Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

I've been following arjand's discussion with GE Morton and Terrapin Station with interest.

I may be wrong, but it seems to turn on the nature of value - what it means to value something, and where the value lies. And it seems obvious to me that value doesn't and can't lie or be in the thing valued. We may value clean water, but clean water isn't a value. Maybe the nominal use of 'value' is what confuses us. We talk about 'having values' and ask 'What are their moral values?', as though values are things and so could be properties of things. Bewitched by the devices of our language.

Yes indeed. A major problem in moral philosophy is the conflation of deontology (theories of moral actions) and axiology (theories of value). The term "moral values" embodies this confusion. That confusion leads in turn to two different understandings of the aims/purposes/scope of "morality" --- it is either a set of precepts for leading a "good" or "noble" life (virtue ethics), or a set of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting. But if we understand "value" as a pseudo-property subjectively applied to things we find desirable or undesirable, then "virtue ethics" becomes a non-viable endeavor.

With regard to the OP question, the only thing that could make morality objective is the real existence of moral value as a feature of reality independent from opinion - so that a moral assertion such as 'slavery is wrong' is not an expression of an opinion - a value-judgement - but a factual claim about reality, with a truth-value.

To the extent morality is conceived to be about values it is indeed subjective. But it isn't about values. It is about rules governing interactions between agents in a social settings, the aim of which is to allow all agents to secure and retain the things they value, whatever those may be, to the maximum extent possible. If that goal is agreed upon then whether a proposed principle or rule furthers it or thwarts it can be determined objectively.

I've elsewhere analogized a moral theory to a set of traffic controls and laws. The aim of the traffic engineer is to devise a system which will allow all drivers to reach their destinations, whatever those may be, as quickly and safely as possible. Whether a signal at a certain intersection or a certain speed limit on a certain stretch of road furthers or thwarts that goal can be determined objectively.

[Thomyum2]

One does distinguish "good" from the opposite before it can value anything in relation to itself. The "good" that is indicated isn't an assertion of properties but something that precedes the valuing and even the being itself. The simple logic to prove this is the consideration that something cannot give rise to itself.

The only "distinguishing" being done in judging something to be good or bad is between the meanings of those two terms, which are a linguistic convention (as are the meanings of all terms). The former is applied to things which please us or satisfy us in some way; the latter to things which displease or dissatisfy us. Which term is applied to a particular thing varies from agent to agent (because different things please/displease different people).

And I don't know what you think "arises from itself," or think that I'm claiming does so. Whether Alfie deems X good or bad arises from Alfie's personal idiosyncrasies --- his neurological makeup, his spectrum of affective responses, his prior experience with things like X.
...
Values don't "arise" from anything. They are assigned to things by agents. What value is assigned to a given thing by a given agent is determined by personal characteristics of that agent. You persist in conceiving them as properties of things, existing independently from valuers. I've explained why that is a non-viable hypothesis; it is refuted by the fact that the same thing will be valued differently by different agents --- a fact true of nearly everything to which anyone assigns a value.

Hello GE, good to run into you again in the forum, it's been a while.

I think you and I have touched on this same question a little in other threads. I agree with you argument up to a point here - that what is good and/or what is valued/desired is something that is only assigned by individual agents, but I think that equating these two is problematic because to say that something is 'desirable' or 'valuable' has a very different meaning than to say it is 'good'.

As I think I've said before, individuals have desires or assign values to something based on an expectation of how it will satisfy our sense of what is good, but we understand that in fact that may or may not be the case. Certainly it is common enough that we will pursue a given object or course of action intended to be good, only to discover that it is not so once we obtain it and that we were mistaken. If a good was simply whatever one happened to value at a given time, then to say we were 'mistaken' about its goodness would be a contradiction and make the word meaningless since 'good' would be nothing more than an ephemeral quality that would fluctuate with every changing whim. It's clear to me that we don't use the word this way - we understand is as being something fixed in or beyond the object of pursuit, a quality of the outcome, even if not a 'property' of the thing itself.

My argument is that "good", despite that it is not comprehensible, like "life", must precede the valuing to provide the nessesary ability to distinghish by which value can derive meaning.

The meaning of "value" is perfectly clear: it is a measure of what an agent will give up to secure something he considers "good," or to be rid of something he considers "bad." Which of those pseudo-properties are applied to a given thing, and what the agent will give up to obtain it or avoid it, varies from agent to agent.

