Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

Imputing purposes to "nature" is anthropomorphic.

No, it is not. Humans are a part of nature. As such, humans are subject to a potential purpose of life given by nature.

Well, that is begging the question; you're simply repeating your previous assertion (that "nature" has purposes).

Having purposes presumes a sentient creature. A purpose is a future goal believed to be attainable through present actions. That requires an entity capable of holding beliefs, envisioning or imagining future states of affairs, and performing deliberate, directed actions --- i.e., a sentient creature. There is no evidence that "nature," or any natural system other than some animals, possesses any of those capabilities.

Moreover, we're entitled to impute a purpose to an agent when we can observe the agent's actions and know from prior experience that the observed actions often lead to a certain end. We may then infer that end to be the agent's purpose in acting. But we have no prior experience with the ultimate ends of natural processes, having never yet reached them. So we have no grounds for assuming observable natural phenomena have any particular purpose.

BTW, that humans are natural creatures is irrelevant to the issue at hand. But we have no grounds for assuming they have any "preordained" purpose either. They only have whatever purposes they individually and idiosyncratically adopt for themselves.

[GE Morton]

I don't know where you get this explanation of objectivity and subjectivity from. They usually refer to independence from opinion and dependence on opinion - so their application is not limited to propositions - as your Alfie example demonstrates.

You're correct, but those applications are derivative. Whatever else we deem to be subjective or objective will something asserted in some proposition.

“Objective” and “subjective,” like the terms “true” and “false,” to apply fundamentally to propositions. It is statements, assertions, which have the properties imputed by those terms. Of course, subjectivity/objectivity are often also imputed to entities, properties of entities, and states of affairs asserted by a proposition. I.e., we can say such things as that elephants objectively exist, or that Paris is the capital of France is an “objective fact.” But applying them to these kinds of things is a derivative use: entities and states of affairs take on the objectivity or subjectivity of the propositions which assert them. That is, we consider it an objective fact that Paris is the capital of France only because the proposition, “Paris is the capital of France” is both true and objective.

Now, per Tarski, “Paris is the capital of France” is true IFF Paris is the capital of France. Paris being the capital of France is the truth condition for the proposition, “Paris is the capital of France.”

But what makes that proposition objective, as opposed to subjective?

What makes it objective is that the truth condition for it, that Paris is the capital of France, is publicly verifiable. Paris is the capital of France if it is the place where the legislature sits, where most government departments have their head offices, etc. For any truth condition which imparts objectivity to a proposition there is an implicit, understood verification procedure for ascertaining whether the condition holds. Anyone who questions the truth of the proposition “Paris is the capital of France” can investigate its truth by observing where the legislature normally sits, where the ministers in charge of various departments have their offices, and so on. It is the possibility of communicating which observations are required, and of anyone being able to carry them out, that makes “Paris is the capital of France” an objective proposition.

A subjective proposition, on the other hand, is one which has no publicly verifiable truth conditions. Either the truth conditions are unclear, or they cannot be specified, or there is no consensus about what they are. “Paris is a beautiful city” is subjective for the latter reason. Because different people apply different standards of beauty, and thus do not agree about what does and does not count as “beautiful,” there is no public truth condition for that proposition. The only truth conditions for it --- if they can be articulated at all --- will be private ones.

A proposition remains objective even if people disagree about its truth, provided they nonetheless agree about its truth conditions and its verification procedure(s). For example, Alfie may have heard, from a source he considers reliable, that the French Assembly had moved the capital of France to Marseilles. Thus he now believes “Paris is the capital of France” is false. But he will still agree that the truth condition for that statement involves where the assembly meets, etc., that the verification procedure involves making the observations above, and that the truth or falsity of “Paris is the capital of France” will turn on the outcome of those observations.

The next question is, then, when and why should it be the case that a proposition has no verification procedure?

Well, one reason would be that condition which prompts Alfie to assert the proposition, or which subjectively justifies his asserting it, cannot be specified in the public language (the language he shares with his hearers, and with which they communicate). If the state of affairs which confirms the proposition cannot be described (via that shared language) with sufficient precision to inform his hearer, Bruno, what he must do to verify it --- what he must look for --- then the proposition must remain subjective. There can be no consensus around a truth condition or a verification procedure which cannot be articulated in the common language.

