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[psyreporter]

You stubbornly ignore the problem for your thesis posed by the subjectivity of "good" and "evil," the ubiquitous fact that the same thing can be deemed "good" or "evil" by different persons, and that there is no objective method of resolving such disagreements. Natural properties of things do not behave that way.

"Goodness" does not exist until that pseudo-property is imputed to something by a valuer. Different valuers may impute "goodness" and "badness" to the same things.

While the valuing of good and evil is relative to an individual, that which precedes the valuing (by the senses) may imply-ably be considered real and as such add an element that is non-subjective.

As an example, pain is relative to an individual but it is imply-ably considered to have a non-subjective origin. This origin, by the nature of value, must be "good".

It may be possible to unlock the ability to formulate non-subjective morality by discovering a philosophical method to imply-ably comprehend "good".

[psyreporter]

Why does life has meaning (value)?

It doesn't. At least, no "transcendental," mystical meaning. "Meaning," like "value," is a subject-dependent and subject-relative term. Something can only have a meaning to someone. Life, like everything else, has whatever meaning each living, sentient creature imputes to it, which will differ from one sentient creature to another.

When "good" can be imply-ably comprehended, it may be possible to discover the value / meaning of life.

[Terrapin Station]

What does "empirically comprehensible/empirically incomprehensible" refer to, exactly? I don't know what those terms are saying.

Empirical implies that eventualization must have taken place before what is applicable can be contextualized.

That just makes the idea murkier. Eventualization?? What is that supposed to be?

And "before what is applicable can be contextualized"?? Applicable to what?

It is therefor founded in a historical context which implies that something must have preceded that cannot be empirically comprehended.

Say what? I'm asking for an explanation of what "empirical comprehensible" is and you're using "empirically comprehended" in the explanation.

[GE Morton]

My argument is that what precedes the senses, the indicated "good", may be imply-ably comprehensible.

The only sense I can make of that is that we may conjecture that there is an external "good" which gives rise to our judgments of "good." Is that what you mean by "imply-able"?

Well, of course we may conjecture that; we can conjecture anything we can imagine. But it is an idle conjecture, since we have no means of verifying it.

And you continue to ignore the subjectivity problem.

[GE Morton]

While the valuing of good and evil is relative to an individual, that which precedes the valuing (by the senses) may imply-ably be considered real and as such add an element that is non-subjective.

Of course there is something "real" which precedes evaluation. The terms "good" and "bad" always have some object to which they are applied, and those objects will have a variety of objective properties. It is those properties, one of them or some combination of them, that elicits the evaluation. But "good" and "bad" are not among those properties; they are judgments applied by valuers to those properties. And they may differ from one valuer to another.

As an example, pain is relative to an individual but it is imply-ably considered to have a non-subjective origin. This origin, by the nature of value, must be "good".

Pain "must be good"? What a strange claim. Methinks you have invented your own definition of "good."

It may be possible to unlock the ability to formulate non-subjective morality by discovering a philosophical method to imply-ably comprehend "good".

There is no "comprehending" of "good," in any sense other than understanding the meaning of the term. As I said, you seem to have given that term a meaning of your own.

[psyreporter]

Empirical implies that eventualization must have taken place before what is applicable can be contextualized.

That just makes the idea murkier. Eventualization?? What is that supposed to be?

And "before what is applicable can be contextualized"?? Applicable to what?[/quote]

Empirical comprehension depends on events that have taken place. It is the contextualization of information that is received by means of the senses, e.g. observation. Thus, it can be said that what is comprehended empirically has been eventualized, similar to the term materialized but then constructed out of observed events in time.

The "what" is that which is empirically comprehended, the information received by the senses. The term received also hints at the historical context.

[psyreporter]

My argument is that what precedes the senses, the indicated "good", may be imply-ably comprehensible.

The only sense I can make of that is that we may conjecture that there is an external "good" which gives rise to our judgments of "good." Is that what you mean by "imply-able"?

Well, of course we may conjecture that; we can conjecture anything we can imagine. But it is an idle conjecture, since we have no means of verifying it.

And you continue to ignore the subjectivity problem.

External should be replaced with non-empirically comprehensible. It does not imply that it is external.

Imply-able is merely a suggestion. It may make it possible to determine truth based on implications. For example, when you feel pain, that is real. Using implications, it may be possible to comprehend the underlying nature that precedes it.

Imply-ability would be a different way of perception, it would be a philosophical perspective, but it may be possible to achieve a similar reliability as with empirical science.

Empirical science has been adapted because of its functionality, not because it was accurate in determining truth. The same may be possible for a philosophical method to achieve non-subjective morality.

[Terrapin Station]

Empirical implies that eventualization must have taken place before what is applicable can be contextualized.

That just makes the idea murkier. Eventualization?? What is that supposed to be?

And "before what is applicable can be contextualized"?? Applicable to what?

Empirical comprehension depends on events that have taken place. It is the contextualization of information that is received by means of the senses, e.g. observation. Thus, it can be said that what is comprehended empirically has been eventualized, similar to the term materialized but then constructed out of observed events in time.

