. "Tall man" is a perceptible property; "married man" is an imputed property. You confirm perceptible properties by examining the subject; to confirm imputed properties you must verify some fact beyond the subject. You can't confirm that the scroll before you came from the Dead Sea by examining the scroll. You need some information as to where it was found.

[Peter Holmes]

Couldn't agree more. And I wonder why this glaringly obvious fact is so hard for many people to grasp.

I agree too. But what is "good" is a question for axiology, not morality.

I find your exclusive demarcation of axiology puzzling. Here's a definition of axiology:

'Axiology (from Greek ἀξία, axia, "value, worth"; and -λογία, -logia) is the philosophical study of value. It is either the collective term for ethics and aesthetics[1], philosophical fields that depend crucially on notions of worth, or the foundation for these fields, and thus similar to value theory and meta-ethics. The term was first used by Paul Lapie, in 1902,[2][3] and Eduard von Hartmann, in 1908.[4][5]

Axiology studies mainly two kinds of values: ethics and aesthetics. Ethics investigates the concepts of "right" and "good" in individual and social conduct. Aesthetics studies the concepts of "beauty" and "harmony." Formal axiology, the attempt to lay out principles regarding value with mathematical rigor, is exemplified by Robert S. Hartman's science of value.'

Can you explain, in simple terms, why you think ethics and morality have nothing to do with questions about value - what people value?

[Terrapin Station]

I answered that question many posts back. The association between a word and a thing --- the thing that is its meaning --- is learned

Non-mentally?

Or otherwise, how does it wind up transferring to non-mental things? So that the association occurs non-mentally?

[Terrapin Station]

No, it isn't. For "objective proposition" the adjective does not denote a natural or perceptible property. It is an imputed property; a pseudo-property imputed to things to mark some external fact about them. The language is rife with such properties, e.g., "Alfie is a married man," "Bruno is a doctor," "Chauncey is the lead actor in Othello", the "Dead Sea Scrolls," etc. "Tall man" is a perceptible property; "married man" is an imputed property. You confirm perceptible properties by examining the subject; to confirm imputed properties you must verify some fact beyond the subject. You can't confirm that the scroll before you came from the Dead Sea by examining the scroll. You need some information as to where it was found.

In all of the examples you're giving, the imputed properties are still properties of the object in question. The man is married. That's a property he has. The scrolls are from the Dead Sea. That's a property they have.

In the case of "objective proposition," "objective" is not a property the proposition itself has. It's a property, if we're realists, of what the proposition is about.

[Terrapin Station]

If some of your observers step out, come in dripping wet and deny it is raining they are delusional or lying.

And "They are delusional or lying" isn't a judgment you're making?

[Terrapin Station]

Whether they agree or not is irrelevant. What makes the proposition objective is the mere fact that they are all basing their verdicts on examination of the rock. That they can't agree merely means they need to examine it more carefully. A proposition is objective if its truth conditions are public, which they are in this case. There is no requirement that all observers agree. A subjective proposition, in contrast, would be, "This rock is beautiful."

"They make their judgment by examining something objective" is different than saying "verifiable by a suitably situated observer."

After all, if no one ever verifies the claim in question, then in what way does it make sense to say that it's verifiable?

Re "a proposition is 'objective' just in case judgments are made about it by examining something extramental" is going to have the problem of "something extramental in whose judgment?" As of course ontological idealists are not going to agree that anyone is ever examining anything extramental.

You're saying that whether they're "suitably situated" isn't a judgment. Well, what decides whether the people in question are "suitably situated" then? Simply whether they verify the proposition? "For any proposition, P, you're suitably situated if you verify it, otherwise you're not suitably situated." That can't be right, can it?

A person is suitably situated if he is in a position to examine the rock --- to inspect it, run tests on it, etc. You're being obtuse, TP.

Per the view of someone claiming the rock to be objective?

[Terrapin Station]

What I was most interested in your addressing was something you completely ignored (though no surprise that you just ignored it:)

Let's say that we have "Paris is the capital of France" written or in sound (like a recording) or something.