Another reason would be that the state of affairs which justifies the proposition is unobservable in principle by anyone except Alfie, the speaker. The “in principle” means, as usual, that the inability of Bruno to make the required observation is not merely a matter of circumstance, that Bruno just does not happen to be properly positioned, at present, to make the required observation. It means that Bruno could not place himself in that position no matter what he did. There is nothing Bruno (or anyone except Alfie) can do, nowhere he can go, to make the observation.

Bruno cannot carry out the verification procedure (say, look for state of affairs s to verify p) if there is no possibility that Bruno can look at s. But Alfie cannot even tell Bruno what to look for unless s can be described in the public language. We can say that anything which is both homogeneous (has no relatable parts or properties) and which can be observed (in principle) by only one person is intrinsically subjective.

I realize this is something of a sidetrack. More on your other comments later.

[h_k_s]

Aristotle and Aurelius both give a definition each of the purpose of life.

To consider it a definition is contentious.

Aristotle teaches that each man's life has a purpose and that the function of one's life is to attain that purpose. He explains that the purpose of life is earthly happiness or flourishing that can be achieved via reason and the acquisition of virtue.

I could agree with his statement but could it be considered a definition? It is clearly a very human perspective and it is (relatively) short-term profit oriented. Could Aristotle's purpose of life be considered to match / accord the purpose of life given by nature?

Evidence that the purpose of life given by nature may be different, is the mere fact that no human wants to die while humans have a 'given' life span. No reason could ever have invented death.

You seem to have personified Nature, arjand .

The scientist in me thinks that human life simply evolved from primates, which evolved from carnivores, which evolved from mammals, which evolved from Dimetrodon, which evolved like other dinosaurs from amphibians, fish, and worms.

The Romantic Philosopher in me thinks that mankind was created by God because He is infinitely good and wanted to share his goodness (Descartes).

The Christian in me believes that God created mankind because he was a lonely God and wanted company with archangels, saints, prophets, apostles, Holy Mary mother of Christ, Jesus the Son of God, and with the rest of us and his Heavenly Hosts.

I only give Nature credit for guiding our evolution. I don't personify "Her."

[h_k_s]

Judging from Jerry Spence's book, "How to Argue and Win Every Time," lawyers mostly use emotional arguments. And that is a Sophist trick -- the fallacy of emotional appeal.

Well, Spence is a well known blowhard, who likely is tooting his own horn in his book. Regardless, lawyers can and do make intellectually compelling arguments on both sides of just about every case (in addition to emotional arguments).

I see your point happening more at the SCOTUS level than elsewhere.

[LuckyR]

Well, Spence is a well known blowhard, who likely is tooting his own horn in his book. Regardless, lawyers can and do make intellectually compelling arguments on both sides of just about every case (in addition to emotional arguments).

I see your point happening more at the SCOTUS level than elsewhere.

I don't disagree, but the point is nonetheless made

[psyreporter]

You seem to have personified Nature, @arjand

...

I only give Nature credit for guiding our evolution. I don't personify "Her."

I disagree. A human is part of nature.

If nature would guide human evolution, then as such, "Her" is a part of the human.

[psyreporter]

No, it is not. Humans are a part of nature. As such, humans are subject to a potential purpose of life given by nature.

Well, that is begging the question; you're simply repeating your previous assertion (that "nature" has purposes).

Having purposes presumes a sentient creature. A purpose is a future goal believed to be attainable through present actions. That requires an entity capable of holding beliefs, envisioning or imagining future states of affairs, and performing deliberate, directed actions --- i.e., a sentient creature. There is no evidence that "nature," or any natural system other than some animals, possesses any of those capabilities.

Moreover, we're entitled to impute a purpose to an agent when we can observe the agent's actions and know from prior experience that the observed actions often lead to a certain end. We may then infer that end to be the agent's purpose in acting. But we have no prior experience with the ultimate ends of natural processes, having never yet reached them. So we have no grounds for assuming observable natural phenomena have any particular purpose.

BTW, that humans are natural creatures is irrelevant to the issue at hand. But we have no grounds for assuming they have any "preordained" purpose either. They only have whatever purposes they individually and idiosyncratically adopt for themselves.

