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[Belindi]

The difference between red, and right angled triangles is that the former is understood from experience and the latter is understood from reason.

The universal 'red' relates only to all known red phenomena and the universal 'red' is abstracted from immanent phenomena only , but right angles triangles relate to the ideal universal right angled triangle and are not abstracted from immanent phenomena only..

To put it another way, you don't reason to define 'red' but you do reason to define a right angled triangle.

[Consul]

Nunn's objectivist view of pain and all the other secondary or phenomenal qualities is absurd and incompatible with the scientific image of the world.

I think you will agree that at Cambridge about a hundred and twenty years ago G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell rebelled against Idealism as a philosophy. The Realism they came up with was more or less like the "absurd" philosophy of T. P. Nunn. How do you account for the fact that such bright guys could take up with such a ridiculous idea? Or did they?

Even very bright guys can come up with silly ideas!

"I saw a patch of a particular whitish colour, having a certain size, and a certain shape, a shape with rather sharp angles or corners and bounded by fairly straight lines. These things: this patch of a whitish colour, and its size and shape I did actually see. And I propose to call these things, the colour and size and shape, sense-data, things given or presented by the senses—given, in this case, by my sense of sight. Many philosophers have called these things which I call sense-data, sensations. They would say, for instance, that that particular patch of colour was a sensation. But it seems to me that this term 'sensation' is liable to be misleading. We should certainly say that I had a sensation, when I saw that colour. But when we say that I had a sensation, what we mean is, I think, that I had the experience which consisted in my seeing the colour. That is to say what we mean by a 'sensation' in this phrase, is my seeing of the colour, not the colour which I saw: this colour does not seem to be what I mean to say that I had, when I say I had a sensation of colour.
It is very unnatural to say that I had the colour, that I had that particular whitish grey or that I had the patch which was of that colour. What I certainly did have is the experience which consisted in my seeing the colour and the patch. And when, therefore, we talk of having sensations, I think what we mean by 'sensations' is the experiences which consist in apprehending certain sense-data, not these sense-data themselves, I think, then, that the term 'sensation' is liable to be misleading, because it may be used in two different senses, which it is very important to distinguish from one another. It may be used either for the colour which I saw or for the experience which consisted in my seeing it. And it is, I think very important, for several reasons, to distinguish these two things. I will mention only two of these reasons. In the first place, it is, I think, quite conceivable (I do not say it is actually true) but conceivable that the patch of colour which I saw may have continued to exist after I saw it: whereas, of course, when I ceased to see it, my seeing of it ceased to exist. I will illustrate what I mean, by holding up the envelope again, and looking at it. I look at it, and I again see a sense-datum, a patch of a whitish colour. But now I immediately turn away my eyes, and I no longer see that sense-datum: my seeing of it has ceased to exist. But I am by no means sure that the sense-datum—that very same patch of whitish colour which I saw—is not still existing and stilI there. I do not say, for certain, that it is: I think very likely it is not. But I have a strong inclination to believe that it is. And it, seems to me at least conceivable that it should be still existing, whereas my seeing of it certainly has ceased to exist.
This is one reason for distinguishing between the sense-data which I see, and my seeing of them. And here is another. It seems to me conceivable—here again I do not say it is true but conceivable—that some sense-data—this whitish colour for instance—are in the place in which the material object—the envelope, is. It seems to me conceivable that this whitish colour is really on the surface of the material envelope. Whereas it does not seem to me that my seeing of it is in that place. My seeing of it is in another place—somewhere within my body. Here, then, are two reasons for distinguishing between the sense-data which I see, and my seeing of them. And it seems to me that both of these two very different things are often meant when people talk about 'sensations'. In fact, when you are reading any philosopher who is talking about sensations (or about sense-impressions or ideas either), you need to look very carefully to see which of the two he is talking about in any particular passage—whether of the sense-data themselves or of our apprehension of them: you will, I think, almost invariably find that he is talking now of the one and now of the other, and very often that he is assuming that what is true of the one must also be true of the other—an assumption which does not seem to be at all justified. I think, therefore, that the term 'sensation' is liable to be very misleading. And I shall, therefore, never use it. I shall always talk of sense-data, when what I mean is such things as this colour and size and shape or the patch which is of this colour and size and shape, which I actually see. And when I want to talk of my seeing of them, I shall expressly call this the seeing of sense-data; or, if I want a term which will apply equally to all the senses, I shall speak of the direct apprehension of sense-data. Thus when I see this whitish colour, I am directly apprehending this whitish colour: my seeing of it, as a mental act, an act of consciousness, just consists in my direct apprehensian of it;—so too when I hear a sound, I directly apprehend the sound; when I feel a tooth-ache I directly apprehend the ache: and all these things—the whitish colour, the sound and the ache are sense-data."