It is a bold statement, but despite that, my statement was applicable to valuing itself, not the evaluating of a thing.

I have no idea what you have in mind with "valuing itself." There is no "valuing" separate from a valuer and something assigned a value. "Valuing" is simply the act of placing a value, positive or negative, on something. What value is placed on what things varies from agent to agent; what value a given agent places on X can be determined by observing his subsequent behavior with respect to X.

The "good" that precedes it as a factor may not be. As such, it can provide a basis for universality and objective morality.

There is no "good" that precedes the assignment of that pseudo-property to a thing by an agent. Once assigned it will have that property relative to him, but not necessarily for anyone else.

So I think I understand what @arjand is getting at here (he/she will maybe correct me if I'm mistaken). When we talk about the 'good' of something, we're meaning more than just a temporary satisfaction of a desire or value - we're referring our sense of to an understood or imagined state of affairs that is good. In other words, there's a sense of the idea of 'good' that precedes the assignment of desire or value - it is the fixed idea or goal beyond the object itself. Our pursuit of specific goals may change and evolve over time, yet the idea of good is one that we understand that we may recognize when we find it, and may recognize it differently from one individual to the next, but that it is not good simply because we as an individual have chosen it and made the efforts to bring it about.

I also think that as social beings, we all understand that any idea of the 'good' has an element of a quality that is common to all. The word functions in language similarly to the word 'true' in that we may disagree about what is or is not 'true', but our definition is such that it has an objective meaning to it. Things are not 'true' or 'good' merely because an individual 'assigns' that quality to them, but rather because they correspond to an idea of a truth or goodness that is shared with others. So in a roundabout way, I guess the bottom of my point is that say that although we all make judgments of what is good, just as we do of what is true, we can't make these judgments in isolation as individuals, but must make them as a shared understanding.

Your thoughts?

[Terrapin Station]

But if we understand "value" as a pseudo-property subjectively applied to things we find desirable or undesirable, then "virtue ethics" becomes a non-viable endeavor.

Value as subjectively applied doesn't make it a "pseudo-property" (do you have some sort of argument that it does?)

Virtue ethics is based on subjective values.

[Peter Holmes]

To the extent morality is conceived to be about values it is indeed subjective. But it isn't about values. It is about rules governing interactions between agents in a social settings, the aim of which is to allow all agents to secure and retain the things they value, whatever those may be, to the maximum extent possible. If that goal is agreed upon then whether a proposed principle or rule furthers it or thwarts it can be determined objectively.

I've elsewhere analogized a moral theory to a set of traffic controls and laws. The aim of the traffic engineer is to devise a system which will allow all drivers to reach their destinations, whatever those may be, as quickly and safely as possible. Whether a signal at a certain intersection or a certain speed limit on a certain stretch of road furthers or thwarts that goal can be determined objectively.

So, you say morality 'isn't about values'. But of course it is. When we say 'this action is morally good or bad, right or wrong', we're making a value-judgement. Social rules designed to achieve a goal - such as safe traffic flow - are facts. But that we should achieve such a goal - that it's morally right or good to try to - is a value-judgement, which is subjective.

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding your point. But rules and codes are morally insignificant. They're just commands to be obeyed or disobeyed.

[psyreporter]

I've been following arjand's discussion with GE Morton and Terrapin Station with interest.

I may be wrong, but it seems to turn on the nature of value - what it means to value something, and where the value lies. And it seems obvious to me that value doesn't and can't lie or be in the thing valued. We may value clean water, but clean water isn't a value. Maybe the nominal use of 'value' is what confuses us. We talk about 'having values' and ask 'What are their moral values?', as though values are things and so could be properties of things. Bewitched by the devices of our language.

With regard to the OP question, the only thing that could make morality objective is the real existence of moral value as a feature of reality independent from opinion - so that a moral assertion such as 'slavery is wrong' is not an expression of an opinion - a value-judgement - but a factual claim about reality, with a truth-value. But in another forum I've just been assured (by a theist, as it happens) that the crux of moral realism is simply that moral facts exist. With reasoning of that calibre, it's game over.

What I intended to indicate is that there may be factors such as "good" of which it can be established that they are real and considerable (without falling into religious or mystical territory) but that todays philosophical methods (i.e. the scientific method) may not be able to comprehend it (yet). It may hold the key for (a base level of) objective morality.