Now, what exactly happens for the marks on the paper or the sound to have "true" or "false" assigned to it relative to non-mental things in the world.

Remember, if you say anything that involves people doing things where they need to be mentally active--making observations, making decisions, making judgments, etc. you're going to get a buzzer, because you're claiming that truth ascriptions have NOTHING to do with ANYTHING in people's heads.

So we've got the marks on paper or a computer screen or a sound recording of "Paris is the capital of France." What happens next so that we have a truth-value ascription on your view?

[GE Morton]

I find your exclusive demarcation of axiology puzzling. Here's a definition of axiology:

'Axiology (from Greek ἀξία, axia, "value, worth"; and -λογία, -logia) is the philosophical study of value. It is either the collective term for ethics and aesthetics[1], philosophical fields that depend crucially on notions of worth, or the foundation for these fields, and thus similar to value theory and meta-ethics. The term was first used by Paul Lapie, in 1902,[2][3] and Eduard von Hartmann, in 1908.[4][5]

Axiology studies mainly two kinds of values: ethics and aesthetics. Ethics investigates the concepts of "right" and "good" in individual and social conduct. Aesthetics studies the concepts of "beauty" and "harmony." Formal axiology, the attempt to lay out principles regarding value with mathematical rigor, is exemplified by Robert S. Hartman's science of value.'

Your source is embracing the confounding of values and morality that has plagued the history of philosophy. What is valuable ("good") and what is moral are two entirely different questions. Morality is commonly understood to be concerned with behavior, with how people treat one another, with the rightness or wrongness of acts by moral agents. It is not concerned with whether chocolate ice cream is better than vanilla, or the life of a scholar is "better" than the life of a farmer, or whether extramarital sex is good or bad. Values --- what is deemed good or bad --- are intrinsically subjective. As long as such questions are intermingled with questions about the rightness or wrongness of actions morality will indeed remain subjective.

To be sure, we also apply "good" and "bad" to behaviors. But usually we so deem them because we judge those actions (morally) right or wrong. Whether an act is "bad" is a subjective judgment on our part (we're saying we don't like it). But whether it is wrong can be objective.

Can you explain, in simple terms, why you think ethics and morality have nothing to do with questions about value - what people value?

Morality has something to do with values --- it assumes that people value things, things that enhance their welfare, give them satisfaction, add meaning to their lives. But it does not assume or promote any particular values, all of which are idiosyncratic and relative to particular agents. What is morally relevant is the fact that people value things, not what they value. "Moral values" is an oxymoron.

[Terrapin Station]

Your source is embracing the confounding of values and morality that has plagued the history of philosophy. What is valuable ("good") and what is moral are two entirely different questions. Morality is commonly understood to be concerned with behavior, with how people treat one another, with the rightness or wrongness of acts by moral agents. It is not concerned with whether chocolate ice cream is better than vanilla, or the life of a scholar is "better" than the life of a farmer, or whether extramarital sex is good or bad. Values --- what is deemed good or bad --- are intrinsically subjective. As long as such questions are intermingled with questions about the rightness or wrongness of actions morality will indeed remain subjective.

Oy vey. What you wrote above is confused.

When we're talking about good in a moral context we're not talking about gastronomy, aesthetics, etc.

Good in a moral context is the same thing as "right conduct."

[Terrapin Station]

But whether it is wrong can be objective.

Holy moley are you confused. There's no way to make "morally right"/"morally wrong" objective.

[Peter Holmes]

I find your exclusive demarcation of axiology puzzling. Here's a definition of axiology:

'Axiology (from Greek ἀξία, axia, "value, worth"; and -λογία, -logia) is the philosophical study of value. It is either the collective term for ethics and aesthetics[1], philosophical fields that depend crucially on notions of worth, or the foundation for these fields, and thus similar to value theory and meta-ethics. The term was first used by Paul Lapie, in 1902,[2][3] and Eduard von Hartmann, in 1908.[4][5]

Axiology studies mainly two kinds of values: ethics and aesthetics. Ethics investigates the concepts of "right" and "good" in individual and social conduct. Aesthetics studies the concepts of "beauty" and "harmony." Formal axiology, the attempt to lay out principles regarding value with mathematical rigor, is exemplified by Robert S. Hartman's science of value.'

