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[GE Morton]

That which is indicated cannot be observed, thus, a form of knowledge that is applicable is 'comprehension'. The term empirically incomprehensible simply indicates that that which is indicated cannot be comprehended using empirical science.

There still seems to be a language problem. We don't "comprehend" anything via empirical science. Empirical science delivers data; we apprehend that data. Comprehension involves discerning relationships among and implications of that data. Before we can comprehend anything, we need some data to consider. Comprehension is not an alternative source of information; it is the understanding of information acquired by empirical means.

My argument is that pain, caused by a disease or otherwise, is necessarily preceded by valuing (implication).

What could possibly be the basis for that claim? What "valuing" precedes the pain when I'm suddenly stung by bee? I suspect anyone stung by a bee would be puzzled when told some "valuing" on his part preceded the sting. He would have no idea what you're talking about. Neither do I.

It can be implied that for valuing to be possible it requires a distinguish ability (implication).

We've covered this. It requires the ability to distinguish, for example, between sweet and sour. But that we deem the sweet cream "good" and the sour cream "bad" requires no further distinctions. The goodness and badness are not additional properties of the cream; they're subjective, arbitrary labels we apply to denote our opinions of sweet vs. sour cream.

Because something cannot give rise to itself, "good" per se cannot be valued.

There is no such thing as "good per se." That is a meaningless expression. "Good" is not an entity or a property of any entity; it is only a label denoting our approval of or satisfaction with something.

By the nature of valuing, "good" cannot be valued and thus cannot be proven to exist using empirical science.

Well, I agree it cannot be valued; one cannot place a value on nothingness. And if the existence of this "good" cannot be proven via empirical science you'll need to set forth some other methodology for proving it before you'll be able to persuade anyone to take it seriously.

The notion that there may be means of gaining knowledge other than via the senses --- "extrasensory perception --- is nothing new, of course. Various religions and mystical philosophies have so assumed, claiming that this latent "faculty" may be awakened by prayer, fasting, self-abnegation, psychedelic drugs, hypnosis, etc. So far no devotee of any of these ESP strategies has produced any useful knowledge, as far as I know.

I presume that the suggested imply-ability is essentially a form of logic outside the scope of the senses. I do not agree that it would be mystical.

Logic does not yield knowledge-of-the-world. It is only a tool to help us think and speak coherently about the knowledge we gain empirically.

[psyreporter]

That which is indicated cannot be observed, thus, a form of knowledge that is applicable is 'comprehension'. The term empirically incomprehensible simply indicates that that which is indicated cannot be comprehended using empirical science.

There still seems to be a language problem. We don't "comprehend" anything via empirical science. Empirical science delivers data; we apprehend that data. Comprehension involves discerning relationships among and implications of that data. Before we can comprehend anything, we need some data to consider. Comprehension is not an alternative source of information; it is the understanding of information acquired by empirical means.

It doesn't matter that a (sub-)process is involved to result in comprehension, or that during the process of empirical science one apprehends the data-aspect that is involved (that would merely be so from the perspective of the scientist, until he/she discovers an insight that results in comprehension ability: eureka).

Comprehension is the functional end result of "empirical science". When empirical science has investigated something and published the results, that what was investigated can be comprehended (i.e. by other people). It is the functional result for which empirical science has been adapted in the human realm.

The data or 'information' that is required hints at the fact that empirical science if founded in a historical context. Before the pursued comprehension can be achieved, it requires events to have taken place, for information to have been received.

My argument is that pain, caused by a disease or otherwise, is necessarily preceded by valuing (implication).

What could possibly be the basis for that claim? What "valuing" precedes the pain when I'm suddenly stung by bee? I suspect anyone stung by a bee would be puzzled when told some "valuing" on his part preceded the sting. He would have no idea what you're talking about. Neither do I.

On a deeper level, there is something that precedes that pain. There is a value element involved. One considers (that what causes) pain as "bad". How is that possible?

It must be implied that an element of valuing is involved for pain to be possible. That what causes pain is considered "bad". But pain also implies something else, that the valuing by an individual, while as such has a subjective element, originates from something that is real. A universal "good".

Almost all animals will respond as if "stung by a bee" when they are stung by a bee. They all appear to feel pain based on a similar value proposition: that a bee-sting is "bad" and should have been prevented, that one should be alert or that special care is needed.

There is evidence that pain can be thought away.