I do not agree with your perspective. It is an empirical approach to provide evidence for the existence of purposeful actionability but it has nothing to do per se with the essence of purpose.

As mentioned in my previous example, no sentient creature wants to die while humans have a 'given' life span. No reason could ever have invented death.

There are many similar examples. I believe that some vital strategic processes of Nature and human evolution may span multiple life spans (e.g. +300 years). In some people it may cause severe struggle to overcome problems which can lead to solutions that humans 2-3 generations further will need. If such an intelligent factor is involved, then, from such a longer term strategy of Nature, it is logical that it can provide humans, even on an individual level, a purpose.

[Peter Holmes]

I don't know where you get this explanation of objectivity and subjectivity from. They usually refer to independence from opinion and dependence on opinion - so their application is not limited to propositions - as your Alfie example demonstrates.

You're correct, but those applications are derivative. Whatever else we deem to be subjective or objective will [be] something asserted in some proposition.

I disagree. This is the myth of propositions at work. To know a feature of reality has nothing to do with knowing a proposition asserting it.

“Objective” and “subjective,” like the terms “true” and “false,” [ ] apply fundamentally to propositions. It is statements, assertions, which have the properties imputed by those terms.

Agreed - what we call truth and falsehood are attributes only of factual assertions - typically linguistic expressions. But the words objective and subjective, and their cognates, don't, even primarily - let alone fundamentally - apply to what are misleadingly called propositions. Consult any dictionary. The words refer to independence from, and dependence on, judgement, belief or opinion.

Of course, subjectivity/objectivity are often also imputed to entities, properties of entities, and states of affairs asserted by a proposition. I.e., we can say such things as that elephants objectively exist, or that Paris is the capital of France is an “objective fact.” But applying them to these kinds of things is a derivative use: entities and states of affairs take on the objectivity or subjectivity of the propositions which assert them. That is, we consider it an objective fact that Paris is the capital of France only because the proposition, “Paris is the capital of France” is both true and objective.

I'm sorry, but this is muddled. A fact is either a state-of-affairs or a description of a state-of-affairs - typically a linguistic expression. It can't be both at the same time. The existence of elephants, and the metropolitan status of Paris, are states-of-affairs which happen to obtain. Those states-of-affairs have absolutely nothing to do with language, and so nothing to do with truth or falsehood. And that they obtain is absolutely nothing to do with anyone's opinion - so their existence as states-of-affairs is what we call objective.

The factual assertions 'elephants exist' and 'Paris is the capital of France' are what we call true - simply because those states-of-affairs obtain. The expression 'objectively true' in this context is redundant. What would 'subjectively true' mean in this context? How could the claim 'elephants exist' be subjectively true or false?

Now, per Tarski, “Paris is the capital of France” is true IFF Paris is the capital of France. Paris being the capital of France is the truth condition for the proposition, “Paris is the capital of France.”

Please, look at the tautology: the claim 'Paris is the capital of France' is true iff Paris is the capital of France. There's no way out of this redundancy through language. Correspondence theories of truth are completely mired in the myth of propositions: that to know a feature of reality is to know a proposition. It's nonsense.

But what makes that proposition objective, as opposed to subjective?

As I hope I've shown, the question misfires because the premise is false.

What makes it objective is that the truth condition for it, that Paris is the capital of France, is publicly verifiable. Paris is the capital of France if it is the place where the legislature sits, where most government departments have their head offices, etc. For any truth condition which imparts objectivity to a proposition there is an implicit, understood verification procedure for ascertaining whether the condition holds. Anyone who questions the truth of the proposition “Paris is the capital of France” can investigate its truth by observing where the legislature normally sits, where the ministers in charge of various departments have their offices, and so on. It is the possibility of communicating which observations are required, and of anyone being able to carry them out, that makes “Paris is the capital of France” an objective proposition.

This argument has the odour of logical positivism. (I assume you're aware of the pretty conclusive demolition of verificationism.)

But anyway, talk of 'truth conditions' - and recently more fashionable talk of 'truth-makers' - merely rehashes the correspondence tautology: 'snow is white' is true because real snow really is white - look, we can go out and check. Reality is not the set of all possible truth-makers. There's no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices.