(Moore, Edward G. Some Main Problems of Philosophy. London: Allen & Unwin, 1953. pp 30-2)

So he thinks unsensed, sensation-independent sense-data are conceivable, and is even strongly inclined to believe that there actually are such sense-data.

However, an unsensed sense-datum is not a datum, something given or presented to sensory consciousness; so "sense-datum" is a misnomer in this case—unless one draws a distinction actual sense-data and merely possible ones. But I think merely possible sense-data—mere sensibilia as opposed to actual sensa—cannot be anything but dispositional primary, physical qualities of material things such as one disposing a material thing to look in a certain way to a seer. Such dispositional primary qualities can certainly exist unseen or unsensed.

The basic mistake of the sense-data theory is to assume that the relation between sensations (events of sensing) and sense-data is an act/event-object relation involving two distinct entities: sense-data and sensings of them (with the former possibly being independent of the latter).

I think the adverbialists are right in claiming that "visual experiences are not episodes of sensing sense data but are rather episodes of sensing in particular ways."

(Fish, William. Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge, 2010. p. 36)

[Consul]

You seem to be writing down your thoughts about the matter as they come to you. Do you see any fatal flaws in the "relation ontology" other than its complexity?

Yes. Properties are ways things are, and it's unintelligible to me how a way a thing is can exist externally to it. If a way a thing is isn't where the thing is, where is it then? It makes no sense to say that it has some spatial location different from the one of its bearer, and it makes no sense either to say that it has no spatial location at all. It seems intuitively true to me that my properties as the ways I am are where I am, and go where I go. They are part of me.

[GaryLouisSmith]

You seem to be writing down your thoughts about the matter as they come to you. Do you see any fatal flaws in the "relation ontology" other than its complexity?

Yes. Properties are ways things are, and it's unintelligible to me how a way a thing is can exist externally to it. If a way a thing is isn't where the thing is, where is it then? It makes no sense to say that it has some spatial location different from the one of its bearer, and it makes no sense either to say that it has no spatial location at all. It seems intuitively true to me that my properties as the ways I am are where I am, and go where I go. They are part of me.

OK, I think I am getting a pretty good picture of what your basic philosophy is. Now the task is to see where all that leads.

[GaryLouisSmith]

The difference between red, and right angled triangles is that the former is understood from experience and the latter is understood from reason.

The universal 'red' relates only to all known red phenomena and the universal 'red' is abstracted from immanent phenomena only , but right angles triangles relate to the ideal universal right angled triangle and are not abstracted from immanent phenomena only..

To put it another way, you don't reason to define 'red' but you do reason to define a right angled triangle.

Why do you think we don't experience the objects of reason as real things external to our thinking about them?

[GaryLouisSmith]

You seem to be writing down your thoughts about the matter as they come to you. Do you see any fatal flaws in the "relation ontology" other than its complexity?

Yes. Properties are ways things are, and it's unintelligible to me how a way a thing is can exist externally to it. If a way a thing is isn't where the thing is, where is it then? It makes no sense to say that it has some spatial location different from the one of its bearer, and it makes no sense either to say that it has no spatial location at all. It seems intuitively true to me that my properties as the ways I am are where I am, and go where I go. They are part of me.

I want you to check out Graham Harman - https://www.amazon.com/s?k=graham+harma ... _ss_i_1_13 . Like you he has an object oriented ontology. He has also written quite a bit on Heidegger. Here is a good book you might enjoy. These links are the same, so one should work.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/gemmhsyabbdal ... n.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/ax21t79aza1cs ... n.pdf?dl=0

[Felix]

Consul wrote: Common sense would tell us that there can be nothing that appears without it appearing to something, a self. I myself see no reason to follow common sense in this regard, being quite happy to say that we mistake a non-relational property of appearing for a relational one." - Peter Forrest

Did he give an example? Perhaps he means something can exist (be apprehendable) without it being apprehended, as are the regions of the Universe beyond the range of our telescopes.

GaryLouisSmith: Why do you think we don't experience the objects of reason as real things external to our thinking about them?

I'd say because they are a product of language, the language of mathematics in this case. The map is not the territory, the description is not the thing described.

GaryLouisSmith: All the different species, shades, hues etc. of red are still red.

If all humans were red color blind, as some are, would this "generic form" still exist?

GaryLouisSmith: The universal Bear exists but there are many different species of bear.

If we had never seen a bear (like the natives of Africa), would the "Universal Bear" still exist? Must it be perceived to be real, like any other ordinary object?

[GaryLouisSmith]

Consul wrote: Common sense would tell us that there can be nothing that appears without it appearing to something, a self. I myself see no reason to follow common sense in this regard, being quite happy to say that we mistake a non-relational property of appearing for a relational one." - Peter Forrest

GaryLouisSmith: Why do you think we don't experience the objects of reason as real things external to our thinking about them?