The "what" is that which is empirically comprehended, the information received by the senses. The term received also hints at the historical context.
[/quote]

So it seems like you've maybe taken a very roundabout way to say that good is not something we perceive but something we either conceive or perhaps apperceive?

[GE Morton]

External should be replaced with non-empirically comprehensible. It does not imply that it is external.

I suspect we may have a language problem. Is English your native language?

"Empirical" doesn't apply to comprehension; it applies to apprehension. To apprehend is to perceive; to comprehend is to understand. All comprehension is "non-empirical," although what is understood may have been learned empirically, i.e., by observation. And if you're suggesting we may acquire knowledge via some other faculty than the senses, or via deduction from that that knowledge, then you'll have to explicate that faculty and explain how to validate the "knowledge" you assume it delivers.

Imply-able is merely a suggestion. It may make it possible to determine truth based on implications. For example, when you feel pain, that is real. Using implications, it may be possible to comprehend the underlying nature that precedes it.

I'm puzzled by this mysterious "underlying nature" you assume exists (it sounds a lot like Plato's "essences"). Yes, pain is real. The only "underlying nature" I can think of would be the injury or illness causing the pain. Is that what what you mean by the "underlying nature," or does that term, for you, denote something non-physical, "transcendental," mystical, which cannot be apprehended via the senses?

If so, as I suggested earlier, you'll need to explain how you know of this "nature," and what hypothesizing it contributes to our understanding of pain.

The notion that there may be means of gaining knowledge other than via the senses --- "extrasensory perception --- is nothing new, of course. Various religions and mystical philosophies have so assumed, claiming that this latent "faculty" may be awakened by prayer, fasting, self-abnegation, psychedelic drugs, hypnosis, etc. So far no devotee of any of these ESP strategies has produced any useful knowledge, as far as I know.

[GE Morton]

"The truth conditions are public" is nonsensical, because truth is a judgment that individuals make that partially depends on the semantics they take to be the proposition.

Well, deciding whether a proposition P is true is a judgment, but judgments are themselves propositions, and may be either true or false, objective or subjective. "The proposition 'Paris is the capital of France' is true" expresses my judgment. That proposition is true and objective (if "Paris is the capital of France " is true, so is the proposition asserting that it is; if "Paris is the capital of France" is objective, so is the proposition asserting that it is).

Of course the judgment of whether a proposition P is true depends upon the semantics of the language in which P is asserted. But any debate about the truth (or objectivity) of P assumes those semantics are common to speaker and hearer. Without that assumption no fruitful dialogue is possible between them. Philosophical debates (or any other kind) cannot be engaged in the Tower of Babel.

[psyreporter]

I suspect we may have a language problem. Is English your native language?

"Empirical" doesn't apply to comprehension; it applies to apprehension. To apprehend is to perceive; to comprehend is to understand. All comprehension is "non-empirical," although what is understood may have been learned empirically, i.e., by observation. And if you're suggesting we may acquire knowledge via some other faculty than the senses, or via deduction from that that knowledge, then you'll have to explicate that faculty and explain how to validate the "knowledge" you assume it delivers.

That which is indicated cannot be observed, thus, a form of knowledge that is applicable is 'comprehension'. The term empirically incomprehensible simply indicates that that which is indicated cannot be comprehended using empirical science.

Comprehension could be usable, for example for non-subjective morality. It would require a level of acceptance, but what I intended to indicate, the scientific model was also invented by philosophy and accepted into the human realm based on a decision to do so.

I did not want to suggest a new philosophical model. I joined this forum to ask a question and to learn (beginner). My arguments are merely based on logic.

Imply-able is merely a suggestion. It may make it possible to determine truth based on implications. For example, when you feel pain, that is real. Using implications, it may be possible to comprehend the underlying nature that precedes it.

I'm puzzled by this mysterious "underlying nature" you assume exists (it sounds a lot like Plato's "essences"). Yes, pain is real. The only "underlying nature" I can think of would be the injury or illness causing the pain. Is that what what you mean by the "underlying nature," or does that term, for you, denote something non-physical, "transcendental," mystical, which cannot be apprehended via the senses?

If so, as I suggested earlier, you'll need to explain how you know of this "nature," and what hypothesizing it contributes to our understanding of pain.

My argument is that pain, caused by a disease or otherwise, is necessarily preceded by valuing (implication). It can be implied that for valuing to be possible it requires a distinguish ability (implication). By the nature of value, valuing per se appropriates its distinguish ability from that what can be indicated as "good" (implication). Because something cannot give rise to itself, "good" per se cannot be valued.

By the realness of pain, "good" is real.

By the nature of valuing, "good" cannot be valued and thus cannot be proven to exist using empirical science.

The notion that there may be means of gaining knowledge other than via the senses --- "extrasensory perception --- is nothing new, of course. Various religions and mystical philosophies have so assumed, claiming that this latent "faculty" may be awakened by prayer, fasting, self-abnegation, psychedelic drugs, hypnosis, etc. So far no devotee of any of these ESP strategies has produced any useful knowledge, as far as I know.

I presume that the suggested imply-ability is essentially a form of logic outside the scope of the senses. I do not agree that it would be mystical.