Your source is embracing the confounding of values and morality that has plagued the history of philosophy. What is valuable ("good") and what is moral are two entirely different questions. Morality is commonly understood to be concerned with behavior, with how people treat one another, with the rightness or wrongness of acts by moral agents. It is not concerned with whether chocolate ice cream is better than vanilla, or the life of a scholar is "better" than the life of a farmer, or whether extramarital sex is good or bad. Values --- what is deemed good or bad --- are intrinsically subjective. As long as such questions are intermingled with questions about the rightness or wrongness of actions morality will indeed remain subjective.

To be sure, we also apply "good" and "bad" to behaviors. But usually we so deem them because we judge those actions (morally) right or wrong. Whether an act is "bad" is a subjective judgment on our part (we're saying we don't like it). But whether it is wrong can be objective.

Can you explain, in simple terms, why you think ethics and morality have nothing to do with questions about value - what people value?

Morality has something to do with values --- it assumes that people value things, things that enhance their welfare, give them satisfaction, add meaning to their lives. But it does not assume or promote any particular values, all of which are idiosyncratic and relative to particular agents. What is morally relevant is the fact that people value things, not what they value. "Moral values" is an oxymoron.

I'm sorry, but I find this explanation unconvincing. We make value-judgements about different things, for sure. But they remain value-judgements, and are therefore subjective - matters of opinion or belief. And because of this, there's no substantial difference between a moral value-judgement and, say, an aesthetic one; 'this action is morally good' and 'this painting is beautiful' are equally subjective, and they equally lack truth-value, because moral goodness and aesthetic beauty aren't objective properties of features of reality. Rather, we use these signs to express opinions about things.

Your analysis is contradictory: 'Morality has something to do with values', but '"Moral values" is an oxymoron'. Of course, the word 'morality' is morally neutral - who ever thought it wasn't? But what could moral discourse consist of if it isn't talk about moral rightness and wrongness, and the value-judgements that inform such talk?

[Steve3007]

If somebody on the News says "The Whitehouse has released a statement", we don't all say "Huh?!? How can a house, whatever its colour, release a statement?". We understand what that shorthand means.

A more obscure one, in Britain, is to say "Number 10 has released a statement".

"How can an abstract concept like a number think or speak, let alone release a statement?" I say for sh!ts and giggles. A lot of linguistic humour seems to be based on deliberately taking English language constructs too literally. So I guess in philosophy comedy clubs the stand-up might say:

"I heard somebody making an 'objective proposition' the other day. Huh? How can a mental construct like a proposition be reified into an object? What's that about?"

I'm sure that would bring the house down.

[Steve3007]

Also, the other day I smoked a languid cigarette and went to the pub for a cheeky drink. (Transferred epithet.)

[Peter Holmes]

If somebody on the News says "The Whitehouse has released a statement", we don't all say "Huh?!? How can a house, whatever its colour, release a statement?". We understand what that shorthand means.

A more obscure one, in Britain, is to say "Number 10 has released a statement".

"How can an abstract concept like a number think or speak, let alone release a statement?" I say for sh!ts and giggles. A lot of linguistic humour seems to be based on deliberately taking English language constructs too literally. So I guess in philosophy comedy clubs the stand-up might say:

"I heard somebody making an 'objective proposition' the other day. Huh? How can a mental construct like a proposition be reified into an object? What's that about?"

I'm sure that would bring the house down.

Can you spell out what you mean? Are you saying the expression 'objective proposition' contains a transferred epithet? And are you making a point about the supposed objectivity of morality - that moral opinions can be independent from opinion?