I'd say because they are a product of language, the language of mathematics in this case. The map is not the territory, the description is not the thing described.

Reinhardt Grossmann, one of my favorite philosophers, draws a distinction between the universe and the world. The universe consists of all those things that physicists and cosmologists think about: protons, quarks, various fields, quasars, the gravitational constant. Photons, muons, and other things that we speculate are there, but which we have no direct knowledge of. The world, however, consists of everyday things: dogs, bicycles, check books, coffee, pain in your leg, fire, a bed, your cell phone, poems, Mt. Everest, bad cooking, sex, a broadway play and on and on. Grossmann says it was Plato who discovered the world. Before him philosophers were a kind of cosmologist; they looked for the fundamental elements of existence that the world was composed out of: earth, air, fire, water, and the forces of love-hate, expansion-contraction, the limited and the unlimited and such.

What Plato said was that the things of the world were what they were because the participated in timeless forms. A bed was a bed because it participated in the eternal form of Bed. A dog was a dog because it participated in the form of Dog. Today we could say that a bicycle and a cell phone are what they are because the participate in or exemplify the eternal forms of Bicycle and Cell Phone. I think you get the point. Platonism, though, is not popular today.

Today popular philosophy still believes in the universe, but now it consists of those things I mentioned up above. And the ordinary things of the world are what they are because the scientific things of the universe aggregate. Then along comes man with his language and applies words or names to those aggregates. A bed in a bed because man has stuck the name “bed” on a cluster of sub-atomic particles. A bed is a bed, not because it participates in or exemplifies the form of Bed or Bedness, but because man uses language to call it a bed. It is Man that has created the world through his language.

As an aside, I wonder in the universe, all the scientific things, would exist if no one had applied the language of mathematics to whatever it is that’s out there. Let’s call that thing out there the Abyss or Tehom, the Deep. Did some man or god have to name it in order for it to be?

My point in relating all that is to show that I am a Platonic Realist. My bed is a bed, not because I or anyone else had called it a bed. Bedness isn’t just a word (nomina in Latin). It is a real thing. To say it is a nomina is to be a nominalist. I am a realist. The world I directly see and live in is real. And it is and would be real even in no one had ever used language to create it. Even if all sentient beings disappeared my bed would still be a bed with a blue pillow lying on it, because it and the pillow and all those relations exemplify timeless, non-human forms.

[Consul]

Yes. Properties are ways things are, and it's unintelligible to me how a way a thing is can exist externally to it. If a way a thing is isn't where the thing is, where is it then? It makes no sense to say that it has some spatial location different from the one of its bearer, and it makes no sense either to say that it has no spatial location at all. It seems intuitively true to me that my properties as the ways I am are where I am, and go where I go. They are part of me.

OK, I think I am getting a pretty good picture of what your basic philosophy is. Now the task is to see where all that leads.

Actually, the ontological situation is more complicated.

"Properties are ways: ways objects are. Properties are not parts of objects. Properties do not make up objects in the way the parts of a table—legs, frame, top, and screws holding these together—make up the table. A table and its parts possess properties." (p. 126)

"Objects, however, are not made up of their properties in the way a clock is made up of its parts: screws, gears, a spring, an escapement, and a case. Parts of objects are objects, not properties. Properties—modes—are particularized ways objects are." (p. 128)

(Heil, John. From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.)

First of all, a very interesting question: Does the linguistic difference between "to be part of" and "to be a part of" represent any ontological or mereological difference?

"[L]et us consider the concept of composition. It is the way components or parts stand to the whole. Now that might seem to be just what mereology is about, namely the part/whole relation. But that would be to overlook the distinction between being part of and being a part of (or a component of). Our childhood paradigms of the latter concept are the bits and pieces of construction toys. Our childhood paradigms of the part/whole relation are more concerned with the division of fairly homogeneous items, as when we only got part of the cake. The concept of a composite, then, is richer than that of a purely mereological part and involves structure."

(Forrest, Peter. "Neither Magic nor Mereology: A Reply to Lewis." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64/1 (1986): 89–91. p. 89)

If being a part of an object means being a "bit" or "piece" of it, then I agree with Heil that "properties are not parts of objects" in this sense of "part", because parts qua bits or pieces of objects are objects themselves rather than properties.

However, who says that object-like bits or pieces are the only (possible) kind of parts? Husserl explicitly differentiates between objectual parts—which he calls Stücke (pieces)—and non-objectual parts—which he calls Seiten (sides) or Momente (moments). (Note that Husserlian moments aren't temporal ones!)

Given this distinction, whether or not properties are parts of their bearers depends on what exactly is meant by "part": bits/pieces or sides?
According to the bundle theory of objects, properties are bits/pieces of them, whereas I say in the context of my nonbundle theory of objects that their properties are sides of them rather than bits/pieces.