[psyreporter]

So it seems like you've maybe taken a very roundabout way to say that good is not something we perceive but something we either conceive or perhaps apperceive?

Yes, but then non-subjective, structured by philosophy.

[Terrapin Station]

"The truth conditions are public" is nonsensical, because truth is a judgment that individuals make that partially depends on the semantics they take to be the proposition.

Well, deciding whether a proposition P is true is a judgment, but judgments are themselves propositions, and may be either true or false, objective or subjective. "The proposition 'Paris is the capital of France' is true" expresses my judgment. That proposition is true and objective (if "Paris is the capital of France " is true, so is the proposition asserting that it is; if "Paris is the capital of France" is objective, so is the proposition asserting that it is).

Of course the judgment of whether a proposition P is true depends upon the semantics of the language in which P is asserted. But any debate about the truth (or objectivity) of P assumes those semantics are common to speaker and hearer. Without that assumption no fruitful dialogue is possible between them. Philosophical debates (or any other kind) cannot be engaged in the Tower of Babel.

Meaning/semantics only occur in individual minds and cannot leave individual minds. Communication doesn't work by literally passing meaning to someone else. Communication works, when it does, by individuals assigning unique meanings that are coherent and consistent with the other meanings they assign and with behavior they observe.

"Paris is the capital of France" as something extramental has no meaning, and is nothing like a judgment. It's a set of particular pixels on a computer screen and that's it.

Truth judgments are not propositions--they're not meanings of declarative sentences. Truth judgments are not linguistic.

[GE Morton]

Meaning/semantics only occur in individual minds and cannot leave individual minds.

Er, no. You're confusing the understanding of the meaning of a word with the denotative meaning of that word. The denotative meaning of a word is its referent. To teach a child the meaning of "dog" you point to Fido. Fido, and other animals like him, are the meaning of "dog." Understanding the relationship between the word and Fido is in your head, but the denotative meaning is the animal.

Communication doesn't work by literally passing meaning to someone else. Communication works, when it does, by individuals assigning unique meanings that are coherent and consistent with the other meanings they assign and with behavior they observe.

"Unique meanings"? Really? You ask, "Please pass the salt." I hand you the salt shaker. How could I do that if we each assigned unique meanings to those words?

"Paris is the capital of France" as something extramental has no meaning, and is nothing like a judgment. It's a set of particular pixels on a computer screen and that's it.

That is incoherent. A set of pixels on a computer screen is itself "extramental" (unless you think the computer is a figment of your imagination). The meanings of those words are their referents, all of which are "extramental." Every written or spoken sentence is "extramental."

Truth judgments are not propositions--they're not meanings of declarative sentences. Truth judgments are not linguistic.

A judgment is a mental event or process; a class of thoughts. But any report or declaration of the results of a judgment are propositions, which will be true or false. If a proposition declaring a judgment is false, so, by implication, will be the judgment itself.

[Terrapin Station]

Er, no. You're confusing the understanding of the meaning of a word with the denotative meaning of that word.

Nope. Denotative meaning does not occur anywhere in the world outside of minds.

The denotative meaning of a word is its referent.

No. This is wrong. The denotative meaning of a word is a matter of making an association of the word with the referent. It's not only the referent. You need a word, like "dog," as you mention, and you need a way to get from that word to the referrent so that we have a meaning that associates the word with the referent. That associative "getting to the referent" from the word is only produced by a mental event.

"Unique meanings"? Really? You ask, "Please pass the salt." I hand you the salt shaker. How could I do that if we each assigned unique meanings to those words?

C'mon now. You're familiar enough with philosophy that you're familiar with nominalism. For nominalists, no numerically distinct things are identical. On my view, nothing is identical through time either.

"Paris is the capital of France" as something extramental has no meaning, and is nothing like a judgment. It's a set of particular pixels on a computer screen and that's it.

That is incoherent. A set of pixels on a computer screen is itself "extramental" [/quote]

Can't you read? I just said that as something extramental, it's a set of particular pixels on a computer screen and that's it.

(unless you think the computer is a figment of your imagination). The meanings of those words are their referents, all of which are "extramental."

What we're pointing to is extramental in the case of something like a dog. (In the case of something like Paris, that's a lot more controversial, because extramentally there is no "Paris" per se, etc.--so stick with something like a dog.) But the dog is not identical to the meaning. We need a word and the associative act to have meaning. If there's nothing with minds in the universe there are things like rocks. But that doesn't make rocks denotative meanings in a world with no minds.

Truth judgments are not propositions--they're not meanings of declarative sentences. Truth judgments are not linguistic.

A judgment is a mental event or process; a class of thoughts. But any report or declaration of the results of a judgment are propositions, [/quote]Reports (as something extramental) aren't judgments. They're marks on paper, sounds that people make, or whatever.

which will be true or false.

They're only true or false to an individual, per that individual making a judgment (which is not a proposition) about the relation of a proposition to something else.

If a proposition declaring a judgment is false,

"'The cat is on the mat' is true" is a proposition correleated to a judgment, but it's not itself the judgment. Truth-value is the judgment (about the relation of the proposition to something else).