If "good" can be considered a factor that precedes values, it means that something that is real is at the basis of moral values. The opinion bias can be prevented using a decision to accept a philosophical method in the human realm, similar to how the scientific method has been accepted in the human realm to distinguish between facts and opinions relative to the tangible reality.

[Terrapin Station]

If "good" can be considered a factor that precedes values,

What would "good" amount to where there's not a connotation of a positive valuation to it?

[GE Morton]

Value as subjectively applied doesn't make it a "pseudo-property" (do you have some sort of argument that it does?)

No argument needed; only a definition. As I use the term, a "pseudo-property" is distinguished from a "sensible property." The latter is a property which can be confirmed by observing the thing alleged to have it, in one way or another. The red of a rose, the taste of cinnamon, the shape of an egg, the mass of a rock, the elements of a water molecule, are all "sensible properties." Pseudo-properties are properties imputed to things by agents, for many different reasons, but often to mark a relationship the thing has with something else, some fact regarding its history, or someone's attitude toward it. Pseudo-properties cannot be confirmed by observing the thing; observations of other things are necessary to confirm propositions asserting them. "Alfie has a bald head" is a sensible property. "Alfie has a degree in philosophy" is a pseudo-property. To confirm the latter we'd need to observe, not Alfie, but some school records. Or, "Alfie is 6 feet tall" is a sensible property; "Alfie is married," or, Alfie is a jerk" are pseudo-properties. The language is rife with pseudo-properties.

Virtue ethics is based on subjective values.

I agree.

[Terrapin Station]

Value as subjectively applied doesn't make it a "pseudo-property" (do you have some sort of argument that it does?)

No argument needed; only a definition. As I use the term, a "pseudo-property" is distinguished from a "sensible property." The latter is a property which can be confirmed by observing the thing alleged to have it, in one way or another. The red of a rose, the taste of cinnamon, the shape of an egg, the mass of a rock, the elements of a water molecule, are all "sensible properties." Pseudo-properties are properties imputed to things by agents, for many different reasons, but often to mark a relationship the thing has with something else, some fact regarding its history, or someone's attitude toward it. Pseudo-properties cannot be confirmed by observing the thing; observations of other things are necessary to confirm propositions asserting them. "Alfie has a bald head" is a sensible property. "Alfie has a degree in philosophy" is a pseudo-property. To confirm the latter we'd need to observe, not Alfie, but some school records. Or, "Alfie is 6 feet tall" is a sensible property; "Alfie is married," or, Alfie is a jerk" are pseudo-properties. The language is rife with pseudo-properties.

Virtue ethics is based on subjective values.

I agree.

Okay, but "pseudo" typically has a connotation of "not genuine" or "fake." You're not saying that having a degree in philosophy is a fake or not genuine property. So is that really a good term for this? It's bound to constantly cause misunderstandings.

[Peter Holmes]

What I intended to indicate is that there may be factors such as "good" of which it can be established that they are real and considerable (without falling into religious or mystical territory) but that todays philosophical methods (i.e. the scientific method) may not be able to comprehend it (yet). It may hold the key for (a base level of) objective morality.

If "good" can be considered a factor that precedes values, it means that something that is real is at the basis of moral values. The opinion bias can be prevented using a decision to accept a philosophical method in the human realm, similar to how the scientific method has been accepted in the human realm to distinguish between facts and opinions relative to the tangible reality.

Understood. I think that to say 'good' or 'the good' or 'goodness' could be a real thing - a feature of reality - that may be detectable given the appropriate method - is a category error, a classic example of metaphysical delusion, mistaking an abstract noun for a thing of some kind. So we'll just have to differ.

[Sculptor1]

What I intended to indicate is that there may be factors such as "good" of which it can be established that they are real and considerable (without falling into religious or mystical territory) but that todays philosophical methods (i.e. the scientific method) may not be able to comprehend it (yet). It may hold the key for (a base level of) objective morality.

If "good" can be considered a factor that precedes values, it means that something that is real is at the basis of moral values. The opinion bias can be prevented using a decision to accept a philosophical method in the human realm, similar to how the scientific method has been accepted in the human realm to distinguish between facts and opinions relative to the tangible reality.

Understood. I think that to say 'good' or 'the good' or 'goodness' could be a real thing - a feature of reality - that may be detectable given the appropriate method - is a category error, a classic example of metaphysical delusion, mistaking an abstract noun for a thing of some kind. So we'll just have to differ.

"Good" has no meaning of itself. It is a comparitor.
"good" and "bad" are values. Values require subjects.

