GE Morton wrote: ↑February 4th, 2020, 12:01 pm
I should have added this above:
If the person is using correspondence or consensus, then one side of the comparative judgment they're making is public, the publicly observable facts they're looking at, but the proposition isn't public, and the judgment the person makes about the relationship of the proposition to those publicly observable facts (which is what truth is) isn't public.
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Again, the propositions "Alfie values the bicycle," and, "The bicycle contributes to Alfie's quality of life," both have public truth conditions and are therefore objective. No one's mental states have anything to do with it.
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Nope. First off, "Alfie values the bicycle" has no meaning if we're not talking about mental states. Meaning is a mental state. Meaning isn't publicly available.
Secondly, "Alfie values the bicycle" is about Alfie's mental states. "The bicycle contributes to Alfie's quality of life" is about either Alfie's or someone else's mental state. There's no non-mental fact re something contributing to someone's "quality of life."
Thirdly, truth conditions are a matter of making a judgment about the relationship of a proposition, which is a mental state, to something else--the exact something else depends on the truth theory the judgment-maker is using on the occasion in question. It could be publicly observable facts, it could be the set of other propositions they assigned "true" to, etc.