The brain sees these signals as dangerous, but if we teach the brain that these signals aren’t actually dangerous, the brain flips off those signals, and the pain goes away.”

The Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Lab at CU Boulder is wrapping up the largest study of its kind for a way to treat chronic back pain (CBP)—a treatment without surgery or drugs—but instead a change in the pain-sufferers’ thinking.

(2019) Is it possible to think pain away?
https://www.colorado.edu/asmagazine/201 ... -pain-away

By thinking differently (e.g. stoicism), people can feel differently, even pain. That is clear evidence that the valuing that precedes pain is actual and not something that is built in (hard wired).

Pain, while experienced by all animals with an apparent similar value proposition with regard to the cause of pain being "bad", can be experienced differently by using a thinking technique.

On a deeper level there is a aspect of valuing involved that enables living beings to consider that what causes pain as intrinsically bad.

It can be implied that for valuing to be possible it requires a distinguish ability (implication).

We've covered this. It requires the ability to distinguish, for example, between sweet and sour. But that we deem the sweet cream "good" and the sour cream "bad" requires no further distinctions. The goodness and badness are not additional properties of the cream; they're subjective, arbitrary labels we apply to denote our opinions of sweet vs. sour cream.

Denoted "good" is something else. It is a mental concept that has been valued before it can be denoted. The valuing that precedes it is what I intended to indicate. The valuing that precedes pain.

Because something cannot give rise to itself, "good" per se cannot be valued.

There is no such thing as "good per se." That is a meaningless expression. "Good" is not an entity or a property of any entity; it is only a label denoting our approval of or satisfaction with something.

It was implicated that for valuing to be possible, it requires distinguish ability and that by the nature of value (good vs bad) it derives that ability from what can be indicated as "good". That good can be named "good" per se to distinguish between denoted good and the good that precedes valuing.

If the "good" per se could be anything other than that what it is considered to be per se, it would need to have been valued and that is impossible by the implication that something cannot give rise to itself. Therefor "good" per se can be implied to be real by logic.

By the nature of valuing, "good" cannot be valued and thus cannot be proven to exist using empirical science.

Well, I agree it cannot be valued; one cannot place a value on nothingness. And if the existence of this "good" cannot be proven via empirical science you'll need to set forth some other methodology for proving it before you'll be able to persuade anyone to take it seriously.

The nature of value is to make a distinction between good and bad. The good that it allows to be conceptualized is denoted good. That what precedes valuing cannot be denoted because of the implication that something (valuing) cannot give rise to itself.

I presume that the suggested imply-ability is essentially a form of logic outside the scope of the senses. I do not agree that it would be mystical.

Logic does not yield knowledge-of-the-world. It is only a tool to help us think and speak coherently about the knowledge we gain empirically.

I do not agree. If the acquisition of comprehensible knowledge is the functional result by which empirical science derives its raison d'être. Actionable knowledge provides a foundation for wisdom. For knowledge to be actionable, its primary quality must be comprehensibility.

Comprehensible knowledge acquired by (philosophically) verified logic may be of similar value, for example for non-subjective morality.

[GE Morton]

The data or 'information' that is required hints at the fact that empirical science if founded in a historical context. Before the pursued comprehension can be achieved, it requires events to have taken place, for information to have been received.

Now you're repeating what I said. Previously you were using "comprehension" as though it was an alternative source of knowledge.

On a deeper level, there is something that precedes that pain. There is a value element involved.

So you keep saying, but present no analysis or evidence of this "deeper level," or for this "something" you claim. There is a "value element" involved, but that follows the pain; it doesn't precede it. Most people (but not everyone) find pain unpleasant, undesirable. Hence they label it "bad."

One considers (that what causes) pain as "bad". How is that possible?

Well, it is possible because "bad" is the term we use to characterize things we don't like (and "good" the term we use to characterize things we like). There is nothing mysterious about it.

It must be implied that an element of valuing is involved for pain to be possible.

"implied" is a logical term. "Pain" is the conscious awareness of a class of neural signals warning that some injury has been inflicted on the body. Please set forth some argument showing how you logically derive a "value element" from that physiological/neurological process.

That what causes pain is considered "bad".

Most pains, by most people. But not all pains for all people.

. . . pain also implies something else, that the valuing by an individual, while as such has a subjective element, originates from something that is real. A universal "good".