A subjective proposition, on the other hand, is one which has no publicly verifiable truth conditions. Either the truth conditions are unclear, or they cannot be specified, or there is no consensus about what they are. “Paris is a beautiful city” is subjective for the latter reason. Because different people apply different standards of beauty, and thus do not agree about what does and does not count as “beautiful,” there is no public truth condition for that proposition. The only truth conditions for it --- if they can be articulated at all --- will be private ones.

It's not that the truth conditions for an aesthetic value-judgement are unclear, unspecified or disagreed about - it's that beauty isn't a state-of-affairs like the existence of elephants. 'Paris is beautiful' expresses an opinion - it doesn't make a factual claim.

[GE Morton]

I do not agree with your perspective. It is an empirical approach to provide evidence for the existence of purposeful actionability but it has nothing to do per se with the essence of purpose.

I have no idea what the "essence of purpose" could possibly be, or what that phrase could possibly mean. I'm using the term in the dictionary sense, to mean the intended end, or objective, of a deliberate action. It has no "essence" beyond that, as far as I can see. ("Essences" are problematic in general). Clearly purpose, as just defined, presumes an intention, which in turn presumes a sentient creature. Applying purposes to natural processes proceeding according to the laws of physics is anthropomorphism, or perhaps you're assuming there is some sort of "higher power" launching and guiding those processes. Is that your assumption?

As mentioned in my previous example, no sentient creature wants to die while humans have a 'given' life span. No reason could ever have invented death.

That quote was, "Evidence that the purpose of life given by nature may be different, is the mere fact that no human wants to die while humans have a 'given' life span."

You seem to be equating the result of a process with a purpose for the process. Many natural processes terminate (even stars have finite lifespans), but that mere fact doesn't entail a purpose for the termination or other result. That would require that the termination be intended, which (again) presumes a sentient entity controlling those processes.

I believe that some vital strategic processes of Nature and human evolution may span multiple life spans (e.g. +300 years). In some people it may cause severe struggle to overcome problems which can lead to solutions that humans 2-3 generations further will need. If such an intelligent factor is involved, then, from such a longer term strategy of Nature, it is logical that it can provide humans, even on an individual level, a purpose.

Many natural processes span multiple human lifespans. But there is utterly no evidence that any of them are intended to benefit humans, of any generation, or that anything exists capable of forming such an intention. Some of those processes may benefit us, others will not. Humans, of course, may adopt anything as a purpose, including imagined transcendental ones instilled by an imagined "higher power."

[GE Morton]

The goal of a theory, however, is not a personal goal; it does not assert any particular interest of any particular person. It is indifferent to personal goals. But it does require a consensus among everyone interested in a viable theory of the subject matter in question. There is, I think, a consensus that the aim of ethics is to secure and advance "the good," or "the good life," in some sense. If there is, and if we agree that what constitutes "the good" or "the good life" differs from person to person, then the goal stated above becomes "quasi-objective."

This is wrong. The fact that most people - or all of them - agree on a goal doesn't make the goal objective or quasi-objective. That they agree on the goal would be a fact. But the goal remains a choice - a matter of judgement - and therefore subjective.

I'll respond here to the remaining comments from your earlier post. More on objective/subjective later.

I said earlier that goals are subjective. So to that extent I agree with you. Perhaps "quasi-objective" was misleading or confusing. So I'll abandon it. The goal cited previously is universal, morally neutral, and seems to embody the consensus as to the aim of moral principles and rules. That is sufficient to justify its adoption.

Independence from anyone's opinion is what makes a fact a fact.

Give that some thought. How would you know that some asserted state of affairs is independent of anyone's opinion, except via the method I mentioned?

Virtually all "facts" that we believe we know originate in some proposition. Henry Cavendish asserted that water is composed of hydrogen aand oxygen. He also described a method of verifying that assertion --- he set forth some public truth conditions for his assertion. That proposition only became accepted as a "fact" after other chemists, following the verification procedure Cavendish described (and others discovered later), confirmed his proposition.