[psyreporter]

If "good" can be considered a factor that precedes values,

What would "good" amount to where there's not a connotation of a positive valuation to it?

"good" logically cannot be valued as it is the valuing itself that is derived from the necessary ability to distinguish that it appropriates from "good".

The simple logic that something cannot give rise to itself would make it impossible to value "good" per se.

[GE Morton]

I think you and I have touched on this same question a little in other threads. I agree with you argument up to a point here - that what is good and/or what is valued/desired is something that is only assigned by individual agents, but I think that equating these two is problematic because to say that something is 'desirable' or 'valuable' has a very different meaning than to say it is 'good'.

"Value" is "quantified goodness." A "good" is something someone desires to acquire or retain (an "evil" something he desires to avoid or be rid of). Generally, if someone desires something he will be prepared to invest some time, effort, other goods, etc., to acquire or retain it. How much time, effort, etc., he is willing to give up is its value to him.

As I think I've said before, individuals have desires or assign values to something based on an expectation of how it will satisfy our sense of what is good, but we understand that in fact that may or may not be the case. Certainly it is common enough that we will pursue a given object or course of action intended to be good, only to discover that it is not so once we obtain it and that we were mistaken.

Quite true, in some cases --- cases in which the good sought is novel or hypothetical (not based on prior experience). In those cases we may be disappointed when the good sought proves not to deliver the pleasure or result or satisfaction anticipated.

I believe the values of which you speak above are for "means goods," not "end goods." The value of a means good depends on the value of the end good for which it is a means, and the efficacy of that means good in yielding the end good. If we overestimate the value of an end good we will likely also overestimate the values of the means goods we choose to pursue it, and invest more in its acquisition than it proves to be worth. This sort of thing happens regularly in the stock market.

If a good was simply whatever one happened to value at a given time, then to say we were 'mistaken' about its goodness would be a contradiction and make the word meaningless since 'good' would be nothing more than an ephemeral quality that would fluctuate with every changing whim. It's clear to me that we don't use the word this way - we understand is as being something fixed in or beyond the object of pursuit, a quality of the outcome, even if not a 'property' of the thing itself.

We deem a thing "good" because we expect it to deliver some sort of satisfaction, to fulfill some particular desire or interest we have. We can say that "goodness" at its most abstract, is the satisfaction of desires and interests. Where the mistakes can happen is in beliefs that a certain thing will provide that satisfaction. It may prove not to.

So I think I understand what @arjand is getting at here (he/she will maybe correct me if I'm mistaken). When we talk about the 'good' of something, we're meaning more than just a temporary satisfaction of a desire or value - we're referring our sense of to an understood or imagined state of affairs that is good. In other words, there's a sense of the idea of 'good' that precedes the assignment of desire or value - it is the fixed idea or goal beyond the object itself.

Well, first, desires are not "assigned." They arise spontaneously, unsummoned. We deem "good" anything we imagine, or know from prior experience, will satisfy one of those desires. An imagined state of affairs will be deemed "good" if we believe it will satisfy some desire, some interest of ours. Yes, there is a goal "beyond the object itself" --- the presumed ability of that object to satisfy a desire.

Our pursuit of specific goals may change and evolve over time, yet the idea of good is one that we understand that we may recognize when we find it, and may recognize it differently from one individual to the next, but that it is not good simply because we as an individual have chosen it and made the efforts to bring it about.

We don't "choose" what we deem as "good," because we don't choose the desires which prompt us to deem something good. Nor do we "recognize " good. We are presented with something, or perhaps merely the idea of something. It strikes some chord, stimulates some neural processes, and arouses a propensity to pursue and acquire that thing, instills a desire for it. Whatever triggers that process is deemed a "good" unless and until, once acquired, it fails to deliver the satisfaction anticipated.

I also think that as social beings, we all understand that any idea of the 'good' has an element of a quality that is common to all.

Well, the meaning of the term "good" is common to all, but clearly not the things to which it is applied. Those are as numerous and varied as the individuals who make value assignments. There is no substantive "common good" in any large society.

The word functions in language similarly to the word 'true' in that we may disagree about what is or is not 'true', but our definition is such that it has an objective meaning to it. Things are not 'true' or 'good' merely because an individual 'assigns' that quality to them, but rather because they correspond to an idea of a truth or goodness that is shared with others.