Well, the first part there is true enough; most value judgments are provoked by something real. Those judgments are, after all of something. But (again) "implies" is a logical term. Please set forth, formally, the derivation of "There exists a universal good" from, "This bee sting hurts," and "I don't like this pain." Since you can't derive universal propositions from existential ones, or value statements from empirical ones, that argument should be interesting.

Almost all animals will respond as if "stung by a bee" when they are stung by a bee. They all appear to feel pain based on a similar value proposition: that a bee-sting is "bad" and should have been prevented, that one should be alert or that special care is needed.

Most animals react to a bee sting as though it is unpleasant. But they don't have the concepts of "good" and "bad" and don't make value judgments. They just react.

By thinking differently (e.g. stoicism), people can feel differently, even pain. That is clear evidence that the valuing that precedes pain is actual and not something that is built in (hard wired). Pain, while experienced by all animals with an apparent similar value proposition with regard to the cause of pain being "bad", can be experienced differently by using a thinking technique.

You may not have noticed, but no valuing is involved in that phenomenon. Experiencing, perceiving, is not valuing.

Denoted "good" is something else.

Now we have "denoted good" and "real good"?

It is a mental concept that has been valued before it can be denoted. The valuing that precedes it is what I intended to indicate. The valuing that precedes pain.

*Sigh*. You've provided no evidence that any "valuing" precedes the pain experienced from a bee sting.

This discussion seems to be going nowhere, arjand. Time, I think, to break it off.

[Sculptor1]

Thing of it is that most scientists worth their salt do not distress themselves with explanations in terms of purpose. Why always leads to why, why, why. Science is about describing the world. Explanations are emergent properties of the best descriptions.
Empirical investigations offer increasingly detailed descriptions and clearer explanations. Nothing in the realm has anything to do with "goodness" or "badness", these things are not empirical, they are conceptual.
Values of these kinds exist in the fantasy realm of the human mind, and any empirical observations made by "science" concerning the consequences of these fantasies do not establish them as empirically sound things for study, but can only take them on as human assumptions (false factors); and through those examine the costs of these fantasies to human society. Here the disciplines of anthropology and psychology have many interesting insights, but there is nothing that the science of the real can speak on.
If there were no humans there would be no good or evil.

I would disagree.

Then we have nothing whatever to say to one another.

[GE Morton]

If the person is using correspondence or consensus, then one side of the comparative judgment they're making is public, the publicly observable facts they're looking at, but the proposition isn't public, and the judgment the person makes about the relationship of the proposition to those publicly observable facts (which is what truth is) isn't public.

Of course the proposition is public. The proposition is asserted in a publicly-viewable written or spoken sentence, and interpreted according to a semantics common to speaker and hearers --- which we know by observing the latter's responses and behaviors. The judgment is not public (it is an internal "mental" process), but that is immaterial. We're only concerned with the results of that judgment --- propositions uttered and observable behaviors. What goes on in another person's mind is inaccessible to anyone else and irrelevant to to the truth or falsity of any proposition he utters.

Again, the propositions "Alfie values the bicycle," and, "The bicycle contributes to Alfie's quality of life," both have public truth conditions and are therefore objective. No one's mental states have anything to do with it.

Nope. First off, "Alfie values the bicycle" has no meaning if we're not talking about mental states. Meaning is a mental state. Meaning isn't publicly available.

No, meaning --- denotational meaning --- is not a "mental state." If meanings were "mental states" then since no one can observe or otherwise experience another's mental states we could never know whether a meaning I attach to X is the same as anyone else's. But we obviously do know that (usually) they are the same. As mentioned, if I hand you the salt shaker in response to your request, "Please pass the salt," then we are clearly attaching the same meanings to those terms --- in the only relevant sense.

Secondly, "Alfie values the bicycle" is about Alfie's mental states.

No, it is not. It is about Alfie's publicly observable behavior with respect to the bicycle. If Alfie invests time and effort in acquiring the bicycle, makes uses of it in his daily activities, complains when it is lost or damaged and seeks to repair or recover it, then it has value to him. What "mental" processes may mediate or trigger those behaviors is irrelevant to that question.

There's no non-mental fact re something contributing to someone's "quality of life."

Assessments of someone's quality of life are based entirely upon observable, non-mental facts about that person, namely, the activities that occupy his time and energies and his success in attaining the goals sought through those activities, along with the public statements he makes concerning his quality of life. There is no need to read anyone's mind to assess their quality of life.