Furthermore, even if one rejects Husserl's distinction between two different kinds of parts of objects, one can still say that a property is part of its bearer without being a part of it. But what exactly does it mean to say that a property as a way a thing is is part of the thing without being a part of it? I found an answer with the help of this text: How to Distinguish Parthood from Location in Bio-Ontologies:

x is part of y =def x is contained in y =def x is located in y but not a part of y

Then I can consistently say that my properties are part of me in this sense without being parts of me.

[Consul]

I want you to check out Graham Harman - https://www.amazon.com/s?k=graham+harma ... _ss_i_1_13 . Like you he has an object oriented ontology. He has also written quite a bit on Heidegger. Here is a good book you might enjoy. These links are the same, so one should work.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/gemmhsyabbdal ... n.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/ax21t79aza1cs ... n.pdf?dl=0

Thanks! I hadn't heard of this guy before, but I now have e-copies of these two books:

* Speculative Realism

* Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything

"[M]y discussion of objects is motivated less by Heidegger than by the Austrian and Polish philosophers immediately preceding him, who use the term ‘object’ in nearly as broad a sense as OOO: Franz Brentano, Kasimierz Twardowski, Edmund Husserl, and Alexius Meinong."
(p. 42)

"OOO means ‘object’ in an unusually wide sense: an object is anything that cannot be entirely reduced either to the components of which it is made or to the effects that it has on other things."
(p. 43)

"An object is whatever cannot be reduced to either of the two basic kinds of knowledge: what something is made of, and what it does."
(p. 257)

(Harman, Graham. Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything. London: Pelican, 2017.)

I don't like his definition, because it turns ontologically reducible mereological sums of objects into non-objects, which I think they are not. What I agree with is that objects cannot be reduced to their actions or effects.

If the concept of an object is used so broadly that it becomes synonymous either with "intentional object"/"object of thought" or "entity", it thereby becomes useless as a distinct ontological category sui generis. See: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/

[Consul]

Reinhardt Grossmann, one of my favorite philosophers, draws a distinction between the universe and the world.…

Do you have a copy of his opus magnum: The Categorial Structure of the World? (1983)
I wish I had one. I could borrow the book from a local university library and create a copy of it myself, but I want to buy and own an original hardcover copy.

[GaryLouisSmith]

I want you to check out Graham Harman - https://www.amazon.com/s?k=graham+harma ... _ss_i_1_13 . Like you he has an object oriented ontology. He has also written quite a bit on Heidegger. Here is a good book you might enjoy. These links are the same, so one should work.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/gemmhsyabbdal ... n.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/ax21t79aza1cs ... n.pdf?dl=0

Thanks! I hadn't heard of this guy before, but I now have e-copies of these two books:

* Speculative Realism

* Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything

"[M]y discussion of objects is motivated less by Heidegger than by the Austrian and Polish philosophers immediately preceding him, who use the term ‘object’ in nearly as broad a sense as OOO: Franz Brentano, Kasimierz Twardowski, Edmund Husserl, and Alexius Meinong."
(p. 42)

"OOO means ‘object’ in an unusually wide sense: an object is anything that cannot be entirely reduced either to the components of which it is made or to the effects that it has on other things."
(p. 43)

"An object is whatever cannot be reduced to either of the two basic kinds of knowledge: what something is made of, and what it does."
(p. 257)

(Harman, Graham. Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything. London: Pelican, 2017.)

I don't like his definition, because it turns ontologically reducible mereological sums of objects into non-objects, which I think they are not. What I agree with is that objects cannot be reduced to their actions or effects.

If the concept of an object is used so broadly that it becomes synonymous either with "intentional object"/"object of thought" or "entity", it thereby becomes useless as a distinct ontological category sui generis. See: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/

OMG, I've been reading conceptual poetry and about conceptual poetry and now what you wrote looks like that. https://poets.org/text/brief-guide-conceptual-poetry
https://poets.org/text/notes-conceptualisms

Read Weird Realism. It's fun.

[GaryLouisSmith]

Reinhardt Grossmann, one of my favorite philosophers, draws a distinction between the universe and the world.…

Do you have a copy of his opus magnum: The Categorial Structure of the World? (1983)
I wish I had one. I could borrow the book from a local university library and create a copy of it myself, but I want to buy and own an original hardcover copy.

I think I do have it packed away in a box somewhere. If I do, there's no way I could get it to Germany from Kathmandu. Sorry.

[GaryLouisSmith]

Reinhardt Grossmann, one of my favorite philosophers, draws a distinction between the universe and the world.…

Do you have a copy of his opus magnum: The Categorial Structure of the World? (1983)
I wish I had one. I could borrow the book from a local university library and create a copy of it myself, but I want to buy and own an original hardcover copy.

Do you ever sleep?

[Consul]

Do you ever sleep?

Yes, I'll soon go to bed. Good night!