For almost any interest anyone has he will be able, in a large community, to find others who share it. But if that community is comprised of thousands or millions of members it will not be shared with everyone in the community.

[GE Morton]

So, you say morality 'isn't about values'. But of course it is. When we say 'this action is morally good or bad, right or wrong', we're making a value-judgement.

Very often we are. But those value judgments are subjective and have no rational basis. A philosophically respectable moral theory must be universal and have a rational basis.

When I said morality "isn't about values," I meant it does not assume, or prescribe, any particular values. It does acknowledge, however, that people value various things and that their quality of life is largely determined by the extent to which those values are realized. It assumes that everyone desires to maximize his/her quality of life.

Morality is generally considered to be concerned with the actions of moral agents, particularly acts that adversely affect other moral agents, which reduce their welfare or prevent them from improving it. Whether an particular act does or does not have that effect is objectively determinable; whether a rule or principle which constrains such actions is objectively defensible. But, to be sure, whether that goal --- devise principles and rules constraining injurious acts by all agents --- is worth pursuing is, like all goals, subjective. But someone who rejects it would probably not be welcome in many social settings.

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding your point. But rules and codes are morally insignificant. They're just commands to be obeyed or disobeyed.

A rule against, say, murder, is morally insignificant? It would make no moral difference whether such a rule was promulgated, or obeyed, or not?

[Peter Holmes]

So, you say morality 'isn't about values'. But of course it is. When we say 'this action is morally good or bad, right or wrong', we're making a value-judgement.

Very often we are. But those value judgments are subjective and have no rational basis. A philosophically respectable moral theory must be universal and have a rational basis.

Agreed, value-judgements are subjective, by definition. But they can be, and usually are, perfectly rational. It's their rationality that has resulted in social moral codes, often with universal scope, and often reinforced by law. Why identify subjectivity with irrationality? How strange,

And the very idea of a 'philosophically respectable moral theory' needs unpacking. What we need is an explanation or description of morality that makes rationally justified claims derived from sound arguments. If that's what you mean - I agree.

When I said morality "isn't about values," I meant it does not assume, or prescribe, any particular values. It does acknowledge, however, that people value various things and that their quality of life is largely determined by the extent to which those values are realized. It assumes that everyone desires to maximize his/her quality of life.

I think your materialist approach makes sense - and notice the completely rational basis for moral values and rules. The reciprocity essential for the existence of higher primate groups is there at the foundation of our morality.

And I agree that description isn't prescription, in moral as in any other discourse. But the question 'what is morally right and wrong?' is central to both moral and ethical theory. And it goes beyond and deeper than a description of what people want and say about it.

Morality is generally considered to be concerned with the actions of moral agents, particularly acts that adversely affect other moral agents, which reduce their welfare or prevent them from improving it. Whether an particular act does or does not have that effect is objectively determinable; whether a rule or principle which constrains such actions is objectively defensible. But, to be sure, whether that goal --- devise principles and rules constraining injurious acts by all agents --- is worth pursuing is, like all goals, subjective. But someone who rejects it would probably not be welcome in many social settings.

I think the subjective goal - objective means argument (Sam Harris on well-being?) doesn't hold water. But that's a separate debate. My point is that value-judgements and facts are completely different things, so that nothing can make morality objective.

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding your point. But rules and codes are morally insignificant. They're just commands to be obeyed or disobeyed.

A rule against, say, murder, is morally insignificant? It would make no moral difference whether such a rule was promulgated, or obeyed, or not?

Morality is about what is morally right or wrong. Moral assertions, expressing moral judgements, contain words like 'right', 'wrong', 'good', 'bad', 'should' and 'ought'. But commands such as 'do not kill' aren't even declaratives, let alone moral declaratives. The morally significant (operative or functional) claim is 'it is wrong to kill'. 'Do and don't' commands - and, more important, simply obeying them, are morally insignificant, in the sense that the moral questions are taken as having been settled. (Of course, you're right about the practical consequences of different codes and rules.)

[Sculptor1]

Holmes and Morton,

You seem to be off topic. Nothing you are now discussing seems to offer anything about "What could make morality objective?".
It seems to me that there can be no moral injunction which could possibly be universally understood or applicable.
Clearly what could make morality objective is the contain all moral judgement into a single entity or deity to which each human is forced to comply. This has been the rather dubious claim of the black-hooded monsters of the church since time immemorial.
When I see others claim moral objectivity all I see is a reflection of the horror of a universal church.