Thirdly, truth conditions are a matter of making a judgment about the relationship of a proposition, which is a mental state, to something else . . .

Er, no. A proposition is not a "mental state." That last sentence is a proposition. You can interpret it, understand it, without knowing anything about my, or anyone else's, mental state.

. . . the exact something else depends on the truth theory the judgment-maker is using on the occasion in question. It could be publicly observable facts, it could be the set of other propositions they assigned "true" to, etc.

The truth conditions applicable to any given proposition are implied by the structure and content of the proposition, and will be immediately understood by anyone fluent in the language in which the proposition is expressed.

[Terrapin Station]

Since we're doing rounds of disagreements about the same things, I'm just doing one thing at a time. My goal isn't rounds of disagreements. I rather hate doing that.

Of course the proposition is public.

No it isn't. The proposition is a meaning, and meanings aren't public.

The proposition is asserted in a publicly-viewable written or spoken sentence,

The expression correlated with the proposition is public, sure.

and interpreted according to a semantics common to speaker and hearers

Interpretation and semantics (meaning) are mental phenomena in individuals' heads. As such, they're not identical from individual to individual (because nominalism has things right), and they're not sharable, in a show and tell manner, as meaning or interpretation, but only as sound or text strings correlated to meaning and interpretation.

--- which we know by observing the latter's responses and behaviors.

People interpret responses/behaviors. Those interpretations are mental phenomena in individuals' heads. Behavior isn't the same thing as meaning, of course.

What goes on in another person's mind is inaccessible to anyone else and irrelevant to to the truth or falsity of any proposition he utters.

No. Completely wrong. Truth value is a judgment in an individual's head. I just explained all of this.

[psyreporter]

Now you're repeating what I said. Previously you were using "comprehension" as though it was an alternative source of knowledge.

I stated the following: Comprehension could be usable, for example for non-subjective morality. It would require a level of acceptance, but what I intended to indicate, the scientific model was also invented by philosophy and accepted into the human realm based on a decision to do so.

Usable, like knowledge.

On a deeper level, there is something that precedes that pain. There is a value element involved.

So you keep saying, but present no analysis or evidence of this "deeper level," or for this "something" you claim. There is a "value element" involved, but that follows the pain; it doesn't precede it. Most people (but not everyone) find pain unpleasant, undesirable. Hence they label it "bad."

The pain itself is already a result from valuing. This is evident from the fact that before one can consider pain bad, that what caused it must have been valued as such before the pain signal is sent to the mind, or before the organism developed the applicable senses.

With a "deeper level" I meant to investigate further, for example to have a look at a broader perspective, by noting that all animals share a similar value proposition with regard to pain. Or, alternatively, to note that for senses to have been developed that the organism must have valued that which it sensed as bad.

The simple logic that something cannot give rise to itself could be considered factual logic or logical truth.

On the basis of the stated factual logic it is possible to state that valuing must have preceded the senses. I consider this logical evidence.

Well, it is possible because "bad" is the term we use to characterize things we don't like (and "good" the term we use to characterize things we like). There is nothing mysterious about it.

Well, how about the liking itself? Is that not a bit mysterious? Why could one like anything at all? Here also the previous stated factual logic or logical truth is applicable. Valuing must precede the ability to like.

It must be implied that an element of valuing is involved for pain to be possible.

"implied" is a logical term. "Pain" is the conscious awareness of a class of neural signals warning that some injury has been inflicted on the body. Please set forth some argument showing how you logically derive a "value element" from that physiological/neurological process.

The factual logic argument is evidence that a random physiological/neurological process cannot be the origin of pain or for example of consciousness.

Pain, like other senses, is part of consciousness. The problem that is being addressed in this discussion is essentially the "hard problem".

. . . pain also implies something else, that the valuing by an individual, while as such has a subjective element, originates from something that is real. A universal "good".

Well, the first part there is true enough; most value judgments are provoked by something real. Those judgments are, after all of something. But (again) "implies" is a logical term. Please set forth, formally, the derivation of "There exists a universal good" from, "This bee sting hurts," and "I don't like this pain." Since you can't derive universal propositions from existential ones, or value statements from empirical ones, that argument should be interesting.

The "something real" that is indicated is relative only to that which enables the (presumed) valuing that precedes the senses. The non-subjective element is thereby a universal element which gives it a different quality than for example the consideration that pain is relative to a "real cause".