But you might ask, "What of facts I learn personally, via direct experience?" Well, if your experience is well within the realm of the commonplace, similar to others you and others encounter and discuss routinely, you'll be justified in considering them "facts" at the outset --- tewntatively. But if it is of something extraordinary, others --- and perhaps you also --- will be reluctant to regard it as a "fact" until it has been confirmed by others.

The realm of "facts" --- the world as we think we know it --- consists primarily of states of affairs observed and reported by others and conveyed to us via propositions.

The 'subjective goal / objective means' argument doesn't hold water, because there are always choices when it comes to selecting means - and therefore judgements to be made - as your Alfie and Bruno example demonstrates. Postulating equal agency as a goal doesn't solve the moral question.

There are indeed judgments to be made. But they are not moral judgments; they are pragmatic ones --- guesses, even --- because the full consequences of all the available options are rarely known in advance. But some options can be ruled out in advance, because they thwart the goal prima facie or violate the Equal Agency postulate.

[psyreporter]

I have no idea what the "essence of purpose" could possibly be, or what that phrase could possibly mean. I'm using the term in the dictionary sense, to mean the intended end, or objective, of a deliberate action. It has no "essence" beyond that, as far as I can see. ("Essences" are problematic in general). Clearly purpose, as just defined, presumes an intention, which in turn presumes a sentient creature. Applying purposes to natural processes proceeding according to the laws of physics is anthropomorphism, or perhaps you're assuming there is some sort of "higher power" launching and guiding those processes. Is that your assumption?

Purpose does not need to be an intended end of a deliberate action. The essence of purpose is a result applicable to the concept "good".

Does "good" need an intention? The aging process for example is controlled by genes. In some recent studies it was discovered that when certain genes are turned off, humans could in theory live for 800 years without aging.

Is aging "good"? The human - a sentient creature - certainly would not agree and would not likely intend or invent it. However, for human evolution it could be considered vital and thereby "good". As such (it appears), even humans can learn to see the beauty in aging.

Emotions and feelings such as pain do not arise from an intention. Those emotions serve a purpose that reaches beyond the intentions of a sentient creature.

If life could exist by accident, it could also accidentally not exist. Therefor, I believe that a concept of "good" that is applicable to the human can be found in Nature.

That quote was, "Evidence that the purpose of life given by nature may be different, is the mere fact that no human wants to die while humans have a 'given' life span."

You seem to be equating the result of a process with a purpose for the process. Many natural processes terminate (even stars have finite lifespans), but that mere fact doesn't entail a purpose for the termination or other result. That would require that the termination be intended, which (again) presumes a sentient entity controlling those processes.

Considering that human aging is controlled by genes, it does indicate a sort of control. That does not imply however that it originates from a sentient entity as the aging process could serve "good" without a preceding intention. If "good" is a purpose, there would be no need for an intention. There is merely a strive to fulfill the purpose.

Many natural processes span multiple human lifespans. But there is utterly no evidence that any of them are intended to benefit humans, of any generation, or that anything exists capable of forming such an intention. Some of those processes may benefit us, others will not. Humans, of course, may adopt anything as a purpose, including imagined transcendental ones instilled by an imagined "higher power."

If "good" is a purpose given by Nature, it requires a strive, a fight. There will likely be no oasis given by Nature where humans can live into eternity in their ultimate dream state. On the contrary, to serve live, is to win for "good". It is to go beyond what exists. One could experience a similar result as a eternal oasis (ecstasy) but it would likely be a reward for having served (or serving) life in a good way.

According to Aristotle, philosophical contemplation is the highest human virtue. Philosophical contemplation is the discovery of "good". It isn't an end by itself, it is a strive. Philosophical contemplation could be seen as serving life in the best way.

[Peter Holmes]

This is wrong. The fact that most people - or all of them - agree on a goal doesn't make the goal objective or quasi-objective. That they agree on the goal would be a fact. But the goal remains a choice - a matter of judgement - and therefore subjective.

I'll respond here to the remaining comments from your earlier post. More on objective/subjective later.

I said earlier that goals are subjective. So to that extent I agree with you. Perhaps "quasi-objective" was misleading or confusing. So I'll abandon it. The goal cited previously is universal, morally neutral, and seems to embody the consensus as to the aim of moral principles and rules. That is sufficient to justify its adoption.