Valuing is making a distinction between good and bad. Bad isn't of substance. Bad is what lessens good. As such, one does not choose but 'value'.

Since bad is not of substance, there is just "good". For valuing to be possible, it appropriates the ability to distinguish from that what can be indicated as "good" per se.

"good" per se must be real due to the fact that, by the factual logic that something cannot give rise to itself (implication), valuing must have preceded the senses. That same factual logic also implies that "good" per se cannot be valued, and thus, that it cannot be empirically comprehended.

"good" per se could be observed in the form of beauty. It is real but the origin cannot be empirically comprehended. Beauty appears to be subjective, but there appears to be a non-subjective and universal element involved that kept philosophers busy until today. It matches the situation of morality.

Denoted "good" is something else.

Now we have "denoted good" and "real good"?

The result of valuing is denoted good. For pain, it means that denoted good indicates that which is required to not feel pain.

"good" per se can be implied to be real by the previous logical evidence.

[GE Morton]

Of course the proposition is public.

No it isn't. The proposition is a meaning, and meanings aren't public.

And,

Interpretation and semantics (meaning) are mental phenomena in individuals' heads. As such, they're not identical from individual to individual (because nominalism has things right), and they're not sharable, in a show and tell manner, as meaning or interpretation, but only as sound or text strings correlated to meaning and interpretation.

And,

What goes on in another person's mind is inaccessible to anyone else and irrelevant to to the truth or falsity of any proposition he utters.

No. Completely wrong. Truth value is a judgment in an individual's head. I just explained all of this.

You don't seem to grasp the implications of the above assertions. They lead to a reductio ad absurdum. If meanings, semantics, truth values are are not public but only "phenomena in individuals' heads," then communication is impossible. Since I can never know what is going on your head I can't know the meanings you attach to anything you say, and you can't know any of mine. All linguistic communication becomes gibberish.

But, of course, we do communicate, meaningfully and effectively, constantly. Nor do we need to know anything about what is going on in someone's head to do so.

You need to abandon the solipsistic definitions you've adopted for those terms and replace them with new ones that render them useful for explaining the relationship between cognitive propositions and reality.

[Terrapin Station]

You don't seem to grasp the implications of the above assertions. They lead to a reductio ad absurdum. If meanings, semantics, truth values are are not public but only "phenomena in individuals' heads," then communication is impossible.

Nope. What's impossible is what mistaken beliefs take communication to be.Communication isn't literally transferring a meaning to someone else. etc. a la passing a football to someone else.

Since I can never know what is going on your head I can't know the meanings you attach to anything you say, and you can't know any of mine. All linguistic communication becomes gibberish.

Not at all.That's only on a view that amounts to "I can only conceive of communication as literally passing meanings to other people a la passing a football, and I'm not going to bother thinking about alternate views of how it could work."

It's not gibberish because as individuals, we parse utterances, gestures, etc. so that as well as we can do so, we make sense out of others' behavior by applying consistent, coherent meanings in the manner of piecing together a puzzle. Of course, this doesn't always work--but it does often enough, because people don't behave completely randomly.

You need to abandon the solipsistic definitions you've adopted for those terms and replace them with new ones that render them useful for explaining the relationship between cognitive propositions and reality.

I couldn't care less about definitions and the exact terms we're using. What I care is what's going on ontologically. And whatever we want to call something like meaning, it's only occurring in individuals' brains and it can't be made into another sort of phenomena that's publicly passable like a football.

You're welcome to argue against my views, of course, but to do so effectively you need to actually understand them and not say something so facile as "communication wouldn't be possible then," as if I just made up my views yesterday and never thought of that, lol.

[GE Morton]

Nope. What's impossible is what mistaken beliefs take communication to be.Communication isn't literally transferring a meaning to someone else. etc. a la passing a football to someone else.

Oh, I fully agree. But then, I've never claimed any such thing. What is transferred via linguistic communication is information, not meanings. The person receiving the information already knows the meanings of the words employed to convey it (else no information would be conveyed). Those meanings, BTW, are public --- they are what is found in any dictionary. What is in the speaker's and hearer's heads is knowledge of those meanings. Knowledge of a meaning is not the meaning, any more than knowledge of a state of affairs is the state of affairs.