Okay - and our decision to adopt that goal is subjective. We always want to justify our moral decisions - and equal treatment for everyone is a rational goal. More to the point, less-than-universal application of a rule or goal would be morally inconsistent. But I think we're agreeing here.

Independence from anyone's opinion is what makes a fact a fact.

Give that some thought. How would you know that some asserted state of affairs is independent of anyone's opinion, except via the method I mentioned?

I think the choice of words here is very important. A state-of-affairs is completely independent of anyone's opinion, so the way you put it is confused. The epistemological question as to how we know a state-of-affairs obtains (is the case) is a separate matter - and I didn't mean to imply that the methodology you describe doesn't or can't work. It patently does work - and it has nothing to do with language. My point is about the different and separate operation of linguistic (or other) descriptions of states-of-affairs - the muddled idea of correspondence theories of truth.

Virtually all "facts" that we believe we know originate in some proposition. Henry Cavendish asserted that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. He also described a method of verifying that assertion --- he set forth some public truth conditions for his assertion. That proposition only became accepted as a "fact" after other chemists, following the verification procedure Cavendish described (and others discovered later), confirmed his proposition.

Again, this conflates the two different meanings of the word 'fact' - of which you seem to be conscious. Cavendish discovered a state-of-affairs, not a proposition. To say most of what we believe or know about reality originates in a proposition is patently false. And the fact that we've been content to state this falsehood as a truth demonstrates the potency of the myth of propositions.

But you might ask, "What of facts I learn personally, via direct experience?" Well, if your experience is well within the realm of the commonplace, similar to others you and others encounter and discuss routinely, you'll be justified in considering them "facts" at the outset --- tentatively. But if it is of something extraordinary, others --- and perhaps you also --- will be reluctant to regard it as a "fact" until it has been confirmed by others.

Again, I agree with your description of the nature of belief and knowledge. My objection is to the assumption that language is constitutive or primary or necessary in believing and knowing things. Why should it be?

The realm of "facts" --- the world as we think we know it --- consists primarily of states of affairs observed and reported by others and conveyed to us via propositions.

And there's the crucial distinction. We describe and communicate information (knowledge?) by means of factual assertions - and things can be described in different ways for different purposes. No disagreement here.

The 'subjective goal / objective means' argument doesn't hold water, because there are always choices when it comes to selecting means - and therefore judgements to be made - as your Alfie and Bruno example demonstrates. Postulating equal agency as a goal doesn't solve the moral question.

There are indeed judgments to be made. But they are not moral judgments; they are pragmatic ones --- guesses, even --- because the full consequences of all the available options are rarely known in advance. But some options can be ruled out in advance, because they thwart the goal prima facie or violate the Equal Agency postulate.

Again, I largely agree with you here. The problem is always that ruling actions in or out in advance is a matter of judgement, precisely because we can never know all consequences - if only because of the problem of induction. Prima facie reasoning can't be deductive.

[Terrapin Station]

An objection to moral subjectivism is that, if moral values and judgements are matters of opinion, we can't know if they're correct. For example, we can't know if slavery is right or wrong, and can't therefore morally condemn those who think slavery is justifiable.

Moral condemnation in no way requires that moral stances are correct/incorrect in the sense of factually being the case or not.

[Peter Holmes]

An objection to moral subjectivism is that, if moral values and judgements are matters of opinion, we can't know if they're correct. For example, we can't know if slavery is right or wrong, and can't therefore morally condemn those who think slavery is justifiable.

Moral condemnation in no way requires that moral stances are correct/incorrect in the sense of factually being the case or not.

I completely agree. My point is that moral 'stances' - judgements or values can't be factually correct or incorrect - the case or not - which is why morality isn't and can't be objective.

[Terrapin Station]

Moral condemnation in no way requires that moral stances are correct/incorrect in the sense of factually being the case or not.

I completely agree. My point is that moral 'stances' - judgements or values can't be factually correct or incorrect - the case or not - which is why morality isn't and can't be objective.

I agree with you. I just wanted to stress that it's a misunderstanding of ethical subjectivism to say that it disallows moral judgments, moral condemnation, etc.