Since I can never know what is going on your head I can't know the meanings you attach to anything you say, and you can't know any of mine. All linguistic communication becomes gibberish.

Not at all.That's only on a view that amounts to "I can only conceive of communication as literally passing meanings to other people a la passing a football, and I'm not going to bother thinking about alternate views of how it could work."

Oh, no. It holds for any view that conceives meanings as "something in someone's head." Either the meanings of the terms in a language are public, objective, learnable and understood by all fluent speakers of the language, or communication --- transference of information --- is impossible with that language.

It's not gibberish because as individuals, we parse utterances, gestures, etc. so that as well as we can do so, we make sense out of others' behavior by applying consistent, coherent meanings in the manner of piecing together a puzzle.

If meanings are things in people's heads Alfie will have no means of determining whether his meanings are consistent with Bruno's. But he can tell by Bruno's behavior that Bruno knows the (objective) meaning of, "Please pass the salt."

I couldn't care less about definitions and the exact terms we're using. What I care is what's going on ontologically.

Nothing is going on "ontologically." There is no ontological issue here. It's only a question of conceptual analysis.

[Peter Holmes]

If meanings are things in people's heads Alfie will have no means of determining whether his meanings are consistent with Bruno's. But he can tell by Bruno's behavior that Bruno knows the (objective) meaning of, "Please pass the salt."

Nothing is going on "ontologically." There is no ontological issue here. It's only a question of conceptual analysis.

Just a sidebar on this absorbing conversation - apologies for the disturbance.

It seems to me we're still struggling with the legacy of substance-dualism that's left deep marks on language and, therefore, how we talk about how we talk: that there are things going on 'in our heads', or mental things in or going on 'in our minds'. They're mysteries invented to explain mysteries of our own invention. A dog chasing its tail needs to re-think the premise.

I agree with GEM - and Wittgenstein - that the facts are all out in the open, and so glaringly obvious that we can't see them. (Sorry, GEM, if that misrepresents your position or its nuances.)

(Needless to say, what we've called 'conceptual analysis' isn't the analysis or description of supposed things in our heads or minds.)

[Terrapin Station]

I'm only doing one issue at a time, because my goal is to clear issues up--at least re understanding of each others' views, so we don't have to keep going over the same stuff again and again. I hate doing that.

Those meanings, BTW, are public --- they are what is found in any dictionary.

What's found in a dictionary is a set of ink marks on paper, or if online, and we're talking about what's on a computer screen, a set of pixel activations, etc. Meaning isn't the same thing as ink marks on paper.

[GE Morton]

What's found in a dictionary is a set of ink marks on paper, or if online, and we're talking about what's on a computer screen, a set of pixel activations, etc.

You're confounding the "is" of composition with the "is" of definition (there is also the "is" of predication). "A dictionary is a compilation of words and their meanings," and "A dictionary is a set of ink marks on paper," are not mutually exclusive, i.e., that the latter may be true does not render the former false. (U. T. Place, 1956).

http://andrei.clubcisco.ro/cursuri/5mas ... rocess.pdf

BTW, the Iliad, Moby Dick, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, and the U.S. Constitution are also sets of ink marks on paper. But if you would suggest that fact descriptively exhausts those works you're probably trying to evade some substantive issue with them.

Meaning isn't the same thing as ink marks on paper.

You're right. The meaning of a denotative word is its referent. E.g., the meaning of "asterisk" is *.

[Terrapin Station]

You're confounding the "is" of composition with the "is" of definition (there is also the "is" of predication). "A dictionary is a compilation of words and their meanings," and "A dictionary is a set of ink marks on paper," are not mutually exclusive, i.e., that the latter may be true does not render the former false. (U. T. Place, 1956).

"A dictionary is . . . meanings" via how people think about it, which is just my point. Outside of minds, in terms of what exists on the page, where things exist, what they're properties of, dictionaries are paper with ink marks.

I'm focusing on composition because that's exactly what I'm talking about--what things are ontically, where they're located, what they're properties of, etc. That's what's at issue here.

[GE Morton]

I'm focusing on composition because that's exactly what I'm talking about--what things are ontically, where they're located, what they're properties of, etc. That's what's at issue here.

No, it isn't the issue. The issue is what meaning must be given "meaning" --- what it must denote --- in order for the word to be functional in communication. It does not denote marks on paper or anything in anyone's head.

You need to deal with the reductio ad absurdum pointed out earlier.